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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will assess the sustainability of managerial corporate governance systems 
in the context of the current economic globalisation wave. In order to do so corporate 
governance is studied as the function of decision-making undertaken by managers as 
corporate controllers, which is embedded in the national and supranational 
institutional context. The latter determine not only how much discretion managers 
have but also how they use it. Two main workable institutional equilibria are 
identified, reflecting two respective visions of the corporation that emerge from an 
overview of the most influential theories developed to study the nature of the firm. 
The first emphasises market transactions by promoting the externalisation of 
corporate functions and tends to align managerial decision-making to the interests of 
current shareholders, i. e. the maximisation of the firm's market value. The second 
contains a tendency towards the internalisation of corporate functions by the 
corporate organisation with enhanced managerial discretion being a crucial element 
for the sustainability of this sort of coordination. The crucial difference between these 
two institutional equilibria, i. e. the shareholder-oriented and the managerial, is that 
the former is less growth-oriented/dependent and emphasises the lack of commitment 
between stakeholders and "exit" from corporate relationships, whereas the latter is 
more growth-oriented/dependent and relies on stakeholder commitment and "voice". 
It is due to this difference that the managerial system is more susceptible to price 
competition which involves drastic cost-cuttings that affect stakeholder relationships 
and therefore more reliant on stable but relatively high macroeconomic growth rates 
and effective demand. A central hypothesis of this project is that this fundamental 
difference between the two systems is the decisive factor behind their ability to 
survive within the current context of economic globalisation. It is argued that 
globalisation, as a process where national institutional structures are gradually 
replaced by others determined by world market forces, not only promotes market 
based macro- and microeconomic coordination but has also (as a result) led to a 
global economic slowdown due to the inherent imperfections of the market 
mechanism. Simultaneously, the gradual removal of economic barriers has brought 
national corporate governance systems in competition with each other with increasing 
emphasis being placed on cost-reductions and short-term investments due to slower 
demand-growth. This has a negative impact on the workability of managerial systems 
and through a process of global isomorphism leads to the emergence of the 
shareholder-oriented system as the most likely winner not because it is better in terms 
of economic efficiency, but because it is more flexible. While these pressures are real, 
global corporate governance convergence is not guaranteed in the short and medium 
term due to different institutional dynamics that exist in each national system and 
which determine the scale and scope of adaptation. Empirical evidence from 
Germany confirms this since, although many basic institutions supporting German 
managerialism are being eroded, some path dependent ones remain stable and thus 
prevent the complete institutionalisation of shareholder supremacy. However, this 
creates systemic workability problems that can in the long term undermine even those 
institutional structures that are highly path dependent. The progress of further 
adaptation in the future depends on whether the costs of unworkability exceed 
adaptation costs. 
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CHAPTER1 
THEORIES AND INSTITUTIONS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: MANAGERIALISM VERSUS SHAREHOLDER 
SUPREMACY 
1.1. INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
In recent years, corporate governance has been attracting the attention not 
only of academics from a whole range of disciplines but also of legal and economic 
practitioners all over the world. Nonetheless, as a concept it remains rather 
ambiguous, not least because of the diversity of approaches to it. 
A reason for this divergence of opinion about corporate governance is that 
there is no general consensus about the nature of the corporation and its role in 
society. Thus the principal aim of this chapter is to review some of the most 
influential theories formulated to deal with this issue and to synthesise them in order 
to identify the main theoretical visualizations of the corporation. For doing so two 
elements are of crucial importance, namely ownership and control. Theoretically, it is 
difficult to imagine these two elements as distinct, because they are closely tied 
together. This is illustrated in Holmes' attempt to define the idea of legal ownership: 
But what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the same as those 
incident to possession. Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is 
allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered 
with, and is more or less protected in excluding other people from such 
interference. The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no 
one. (Holmes 1963: 193) 
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It is evident that, following this definition, the right of corporate ownership also 
constitutes a right to unfettered control and vice versa. Thus, at least in theory, once it 
is possible to identify who owns the corporation, the issue of control is also resolved, 
just as the issue of ownership is also resolved if it can be identified who controls the 
corporation. 
In practice, however, this is too simplistic a view to hold because, as the next 
section will show, the unity between corporate ownership and corporate control 
cannot be taken as given. The emergence of professional managers as controllers of 
the corporation has broken the link between corporate ownership and control. It is 
precisely this de facto division between the two elements that now obscures the 
nature of the corporation and sustains the debate on corporate governance, which in 
essence is a debate about who owns or should own the corporation, if of course it is 
something that can be owned at all. It is for this reason that the focus of this thesis is 
on the managerial corporation. 
An overview of the most influential theoretical approaches to the corporation 
in section 1.3 will show that two main models emerge. The first regards shareholder 
as the residual claimants of all corporate assets and thus grants them the right to own 
the corporation. In this way, the debate on corporate governance is transformed into 
one that focuses on how to ensure that those who are vested with the control function, 
i. e. the management, are held accountable to the shareholders as owners. The second 
model gives the corporation a real personality, which then precludes it from being 
owned by anybody. The implication of this is that managers should be accountable 
not to the shareholders but to the corporation itself 
Obviously these two visions of the corporation have important implications 
with regard to the ideal choice of managerial objectives. However, they have little to 
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say on how managerial choices in corporate decision-making are actually shaped. In 
order to explore this issue, section 1.4 adopts a simple but novel approach. Firstly, it 
gives corporate governance its literal meaning, i. e. the function of exercising a power 
to make decisions about the corporation's affairs. Then, since the focus is on the 
managerial corporation, it examines the institutional factors that constrain and 
therefore shape the governance choices of managers. It thus argued that it is the 
network of such institutional constraints on managerial choices that determines the 
direction of corporate governance and through that the nature of the corporation itself. 
1.2. DE FACTO SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP I AND CONTROL - 
EMERGENCE OF THE MANAGERIAL FIRM2 
In section 1.3.2 below it will be shown that the analysis of corporate 
ownership and control in traditional economic theory is inadequate to say the least. In 
fact, both elements are treated as a tautology in the sense that ownership also implies 
control and vice versa just as Holmes' definition above implies. Furthermore, this 
tautology is seen in a static way so that even though the firm may change, for 
example by growing or shrinking, ownership and control as well as the relationship 
between them remain unaltered. Perhaps this is related to the tendency of 
(neo)classical economics to treat the company as one of a large number of small, 
specialised and single-product firms whose ownership and control are vested in the 
1 The word "ownership" here is defined narrowly to describe the role of shareholders as owners. On 
the divergence between this common perception and the role of shareholders at law see section 1.4.1 
below. 
2 Instead of the word corporation economists prefer to use the more generic term "firm" which includes 
all types of production organisations irrespective of their legal nature. Nevertheless, economic theories 
of the firm tend to concentrate on the public listed corporation which is also the focus of this thesis. 
Thus, the ternis "corporation" and "firm" will be used interchangeably here. 
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same person, the entrepreneur, and who are regulated by the "invisible hand"3 of a 
perfectly competitive market. Historically, however, the relationship between 
ownership and control has not been static. 
The traditional model perhaps reflected better the economic conditions of the 
late 18 th and most of the 19th century. Despite the existence of few large joint stock 
companies created to promote foreign trade and colonisation or to manage some 
utilities, all major economies were dominated by unincorporated business forms 
owned and controlled by individuals. The volume of firms' operations was limited 
and owners were able to manage their businesses on their own or merely with the 
help of a few family members (Chandler 1977: 14). As Bratton reports: 
Very little tension arose between economic practice and individualist 
economic and legal theory in the early nineteenth century. The economy 
closely resembled the atomistic type described in Adam Smith's classical 
theory. (Bratton 1989: 1483) 
Therefore, the managers of the firm could easily be regarded as its owners and vice 
versa. 
During the 19'h century the enactment of general incorporation statutes 
dispensed with the need of special state corporate charters and made the creation of 
incorporated companies much easier. Gradually what Chandler (1977: chs. I and 2) 
has called the "traditional enterprise" begun to be replaced as a business form by the 
incorporated company. Initially, incorporated companies were still "entrepreneurial" 
in their nature. Ownership and control were integrated since the owners of shares 
were also the managers of the company's business without the need for extra 
managerial input. Segregated economies, small productions and slow movement of 
3 The term belongs to Adam Smith who wrote that while "a businessman intends only his gain, he is 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is not his intention" (Smith 1976: 456). 
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goods generally meant that the operational workload was still manageable by the 
entrepreneurs themselves. So the use of salaried managers was minimal and even 
where it occurred those managers were acting under the guidance of the owner- 
entrepreneur. 
The first big change came during the second industrial revolution around the 
1900s with the emergence in the US and in Europe of large infrastructure and utility 
ventures like the railways, the telegraph, and mining. These ventures could only be 
undertaken by large corporations run not by owners-entrepreneurs but by extensive 
salaried managerial hierarchies who provided very little capital. The finance for such 
large capital intensive projects was only available by pooling the funds of thousands 
of investors and financiers. The owners of stock had neither the knowledge nor the 
power to administer those corporations, the pioneers of "big business". 4 As Chandler, 
states: 
The building and operating of the rail and telegraph systems called for the 
creation of a new type of business enterprise. The massive investment 
required to construct those systems and the complexities of their operations 
brought the separation of ownership from management. The enlarged 
enterprises came to be operated by teams of salaried managers who had little 
or no equity in the firm. The owners, numerous and scattered, were investors 
with neither the experience, the information, nor the time to make the myriad 
decisions needed to maintain a constant flow of goods, passengers, and 
messages. Thousands of shareholders could not possibly operate a railroad or 
a telegraph system. (Chandler 1990: 1) 
Thus, the first management controlled or "managerial", as they are commonly 
called, companies emerged as one of the by-products of the second industrial 
revolution. The significance of this development is twofold. First, these managerial 
corporations provided a previously non-existent managerial and administrative know- 
4 In fact, Adam Smith (1976: 741) himself acknowledged that in the early joint stock companies of the 
18th century the involvement of shareholders in management was an imaginary presumption rather than 
a reality. Nevertheless, the manager-controlled corporation then was merely an exception to the rule of 
integrated ownership and control. 
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how, such as accounting and statistical controls, which emerged as the basis for 
modem business. The second contribution was the creation of the transportation and 
communication infrastructure that created the opportunities for mass production in 
many other industries that transformed the nature of capitalism - from classical to 
"managerial"- and of markets -from rural, agrarian and commercial to industrial and 
urban. Fast and large volume transportation created large integrated markets which 
presented vast opportunities for industrial growth in scale and scope (Chandler, ibid). 
These growth opportunities that emerged from the enlarged markets and 
changing technologies during the late I 9th and early 20th century demanded new 
organisational. structures similar to those that had been develoPed by railway 
companies. In the 1890s and early 1900s intense merger activity in the United States 
and to a lesser extent in Gennany resulted in the dilution of original entrepreneurs' 
stock ownership. Similar developments also occurred in Britain and Japan but at a 
slower pace which, nevertheless, accelerated after the World War 11. Thus, the giant 
managerial corporation emerged, first in the United States and Germany and later in 
Britain and Japan, as the dominant economic player of the 20th century. This 
dominance over industrialised economies was so obvious to Chandler (1977) that he 
claimed that the "visible hand" of the managerial hierarchy had come to replace 
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of the market. In 1941 James Burnham went even 
further to claim that the "managerial revolution" would give rise to a new "ruling 
class" of managers (Burnham 1941). Irrespective of whether such concerns 
eventually materialised, the truth was that managerial capitalism established a strong 
foothold in most major economies. 
Differences of course did exist as each version of managerial capitalism 
reflected national institutional sets and historical events that also determined the time 
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when the separation of ownership from control took place. Such national differences, 
according to Chandler (1990: 12), give rise to a distinction between "competitive" 
and "cooperative" managerial capitalism. The US is an example of the former as the 
early prohibition of cartels, on the one hand, constrained close inter-firm cooperation 
and made merger combinations more attractive and, on the other, it enhanced 
competition between the large oligopolistic corporations that ensued. In contrast, as. 
chapter 3 below will show, in Germany's cooperative capitalism cartelisation was not 
illegal -at least not before the end of World War II- and consequently intra-firm 
cooperation was common in the home market, although competition between German 
companies was intense in the international market (Wengenroth 1997). Nevertheless, 
in the somewhat peculiar case of Japan, manager controlled finns were allowed to 
cooperate closely by forming extensive group networks, but competition between 
those groups has been very aggressive both at home and abroad (Morikawa 1997). 
Despite those differences, the common denominator in major capitalist 
economies has been the managerial corporation with de facto separation of corporate 
ownership from control. Obviously, this major socio-economic development did not 
go unnoticed. Keynes (1931: 314-315) himself observed this practical departure from 
economic classicism in 1926 when he wrote that shareholders had dissociated 
themselves from company management. In another early account of the developments 
in large corporations, Veblen (1924) claimed that there was a gradual transfer of 
corporate control from capitalistic owners to engineer-managers who had objectives 
that were different from those of owners. However, the milestone work on the 
separation of ownership and control came from Berle and Means, a lawyer and an 
economist respectively. In 1932 they published The Modern Corporation and Private 
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Property which was the first systematic study of corporate control in the United 
States (Berle and Means 1932). 
Berle and Means assumed that corporate control derives from the ability to 
select and appoint directors since the board of directors is the main decision-making 
body of the corporation. Their study of ownership structure of American corporations 
showed that shareholdings were so dispersed as to preclude shareholders from having 
sufficient interest in exercising their control rights over management. According to 
their analysis, 65% of the largest two hundred American corporations were manager- 
controlled which in their view signified the de facto separation of ownership and 
control (Berle and Means 1932: 110). 
What has to be noted here is that the Berle and Means thesis applies merely to 
corporations with diluted shareholdings. So it has an application to large British 
corporations which are characterised by an ownership structure similar to that of US 
companies. Nevertheless, in most other countries the pattern is rather different even 
for large firms. In both Germany and Japan, for instance, ownership is much more 
concentrated, as banks, families and, most importantly, corporations themselves are 
large shareholders. This could lead one to assume that due to these ownership patterns 
the separation of ownership and control thesis has primafacie no relevance. 
5A closer 
look, however, reveals that, although there can be no direct application of the thesis, 
managerialism can exist even in these countries. As it will be shown below, the 
divorce between ownership and control does not only occur in the Berle and Means 
type of corporation. Despite its concentrated ownership a company can come within 
the managerial category due to the identity of its large shareholders, if the 
latter are 
not interested in controlling managers. For instance, chapter 3 below will 
demonstrate 
' This has indeed been the mainstream view. See for example Pettet (2000: 55 and 59). 
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that extensive cross-shareholding networks have this very effect since they are used 
as a shield against control-oriented shareholders' influence. But even where families 
are still present in large companies, their ability to direct company affairs can be 
substantially reduced by the scale of operations that demands the delegation of 
control to a large managerial hierarchy. Thus, concentrated shareholdings do not 
automatically imply the integration of corporate ownership and control. 
The importance of Berle and Means' study does not lie solely in the 
realisation that there was a control gap in the large modem corporation. Even though 
that in itself constituted a challenge to conventional legal and economic thinking, 
perhaps more challenging was the two authors' concern that managers were 
becoming increasingly unaccountable in the absence of shareholder control, and that 
they could abuse their unchecked power to pursue their own interests to the detriment 
of corporations and shareholders (Pettet 2000: 112-116). 
This assertion was not entirely original. Over a century earlier Adam Smith 
himself had made a similar observation about the joint stock companies of his time 
when he wrote: 
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own (Smith 1976: 741). 
However, what made The Modern Corporation and Private Property a milestone was 
that, unlike in the 18'hcentury, by 1932 the managerial corporation had emerged as a 
significant force in society, instead of being a mere exception to the rule. As Berle 
and Means explained: 
A society in which production is governed by blind economic forces is being 
replaced by one in which production is carried on under the ultimate control 
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of a handful of individuals. The economic power in the hands of few persons 
who control giant corporations can harm or benefit a multitude of individuals. 
affect whole districts, shift the currents of trade, bring ruin to one community 
and prosperity to another (Berle and Means 1932: 46). 
As a result, the Berle and Means thesis not only gave a new spin to an old legal 
theory debate on the nature of the corporation but also attracted the interest of 
economic theorists. Both lawyers and economists searched for a solution to the 
problems of corporate legitimacy that managerialism raised. The former examined the 
social legitimacy of managerial power over companies and the latter looked for the 
economic efficiency implications of the separation of ownership from control. The 
following section provides a closer look at the most influential of these theories. 
1.3. THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION 
The corporation and its governance has been the subject matter of academic 
debate even before the rise of the managerial firm as the dominant economic actor in 
major economies. Incorporation and corporate personality raised legal and economic 
efficiency questions that gained importance as the company became a more common 
business form. The practical usefulness of answering those questions lies in their 
regulatory significance. In order to determine the purpose and extent of corporate 
governance regulation one has first to understand the nature of the corporation. As the 
following discussion will show, this is by no means a straightforward task. Different 
theoretical approaches can lead either to regard the corporation as real as a human 
person or as a pure fiction that exists only by name in people's minds and not in 
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reality. These two perceptions of the corporation are called corporate realism and 
nominalism respectively. 
The choice between corporate realism and nominalism has important 
implications for corporate governance, because our views about the nature of the 
company reflect how we comprehend the concept of corporate ownership and its 
relation to control. If, for example, a company is a real person, the question of 
ownership becomes irrelevant since real persons are legal subjects that cannot be 
legally owned. They are owners and controllers themselves as legal subjects and have 
their own rights and duties. Thus, corporate governance is internalised and integrated 
into the corporate organisation and its purpose is to serve the needs of the corporate 
person subject to its duties as such. On the contrary, if the nominalist approach is 
followed, the corporation resembles a legal object. As such, it has no rights or duties 
and can be owned by real persons who are vested with the corporate control rights in 
order to serve their own needs. 
1.3.1. Legal Theories of the Corporation 
During the early formative years of corporate law the theoretical debate 
essentially concerned the origins of the new business form and only indirectly its 
nature. What theorists looked for was the source from which the right for corporations 
to exist derived. 
The origins of the corporation can be traced in the Roman societas, an 
association of persons with a common purpose, and the medieval canon law which 
allowed religious foundations to incorporate as legal personae fictae in order to 
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receive and own property. These were the first forms of incorporated bodies ý, N-ith 
some legal capacity as persons though not natural ones. Contract was the basis of 
such legally recognised bodies 6 as it was for forms that evolved later such as common 
law partnerships and the civil law societe en commendite, the ancestors of the 
incorporated company. The existence of those bodies depended on the private 
initiative of individuals who were free to draft association agreements. This led to the 
belief that the very existence of corporations too derived from contracts between 
natural persons who could thus create fictitious persons with legal capacity. 7 In other 
words, the basis of the corporation's existence were contractual relationships between 
private individuals. 
However, this contractual view was not left unchallenged. Until well into the 
1 gth century full incorporation associations could not take place unless a special 
charter were granted by statute or decree. Such privileges conferred by the sovereign 
or the state were common since the 16 th century when the corporate form was used 
for the expansion of foreign trade and colonisation or for the creation of national 
monopolies in utilities, transport, finance, etc. The state was heavily involved in the 
incorporation process and was therefore a party to the corporate contract. That is, for 
associations of individuals to become legal persons a concession from the state was 
necessary. Thus, according to this "concession" theory the origins of the corporation 
lay in the regulatory power of the state rather than in the private initiative of 
contracting individuals (Millon 1990: 206). 
Concession theory was very influential so long as the state's participation in 
each and every incorporation was necessary. That was to change considerably with 
the adoption of general incorporation statutes. These instruments turned the act of 
6 See Buckland and McNair (1965: 300-301). 
' See Jacobson (1980: 662-63); Stokes (1986: 162); Angell and Ames (1846: 36). 
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incorporation into a private right rather than a privilege, since no special charter 
grants by the state were necessary any longer. Thus, with the enactment of general 
company statutes the state's micro-level involvement was transformed into macro- 
level regulation. The most important illustration of this is that now the state has no 
power to designate what the objectives of a corporation will be when corporate 
charters are drafted by and according to the needs of private individuals. All the state 
can do to exert its influence is to formulate general macro-level rules that define the 
boundaries of corporators' freedom to draft charters. 
Despite this change neither concession theory has entirely lost its relevance 
nor has contract theory emerged as the dominant theory about the origins of the 
corporation. Although the latter theory has gained more relevance, the concession 
approach is still valid since incorporation is still based upon the enactment of 
company laws by the state (Foster 2000: 583). In other words, the right of 
incorporation is still granted by state law. Thus the presence of general company laws 
may not necessarily imply a decrease of state influence. Indeed some have argued that 
the state has had a dominant role even after the shift of incorporation regulation from 
the micro- to the macro-level. 8 
In sum, by looking at who the actual corporators are, both concession and 
contract theories attempt to explain the origins of the corporation. The former 
contends that the state has a prominent role, while the latter tends to project the 
associated individuals. But both theories have an inherent legitimation element; their 
direct purpose is to provide justifications for or against state influence on private 
individuals' ability to form corporate bodies. However, although their primary focus 
8 Hazen (1991: 297-298). for instance claims that, even though corporate charters were not created by 
the state, tight regulatory constraints on corporate activity gave a public element in company law. 
Similarly, Millon (1990: 211) writes that "extensive regulation indicated a conception of corporate law 
as public law. " 
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is on the corporators, these legitimation attempts also entail indirect implications 
, 11ý. about the nature of the company. Concession theory's centrality of law in the 
formation of a company strips the latter of any real, natural existence. The 
corporation is thus a mere construct of the mind and exists artificially simply because 
the law says so. 
Due to these implications the concession approach has been associated with 
the "fiction" theory which attempts to describe the company's nature rather than its 
origins. The most prominent exponent of this theory was the German Romanist 
Friedrich Karl von Savigny. His initial contention was that a legal relation could only 
exist between persons as subjects (Savigny 1884: 1). But in order for such a relation 
to take place the persons involved should recognise each other as capable of assuming 
the role of a legal subject. Having established this as his starting point, Savigny then 
went on to determine who or what can be such a person. Firstly, he contended that 
humans should fall within the definition of a person because, due to their real 
corporeal existence, they can be recognised as the subjects in a legal relation 
naturally. He then distinguished such human persons from numerous others that are 
recognised in law as persons but which are not real as they do not exist naturally. 
Such entities, according to Savigny, can also be legal subjects, or legal persons, but 
only because the law makes them so. The law gives them those attributes that allow 
them to be recognised as subjects in legal relations. Thus, such legal persons exist 
merely as fictitious ones rather than naturally and only with the essential 
contemplation of law. 
Following this line of thought, the corporate entity, lacking a natural 
existence, falls within this second type of person. Thus, according to Savigny, the 
corporation is an entity that has an existence of its own which is distinct from its 
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corporators but only as a fictitious legal person rather than as a natural being. It can 
effectively be a subject in legal relations and it is also recognised as such by other 
persons, but this is so only with the assistance of the law. As lwai explains: 
the corporate personality is an inter-subjective concept which has been 
introduced into the legal system as a legal device to simplify the web of 
contractual relations between a group of individuals and a multiple of outside 
parties (Iwai 1999: 603). 
Thus, the law appears to be a core element in the fiction theory as it is in 
concession theory. It is because of this observation that the two theories have been 
largely merged. 9 Since, according to concession theory, the corporation is a mere 
legal creation, it must only be an artificial construct, a fiction. 
Although fiction theory attempts to define the nature of the corporate entity, 
its explanatory power regarding the relationship between ownership and control is 
minimal. Although it recognises that a corporation can exist as an entity in law, it 
fails to determine the exact nature of this entity's relationship with the corporators. 
Thus, fiction theory's normative usefulness is more apparent in explaining the role of 
the state in corporate governance. Since the law is vital for the corporate entity's 
existence as a person, the state, being the main promoter of the law, can have an 
important interest and influence in corporate activity (Phillips 1994: 1082). However 
there may be an indirect implication from this. If the state does have an influence this 
is so to the detriment of the corporators as private individuals free to create 
associations without state interference. Thus, the corporate control role of corporators 
is weighted against the role of the state. In other words, there is a balance between 
statism and nominalism. 
9 In fact Savigny has been severely criticised for this. See Maitland's criticisms in Gierke (1900: xxi) 
and Phillips (1994: 1064). 
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Nevertheless, for the same reasons that the concession theory lost much of its 
significance with the decline of the state's chartering authority, the fiction theory's 
assertions about the nature of the company also lost ground to other less statist ones. 
These were the aggregate theory and corporate realism. 10 
The former is in fact based upon the contract theory presented above. It was 
originally developed by 19'hcentury European theorists like von Jhering (1873-1875) 
and de Vareilles-Sommieres (1902) who shared a different view about the nature of 
the corporation which was one founded on the individual freedom to form contractual 
associations without any state interference. The basis of the aggregate theory is the 
premise that human beings, being the only "real" persons, have the ability to be legal 
subjects and have rights naturally without the prior operation of law. One such natural 
right is the freedom to establish contractual relations with each other in order to form 
business associations. Thus, corporations are seen as associations that are formed by 
aggregates of individuals and are comprised of the contractual relations between 
those individuals. The company being an aggregate of contracts becomes neither a 
real entity nor an artificial legal person independent of its members. In fact, as the 
corporate entity disappears completely from the picture, any corporate rights, duties 
or interests are in fact those of the corporators themselves (Morawetz 1886: 2). By 
denying the corporation any "real" existence separate from its members aggregate 
theory represents the pure "nominalist" view of the corporation. Viewed in this way 
the corporation is seen as something very similar to the contractual relationship 
between partners in a partnership (Schane 1987: 568). 
The normative implications of aggregate theory are very important from a 
corporate governance perspective. Firstly, by identifying the company with the 
10 These theories are also known as group theory and real entity theory respectively. It should be noted 
here that corporate realism should be distinguished from the "realist" movement in general legal 
theory. 
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contracting shareholders it legitimises the norm of shareholder supremacy in 
corporate decision-making. Since there is no real and distinct corporate entity, it is the 
shareholders' interests, rights and duties, as expressed in the corporate contracts, that 
need to be observed and enforced. Although later versions" of the theory have 
included other non-shareholder contractual relations -e. g. of creditors, managers, and 
of other comPany officers- shareholders have generally been regarded as the core 
constituency (Phillips 1994: 1066). This theoretical model fits well the middle I gth 
century economic reality which was characterised by stable concentrated ownership 
and small companies controlled by their shareholders. The second important 
implication stemming of aggregate theory concerns the role of the state. Since, as 
stated above, the corporation is formed by contract between private individuals, the 
state automatically becomes an outsider with no legitimate influence. Thus, 
nominalist theorists have been categorically opposed to goverm-nent regulation of 
corporate activity since that would be contrary to the principle of individual freedom 
of contract. 
Nonetheless, around the end of the I 9th century the aggregate theory began to 
lose its normative influence (Bratton 1989: 1490). The emergence of the large 
managerial firm with constantly fluctuating and fragmented ownership as well as the 
acceptance of limited liability did not sit well with the aggregate model. The 
identification of the corporation with its members was increasingly untenable. 12 it 
seemed that as the influence of shareholders was diminishing the corporation was 
acquiring a separate life of its own, this time as a real entity. Moreover, the 
corporation was losing its contractual nature also in a legal sense. As Hazen (1991: 
284-285 and 299-302) and others have argued, the consent requirement for the 
" See the discussion on economic theories below. 
12 See Machen (1910/1911: 259) claiming and mathematically proving that "any group whose 
membership is changing, is necessarily an entity separate and distinct from the constituent members. " 
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creation of a legally binding contract cannot be realistically fulfilled in the case of 
large managerial firms. An alternative theory not based on contractual considerations 
could accommodate these changes with more ease. Such an alternative was provided 
by corporate realism. 
The main advocate of corporate realism was the German scholar Otto von 
Gierke (1900,1977), who viewed the corporation as an entity which was completely 
independent from its members. The difference from Savigny's assertions was that 
Gierke's entity was not a legal fiction but a real person. The argument was that in all 
societies when individuals join together into groups and associations there is a trade 
off between individualism and collectivism. That is, in order for a group to persist, 
the individual has to make sacrifices. When this happens, the group's interests can be 
no longer identified with those of the individual ante association. Instead, the group 
acquires a will and goals of its own which do not necessarily fluctuate with 
membership changes. In fact, the opposite may be the most common situation; the 
individual will usually have to adapt in order to join the association. In this process 
the prescriptions of the law are irrelevant. Legal recognition is not necessary for the 
associated group's real existence to be established. Maitland's description of the 
corporation in his introduction to the translated version of Gierke's work illustrates 
this: 
[The corporation is] no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State's machinery, 
no collective name for individuals, but a living organism and a real person, 
with body and members and a will of its own. Itself can will, itself can act; it 
wills and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills and acts by brain, 
mouth and hand (Gierke 1900: XXVi). 13 
The normative value of these assertions is obvious since corporate realism 
provides theoretical legitimacy to managerial power. Being a real entity, the 
" in the original text as translated by Maitland Gierke uses the term "German Fellowship". 
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corporation can have its own interests and duties separately from its members, it can 
own property and employ a workforce, but most importantly it cannot itself be owned 
just as all other real Persons cannot. There is a differentiation between corporate 
property and shareholder property. Shareholders cannot be regarded as the owners of 
the company which is then not run solely for their benefit. Instead the corporate entity 
defines its own objectives and uses all its available inputs to achieve them through its 
officers. Consequently, the shareholder supremacy norm advanced by the aggregate 
theory loses its validity. All this fits well the managerialist paradigm, and so it is not 
surprising that corporate realism became dominant with the emergence of the 
managerial firm (Bratton 1989: 1490-1493). However, with regard to the role of the 
state corporate realism is somewhat contradictory. While Gierke and his followers 
were prepared to advocate for more regulation in order to ascribe a public character to 
the corporation, others used corporate realism to deny any state involvement in what 
they saw as strictly private bodies (Hager 1989: 630-32). 14 
The theory has two ma or flaws. The first is that, although it offers plausible j 
arguments about the existence of the firm as a real entity, it stops short of attempting 
to define the nature of the corporate entity's interests. This is, in fact, one of the 
aggregate theory's strengths since it precisely defines the corporate interests by 
identifying them with those of the shareholders. Realism convincingly refutes this 
assertion, but it does so by creating an uncertainty. In effect there is a shift of the 
theoretical uncertainty from the company's nature to the company's interest. 
The second flaw derives from the realist assumption that the corporate person 
is similar to the human person, in that they both seek to achieve their objectives 
without any internal tensions or conflicts of interest. In other words, officers such as 
14 See also Dodd's approach below. 
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managers and other employees, being the company's organs, are treated as a integral 
parts of the corporate entity and have no will, interests or objectives of their own. 
They only act in accordance to the corporate will whatever that may be. 
Consequently, the realist model excludes the possibility of opportunistic behaviour on 
the part of any of the individuals involved with the corporation either as members or 
as officers. Although plausible in an ideal world, this premise is hardly sustainable in 
reality. Individuals even within the structure of commercial associations do not 
subject their self-interest to the common objective unless the two somehow coincide. 
Thus, even if one could define the corporate interest with precision, corporate realism 
does not provide any support for the assertion that they will be promoted by the 
company's organs which are usually identified with management. Inherently an 
accountability problem arises. 
Despite these flaws, the economic success of managerial capitalism remained 
largely undisputed for several decades just as did the justifications provided for it by 
corporate realism. However, this temporarily changed with the Great Depression. 
15 It 
was in such a context of severe economic downturn that Berle and Means presented 
their thesis about the separation of ownership from control and the rise of 
unconstrained managerial power. These realisations pressed for answers to the 
complications of corporate realism presented above and sparked the famous debate 
between Adolf Berle himself and his fellow law professor Merrick Dodd. They 
summed up the whole problem in the question "for whom are corporate managers 
trustees? " 
16 
In his attempt to answer this question Dodd followed a novel pluralist 
approach as he sought to expand the theory of corporate realism to include corporate 
" Galbraith (1961: 183), for instance, identified "bad corporate structure" as one of the causes of the 
1929 crash. 
" See Dodd (1932,1935) and Berle (1931,1932). 
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social responsibility. He accepted that the corporation is a real entity distinct from its 
shareholders but similar to any other real person that entity has a social role and 
should be subjected to the principles of citizenship. Those principles may at times be 
contrary to pure self-interest by imposing social obligations. Thus, in the case of 
corporate citizens, purely economic self-interest, i. e. profit-maximisation, may be 
subjected to other social objectives. The adoption of a realist stance is crucial for the 
plausibility of this assertion. If the corporation was not seen as a real autonomous 
entity but was identified with the shareholders' aggregate then it would have been 
impossible to construct a corporate citizenship concept. Thus, when Dodd detached 
the corporate interest from shareholder interests, corporate social responsibility could 
be inserted. The implication from this is that social objectives can be integrated into 
the corporate interest so that ultimately there should be a balance between the two. 
Having dealt with the definitional problem of the corporate interests in this 
manner, Dodd was then able to engage upon the accountability issue. Once again the 
theoretical basis for his claims was provided by corporate realism. Since managers of 
large corporations had to discharge their duties in accordance with a socially 
responsible entity that is distinct from its shareholders, they should also be expected 
to have "a sense of social responsibility toward employees, consumers, and the 
general public" (Dodd 1932). In other words, Dodd's answer to the debate's question 
was that managers are trustees for the corporation as a socially responsible person 
rather than for the shareholders as Berle believed (ibid at 116 1). 
Dodd's pluralist approach is very important from a corporate governance 
perspective because it entails important ramifications for the nature of ownership and 
its relationship with control. Similarly to Gierke's realism, share ownership is 
distanced from the concept of control since the corporation pursues its own objectives 
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and not those of its shareholders. By directing the element of management 
accountability towards the corporation as an independent entity the shareholders' 
aggregate is stripped of its control function. Therefore, Dodd provides a clear 
justification for the separation of ownership from control. The whole concept of 
shareholder supremacy legitimised by the aggregate theory loses all its influence 
since managers can pursue goals that may even contradict it in order to achieve the 
principal corporate and social objectives. Moreover, although the original version of 
corporate realism was often used to oppose state regulation of corporate activity 
(Horwitz 1985: 221 et sec. ), Dodd's approach is diametrically different. As Millon 
observes: 
[Dodd's] objective was a legal regime that encouraged managers to use their 
broad powers not only for the benefit of shareholders, employees, and other 
participants in the corporation's activities but also for the good of the general 
public [ ... ] Here then was an argument for a public law of corporations [ ... ] Far from assuring the triumph of big business, the natural entity theory itself 
contained implications that critics relied on to attack the large corporation's 
new-found position of privileged economic power (Millon 1990: 220). 
Dodd's corporate social responsibility argument had many strengths which were also 
recognised by Berle and Means who in The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property acknowledged in principle the possibility and desirability of a solution 
based upon a pluralist approach similar to Dodd's with: 
a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups 
in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the 
basis of public policy rather than private cupidity (Berle and Means 1932: 
356). 
In practice, however, Berle felt that such a solution entailed hidden accountability 
weaknesses because of the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism. His concern 
was that the amorphousness of the beneficiaries' interests in the pluralist model 
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diluted managerial accountability and granted managers more unconstrained power. 
In his reply to Dodd's proposition, Berle (1932) promoted the idea of a narrowly 
defined accountability mechanism with managers being trustees for the shareholders 
rather than the company itself In this way he assimilated the corporate interest with 
the shareholders' wealth maximisation objective by disregarding all the insights of 
corporate realism. In fact, though not expressly stated, the theory underlining Berle's 
minimalist analysis is a version of the aggregate theory which also comprises a 
contractual relationship between shareholders and managers. Under that contract, the 
former entrusted their private property to the latter. The only issue to be dealt with is 
that of ensuring the enforcement of this contract by enhancing managerial 
accountability to the shareholders. Conceived in this way the corporation loses all the 
public characteristics attributed to it by Dodd's version of corporate realism and 
becomes an aggregation of private (shareholder) interests. Consequently, the 
legitimation arguments for corporate social responsibility collapse in favour of the 
shareholder supremacy principle as an expression of individualism. 
In sum, the debate between Dodd and Berle transformed the old legal debate 
on the nature of the corporation by placing the focus on the legitimacy of managerial 
power and the role of corporations in society. Although both theorists have as their 
staring point the de facto separation of share-ownership from control, their final 
propositions are antithetical. Dodd welcomed the ostracism of the shareholder from 
the centre of corporate control in order to give way to the possibility of "socialising" 
the corporate entity. On the other hand, for practical reasons Berle regarded the rise of 
managerial power as inherently evil and sought to find mechanisms to bridge the 
accountability vacuum, as he saw it, which exists in the managerial corporation. He 
believed that enforcing accountability would become an easier task if the corporate 
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objective were limited to shareholder wealth maximisation as opposed to Dodd's 
vaguely defined social responsibility. 
Such is the force and theoretical foundations of these two approaches that the 
battle between them continues to shape the corporate governance debate to this day. 
By the 1950s Dodd's pluralism/realism appeared to win the argument and this was 
even acknowledged by Berle himself as he converted to pluralism in his later 
writings. 17 The economic successes of managerial capitalism in major economies 
during the early post bellum reconstruction era provided empirical justifications for 
socially responsible corporate realism and managerial autonomy (see infra. chapter 
2). It appeared that managerial self-interest coincided with societal objectives even 
without the imposition of mandatory company law constraints to establish corporate 
social responsibility. 18 The objectives of managerial companies were an 
amalgamation of private and social interests similar to that envisaged by Dodd. 
Managerial autonomy from shareholder supremacy enabled the corporation to 
accommodate diverse interests such as those of employees, the customers or even the 
state and the general public, and to be seen as a social institution rather than an 
aggregation of private interests. 
However, the minimalist/nominalist approach did not disappear. Instead, it 
was taken up, expanded and refined, this time by economists rather than lawyers, 
beginning with Coase in the 1930s and continuing with Jensen and Meckling in the 
1970s, to become the dominant by the end of the 20 th century. This was the era when 
17 See Berle (1954: 169; 1959: 90-91 and 100). Of course, critics of the social responsibility thesis 
were also present. The most prominent was Milton Friedman (1962: 122 and 133-36) who saw the 
shareholders as the real owners of the corporation as a persona ficta. He believed that allowing 
managers to promote social objectives amounted to giving them the right to impose social taxes on 
shareholders' property without having the necessary political authority. See also Fischel (1982: 1269- 
70) arguing that the corporation is a legal fiction and as such it cannot owe a social responsibility duty. 
18 Although in some European countries there was indeed some legal institutional isat ion of non- 
shareholder interests like those of employees with the enactment of worker participation laws. The 
issue of concurrency between managerial objectives and the interests of other corporate constituencies 
including society will be further discussed below. 
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managerialism begun to lose its legitimacy first in the US and the UK19 and later in 
other countries and international fora. Aggregate economic theories slowly began to 
infiltrate and shape legal theory to such an extent that they can now offer a fully 
developed alternative to corporate realism. These developments in the economic 
analysis of the corporation are discussed next. 
1.3.2. Economic Theories of the Firm 
To begin with, the main concern in economics is whether available resources 
are allocated in an efficient manner. So, while legal theories of the corporation are 
based on arguments that have their roots in legal tradition and moral values, 
economics views the issues related to nature of the firm through the prism of 
economic efficiency. Some have even argued that efficiency can be a moral principle 
in itself since it increases general welfare (Posner 1980: 500-502). But as a concept it 
is rather elusive. For example, Coleman (1998: 11-18) identifies at least four 
efficiency-related notions. However, the most commonly used version is Pareto 
efficiency/optimality, named after its originator, the I 9th century economist and 
sociologist Vilfredo Pareto. This notion describes the state of affairs where resources 
cannot be reallocated so as to make one person better off without making someone 
else worse off. Moreover, apart from allocative efficiency, economics is also 
concerned with the notion of productive efficiency. Simply put, this describes the 
maximisation of output from given inputs. These two aspects of economic efficiency 
19 See the discussion in section 6 below. Such was the force of Dodd's social responsibility claim that 
some theorists even attempted to integrate it into aggregate theory. Chayes (1959: 25), for instance, 
based his social responsibility argument on an aggregate model with expanded membership. The 
aggregate membership included non-shareholder constituencies, such as employees, who were entitled 
to participate in corporate decision-making. 
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are interrelated since it is the efficient allocation of resources that makes efficient 
production possible. Economics uses such criteria as a rule of thumb in order to 
determine when a particular type of conduct or institution is justifiable. Therefore. 
any arguments about the firm's nature are based on economic efficiency grounds. 
What is striking, however, is that at least until relatively recently, traditional 
(neoclassical) economic theory virtually ignored the existence of the firm and 
concentrated on market operations or individuals' actions instead. In neoclassical 
economic theory firms are simply considered as economic actors quite similar to 
individuals who transact in the market. This theory, based on the Walrasian and 
Marshallian tradition, 20 refuses to look into the internal operations of the firm, which 
resembles an "empty box" (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 307), and thus has no 
complete analysis of the firm to offer. 
Neoclassicists study the firm by using a number of theoretical assumptions. 21 
The first assumption is that the distribution of production factors within the firm is 
always coordinated according to the classical price theory which also applies to 
market coordination. 22 This predicts that, if factor X is valued higher in A than in B, 
then X will move to A until the price difference disappears. In this way the market 
determines the prices and automatically marks out what the best allocation choice is. 
This implies that the role of management, if any, is a passive rather than an active 
one. Thus, in neoclassical economics there is no theorising about managerial 
coordination and the firm is assimilated to a factory without an administrative 
hierarchy (Chandler 1997: 490). Even where an administrative hierarchy exists, the 
20 See Walras (1954) and Marshall (1920). 
21 Some prominent exponents of the theory are Machlup (1946); Oliver (1947); Friedman 
(1953); 
Stigler (I 947a); Some classic neoclassical models of the firm are have been developed by Hicks (1939) 
and Arrow and Debreu (1954). 
22 The assumption is that natural prices of goods are reflected by market prices which are determined 
by the matching of supply and demand. 
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neoclassical assumption is that it merely coordinates factors in the same way that the 
price mechanism would. Alternatively, the theory assumes that the firm is owned by a 
single entrepreneur. Again this single owner makes all management decisions 
according to the price-theoretic assumption. 
The second assumption, based on the classic axiom that all economic actors 
seek to maximise profit, is that the finn pursues the single objective of profit 
maximisation. This is achieved by applying the marginalist principle which assumes 
that the change in total revenue resulting from selling an additional unit of 
commodity (Marginal Revenue) equals the change in total cost resulting from a unit 
change in output (Marginal Cost). Profit maximisation is attained when Marginal 
Revenue equals Marginal Cost (MR=MC). This occurs in series of independent time- 
horizon periods which are determined by technological change, capital intensity of 
production, product life, and so on. Profit maximisation within all these independent 
short-term periods leads to profit maximisation in the long-term as well. That is, the 
relation between short-term and long-term profit is harmonious. Moreover, when 
pursuing their goals firms act atomistically without being conscious of other finns' 
reactions 
Finally, the third main assumption of the neoclassical theory is that the firm 
operates in perfect certainty as it has full knowledge about all present and future 
circumstances that affect its operations. Irrespective of whether production factors are 
coordinated by an administrative hierarchy or by a single entrepreneur, the firm has 
unlimited information on production costs and revenues. The lack of informational 
asymmetries excludes any uncertainties and enables the firm to make all rational 
decisions in order to achieve its profit maximisation goal. 23 In this way, all alternative 
23 This is the well-known "global rationality" assumption of neoclassical economics. 
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strategies are evaluated and compared with certainty so that only the profit- 
maximising ones are "chosen". In fact, as Loasby claims, firms and other economic 
agents' choices are absolutely predetermined 
If knowledge is perfect and the logic of choice complete and compelling then 
choice disappears; nothing is left but stimulus and response ... if the future is certain there can be no choice. (Loasby 1976: 5 )24 
The neoclassical theory of the firm is essentially a theory of equilibrium 
which is achieved in markets characterised by perfect competition. 25 It is in such 
markets that the price-theoretic assumption that firms are passive price-takers rather 
than active price-makers applies and where Pareto optimality is achieved. In the 
neoclassical equilibrium a single price prevails in the market according to which all 
rational profit-maximisers make their adjustments to their output in order to equate 
Marginal Cost with Marginal Revenue. Thus, profit-maximi sing firms achieve their 
goals by using the prices formed by the market according to the law of supply and 
demand. 
It should be noted here that subsequent formulations of the neoclassical theory 
have allowed for the possibility that non-profit maximising firms may exist at least in 
the short-term. For instance, in a classic paper published in 1950 Alchian used the 
Darwinian natural selection methodology to claim that the achievement of long-term 
profit maximisation is crucial for the firm's survival in a perfectly competitive market 
(Alchian 1950). Profit maximising firms enjoy an advantage over non-profit 
maximising firms, since they have the financial resources to grow faster than the 
latter who will be out-competed and eventually eliminated. The significance of 
24 See also Latsis (1976). 
25 Perfect competition describes a market where there are a large number of small firms who produce 
an identical (homogenous) product, where there are no entry-barriers for new competing firms and 
where all firms face the same costs. 
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Alchian's model is that, although it allows the possibility of firm-level divergence 
from profit-maximisation, the neoclassical objective applies at an industry-wide level 
through an evolutionary process and thus the neoclassical equilibrium holds. Profit 
maximisation is then not a choice objective but it is one externally imposed on the 
finn's owner as a necessary precondition for survival. 26 
The equilibrium assumptions of the neoclassical theory have some important 
implications for corporate governance. First, since both managerial hierarchy and sole 
entrepreneur ownership are treated as equivalent coordination mechanisms within the 
firm, the relationship between ownership and control and its organisational 
implications are rendered irrelevant. There is no difference between a non-owner 
manager and an owner-entrepreneur since both are simply assumed to make optimal 
decisions based on given (perfect) information. In such a theory where discretion is 
completely ruled out managerial innovation and motivation have no relevance. 
Irrespectively of who is in control of the firm the profit-maximisation objective will 
be pursued. Secondly, the perfect markets assumption of the theory calls for the 
rejection of any non-market intervention. Since the allocation of resources in 
equilibrium is optimal, any regulatory or other interference would lead to 
inefficiency. Neoclassicism is therefore antithetical to the regulation of corporate 
activity by the state or any other regulator and in favour of a laisez-faire approach. 
Thus the role of the state in corporate control is totally eliminated and replaced by 
rational preferences, namely, the profit-maximisation drive. 
Despite its undisputed influence in modem economic thinking, neoclassical 
theory has some obvious flaws. Particularly, the over-abstraction of the global 
rationality, certainty and perfect market assumptions which constitute the basis of the 
26 On competitive selection see also section 2.4 below. 
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theory. The problems stem from the fact that the neoclassical theory is based on 
optimal equilibrium conditions. This means that if its preconditions are relaxed with 
the introduction of elements of uncertainty or deviations from the perfect market 
models, then the price-theoretic assumptions begin to lose their predictive power and 
the neoclassical theory its normative significance. While in a utopian world markets 
can be perfectly competitive and economic agents (individuals and firms) can make 
their decisions having perfect knowledge about all current and potential eventualities, 
in reality these conditions cannot be met. 
As already mentioned, traditional neoclassical theory probably fits best the 
pre-managerial era when markets resembled to a large extent the teleological models 
of competition. It is in that era that the theoretical consensus about neo-classicism 
arose after all (Kirzner 1997), despite the fact that even then global rationality was far 
from a real circumstance. However, in an economy dominated by managerial firms 
the neoclassical theory loses much of its relevance. The size of managerial firms 
indicates that markets are imperfectly competitive (oligopolistic) and that Alchian's 
evolutionary argument cannot apply. In addition, the separation of ownership from 
control appears to be in odds with the owner-entrepreneur assumption and reveals the 
gap left by traditional theory's failure to deal with the structure of the finn. So it is 
not a coincidence that it was in the 1930s, the heyday of managerial capitalism, that 
an intense debate arose on whether neoclassical theory was satisfactory or a new 
more realistic approach should be developed to deal with the firm as an organisation 
that differs from markets or individuals. 
The pioneering attempt to provide theoretical insights into the nature of the 
firm as a coordinator of resources was made by Coase. In his famous article "The 
Nature of the Finn" he sought to explain the firm's nature and existence by looking at 
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the reasons for intra-firm. as opposed to market coordination (Coase 1937). If as 
neoclassical theory assumes there is no difference between the two, he asked, then 
why is it that firm coordination sometimes supersedes price-mechanism coordination 
in the market? 
In order to deal with this question Coase focused on the single exchange 
27 transaction or more simply the contract between two economic agents. What he 
found was that the use of the price mechanism entails what he called transaction costs 
(Coase 1937: 391). Such costs can arise from drafting, negotiating and enforcing 
contracts because natural prices of goods are not automatically known to the 
transacting parties. The real world is one of uncertainty where, contrary to the global 
rationality assumption, economic agents do not and cannot have full knowledge about 
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all relevant contingencies. Thus, Coase argued, in order to economise on the costs 
of using the market and therefore of production or allocation, transacting parties 
allow an "entrepreneur" to coordinate the distribution of resources by command. 
Within the firm contracts are not eliminated but are considerably reduced because 
they are replaced by co-operation. For the series of contracts between the 
entrepreneur and other agents required in market transacting one is substituted where 
the latter agrees to follow the directions of the former in return for some 
remuneration. So, Coase (1937: 393) defined the firm's hierarchical structure as a 
"system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources 
is dependent on an entrepreneur". Optimal firm-size is determined by balancing the 
" In economic literature the word contract has broader meaning than in legal texts as it is used to 
describe an economic transaction. 
" These circumstances are responsible for what Simon (1957) has termed "bounded rationality". By 
rejecting the neoclassical hypothesis of global rationality because the real world is one of uncertainty, 
incomplete knowledge and because the human brain has limited computational capacity economic 
agent's rationality is unavoidably bounded. 
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costs arising from market and entrepreneur coordination so the firm expands until the 
point where both types of costs are equal. (ibid at 394). 
Coase's insights gave a new spin to the theorisation about the finn because he 
demonstrated that firms do exist and they are different from markets or individuals. 
Although, as himself admitted fifty years after his seminal work, his intention was to 
compare coordination by organisations with that by the market mechanism (Coase 
1988: 47), his transaction cost approach provided the theoretical platform for an 
analysis of the firm as a governance structure. The Coasean theory, however, did not 
catch on until several decades later when theorists, like Williamson, rediscovered and 
expanded it to form a new kind of economic analysis based on transaction costs. 29 
More influential at the time was the empirical disputation of traditional 
neoclassical thought that came from the renowned Oxford Economists Research 
Group. 30 They presented evidence that real businessmen do not attempt to maximise 
profits according to the neoclassical marginalist principle and that oligopoly, rather 
than perfect competition, is the main market structure. In contrast to the neoclassical 
proposition, firms do not make decisions without regard to their competitors' actions 
and reactions but are subjected to oligopolistic interdependencies. Firms are not price- 
takers but instead they make conscious decisions about pricing. They prefer price 
stability because of customers' aversion to volatility, and so, contrary to the 
traditional theory's predictions, prices are adjusted to output rather than vice versa. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Oxford economists found that profit-maximisation was 
not the only goal of firms, but other objectives like goodwill were also important. 
This constituted a direct empirical attack on the backbone of Walrasian neo- 
29 See infra. note 45 and accompanying text. 
30 See Hall and Hitch ( 193 9). The publication of this paper gave rise to an intense debate on the profit- 
maximisation assumption between marginalists and anti-marginalists. See Machlup (1946) arguing that 
the neoclassical theory of the firm is not intended to yield predictions about individual firms it is only 
concerned about competitive market prices; Stigler (1947b); Friedman (1953); and Nagel (1963). 
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classicism which, due to its neglect of the firm and its nature, was unable to explain 
common business behaviour outside perfect market conditions. 
This revisionist trend combined with the Berle and Means stipulation that 
managers were in control of large corporations set the stage for the theoretical 
examination of managerial behaviour in oligopolistic markets . 
31 In fact, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property was the first work to imply that managerial firms 
did not pursue the profit maximisation objective. However, despite the undisputed 
theoretical influence of their thesis (Sawyer 1979: 89-90), Berle and Means did not 
attempt to develop an economic theory upon which to base this implication. They 
merely assumed that, due to the divorce of ownership from control, management 
teams do not pursue the objectives of the neoclassical firm. As Bratton (1989: 1495) 
observes, the concept of the neoclassical entrepreneur was split between management 
and capital. This split left a theoretical vacuum, arising from the fact that traditional 
economic theory treated the firm as a mere entrepreneur rather than as an 
f 11.32 organisation, that economists were keen to 1 
The first managerial theories of the firm, as they are known, begun to appear 
in the late 1950s and suggested a significant conflict between managerial objectives 
and profit maximisation as envisaged in equilibrium theory. The argument was that a 
conflict arises from the fact that in managerial firms decision-makers own no stock. 
So managerial theories, similarly to the neoclassical postulation, assume that 
shareholders are the owners of the firm who would maximise profit had they been in 
control. However, because managers are vested with the decision-making function, 
they pursue other goals that suit their own preferences. This implies that managerial 
31 By oligopoly economists mean markets that are neither pure monopolies not perfectly competitive 
but anything in between. It is assumed that the economic agents in oligopolistic markets are large firms 
who produce identical or similar products. Entry barriers are also assumed to be present. 
32 For an early critique of the neoclassical theory on this point see Papandreou (1952). 
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theories share with neoclassicism a common assumption: individuals, whether owners 
or managers, are assumed to be self-interested persons who to seek to maximise their 
own welfare. So given that there may be a divergence between shareholder and 
management preferences, the crucial element that determines whether the profit 
maximisation objective is pursued is managerial discretion. In other words, the basis 
of managerial theoretical models is the ability of managers to exercise their discretion 
and diverge from the neoclassical assumptions in order to maximise their own gains. 
In an early attempt to examine managerial objectives and incorporate 
managerial preferences in the theory of the firm, Baumol (1967) hypothesised that 
managers are interested in sales revenue maximisation as opposed to profit. Of 
course, the two motives are not always conflicting for the obvious reason that profit is 
a by-product of sales revenue. So, the promotion of sales is a necessary precondition 
even for attaining the neoclassical objective. For example, because of declining sales 
consumers may shun a product when they feel it is falling in popularity, banks and 
money markets will be more reluctant to provide capital, distributors may be lost, and 
employment relations can deteriorate as firing rather than hiring can become the 
norm. However, Baurnol's proposition is that managers out of self-interest see sales 
revenue as an end in itself rather than just a means (ibid: 46-47). His argument is 
based on the fact that managers' salaries are more closely linked to sales rather than 
profit (e. g. sales commissions) and often companies are ranked according to their 
sales performance. Moreover, large sales give prestige to managers, while large 
profits are most likely appropriated by the shareholders. According to Baumol's 
professional experience, the sales revenue maximisation bias is also reflected on 
managers' stated preferences. Thus, firms use the sales objective as a "rule of thumb" 
even at the expense of maximum profit by setting output at a level where Marginal 
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Revenue is lower than Marginal Cost (MR<MC). In theory, sales maximisation may 
lead to zero or negative profitability if it requires prices that are so low that costs are 
not covered (ibid at 48); hence the potential conflict between the two objectives. 
Nevertheless, Baurnol (ibid: 49) suggests that, although sales revenue is the 
ultimate managerial goal, a compromise is reached where a certain minimum 
acceptable profit level is laid down. In other words, managerial discretion is not 
totally unconstrained. Sales' growth demands ftinds that are generated either 
internally through capital retentions or externally by borrowing or issuing equity. In 
the former situation the profit requirement is direct. If, on the other hand, the latter 
method is adopted, the minimum profit constraint is determined by external demands 
and expectations. Lenders are more willing to lend to a profitable firm. In the case of 
equity finance, the higher the profitability level the more funds capital markets will be 
willing to provide. At the same time, the firm must ensure that its shares remain 
attractive to the capital market by providing a rate of return that is satisfactory to the 
current and potential investor. If this rate falls below the minimum acceptable level 
managers run the risk of being ousted, since shareholders may sell their shares to a 
hostile takeover raider who may be attracted by a falling share-price and acquire the 
firm's control. Since such transactions in the market for corporate control are usually 
followed by a replacement of incumbent management, they are assumed to constitute 
a force constraining managerial discretion. 
33 The calculation of the difference 
between the minimum profit constraint and the maximum profit level provides a 
method of measuring managerial discretion; the larger the difference the greater the 
discretion managers enjoy. 
33 The classic analysis of the market for corporate control is Manne (1965). 
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What can be seen as an expansion the sales-maximisation model was 
presented five years after Baumol's exposition by Williamson (1964) who argued that 
managers use their discretion to maximise their own utility as opposed to that of 
shareholders. The concept of managerial utility comprises pecuniary and non- 
pecuniary elements such as salary, security, power and status, prestige and 
professional excellence (ibid: 32). While salary is easily measurable in monetary 
terms all the remaining elements are non-pecuniary and therefore their monetarisation 
is necessary for their inclusion in an economic theory of the firm. For this purpose 
Williamson developed the concept of "expense preference" to describe the 
satisfaction that managers get from certain types of expenditures. In particular, there 
is a positive managerial preference for staff expansion expenditures, emoluments and 
discretionary profits (ibid: 34-37). Regarding the first type, managers have a 
preference for staff increases which are to a certain extent equivalent to promotion 
since they contribute to power and often to salary. Emoluments are defined as the 
portion of salaries which is discretionary in the sense that its removal would not 
influence managers' decision to keep their job. Such expenses can arise from 
company cars, luxurious offices, expense accounts and so on, and are believed to also 
add to managerial power, status and prestige. Finally, managerial utility can also 
derive from the attainment of profits above the minimum necessary for job security 
(discretionary profits). The implication here is that future expansion and therefore 
managerial satisfaction depend on such profits which are also a measure of success 
since they demonstrate the achievement of the firm's goal. According to Williamson, 
although there is a distinction between the purposes of the firm as an organisation and 
the personal goals of managers, managerial utility can also derive from organisational 
achievement (ibid: 36). This is a deviation from the approach to the minimum profit 
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constraint in Baumol's model, where it is assumed that managers gain no utility from 
profit per se and therefore are prepared to sacrifice any profit above this minimum 
necessary for an increase in sales revenue (Sawyer 1979: 98-99). Nonetheless, 
managerial expense preference and the profit-maximisation objective are by no means 
aligned. In his careful case-studies Williamson shows that in a sharp fall of demand 
and therefore of profitability, the decline of managerial utility expenses is 
disproportionate to that of other expenditures. This, he argues, proves the ability of 
managers to exercise their discretion according to the expense-preference model. 
Also in 1964, Marris presented a different approach to the behaviour of the 
managerial firm that focuses on growth as a management objective (Marris 1964). In 
this model, all the diverse objectives that can be pursued by managers are 
amalgamated into the single motive of "sustainable long-run growth in size measured 
by assets, employment or real output" (Marris 1998: 113). Although the starting point 
is similar to that in Williamson's model in that managers are after prestige, power and 
security, Marris' claim is that these objectives are attained by pursuing a growth rate 
that is faster than would be optimal for shareholders in terms of profitability. The 
assumption here is that beyond a certain point the growth rate and the return rate do 
not increase proportionately. Thus, in contrast to the neoclassical theory where 
growth is merely an indirect outcome of pursuing maximum profit, in Marris' model 
the managerial firm free from shareholder control can set its growth rate 
independently from the neoclassical equilibrium ob ective. Growth nevertheless, is j5 
costly and thus requires cash flow. Marris identifies retained earnings, i. e. profits non- 
distributed as dividends, as the most important source of cash flow. He then argues 
that retention and reinvestment can be justified from the maximisation point of view 
since it can ensure long-term profit maximisation. in this case, shareholders are 
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satisfied and the firm's stock is seen as an attractive investment causing the market 
valuation of the firm to rise. However, beyond certain point the substitution of an 
expectation for larger future profits/dividends for smaller current ones can cause 
shareholder dissatisfaction and depress the firm's market value. This is where 
managerial preference for maximum growth rates begins to contradict market 
valuation. Marris' prediction is that managerial discretion leads to the maximisation 
of growth rates subject to a minimum market valuation constraint. This constraint 
arises from the fact that as the market valuation falls the potential of the firm being 
taken over increases. Thus, managers need to find a balance between the maximum 
growth rate and the maximum market value in order to ensure their job security. 
One observation that has to be made here is that all these managerial models 
are based on the fact that, just like product markets, capital markets are also 
imperfect. In other words, they assume that shareholders or potential takeover raiders 
do not have perfect knowledge about the finn's actual and future profitability. If stock 
markets were perfect in providing all necessary information about a firm's present 
and potential profitability, then any firms who pursue growth beyond the current 
profit maximisation rate would be taken over as they would depress their market 
value. Thus, the market for corporate control would be sufficient to ensure that no 
other objectives than current market value maximisation were pursued and the need 
for alternatives to the neoclassical paradigm would automatically disappear. 
Obviously the analysis of firm behaviour in managerial theories is useful in 
understanding the ramifications from the separation of corporate ownership and 
control. Manager-controlled corporations are different from owner-controlled ones in 
that they are inherently prone to pursue objectives that are not only different from 
those of shareholders but can also be antagonistic to them. In a sense, by recognising 
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that managers and/or corporate organisational hierarchies can actually pursue their 
own objectives as those of the firm rather than of the shareholders, managerial 
theories introduce some elements of corporate realism into the economic theory of the 
firm. While ownership is detached from actual decision-making and control. 
management input becomes the centre-point and the main driving force of the firm as 
an end in itself As a result, the shareholders' interests are reduced to a mere 
constraint on the pursuit of the finn's own goals as an organisation and as an entity 
that has its own separate existence. 
Regarding the two component elements of corporate governance, managerial 
theories of the firm are mainly concerned with the nature of control and its 
microeconornic effects. As regards the nature of ownership they do not provide any 
analysis, since they simply assume that shareholders are owners without any further 
elaboration. What may seem an arbitrary assumption can be explained by the fact that 
the primary purpose of managerial theories is not to determine and justify the 
metaphysical nature of the corporation and its ownership but simply to explain 
managerial motivation. Another explanation can perhaps be that managerial theories 
are not intended to displace neoclassical theory altogether. Rather, their purpose is to 
fill the theoretical gaps that it leaves in the sphere of imperfect markets where the 
organisational nature of the firm becomes important in understanding economic 
activity. Nevertheless, the mere fact that managerial theories visualise the firm as 
something different from the profit-maximising economic agent constitutes a 
challenge to Walrasian neo-classicism and the universal applicability of its 
assumptions, just as the Coasian argument did to some extent. 
However, as already mentioned, since the 1970s the popularity of managerial 
legitimacy has been waning mainly because of the mediocre performance of some of 
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those very corporations that once sustained it. Overcapacity in mature and 
unprofitable operations which managerial corporations had failed to reorganise and 
subsidised from profitable divisions have been the main cause of criticism (Jensen 
198% 1993 ). 34 This context makes it easier to appreciate the efforts of theorists, such 
as Alchian and Demsetz or Jensen and Meckling, to explain the behaviour of the 
managerial firm in neoclassical terms and argue against managerialiSM. 35 
Alchian and Dernsetz' starting point is similar to that in the Coase's theory, 
namely the transaction within and outside the fin-n (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
However, they conclude that Coase's argument that coordination within the finn is by 
command is unsatisfactory because it fails to explain where the entrepreneur's 
authority to coordinate production comes from. In order to provide an answer to this 
problem, they deviate significantly from Coase's theorisation by arguing that the firm 
should not be seen as a mechanism where coordination of resources is by command. 
On the contrary, they claim that there are no authority-based relations within the firm 
which in turn has 
no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the 
slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between two people ... To 
speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a 
deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in 
renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties. 
(Ibid: 777) 
By viewing the firm in this way, Alchian and Demsetz deny that there is any 
difference between transactions that take place in the market and those that are 
concluded within the firm. In essence the firm is itself a market and therefore the 
34 While Jensen allocates all the blame on managerial governance as a "failed" microeconomic model, 
this thesis presents a very different view which emphasises the adverse macroeconomic conditions in 
the global economy since 1970s. See chapter 2 below. 
35 In fact, the emergence of this anti-managerialist trend that appeared during the 1970s was almost 
simultaneous to a similar movement that had begun to dominate the legal field at least in the US and 
the UK (Bratton 1989). See also the discussion below. 
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management function is reduced to a mere contract renegotiation process. No 
hierarchy or authority-based relationships exist within the firm. To illustrate this 
stipulation they focus on the employer-worker relationship. They argue that, although 
it may appear that management has an authority over the worker, in fact the relation is 
a symmetrical one based on a "quid pro quo" contract (ibid.: 783). Just as the 
employer orders the worker to perform certain acts, the worker "orders" the employer 
to pay him a wage in consideration. Similarly, the worker can "fire" the employer by 
leaving the job in the same way that the employer can also terminate the employment 
agreement. Thus, the firm is a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts and within it 
there is the continual renegotiation described in the extract above. Because there are 
no power differentials (hence the lack of hierarchy) every (re)negotiation leads to 
outcomes that are satisfactory for both contracting parties so that there is always an 
equilibrium reached. To take the employer-worker example again, if either party to 
the employment contract does not like the terms offered it will seek a better 
alternative elsewhere. Where this results in a shortage of employees, (perfect) labour 
market forces will compel employers to offer better terms of employment until 
equilibrium is reached. 
The only thing that distinguishes firms from markets, according to Alchian 
and Demsetz, derives from the fact that team production by workers is involved. This, 
they argue, involves "metering" problems that make it difficult to determine workers' 
rewards according to their performance, i. e. their individual contributions to the 
collective effort. This is because individuals have the tendency to "shirk" when they 
work as part of a team (ibid: 779). In order to overcome shirking in team production, 
firms assign a central agent, namely the shareholder, the role of monitoring. This 
monitoring party is himself discouraged to shirk by being made the ultimate risk- 
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bearer as "residual claimant" of the team's earnings after all the "fixed" claims of 
other contracting parties (e. g. creditors) are deducted. Thus, the residual claimant 
must be given "property rights" over the firm's net-cash-flows and the ability to 
renegotiate contracts in order to carry out his coordination function efficiently. The 
precondition for efficient coordination is the aligm-nent of each individual's rewards 
with his output. 
The importance of Alchian and Demsetz's model for corporate governance 
lies in the fact that it justifies the role of shareholders as profit-eaming entrepreneurs 
by using efficiency considerations. In other words, it provides theoretical legitimacy 
to the economic assumption that shareholders should be regarded as the ultimate 
controllers of the firm and therefore as "owners" of the finn, or more precisely its net 
cash-flow. 36 Not only are they the constituency that determines what objectives 
should be pursued by the firm if it is to be efficient, but they also have the necessary 
incentives to ensure that these objectives are actually pursued. The implication is that 
firms controlled by unconstrained managers are not efficient, because of the 
divergence between the objectives of managers and those of profit-maximising 
shareholders. 37 Therefore, the argument goes, in order to promote efficiency and 
economic welfare, one would have to ensure that within the firm structure there are 
sufficient constraints on managerial discretion aligning management motivation to the 
36 Alchian and Demsetz define firm ownership as the combination of the right to 
be a residual 
claimant-monitor of the team, to be the central party common to all contracts with 
input providers, to 
observe input behaviour, to alter the membership of the team, and to sell all these rights. 
So even 
though they talk about "ownership", they do not use the term with its legal meaning. 
(Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972: 783). 
37 This has provided the theoretical basis for the view that corporations should be run solely 
in the 
interests of shareholders, to whom managers should be accountable. See Easterbrook, and 
Fischel 
(1983) at 403, Easterbrook and Fischel (1989); and Fischel (1982). 
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profit-maximisation objective which in turn leads to the maximisation of the finn's 
market value. 
38 
This line of thought is also followed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who 
extended the nexus-of-contracts theory by including explanations about managerial 
motivation. Their analysis is similar to that of Alchian and Demsetz in that they 
regard the firm as a nexus of equilibrating contracts similar to those concluded by 
self-interested economic agents in a market. To use their words, the firm is nothing 
more than 
a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships 
[among individuals] and is also characterised by the existence of divisible 
residual claims on the organisation's assets and cash flows, which can 
generally be sold without permission of other contracting 
individuals 
... Viewed 
in this way, it makes little or no sense to try to 
distinguish those things that are "inside" the firm from those things that are 
"outside" of it. (Ibid: 311) 
However, their main contribution is their analysis of the motivational split between 
managers and owners by describing the relationship between them as one of agency. 
According to Jensen and Meckling, an agency relationship is a contract under which 
one or more individuals, the principal(s), engage another, the agent, to perform some 
service on their behalf by delegating to him some decision-making authority (ibid. at 
308). This relationship is based on an assumption that, because all individuals want to 
maximise their own utility, the agent will not always act in the interests of the 
principal. This divergence of interests gives rise to what they call agency costs. These 
accrue from the principals', i. e. the shareholders, efforts to align the interests of 
agents with their own as residual claimants, and are the sum of expenses for 
monitoring the agent's performance, of expenditure incurred so that the agent 
38 fi When dealing with this issue in this way the object of study changes ftom how to reconcile irm 
behaviour with neoclassical marginalist principles to how to reconcile firm structure with marginalist 
principles. 
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miarantees that he will act in the principal's interests ("bonding"), and of any residual 
loss caused by any remaining divergence. In effect, monitoring expenses are the 
product of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, since the 
former does not have knowledge about the efficient allocation of resources that is 
equal to that of the agent. Obtaining all necessary information in order to exercise 
monitoring is inherently costly. Principals, therefore, will be willing to incur such 
costs only if the benefits accruing to them from monitoring are higher. This depends 
on the extent of residual claims owned; the higher the claims, i. e. of shares owned, 
the more motivated the principal, i. e. the shareholder, will be to exercise monitoring. 
Having described the owner-manager relationship as one of agency, Jensen 
and Meckling state that agency costs are in effect the costs of the separation of 
ownership and control or of shirking in Alchian and Demsetz' terms. Consequently, 
they are related to the extent to which managers are also residual claimants; the 
higher the managers' claims and, therefore, the higher their interest in the firm's 
market value, the lower the agency costs. Where, on the other hand, managers have 
anything less than a controlling interest in the firm, as is the case in managerial firms, 
their residual claims are deemed insufficient to bridge the gap between ownership and 
control and as a result agency costs accrue. 
Addressing this Jensen and Meckling suggest that constraints can arise from 
the market for managers within and outside the firm itself Competition from other 
potential managers disciplines the incumbent management team who, as a result of 
the increased risk of losing their jobs, will be prevented from diverging from the 
market-value maximisation objective. The effectiveness of this constraint depends on 
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the cost of replacing the under-perfon-ning managers which in turn is related to the 
principal's ability to measure performance. 39 
Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and subsequently Jensen (1986) argue 
that managerial discretion can also be constrained by the financial structure of the 
firm. Increased debt, for instance, has the effect of reducing cash flow and thus makes 
the risk of bankruptcy more imminent. The more intense competition in the product 
market is, the higher the risk of bankruptcy and the more effective this constraint will 
be. On the other hand, excess cash-flow - that is, cash for which there are no 
profitable investment opportunities left within the firm - reduces the threat of default 
and therefore increases agency costs resulting from the managerial discretion. For this 
reason, any excess cash flows should be re-distributed to the shareholders in the form 
of dividends or share-repurchases, so that managers are prevented from wasting it in 
44 inefficient" organisational spending and excessive growth beyond the market-value 
maximisation point. 
Obviously, the availability of relevant firm-specific information to the 
monitoring principal is the key for both these constraints to become operative. In the 
managerial firm, however, no shareholder has sufficient incentives for acquiring 
control-related information. The obvious problem that arises is how to ensure the 
operation of the above mechanisms in the absence of direct shareholder monitoring. 
Jensen and Meckling, just like managerial theorists, propose the market for corporate 
control solution through the hostile takeover transaction as the main managerial 
constraint. If, as it is assumed, capital markets are efficient - that is, if they are able to 
process all relevant information about the firm's investment opportunities so that the 
market value of the firm reflects the present value of the firm's expected future net 
39 See also Fama (1980). 
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cash flows, including those from future investment opportunities - then managerial 
effort will be fully reflected in the stock prices as determined by the market (Jensen 
40 1983; Fama and Jensen 1983; and Fama 1980). Poor managerial performance will 
lead to the undervaluation of the firm's stock in comparison to the market as a whole. 
The resulting reduction of the firm's market value is a measure for the "residual loss" 
element of agency costs. Consequently, the higher the agency costs in a firm the more 
likely it is that a bidder will attempt make a hostile takeover offer to the firm's 
shareholders. As a result managers will have the incentive to reduce agency costs in 
order to avoid their replacement after a change in ownership. They do so by 
implementing ex ante monitoring devices such as audits, independent directors, 
incentive compensation schemes etc. So ultimately it is managers who bear the costs 
of discretion, and the more efficient the market is, the stronger the managers' 
incentive to reduce agency costs will be. When firms do not structure their incentive 
contracts so as to minimise agency costs, the theory assumes that they will be selected 
out and disappear in a similar way to that described by Alchian (Alchian 1950; Jensen 
1983: 331, Fama and Jensen 1983: 327). Therefore, optimal resource allocation 
within and without the firm is directly related to capital market efficiency; hence the 
emphasis placed by advocates of the agency paradigm on ensuring that market 
efficiency is maintained, for example by rejecting any factors that may hinder the 
operation of the market for corporate control. 
What is important in the "nexus-of-contracts"' and agency analysis is that in 
effect it introduces nominalism into the economic theory of the firm. It 
does so by 
dismantling the firm into a number of transactions between self-interested input- 
40 This is the efficient markets hypothesis which generally holds that a market is efficient if it 
is 
impossible to make economic profits by trading on available information. For a general literature 
review on this hypothesis see Fama (1970). Market efficiency also implies that, since 
the short-term 
price of a stock reflects the present value of the firm's long-term results, short-term values cannot 
be 
distinguished from long-term values. See Easterbrook and Fischel (198 1). 
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providers and by focusing on the monitoring role of shareholders as residual owners 
of the revenue generated. Private bilateral contracts between actors prevail over 
managerial command and, therefore, market constraints determine the allocation of 
resources in an efficient manner. Managerial input is reduced into a commodity, an 
agency service, acquired by the principals at a certain cost (agency CoStS). 
41 In effect, 
management ceases to be an end, as predicted by managerial theories, and is reduced 
into a mere production means. By regarding intra-firm coordination as no different 
from market contracting the nexus-of-contracts/agency approach "progresses" from 
the Walrasian "black box" to a "no-box" analysis, i. e. the microeconornic institutional 
analysis of the firm remains strictly neoclassical. 
The theory also contains some other important implications of a normative 
character. Firstly, because of the firm's nexus-of-contracts nature, the role of law is 
only to provide "mandatory" contractual terms supplementing those privately agreed 
with the only purpose of reducing agency costs. So legal rules are the "products of a 
historical process in which there were strong incentives for individuals to minimise 
agency costs" (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 360). The implication here is that, since 
only market forces and individual choice determine contractual and legal rules 
efficiently, there is no need for mandatory corporate law. 42 Secondly, related to the 
first point any corporate social responsibility assertions, such as those put forward by 
Dodd, are unacceptable for two reasons. 43 Firstly, since the alignment of managerial 
41 As Jensen and Meckling (1976: 328) claim: "Finding that agency costs are non-zero ... and 
concluding therefrom that the agency relationship is non-optimal, wasteful or inefficient is equivalent 
in every sense to comparing a world in which iron ore is a scarce commodity (and therefore costly) to a 
world in which it is freely available at zero resource cost, and concluding that the first world is 'non- 
optimal"'. 
42 On the argument that corporate law rules should not be mandatory so that individuals can exercise 
their contractual freedom and contract them out if they consider them inefficient see Bebcuck (1989), 
McChesney (1989), Fischel (1982: 1273). 
43 Jensen and Meckling state this expressly: "The personalisation of the firm implied by asking 
questions such as, what should be the objective function of the firm? Or, Does the firm have a social 
responsibility? Is seriously misleading, Thefirm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction that serves as a 
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behaviour to shareholder interests as a precondition for the reduction of agency costs 
is one of the main premises of the nexus-of-contracts analysis, any inclusion of non- 
shareholder interests in managerial decision-making constitutes a diversion from the 
market value-maximisation objective and is therefore inefficient. Secondly, the nature 
of the firm as a mere fiction demolishes the foundations of Dodd's social 
responsibility argument which, as noted earlier, is built upon corporate realism. 
From these inferences about the nature of the firm it becomes apparent that 
the nexus-of-contracts theory is to a large extent a reformulation of the aggregate 
theory in economic terms (Millon 1990: 232; Phillips 1994: 1090-1091; Bratton 
1989: 1513-1515). The neoclassical nexus-of-contracts approach provided economic 
efficiency justifications for the old legal assertion that contract was the basis of the 
firm's fictitious nature. Seen in this way, it is not surprising that the theory has had an 
enormous influence in legal literature too. 44 As Clarke (1989: 1705) observes, the 
"theory now dominates the thinking of most economists and most economically 
oriented corporate law scholars who focus at all on the theory of the corporation". But 
perhaps the main driving force behind the almost immediate acceptance of the 
neoclassical nexus-of-contracts/agency paradigm was the general discontent aimed at 
managerial power in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Despite its influential assertions, the neoclassical version of the contractual 
theory of the firm has not found unanimous acceptance in academic thinking. The 
main source of dissent is its over-reliance on efficient markets and the global 
rationality of contracting parties when agreeing on the ex ante monitoring 
mechanisms. 
focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals... are brought into 
equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. " (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 311). 
44 See, for example, Gordon (1989) and Easterbrook and Fischel (1989). 
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In a series of articles and books since 1975, Williamson has expanded 
Coase's claim that firms supersede markets to fully explain the firm's nature and 
behaviour on a transaction cost basis. 45 Once again the initial point of reference is the 
contract. However, in contrast to the neoclassical model, Williamson accepts that 
markets are not perfect or efficient due to the presence of transaction costs. As 
discussed above, these arise during and from the process of negotiating as a result of 
the combination of bounded rationality and opportunism, and due to the 
impossibility/difficulty of predicting all future contingencies that may affect a 
contractual relation. Consequently, parties are unable to write complete contracts 
either because they are too costly or simply because it is humanly impossible. 
Contractual incompleteness imposes costs arising from renegotiationS46. Moreover, 
Williamson claims that transaction costs are particularly high where efficiency 
requires that one or both parties invest in transaction- specific assets. This is because 
asset specificity has "lock-in" effects that increase the vulnerability to the other 
party's opportunism. 47 Thus, where one party makes a transaction-specific 
investment, it will expect that adequate governance structures, i. e. institutions, exist to 
safeguard its investment. These can be realignment incentives (e. g. termination 
penalties), a specialized governance structure to resolve disputes, trading regularities 
that support and signal intentions of continuity or in some cases full disclosure of 
transaction- specific information (Williamson 1984: 1204-1205). 48 The hierarchical 
structure of the firm is assumed to provide such safeguards and is therefore itself seen 
45 See Williamson (1975,1979,1981,1984,1985). 
46 These can be costly simply because of the time and resources spent in the bargaining process or 
because in the presence of informational asymmetry one party may be cheated and thus suffer loss. 
47 This is because, contrary to general purpose assets, such transaction-specific assets cannot be 
redeployed without significant cost if the contractual relation is terminated or otherwise upset. As 
Williamson states: "what was a competitive market with a large number of bidders at the outset is 
effectively transformed into one of bilateral monopoly thereafter. " (Williamson 1984: 1202-1203). 
48 On the nature and role of institutions see section 1.4 below 
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as a non-market governance mechanism. So, within the firm contracting parties have 
the incentives to make transaction-specific investments and thus minimise the 
efficiency loss that would arise had they settled for the less efficient alternative of 
arm"s length contracting in the market. This explains the economic significance of the 
firm and its survival against markets or other organisational forms in the adverse 
selection process. 
Having recognised the firm as a governance mechanism, Williamson uses the 
transaction cost analysis in order to explain the potential role of corporate 
constituencies - such as labour, shareholders, managers, suppliers, creditors and 
customers, as well as the community's interest - in corporate governance through 
board-level representation (ibid: 1207-1221). His conclusion is that all 
constituencies, except for shareholders as a group, have opportunities to renegotiate 
their contracts and thus establish adequate safeguards for their investments without 
board representation. On the other hand, (dispersed) shareholders bear the residual 
risk of the company's failure or success and their claims are "located at the end of the 
queue should liquidation occur" (ibid: 1210). For this reason, Williamson argues, the 
finn's governance structure and the board in particular should be seen as a 
mechanism to safeguard shareholders' investments from expropriation by other 
constituencies. 
49 
Addressing managerial discretion, Williamson admits that it does exist and 
treats it as another type of transaction cost - after all he was one of the first to c aim 
this. However, somewhat controversially he claims that the governance structure of 
the corporate hierarchy serves as an important constraint on managerial misconduct. 
More specifically, the managerial finn's multidivisional structure (conglomerate)5 
49 So agency costs as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) can be regarded as just one type of 
transaction costs. 
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where quasi-autonomous divisions are coordinated by a central office, has improNred 
managerial incentives for "longer-run strategic decision-making" (Williamson 1981). 
This is achieved because the central office acts as an internal capital market that 
reallocates funds from low-growth divisions to high-growth ones favouring profit 
over other goals. Williamson admits that the multidivisional forrn alone does not 
eliminate managerial discretion. However, he claims that it enhances the effectiveness 
of the market for corporate control because acquirers can "digest" their acquisition 
(Williamson 1984: 1225). Thus, although the divergence between managerial and 
shareholder incentives does not disappear, organisational structure can "relieve 
legitimate concerns with managerial discretion" (Williamson 1985: 322). 
The neo-institutional transaction cost approach obviously departs from the 
neoclassical version of contractualism in certain significant ways. Most importantly, 
in Williamson's and other neo-institutional models markets are not assumed to be 
efficient. It is for this reason that the firm, not as another market but as a governance 
structure, comes into play to alleviate the impact of market failure by eliminating 
transaction costs so that an efficient equilibrium is still reached as a result of the right 
mix of markets and non-market governance structures. Thus, although, contrary to 
Jensen and Meckling's assertion, in Williamson's model the firm has both authority 
and fiat as a meaningful entity rather than a mere fiction, the same result is reached 
with regard to the ultimate purpose of the firm, namely current market value 
maximisation with shareholders enjoying a central role as residual claimants. 
In other 
words, both models provide arguments for the alignment of managerial 
decision- 
making with shareholder interests so as to reach an efficient equilibrium. 
However, 
whereas in the Jensenian agency version it is the finn's lack of real existence 
that 
excludes objectives other than market-value maximisation, in Williamson's neo- 
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institutional version of contractual theory corporate social responsibility claims are 
ruled out by the firm's organisational existence. 
These contradictions in the theory of the firm have recently become more 
pronounced with the extension both of (neoclassical) contractual and of neo- 
institutional models so as to legitimate the inclusion of non-shareholder interests in 
corporate decision-making. The excesses of the 1980s in the market for corporate 
control, especially in the US, and the resulting 1987 crash may have contributed to 
the general discontent with the hostile takeover as a mechanism for managerial 
discipline where markets are imperfect. 50 
Thus, in 1992 Hill and Jones (1992) reformulated Jensen and Meckling's 
agency model by excluding the element of market efficiency. Their results were 
startling since they found that market inefficiencies give rise to power differentials 
between the firm's stakeholders and managers and between stakeholders themselves 
that lead to a persistent disequilibrium. at least in the short and medium run. Certain 
constituencies, such as management, exploit and entrench these power differentials to 
the detriment of stakeholders who lose their ability to enforce implicit or explicit 
contracts and as a result bear the residual risk. This gives rise to what they call 
"contracting costs" which amount to the utility loss to all stakeholders resulting from 
managerial autonomy. In response, stakeholders seek to develop institutional 
structures that will align managerial motivation to their interests and thus lead to 
more efficient results as the power differentials diminish. In this way, Hill and Jones 
provide a theoretical paradigm, a "stakeholder- agency theory", which legitimises 
managerial accountability to all stakeholder interests rather than just the shareholders. 
In effect, this model provides a justification for departing from the Jensenian 
" See section 3.2 below. 
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objective of current shareholder/market value maximisation. Therefore, so long as 
this diversion from shareholders' interests is justified from an efficiency point of 
view, i. e. if it does not translate in managerial rent extraction, Hill and Jones' 
argument can be characterised as managerialism in disguise. Where markets are not 
efficient optimal equilibrium is reached only when managers are able to balance 
diverse stakeholder interests efficiently. 
There have also been similar extensions of Williamson's model with the most 
important being that developed by Freeman and Evan (1990) who claim that even 
non-shareholder constituencies can make transaction-specific investments that cannot 
be safeguarded any better than shareholder inputs. Due to interdependencies that exist 
among stakeholder claims, it may be impossible for certain stakeholders to institute 
sufficient safeguards for their claims in bilateral agreements with the firm and 
therefore representation and voting rights are necessary. 51 Moreover, Freeman and 
Evan do not share Williamson's argument that shareholders have no renegotiation 
opportunities. They distinguish between small shareholders, who renegotiate their 
contracts on a daily or even quarterly basis, and shareholders with large blocks of 
stock that are not easily redeployable. Their claim is that it is only the latter type of 
shareholder that incur asset specificity and therefore deserve board representation. 
Thus, their main proposition is that the firm should be conceptualised as a "set of 
multilateral contracts" and that "governance rules could be devised to ensure that the 
interests of all parties are at least taken into consideration" (Freeman and Evan 1990: 
352). In this way, Freeman and Evan use a transaction cost methodology similar to 
that of Williamson to integrate stakeholder interests into the theory of the firm. Thus, 
5' Examples of such interdependencies are provided: "A dividend payout to stockholders may well 
reduce product quality to customers, and put pressure on suppliers for lower prices. Consumer 
arbitration panels, pollution control machinery, and so on, may favour several stakeholders at the 
expense of stockholders or lenders. " (Freeman and Evan 1990: 349). 
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just like Hill and Jones do using agency theory, they provide efficiency based 
justifications for a pluralist approach similar to that advocated by Dodd. 
1.3.3. Two Competing Visions of the Firm and their Significance 
The theories outlined above derive from two social science disciplines, 
namely law and economics, which differ significantly in the methods and criteria they 
use. While the former traditionally relies on moral principles and metaphysical or 
sociological arguments, in the latter as the standard rule of thumb in theorising is 
regarded the concept of efficiency. However, in the analysis above it is evident that, 
despite the divergence in the manner they approach the corporation (or the firm), both 
law and economics can produce similar results at least as far as the corporate entity 
and its governance power are concerned. For instance, the resemblance between 
fiction, aggregate and neoclassical contract theories on the one hand, and corporate 
realism and managerialism on the other is quite obvious. The former group can be 
relied upon to advocate nominalism, while the latter shows that the firm cannot be 
identified with its shareholders. 
Thus, two main visions of the corporation emerge as solutions to the problems 
regarding its nature and governance, which correspond to two basic underlying 
concepts, namely shareholder supremacy and managerialism. Shareholder supremacy 
refers to the recognition that current shareholders are the owners and therefore the 
only legitimate controllers of the corporation which has to be run in accordance to 
their preferences. This nominalist vision of the corporation then refers to what can be 
called shareholder-oriented corPorate governance which calls for the alignment of 
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managerial decision-making with the interests of shareholders. On the other hand, 
managerialism can be defined in a negative way as the non-alignment of managerial 
objectives with shareholder interests. This definition follows the use of the term in 
managerial theories but, just like all negative definitions, it is ambivalent because it 
raises the question whether there is any real difference between managerialism and 
the stakeholder approach of Dodd and others. The answer to this depends on whether 
managers use their discretion in order to promote the interests of all stakeholders 
including those of shareholders in an efficient way. In fact, Aoki (1984) has made 
such a claim by conceiving the role of management (the board) as one of balancing 
different interests within the firm. 52 This can only be so where managerial goals 
somehow coincide with the objectives of this balancing process. If this claim is valid 
then it is correct to associate managerialism. with the balanced promotion of 
stakeholder interests as envisaged by Hill and Jones (1992) or Freeman and Evan 
(1990) and treat the two theoretical models as identical. This model is a realist one 
because the corporation is not identified with any particular group of stakeholders. 
Instead, diverse interests, which are often antithetical, are amalgamated through the 
managerial balancing process into what can be conceived as the interests of the 
company as a separate entity. The associational trade offs between shareholders' 
individualism and collectivism found in Gierke's realist argument 53 could then be 
extended to include similar trade offs between and among all types of stakeholders. 
Where, however, the concurrence of managerial goals with the promotion of 
the corporate interest as defined here does not arise, then managers are able to (ab)use 
their discretion in order to promote their own self-interest to the detriment of all other 
" See also Blair and Stout (200 1) for a similar claim. 
53 See supra. note 13 and text. 
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stakeholders and of course the fin-n. 54 In order to distinguish this latter state of affairs 
from the former scenario of efficient management the terni "managerial slack" will 
henceforth be used. Managerial slack cannot be considered as a third vision of the 
corporation, because it simply constitutes an anomaly arising from the inefficiencies 
contemplated by the two visions outlined here rather than a separate theoretical 
model. 
The crucial issue that makes these two visions of the corporation different in 
practice is the allocation of cash flow generated by the firm's activities. As already 
mentioned, neoclassicists or anti-managerialists, such as Jensen and Meckling, argue 
that shareholder supremacy is a superior guiding principle because it reflects the 
ability of market forces to allocate resources efficiently. This means that cash flows 
must be invested only in order to maximize the market value of the firm, i. e. current 
shareholder wealth. 55 Moreover, any excess cash flows that may accrue after this 
objective is attained do not belong to the firm, since, in their view, it doesn't even 
have a real existence, and therefore should be returned to the finn's residual 
claimants, the shareholders, either in the form of dividends or share buy-backs. As 
Rajan and Zingales state in a recent paper: 
Unless there is a strong complementarity between assets in place and growth 
opportunities from a technological point of view, there is no reason why new 
opportunities should be undertaken within the legal shell represented by the 
existing company. (Raj an and Zingales 2001 a) 
54 This is an allegation that Jensen has tried to make. See Jensen (200 1). 
55 Recently, however, Jensen has significantly moderated this claim by arguing that firms can only 
t6seek" to maximise market value, an objective that can be combined with what he calls "enlightened 
stakeholder theory". In this model Jensen (2001: 154) seems at least partially to concede on the 
efficient markets hypothesis issue particularly since he admits that short-term profit maximisation can 
destroy long-term market value. Moreover, contrary to his early arguments, he goes as far as to claim 
that "companies, management systems, and economic systems are also like orgaMsms". 
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Excess cash retention by the firm is inefficient because it obstructs market allocation 
and, as a result, deprives other firms with profitable opportunities from obtaining the 
necessary finance to pursue them. 
On the other hand, pro-managerialists 56 do not necessarily oppose the 
retention of excess cash-flows by the firm so that they can be invested in projects that 
are related to the firm's future growth beyond the maximum point that is acceptable 
by the present shareholders or for the creation of cash reserves that can be used in 
difficult times and thus reduce the risk of failure. Thus, this view challenges the 
legitimacy of the claim that shareholders are the only claimants of excess cash flows 
on the ground that other stakeholders may also be residual risk bearers. In accordance 
with Freeman and Evan's argument, this is especially so where shareholders have 
diversified portfolios, so that their investment is not firm-specific. In this case, if a 
balance between stakeholder interests is to be achieved a minimum level of 
managerial discretion, i. e. diversion from shareholder/market value maximisation, is 
necessary and therefore legitimate. 
At first sight these two visions of the corporation seem to be in competition 
with each other. However, at least from a theoretical perspective no claim can be 
made that the shareholder model can lead to a better result than the managerial model 
and vice versa. The reason for this is that the two models are simply based on 
different sets of fundamental assumptions. For instance, Jensen's agency theory is 
founded upon the existence of efficient markets. Indeed, where markets are efficient 
informational asymmetries between shareholders and managers are contained (i. e. 
agency costs = 0) so that shareholders can always provide the firm with the necessary 
finance to pursue its profitable investment projects. Similarly, as Alchian and 
56 For convenience purposes hereafter the tem-is 44pro-managerialist" and "managerialist" will be used 
interchangeably. 
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Demsetz argue, in the absence of bargaining power differentials between stakeholders 
no opportunistic expropriation takes place. 
However, as already mentioned, if the market efficiency assumption is 
dropped, then either managerial discretion accrues or the alignment of managers' 
objectives with those of a particular type of stakeholder such as the shareholders can 
lead to inefficiencies. For example, if markets are not perfect and thus short-term 
values do not reflect long-term expectations, the alignment of managerial objectives 
with (dispersed) shareholders' expectations can translate into a preference for short- 
term returns with disastrous consequences for other stakeholders and the firm's long- 
term viability. This phenomenon, which amounts to excessive rent extraction by 
shareholders and is usually referred to as "short-termism", has sensibly attracted the 
severe criticism of observers who do not adhere to the neoclassical paradigm. 57 
Therefore, where markets are imperfect so that they cannot allocate resources 
efficiently, the internalisation of corporate finance with the retention of cash flow, 
even if that's beyond the levels acceptable to current shareholders, is an efficient 
outcome because managers are in the best possible position to know what the finn's 
opportunities are and allocate resources accordingly. Managerial discretion, as 
defined here, is necessary in these cases for the exploitation of complementarities 
between the firm's assets and growth opportunities. 
Thus, in imperfect markets a corporate governance model based on the 
principle of shareholder supremacy can hinder the sustainable growth of firms unless 
somehow shareholders have the ability and the incentives to bridge the informational 
gap between themselves and managers. This is the classic dilemma between stock 
liquidity and corporate control faced by shareholders and identified by Coffee (1991) 
57 See Cosh et al. (1990) and Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1995). For an empirical investigation 
see Miles (1993). 
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over a decade ago: the greater the preference of shareholders for liquidity, the lesser 
their incentive to micro-manage the firm. 58 The de facto separation of corporate 
ownership from control is, therefore, the direct result of this dilemma. While in theory 
the two models are equally sound, in practice their explanatory power is not 
equivalent. This is because the neoclassical assumption that markets are perfect and 
therefore efficient cannot be realistically fulfilled outside the theoretical laboratory. 
The very emergence of the oligopolistic, manager-controlled firm demonstrates this 
conclusively. Thus, from a microeconomic perspective, managerial discretion can be 
regarded as a positive safeguard against detrimental shareholder supremacy in a 
context of imperfect capital markets, bargaining power differentials and opportunistic 
behaviour. 
Apart from these microeconomic arguments against shareholder supremacy, 
managerialists have also produced some additional macroeconomic justifications for 
managerialism stemming from managers' preference for cash retention and output 
growth maximisation. For instance, Baumol (1967: 75-79) has claimed that manager- 
controlled firms have the tendency to produce goods more cheaply than 
6 (neoclassical" ones, and that manager's aversion to risk can have a stabilising effect 
for the economy. 59 Regarding the latter element, it could be argued that the retention 
of excess cash flow by the firm can indeed have a counter-cyclical effect. The build 
up of reserves can be a useful cushion absorbing some of the adverse effects of 
business cycles and financial shocks on investment, employees and so on. Moreover, 
others have suggested that the managerial motive for output growth may translate into 
faster macroeconomic growth rates. Odagiri (1981,1992) and Marris (1998), for 
instance, have argued that the higher the barriers to hostile takeovers, one of the main 
58 This claim, however, is not unqualified since some shareholders with illiquid stock may still lack the 
incentive to exercise corporate control. See infra. notes 104-105 and text. 
59 Williamson, however, expresses a more mixed view (Williamson 1964: 169-7 10). 
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shareholder control mechanisms, the faster the growth-rates pursued by managers and 
the higher the growth rates for the whole economy. Chandler's account of the early 
20th century managerial capitalism in major economies is also consistent with this 
view (Chandler 1990). 
60 He argues that the managerial firm emerged as the most 
successful corporate form because, freed from shareholder control, it was able to 
invest in developing its organisational and technological know-how in order to 
promote production efficiency and long-term growth as opposed to focusing current 
profits' maximisation (Chandler 1977: 10). In a Shumpeterian 61 fashion, managerial 
firms changed the nature of competition from one that resembles the traditional 
textbook model that focuses on prices, to another where technological and 
organisational innovation are the key to success. 
Thus, in effect, these pro-managerial claims take the argument further to 
justify managerial discretion as a source of economic welfare and consequently to 
legitimise the detachment of (share)ownership from control (Donaldson 1963; 
Manning 1958). In sum, a steadily growing firm creates more employment, promotes 
job security, pays better salaries, keeps shareholders satisfied in the long run and 
ultimately increases general welfare. 62 In a way, managers' discretion allowed them 
to undertake a central coordinating role within the firm and deploy resources in a way 
that resolved conflicts among different resource providers and promoted efficiency. 
As skill formation became crucial for production efficiency, funding of university 
60 See also Lazonick (1992) and Buxbauin (1984: 522-24). 
61 Schumpeter (1934,1942) is widely regarded as the father of evolutionary economics. 
62 See Coffee (1986), claiming that hostile-takeovers, the main constraining factor of managerial 
discretion, have serious adverse effects on non-shareholder constituencies and that there is a "natural 
alliance" between managers and those constituencies as the negative impact of such transactions is 
shared by both. See also Lazonick, (1992: 454 and 484) claiming that during the 1920s, the heyday of 
American managerialism, "as the major manufacturing corporations were paying their workers 
somewhat higher wages and expanding market share by reducing product prices to consumers, they 
were paying out well over 60% of net income as dividends to shareholders ... [and] still 
had enough 
retained earnings to fund virtually all their fixed capital outlays", and that "managers generally used 
[corporate] assets and revenues first and foremost to make long-term commitments to employees who 
could contribute to the development and utilization of the enterprise's productive resources. " 
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schools or setting up apprenticeship systems became a corporate norm (Lazonick and 
O'Sullivan 1997: 497- 521). So, it is not surprising that even corporate social 
responsibility claims were associated with managerial discretion. Baumol et al. 
(1970) went as far as to argue that "corporate altruism" is essential for a sustainable 
capitalist economic system, just as Dodd had done in the 1930s. It is in this context 
that Henry Ford decided to sacrifice shareholders' special dividends in order to 
devote more funds to the promotion of public purposes. 63 As Hikino observes: 
Within the microeconomic and institutional contexts that have existed since 
the Second Industrial Revolution, managerial capitalism has exhibited more dynamics than personal, family, and financial capitalism or centrally planned 
economies. (Hikino 1997: at 485) 
The micro and macroeconomic justifications for managerial discretion 
provided by managerial theorists where the efficient markets hypothesis does not 
apply are attractive. In particular, the link between microeconornic goals and 
macroeconomic variables provided by Odagiri is extremely important if one is to 
assess the wider economic success of a corporate governance system. Indeed, as it 
will be shown in chapter 2 below, one of the aims of this thesis is to emphasise the 
complementary relationship between microeconomic factors and macroeconomic 
conditions -a relationship that is crucial for understanding corporate governance and 
assessing its effectiveness. However, while Odagiri's model is micro-driven, i. e. 
managerialism drives macroeconomic growth- this thesis follows a two-way approach 
where firms' choice of goals can push or slow down an economy just as 
macroeconomic factors, such as effective demand, can pull it or slow it down. 
6' Eventually this decision was successfully challenged in court by Ford's shareholders. See Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Company (1919) 204 Mich. 459; 170 N. W. 668. 
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Moreover, the argument that managerial autonomy is the best guiding 
principle in imperfect markets needs to be qualified by the fact that managerial 
discretion can lead to (balanced) managerialism as much as to managerial slack. The 
former possibility where managerial discretion leads to the promotion of the 
corporate interest has already been explained above. However, in the latter scenario. 
freedom from the "rentier class" of shareholders would amount to slavery to the 
managerial class who would be in a position to abuse their power, e. g. by awarding 
themselves excessive salaries and other benefits, to the detriment of the firm and the 
economy at large (Marris 1998: 159). Furthermore, due to the existence of bargaining 
power differentials both within and outside the firm, opportunistic behaviour by one 
or more powerful stakeholders can be equally detrimental. Where one group of 
stakeholders is able to tilt the balance of corporate decision-making to its side by 
dominating management, i. e. by aligning managerial interests with the promotion of 
its own goals beyond what the corporate interest would justify, a detrimental 
expropriation of the firm's cash flow occurs. 
Having identified the two main theoretical visions of the corporation the next 
necessary step is to investigate what determines the nature of corporate governance in 
practice. Obviously, in the case of the managerial firm the analysis should seek to 
explore the factors determining the choice of managerial goals. This is the purpose of 
the next section. 
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1.4. A COMPARATIVE STATICS APPROACH TO THE DETERMINANT 
INSTITUTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Certainly, in a perfect world where the neoclassical teleological assumptions 
apply the only determinant of corporate governance is the market. However, in reality 
managerial behaviour is shaped in an imperfect world where the bounded rationality 
of economic agents and uncertainty give rise to positive transaction costs. Therefore, 
the appropriate theory for analysing corporate governance practice should be one that 
can encompass the existence of imperfect markets. As a result, the preferred approach 
of this thesis for understanding real corporate governance phenomena is one that 
relies on institutional analysis rather than one based on neoclassical equilibria that are 
free from institutional interference. 64 That is, in imperfect markets, whether corporate 
governance reflects shareholder supremacy, managerialism, or managerial slack is 
determined by the institutional structure within which it is embedded. 
According to Alston's methodological proposition, institutional analysis can 
proceed in two different ways (Alston 1996: 26). The first is one that focuses on the 
effects of existing institutional configurations on economic agents' choices of action 
as a "comparative statics" exercise. The second method concentrates on the dynamic 
analysis of institutional sets by examining the causes of institutional change. While 
the latter approach is central for the purposes of this thesis, the remainder of this 
chapter is devoted to a static institutional analysis leaving the dynamic analysis for 
the next chapter. This is because, in order to identify the endogenous and exogenous 
dynamics as sources of a corporate governance system's change, a prior 
understanding of the determinant role of institutions is necessary. 
64 On the role of institutions in perfect markets see section 2.4.1 below. 
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Although institutionalist methodology has gradually gained wide acceptance 
over the years and now constitutes a significant element in economics and social 
science in general, 65 there is no standard definition of institutions. For instance, 
Veblen (1919: 239), one of the pioneers of institutional analysis, saw institutions 
broadly as "settled habits of thought common to the generality of men". While 
versions of this "common habits" approach can be found in several texts, others 
attempt to define institutions in more formal terms (Knight 1947; Katona 195 1; 
Polanyi 1967). 66 Thus, to North institutions are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence 
they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or, 
economic. An the jargon of the economist, institutions define and limit the 
set of choices. (North 1990: 3-4) 
These behavioural constraints can be formal and informal. The former institutional 
type may include rules contained in constitutions, statute and common law, 
organisational by-laws, and even contracts. Informal institutions or norms, on the 
other hand, consist of accepted practices, customs and regularities that are not legally 
enforceable but which are, nevertheless, followed either for habitual reasons or 
because breaching them entails social and peer-group criticism as well as reputation 
costs. However, while they have an important influence on individuals' choices, these 
constraints do not determine human behaviour completely (Hodgson 1988: 10-12). 
Contrary to the absolute neoclassical determinism, they simply set the limits of action 
and define the opportunity set of economic agents, which may be broad or narrow 
depending on the nature and effect of institutional constraints. 
67 As Parsons (1940: 
190) states, institutions are "nonnative patterns which define what are felt to be, 
in 
65 See also Hodgson (1988). 
66 For a review of the literature see Hodgson (1988) at 124-134. 
67 On the significance of this for institutional evolution see section 2.4 below. 
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the given society, proper, legitimate, or expected modes of action or of social 
relationship". Since the behavioural choices of economic actors are not fully 
predetermined by the invisible hand of perfect markets, total uniformity is not the 
norm. Zysman summarises the determinant role of institutions as follows: 
[The] national institutional structure shapes the dynamics of the political 
economy and sets the boundaries within which government and corporate 
strategies are chosen ... Certainly, there will be variety within a particular 
polity; but its common national features give character and provide limits to 
that diversity. (Zysman 1994: 271) 
Institutions do not exist and operate in isolation from each other. On the 
contrary, viewed in a static way, they form coherent institutional webs the component 
elements of which are interconnected and complementary (Zysman 1994; Amable 
1999). Complementarity can be vertical, i. e. between formal institutions and informal 
institutions, or horizontal, i. e. between institutions of the same type. For example, 
vertical complementarity occurs as legal rules often come into existence as a result of 
the crystallisation of routines, conventions, traditions etc. and are therefore closely 
linked to the context of norms and values from which they derive. Moreover, 
informal institutions can be extensions, elaborations and qualifications of formal rules 
(North 1990: 83). Horizontal complementarities come about as institutions, especially 
formal ones, are often shaped so as to be compatible and often to reinforce each other. 
Such complementarities are more common between groups of institutions that are 
assigned with the task of regulating particular areas of activity, such as 
finance, 
industrial relations, social security, education, crime, property ownership, justice, 
contract, etc. These institutional groups collectively form sub-systems which are also 
in a complementary relationship with each other as they make up a coherent system. 
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Having identified the nature and role of institutional constraints, an important 
distinction that must be made is that between institutions and organisations, such as 
firms, unions, and regulatory or government agencies (North 1990: 4-5; Aniable 
1999). 68 While the latter may also provide a structure for human activity, just as 
institutions do, they are essentially the creators of the institutional sets within which 
they act rather than parts of it. That is, just like humans, organisations are the players 
and institutions are the rules. Since institutions are created by humans, often through 
organisations, this distinction is crucial for understanding not only the nature and role 
of particular institutional frameworks but also the interaction between rules and 
players. While organisations create institutions, at the same time they are shaped by 
the institutional sets within which they operate. Institutions determine the boundaries 
of organisations activities and, thus, shape their nature. 
The focus of this thesis is on a particular type of player, namely the firm as an 
organisation which, as it was shown above, can either have an existence of its own or 
be a mere fictitious entity. In a similar manner to Dewey's "consequentialiSMio69 of 
the 1 9th century this thesis argues that to a large extent the nature of the corporation 
can be determined by its actions as these are shaped by the institutional environment. 
By operating as constraints that affect economic agents' choices of action, institutions 
can to a large extent determine corporate decisions. In the managerial corporation, 
each institution affecting the behaviour of managers, and, therefore, of the firm, has a 
particular dynamic which pulls finn behaviour towards a particular direction. For 
instance, an institution that constrains managerial discretion pulls the system towards 
" Some authors, however, tend to blur this distinction. E. g. see Alston (1996). 
69This claim was part of the early 190' century debate between legal theorists on the role of theory in 
determining the nature of the corporation. Dewey's position was that the theories of the corporation 
outlined above lead to conflicting implications as each theory can be "used to serve opposing ends. " 
Instead, he claimed that the corporation is a concept which can only be determined by the 
consequences of its actions within the particular circumstances each time; see Dewey (1926). 
73 
a market-oriented shareholder supremacy model, whereas another that constrains the 
operation of the market for corporate control pulls it towards managerialism. In this 
way, institutions determine not only how much discretion, if any, managers can enjoy 
but also how it will be used. 
Thus, a corporate governance system must be described as a nexus of several 
such institutional forces. What then determines the nature of corporate governance is 
the resultant force of this nexus, which drives firrn behaviour towards either the 
managerial paradigm or shareholder supremacy. So, while two separate national 
systems may bear several institutional differences, if the combined force of 
constraints limits managerial discretion considerably, then they can be categorised as 
versions of the neoclassical shareholder supremacy model . 
70 If5 on the other hand, the 
institutional constraints as a whole leave significant discretion to managers, then the 
systems will essentially be versions of the managerial paradigm. 71 
However, one implication of institutional complementarity is that identifying 
all the institutions that may affect managerial behaviour either directly or indirectly 
can be a colossal and almost impossible task. 72 This is even more so in a comparative 
analysis due to the particular differences that exist between national institutional sets. 
Therefore, an alternative and more realistic methodology is one that is more generic 
than specific and which relies on the selection of particular elements or sub-systems 
that seem to have the largest influence on the strategic choices of the players 
70 Of course, due to the unavoidable presence of positive transaction costs it is practically impossible to 
reach a neoclassical equilibrium. Therefore, managers will always enjoy some discretion. Institutional 
sets, however, can enhance the role of market contracting enough to minimise the level of managerial 
discretion and so promote shareholder supremacy as the prevailing governance principle. 
71 For instance national institutional forces in major economic powers during a large part of the 
previous century supported and promoted managerial discretion and thus gave rise to different versions 
of managerialism. See section 1.2 above. 
72 On the methodological difficulties of institutional analysis see Amable and Pettit (1999) and Amable 
(1999). 
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studied. However, it is necessary to note that due to systemic complementarity and 
complexity, identifying and defining the precise boundaries of such subsystems is not 
always possible and, as a result, some arbitrariness is unavoidably introduced. The 
general areas selected here as the most important in determining corporate 
governance are company law, the financial system, the industrial relations system, 
and macroeconomic and competition policy institutions. Due to the centrality of 
company law in regulating corporate activity it seems appropriate to examine its role 
first and as a separate heading. 
1.4.1. The Indeterminate Nature of Fundamental Company Law Concepts and 
Its Implications 
The vast majority of comparative company law studies concentrate on the 
differences rather than the similarities that exist between national legal rules 
governing corporate activity. However, the discussion that follows will argue that 
some of the most fundamental elements of company law are very similar in all major 
capitalist modelS74 so that any modem company lawyer takes them for granted even 
though historical analysis shows that they are products of a long evolutionary process. 
These elements have significant implications for corporate governance as they are 
directly linked to the elements of ownership and control and the relationship between 
them. 
" Such a methodology resembles the "R6gulation" approach, which concentrates on certain standard 
institutional themes which can even be loosely connected with the subject of analysis, rather than a 
more comprehensive analysis which would seek to identify all the institutions that are directly linked 
to the activities that are being studied. See, for instance, Aglietta (1979) and Boyer (1990). 
74 By major capitalist models this thesis refers primarily to the UK, US, Germany, France and Japan. 
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Corporate personality and ownership 
The notion of corporate legal personality and its implications are perhaps 
features that most company lawyers in all major jurisdictions now tend to perceive as 
given and inseparable from the very existence of company law. However, when they 
do so, they ignore the fact that this fundamental notion, the basis of company law as a 
legal subject, has emerged through an evolutionary process. 
While in I 9th century England the use of the trust enabled commercial 
associations to function without the need of legal personality, 75 in the absence of the 
trust, lawyers in European continental jurisdiction had to invent a vehicle that would 
serve the needs of associations of entrepreneurs. Thus, the societe en commandite 
with a legal personality distinct from its members who enjoyed limited liability 
became the dominant business form in Continental jurisdictions relatively early. The 
need to grant legal personality to such associations was more imminent on the 
Continent than in England where deeds of settlement and partnerships continued to 
dominate economic activity until well into the second half of the I gth century (Foster 
2000). 76 Nevertheless, commercial reality revealed the weaknesses of the English 
legal regime and inevitably led to the grant of limited liability and the recognition of 
the company's autonomous legal persona even for small one-man companies. 
77 so 
although English company law had different origins from other Continental European 
ones and followed a different path of evolution for several decades, over time the 
15 See for instance Child v Hudson's Bay Co (1723) 2 P. Wins 207; Harrison v Pryse (1740) Barn. Ch. 
324; Taylor v Chichester Rly Co (1867) LR 2 Exch. 256. 
16 When the Bubble Act of 1720 restricted dramatically the creation of joint stock companies in 
England, entrepreneurs used the deed of settlement to establish unincorporated associations in order to 
conduct their business operations. Those bodies were not separate legal entities and their assets were 
held by trustees who could act on the associations' behalf On the other hand, the debate on whether 
societý en commandite should be introduced into English law was long and intense (Davies 1997: 40 et 
sec. ). 
17 See Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 and Salomon v. Salomon Ltd [1897] AC 22 respectlvelý'; for a 
detailed overview see Davies (1997: 28-46). 
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fundamental notions of corporate personality and limited liability became an 
indispensable element of both systems and their former colonies. 
A significant qualitative change in the nature of the share had immense 
influence on the development of those notions (Ireland 1996: 303). This change came 
with the growth of corporations, especially railway, mining and canal building 
companies, during the two industrial revolutions of the 19'h century combined with 
the increase in the number of shares with free transferability. Investors met in stock 
markets and bought, sold and liquidated their shares in companies in the same way 
that bonds were exchanged without affecting the companies themselves. The share as 
a unit of property was separated from the company's assets and acquired a market 
value of its own. The link between share-ownership and corporate ownership was 
practically broken. 
So. in the most influential capitalist economies registered companies came to 
be regarded as autonomous legal entities or persons which are separate and distinct 
from their shareholders. As a legal person a company can sue and be sued. It can own 
property and enter into contracts with third parties, including other companies. 
Generally, a company can conduct its business in its own name and on its own behalf 
It has a separate existence from its shareholders who may change or cease to exist 
without necessarily affecting the corporation. 
Perhaps one of the most important consequences of corporate legal personality 
is in the sphere of ownership, one of the two basic component elements of corporate 
governance identified in section 1.1 above. All major company 
law systems stop short 
of attributing to any natural or legal person(s) full legal ownership of a corporation. 
So while under the doctrine of corporate personality a company may own property 
under its own name, even a controlling shareholder 
interest in a company, say 51 %- 
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100% of all voting shares, will not give rise to a proprietary interest in the company's 
assets. 78 The only property a shareholder owns is the shares themselves and the 
bundle of rights that their ownership carries . 
79 This means that ownership of a 
company's shares is a matter distinct from corporate ownership. 
Another fundamental attribute of the incorporated company is the doctrine of 
shareholders' limited liability. In fact, limited liability and corporate personality are 
the two sides of the same coin. It would be paradoxical to regard the corporation as a 
legal person distinct from its shareholders if the later were to be liable for the acts or 
liabilities of the former. Thus, company law allows for shareholders' liability to be 
limited to the amount of capital they provided for the purchase of their shares. So in a 
sense limited liability reduces the economic status of a shareholder to that of a 
debenture holder. As Sealy observes: 
The theoretical differences between being a creditor of the company and being 
a member are considerable from a legal point of view, but (at least in the case 
of a solvent and prosperous company) the practical consequences for 
investors, apart sometimes from tax considerations, are very similar [ ... ] an investment in debentures or debenture stock is very similar to an investment in 
shares: both are securities in the corporate sector of the economy offering 
different kinds of risk and different kinds of return. (Sealy 1996: 38 1) 
In fact, the creditor-shareholder comparison may be a useful one when investigating 
the issue of corporate legal ownership. In the same way that unsecured creditors can 
78 See for instance the English decision in Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd [1925] A. C. 619. 
Similarly, Article 529 of the French Commercial Code of 1807 acknowledged that a company (societý) 
owned its assets in its own right (Foster 2000: n. 114 and text). 
79 There is vast obscurity regarding the legal definition of the share. In English company law, 
Pennington (1990: 56) writes, "[s]hares are simply bundles of contractual and statutory rights which 
the shareholder has against the company" (emphasis added). The French version provided by Ripert 
and Roblot (1989: para 1147) is even less enlightening since it describes a share as "the rights of a 
shareholder in a company with a share capital as opposed to his economic interest in it. " For the 
American definition see Ballantine (1946: para. 198) where a share is defined as "a profit sharing 
contract, one of a series of units of interest and participation, authorised by the charter of a corporation, 
by which capital is obtained in consideration of a proportional right to participate in dividend and their 
distributions. " In German company law a share is described as 'the collective proprietary and 
membership rights inherent in a member's participation in a company" (Godin-Welhelmi 1967: 12). 
The important thing here is that none of these definitions defines the share as a fraction of the company 
as a piece of property in the company itself (Pennington 1989). 
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become the controllers of an insolvent company without any absolute ownership right 
over the corporation itself, shareholders are the ultimate controllers of a solvent 
COMPany without enjoying the status of a legal owner. 
However, although a company has no owner in the strict legal sense, in most 
capitalist jurisdictions, company law recognises the centrality of the body of 
shareholders in corporate control and governance at the General Meeting. It is this 
body that approves significant transactions such as mergers and capital increases, has 
the last word over who will be a director, and even decide on the company's 
dissolution and liquidation. This situation, that has its roots in the partnership origins 
of company law, puts the constituency of shareholders as a group at the top of the 
legal model of the corporate hierarchy. 
Legal Separation of Share-Ownership and Control - Directors Duties 
Another common feature of company law systems is the legal separation of 
share ownership and control of day-to-day management. This is effected by the 
legally prescribed organisational structure of the company itself. 
As stated above, at the top of the corporate hierarchy are the shareholders as a 
group that assembles at the General Meeting. The functions of the General Meeting 
are regulated in a very similar fashion in all major company law systems (Wymeersch 
2000). For instance, General Meetings vote by majority, appoint the company's 
auditors and decide upon important corporate transactions. Similarly, all national 
company laws provide minimum safeguards against the exploitation of minority 
shareholders by the majority, and specify General Meeting procedures that have to be 
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followed at all times. 80 All these fundamental features of modem company laxx were 
not always present. Principles like minority protection and "corporate suffrage" %vere 
virtually unknown in the early days of company law. The norm was great divergence 
both within and between jurisdictions. 81 Over time, however, significant convergence 
towards both these principles occurred in all major company law systems. 
What is more important, however, is that all company laws in one way or 
another call for the delegation of the powers and responsibilities of day-to-day 
management to a body which is separate from the General Meeting. 82 So there is a 
significant delegation of corporate control from shareholders to a board of directors 
which is most commonly a unitary one, but it can also be a two-tier structure 
comprising a non-executive supervisory board and an executive management board 
83 (e. g. in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Denirnark and Sweden). The main link 
between those boards and the shareholders is that directors are appointed by the 
General Meeting. 84 This is the ultimate control function associated with share- 
ownership. When the body of shareholders are not happy with the incumbent board 
members they can dismiss or refuse to reappoint them as they think fit. While this is a 
considerable power over the company granted by company law, the General 
Meeting's powers are of a "residual" and "generic" character, since by law the main 
decision-making body is the board. The management functions of a company are 
transferred on to the directors making the board the centre of the company's power 
structure. 
80 Although accoding to La Porta et aL (1999) common law countries have tended to have higher levels 
of minority protection than their civil law counterparts. 
81 See for instance Dunlavy (1998: 5-39). 
82 On the origins of the German delegation of control to management see Chandler (1990: 591). On 
Germany, Britain and France see Whittington and Mayer (2000). 
83 The supervisory board stands between the General Meeting and the management board. See section 
3.4.1. below for a description of the German two-tier board structure. 
84 In two-tier systems up to half of the supervisory board members may now be appointed by 
employees and labour unions. The chairman is a shareholder appointee and 
has a casting vote in the 
case of stalemate. 
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This legally prescribed separation of (share-)ownership from control instantlý, 
raises the issue of accountability of those in control of the company's affairs. So 
another standard feature of company law is the imposition of legal duties on directors 
with the purpose of ensuring that they meet certain standards of conduct and 
preventing abuses of power. There is great diversity in the methods employed and 
their possible effectiveness for the enforcement of directors' duties. For instance, 
while most systems leave enforcement to adversarial private litigation, some 
company laws show a preference to internal negotiation and pressure from within the 
board structure. 85 However, there are very important similarities in the nature of those 
duties and their purpose in all major jurisdictions, they all contain a duty that board 
members have to act in the best interests of the company (Stengel 1998; Teubner 
1985: 155). The duty is owed to the company itself as an autonomous entity and as a 
general rule it is the company that enforces it. 86 
Certainly, the formulation of the duty raises the issue of what the interests of 
the company are. However, the law in most cases is insufficient to provide a clear 
answer to this so that in some cases the company's interests have been described as 
an 44elusive concept" (Farrar 1987: 55). Most major company law systems give a 
broad meaning to the duty. In the United States, for instance, the enactment of 
corporate constituency statutes and some landmark court decisions balanced 
shareholder supremacy with stakeholder objectives. 
87 In Germany, the concept of 
Unternehmensinteresse (interest of the enterprise) developed by courts is also 
believed to integrate shareholder and non-shareholder interests (Kiibler 1985: 439). 
85 E. g. through supervisory board monitoring over the management board 
in the two-tier model. 
81 Many jurisdictions allow derivative actions by shareholders. But even these actions are brought on 
behalf of the company. Personal shareholder actions are very rare and even then their subject matter 
is 
not a wrong done to the company but an infringement of the shareholders 
individual rights. 
81 See Gordon (1997: 1488); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica 481 U. S. 69 (1987); Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 571 A. 2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
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Similarly, in France Vinterit social (interest of the company) includes a plurality of 
interests apart from those of the shareholders (Paillusseau 1991: 31-38). 
English company law is rather exceptional since it has not entirely broken 
away from the I gth century shareholder-oriented model. The courts continue to hold 
that the interests of the company are equivalent to the interests of the present and 
future shareholders. 88 On the surface this may seem to resolve the problem in favour 
of shareholder supremacy. In practice, however, even this formulation of the duty 
does not automatically preclude non-shareholder interests from being taken into 
account in directors' decision-making. In practice, the inclusion of future 
shareholders' interests expands the corporate interest enough to provide justifications 
for significant diversion from what current shareholders may perceive as their 
interests. Indeed, English businessmen tend to perceive the interests of non- 
shareholder constituencies as fully integrated in the interests of the company. 89 As 
Lord Wedderburn observes: 
a director whose legal duty is to make an honest business judgment balancing 
all these interests will rarely be open to challenge unless he is a crook who has 
been careless with the minutes. The field is full of fudge. (Lord Wedderburn 
1993: 231) 
On the other hand, the enactment of s. 309 of the Companies Act, which expressly 
provides for the inclusion of employees interests in corporate decision-making, seems 
to further dilute directors' accountability to current shareholders (Davies 1997: 603). 
So even the more traditional English version of the duty does not provide significant 
18 Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421; Greenhalph v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch. 286; Lee 
Panavision Ltd V Lee Lighting [1991] B. C. C. 620; Milner Holland Q. C., Report on the Savoy Hotel 
Ltd And the Berkeley Hotel Company Ltd Board of Trade. (1954) cited in Davies (1997) at 604. 
Although, one should acknowledge that pending English company law reform may ultimately provide 
recognition of wider interests. See Modernising Company Law, Command Paper CM 5553-1, July 
2002. 
89 See Hampel Committee (1998: 12). 
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disincentives for the inclusion of non-shareholder interests in what managers perceive 
as the corporate interest. 
Doctrinal Indeterminacy as a Promoter of the Managerial Paradigm 
As the preceding discussion has shown national company law systems have important 
similarities in the way they deal with corporate ownership and control and the 
relationship between them. What then requires examination is the extent to which 
company law can pull corporate governance towards the shareholder supremacy or 
the managerial paradigm. 
One could logically expect that company law should provide some conclusive 
answers about the nature of ownership and control, given their significance as factors 
determining not only the true nature of the company but also its governance. More 
precisely, the law could clarify the status of the shareholder either as the owner of the 
company or as a mere financier similar to a creditor. By doing so it would not only 
determine the nature of corporate ownership but it would also settle the issue of who 
should be in control. Nevertheless, it does neither with sufficient certainty. Company 
law accepts the centrality of shareholders in corporate control by placing the general 
meeting at the top of the power hierarchy and by allowing it to have the final word on 
important matters. This closely resembles the shareholder supremacy view of the 
corporation. However, by stopping short of treating them as true legal owners 
company law also follows the managerialist paradigm. 
It has to be noted here that in the case of a closely held corporation with 
shareholders who are interested in using the control tools provided by company law, 
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the legal separation of ownership and control can become practically irrelevant from 
the corporate governance perspective. If a shareholder or a group of them are eager to 
get involved in the management of the company, they can do so provided they own at 
least the majority of voting shares. For instance, this is usually the case in small 
family companies with few shareholders who see their company's affairs as their own 
personal business. They appoint themselves as directors and thus turn the corporate 
organic structure into a mere formality prescribed by law. The general meeting and 
the board of directors are technically separate organs, but in practice they are not 
since they are comprised partially or entirely by the same persons. The situation may 
be similar in a wholly owned subsidiary which is controlled by its parent or a closely 
held company with homogenous 90 shareholders. 
This thesis, however, is concerned with the large management-control led 
corporation which is characterised by a de facto separation of ownership and control. 
In this type of company the role of company law is potentially crucial as it could 
provide concrete governance solutions. For example, if legal rules awarded 
shareholders clearly defined ownership rights over the company as a whole the 
corporate governance issue would become a marginal one. That is, it would be 
reduced into a legal enforcement debate which would merely concentrate on the effort 
of ensuring managerial accountability to shareholders in order to bridge the gap 
between ownership and control. Had this been the case, the raison dWre of all the 
theories discussed in section 1.3 above would instantly disappear. In fact, shareholder 
supremacy would have prevailed as a guiding principle thus rendering any managerial 
legitimacy arguments hollow. 
90 The term is used here to describe a group of shareholders with similar interests and views about the 
company's affairs. 
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Perhaps company law's indeterminacy in respect of ownership would become 
irrelevant if there were a clear legal answer as to what the company's interests are. If 
those were equated to the interests of current shareholders then the ownership 
problem would be circumvented. It would be as if the shareholders were themselves 
the corporation thus resolving the ownership issue before even arising. However, this 
is not how the law is. As shown above, the corporate interest is a vague and flexible 
concept that can be stretched to cover non-shareholder interests. 91 Directors owe their 
duties to the company and, subject to some limited exceptions where available, it is 
the company that enforces its rights and protects its interests. The incorporated 
company is indeed a legal person separate from the owners of stock. 
Fortunately for academics and unfortunately for practitioners company law 
seems to be incomplete from a corporate governance perspective. It does not provide 
the necessary link between ownership and control so as to resolve the governance 
issue either directly, by awarding a legal ownership status to the shareholder, or 
indirectly, by giving a limited meaning to the corporate interest. Due to this 
incompleteness, company law resembles a pendulum that balances between 
shareholder supremacy and managerialism. As Iwai observes, due to its inability to 
determine the nature of the company, all company law provides is a 'menu' of 
corporate structures ranging from the purely "nominalistic" to the purely "realistic" 
from which a society can choose (Iwai 1999). In other words, national company law 
systems seem to share a common characteristic of indeterminacy. They stop short of 
determining the Orientation of corporate governance, since they do not define 
conclusively the nature of corporate ownership and its relationship with control. 
91 For a similar view on the flexibility of English company law see Parkinson (1993: 279-280). 
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The implications from this indeterminacy are significant. By avoiding the 
conclusive resolution of corporate governance issues, company law as an institution 
becomes flexible enough to allow diverse corporate policies according to the specific 
wishes of those in control of the company. This flexibility derives from the gap 
created by the simultaneous recognition of corporate personality with a vaguely 
defined interest and of the shareholder merely as a "virtual" but not legal owner of the 
company. In the case of large public corporations where managers are in control, 
incompleteness and flexibility automatically translate into increased discretion. So, to 
a great extent managerial discretion is institutionalised in company law subject of 
course to the use of the legal control tools supplied to the shareholders, which, 
however, may not always be available in practice. 
From a comparative perspective, the significant similarity of basic company 
law doctrines along the lines of the managerial paradigm should be expected to reflect 
or be reflected by a corresponding similarity in corporate governance. Indeed, as 
section 1.2 has shown, for a large part of the 20'h century versions of managerialism 
have been dominant in several major economies. However, this similarity did not 
persist. As section 3.2 below will argue, institutional developments that occurred in 
the UK and the US during the 1980s transfonned corporate governance there even 
though company law remained fairly stable as a promoter of managerialism. This 
means that, while company law could be seen as a core factor affecting corporate 
governance, in practice its determining force as an isolated institution is minimal. In 
other words, the core of national company law rules alone may not be sufficient to 
account for the fundamental differences in the nature, the role and the governance of 
the corporation between national systems. Other institutions have an important role as 
deten-ninants of corporate governance that can even "neutralise" the influence of 
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company law. This does not mean, however, that the institutional complementarity 
considerations discussed earlier have no validity. On the contrary, the "neutralisation" 
of company law is an illustration of institutional interaction and complementarity. 
This is because, when other institutions determine corporate governance, they do not 
override company law but fill those doctrinal gaps that are responsible for its 
indeterminacy. 
1.4.2. Other Sub-Systems of Institutions and Their Determinant Influence 
Having considered the function of company law as a promoter of the 
managerial paradigm, at least in the case of corporations that are de facto controlled 
by managers, the thesis now turns to examine the influence of other sub-systems on 
corporate governance. Of course, the analysis of constraints herein is by no means 
exhaustive since the subsystems and individual institutions that shape finns' and 
managers' choices are enormous. However, the institutional configurations analysed 
here are in this thesis view the most important in terms of determinative influence. 
Without resorting to a detailed analysis of specific institutions, the main aim here is to 
provide illustrations of the role of fundamental institutional subsystems and their 
complementarities as determinants of corporate governance outcomes. The areas 
selected here are considered as fundamental, because they are directly related either 
to the two most essential inputs of the firm, namely financial capital and labour, or to 
the nature of product market competition. These three institutional subsystems 
regulate the three most important sources of managerial constraints. 
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The Financial System 
Broadly speaking a financial system comprises the processes through which 
savings are channelled to the real economy. Schmidt et al. define a financial sý, stem 
as the "interaction between the supply of, and the demand for, the provision of capital 
and other finance-related services" (Schmidt et al. 2001). They distinguish between a 
financial system and the financial sector, with the latter being a component of the 
former. 92 However, they also claim that corporate govemance is also part of the 
financial system. This is not entirely consistent with the view presented here which 
conceives corporate governance as the product of complex and diverse institutional 
arrangements, which include but also go beyond the financial system, and not as part 
of them. This divergence of opinion demonstrates how institutional complementarity 
makes the distinction between sub-systems a very difficult task. It also shows how the 
relationship between institutional structures and economic actors is based on 
interaction so that the former determines the latter and vice versa. Nonetheless, 
following the distinction between institutions and players 93 and since corporate 
decision-making in the view of this thesis is better defined as a player's action rather 
than as a constraint, corporate governance should be differentiated from the financial 
system, or any other institutional sub-system. 
Financial allocation channels are numerous and diverse the most important of 
which are banks, securities markets, pension funds and other non-bank financial 
intermediaries which collectively comprise the financial sector. In modem economies 
92 They define the financial sector as "the part, or sector, of an economy which offers the economic 
units in the other sectors opportunities to invest and to obtain financing, together with associated 
advisory and intermediation services. Its principal constituent elements are 
banks, other financial 
intermediaries and the financial markets, in particular the securities exchanges as organised financial 
markets" (Schmidt et al. 2001). 
93 Supra. notes 66-68 and text. 
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the regulatory environment in financial markets constitutes an extremely complex 
system of interwoven institutions which range from rules governing foreign 
exchange, savings, securities markets and investor protection, taxation, etc. All these 
institutions combined determine the ways in which financial capital is mobilized and 
ultimately distributed to the corporate sector and, therefore, shape the financial 
system as a whole. Different historical contingencies require different institutional 
responses which in turn determine what types of channels are ultimately chosen for 
funding industrial investment. Thus, while all capitalist financial systems are similar, 
in that financial sectors therein consist of various allocation mechanisms, the role of 
particular channels differs. 
In order to explain this divergence between financial systems it is important to 
emphasise the existence of relationships between savers, the financial sector and non- 
financial firms as channels of information flows (Schmidt et al. 2001). The role of 
information is of crucial importance since it affects the nature, distribution and 
volume of transaction costs by defining the boundaries of each economic actor's 
rationality (Leland and Pyle 1977). It is at this level that institutions come into play as 
they determine the types of financial relations by "guiding" the flows of information 
between economic actors. For instance, institutions that facilitate the flow of 
information from a corporation towards public investors can decrease the level 
uncertainty in securities markets and consequently reduce the transaction costs of 
securities finance. Mandatory disclosure rules are one such type of institutions. 
94 
Other rules, however, may hinder such public information flows. When sufficient 
public information is lacking, close and private rather than arm's length market-based 
financial relationships will emerge, as high transaction and agency costs will deter 
94 For a detailed analysis of specific institutions see Black (2001). 
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economic actors from using securities markets. Under such circumstances, financial 
intermediaries, the most important of which are banks, 95 may be able to resolve 
informational asymmetries by pooling funds and thus internalising financial 
transactions. So, two fundamental parameters that characterise financial systems are 
the degree of financial intermediation, on the one hand, and securitisation on the 
other. The former shows the importance of non-market mechanisms in channelling 
financial resources, while the latter is evidence for the relevance of market-based 
financial relationships. 
Since the inevitability of at least some transaction costs in financial 
contracting makes the presence of some intermediation a characteristic of any 
financial system, it is inevitable that completely securitised systems cannot exist in 
the real world. Nevertheless, while securities markets and financial intermediaries are 
present everywhere, their significance and role are not equal in all financial systems 
as they depend on the manner in which institutional sets resolve informational 
asymmetries. Thus, where financial systems as a whole tend to reduce the costs of 
securities finance, securities markets should acquire a central role in the allocation of 
capital. In contrast, if systems hamper public flows of information, the importance of 
financial intermediation, and so the role of banks, should increase. In other words, 
institutional differences can give rise to two main types of financial systems. The 
first, which can be called "market-based", is built around large and liquid public 
securities markets that constitute its centre. The second, which can be termed "bank- 
based", is a financial system in which banks as financial intennediaries constitute the 
dominant channels through which financial capital reaches the non-financial 
corporate sector. 
95 While other financial institutions, such as insurance companies, investment funds and pension funds 
may also have an intermediation role, banks are considered to be "unique" in their function as financial 
intermediaries (James 1987; Diamond 1984). 
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From the above discussion it is evident that the institutional constraints 
regulating the costs of using the securities markets are of central importance in 
determining whether a financial system is bank-based or market-based. Such 
institutions are numerous and diverse both in terms of function and of nature. While 
some observers attach more importance to legal rules (La Porta et al. 1997,1998, 
2000; Shleifer and vishny 1997), others claim that legal enforceability is not a 
necessary condition for a particular institution to exert determinant influence and that 
self-governance mechanisms can be at least as effective (Coffee 2001; Cheffins 
2001). Irrespectively of what their type is, institutions promoting and supporting the 
role of securities markets have two specific functions. The first is to resolve 
information asymmetries between public investors and the corporate sector by 
increasing the volume of valuable information that is publicly available. Such 
institutions include mandatory disclosure rules for listed corporations and accounting 
standards, but also quality screening of securities issues by private investment banks, 
stockbrokers and rating agencies. Increased information flows facilitate the 
calculation of risk by those interested in investing in securities and related 
instruments and so they reduce uncertainty. Thus, the more public information such 
institutions produce, the less the transaction costs and the more efficient the markets. 
The second function is to reduce the ability of those who possess non-public, 
privileged information to behave opportunistically to the detriment of market 
investors. Institutions such as insider trading prohibitions, takeover regulations and 
various other minority shareholder protection rules can minimise private rents that 
accrue from establishing close financial relationships. As a result, the transaction 
costs for arm's-length investors arising from relational investors' opportunistic 
behaviour decline. In the absence of private rents accruing form relational financial 
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contracts both types of investors are placed in a similar position vis-a-vis the 
corporate sector. Thus, the incentives for non-market financial relations diminish and 
the role of securities markets as an allocation mechanism of financial capital is 
enhanced while that of intermediation declines. 
Furthermore, apart from those institutions that directly regulate information 
flows, numerous other constraints may also exist that determine the role of securities 
markets in the financial system. For example, particular regulatory controls and 
government policies may be specifically designed to hinder the development of 
securities markets to the advantage of the banking sector and vice versa (Coffee 2001 
and Cheffins 200 1). 96 The imposition of such institutional constraints can directly 
interfere with the competitive position of each type of financial resources allocation 
mechanism and thus determine the orientation of the financial sector. The manner of 
such interference varies significantly both in form and in influence from interest rate 
policies, 97 minimum reserve requirements 98 or tax burdens 99 to direct restrictions on 
the scale and scope of operations that financial institutions can undertake. 100 Of 
course, the effect and orientation of such direct measures in the financial sector can 
only be expected to be complementary to those of the information-related institutional 
constraints described above. 
On the surplus side of a financial system a number of institutional factors 
shape both the extent and the choice of savings according to the particular needs of 
each country. A particularly significant element of national savings is the system of 
96 For an analysis of this view from a political perspective see Roe (2000). 
97 The interest rates are directly related not only to banks' profitability but also determine the 
attractiveness of bank saving as opposed to investment in other assets such as securities. 
9' if these requirements are too high banks will be in a direct disadvantage, since they either have to 
shift the higher costs to their clients or face a decline in profits. 
99 Most importantly, capital gains tax rates are one of the costs of securities transactions and thus have 
a direct impact on the liquidity of securities markets. 
... See, for instance, the impact of the Glass-Steagal Act upon the US banking sector until its repeal. 
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pension provisions. Generally, there are two types of pension systems. The first and, 
at least until now, the most common is the "pay-as-you-go" system where the 
working population undertakes to fund the retirement of pensioners by making 
compulsory contributions to state and corporate pension schemes in return for a 
guaranteed income ("defined-benefit") they will receive when their turn to retire 
comes. The important aspect of this system is that pension income distribution is 
simultaneous to the active population's contributions so that no significant asset 
accumulation takes place. The second type is the "funded" system where wage 
earners make their own retirement provisions by contributing specified amounts 
("defined-contributions") to public or private pension funds. Those pension funds 
invest the capital contributed in securities and other assets so that, when the pension 
policy of a particular beneficiary matures, the accumulated capital will depend on the 
asset prices at that time. Whether the pay-as-you-go or the funded system is the 
prevailing pension system depends on institutional factors, such as tax incentives and 
other pension-related regulations, that discourage or encourage households to invest 
in pension funds and similar savings vehicles - e. g. mutual funds, unit trusts etc. 
What is important for the purposes of this discussion is that the way savings 
and most importantly pension provisions are organised has a major influence in role 
securities markets have in the financial system. Where the funded system is chosen, 
then a very large portion of household savings is directly channelled to securities 
markets. Pension funds and other institutional investors promote securitisation rather 
than intermediation (Davies 1996). They are market-oriented financial institutions 
since most of their investment goes to securities and related instruments rather than 
taking the form of direct loans to corporations as banks do. At the same time, theN 
rely on developed and liquid securities markets because they need to diversify their 
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investments so that they can minimise their risk and avoid becoming locked in 
particular securities by over-investing in them. Thus, pension funds, similarly to other 
institutional investors, do not commit themselves to close financial relationships but 
prefer their investments to be as liquid as possible so that they can dispose them 
66 silently" in the market without affecting prices. 
It is due to these factors that Schmidt and Tyrell (2001) conclude that the 
design of pension provisions as an integral part of a financial system is directly 
related to whether a system is market-based or not. Where the financial system is 
designed to channel savings to securities markets via pension funds and other 
institutional investment vehicles, banks have a disadvantage in attracting savings, due 
to the higher long-term yields of stocks and bonds in comparison to bank deposits. 
Therefore, their role as providers of long-term finance diminishes as securitisation 
progresses. So, pay-as-you-go pensions are complementary to financial 
intermediation since they shield banks from competition and thus warrant their role as 
long-term financiers of economic activity. Similarly, those institutions that promote a 
financial system's market-orientation are complementary to the institutional 
arrangements that sustain a funded pension system and the securitisation of savings 
more generally. However, it is important to note that in the latter case 
complementarity does not imply that securitisation cannot exist without a funded 
pension system. Rather, it is the reverse causational sequence that reflects more 
accurately the link between developed securities markets and funded pensions. The 
institutional arrangements mentioned earlier that relate to information flows and 
investor protection can be sufficient for the development securities markets. This, 
however, does not undermine the important role of pension funds and other market- 
oriented collective savings vehicles as providers of liquidity. 
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In sum, two main types of financial systems can be identified. The first is the 
market-based system where securities constitute attractive investment opportunities 
for the surplus sector and an important source of long-term finance for the corporate 
sector. The function of banks in corporate finance is thus limited to providing 
diversified short-term loans that do not require the establishment of committed 
relationships with their clients. Moreover, institutional arrangements facilitate 
information flows in securities markets and thus reduce the costs of market 
transacting. So, generally, in the market-based system relationships between the 
financial sector and non-financial corporations are not necessarily committed and 
long-term but arm's-length and determined by market forces. 
The second type of financial system is bank-based with securities markets that 
do not play a significant role either in pooling savings or in corporate finance. 
Instead, banks are dominant as channels of long-term financial flows from the surplus 
sector to the corporate sector. Since information does not become a public good and 
therefore transaction costs in securities markets are high, the financial sector needs to 
expend resources to acquire it privately. Long-term and committed relationships 
between financial institutions and corporations are necessary for two reasons. Firstly, 
the acquisition of private information from the client requires significant relation- 
specific investment by the bank that, according to transaction cost theory, entails 
significant lock-in effects. Such relation-specific investment is possible only because 
the bank can use the acquired information for its own private benefit without sharing 
it with competitors. Secondly, the corporate sector is also interested in maintaining 
such financial relationships in order to prevent the opportunistic use by the banks of 
the private information it releases and to gain easy and stable access to the main 
external source of financial capital. 
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What is the significance of such differences in financial sYstems for corporate 
governance? To a large extent the answer to this lies in the differences in corporate 
finance that exist between the two types of financial systems. This is because there is 
a clear relation between corporate finance and patterns of share-ownership. The 
presence of liquid securities markets means that financial claims are small and 
therefore dispersed. Otherwise they would not be liquid, since concentration of 
financial claims and the lock-in effects that characterise committed financial 
relationships are two sides of the same coin. Thus, subject to the forces of other 
institutional subsystems, in a market-based financial system one expects to find a 
pattern of highly fragmented ownership of stock, whereas in a bank-based system 
shareholdings of listed corporations should be more concentrated and illiquid. ' 01 
This divergence in ownership structures between the two financial system 
types is highly significant for corporate governance because it is directly related to 
the corporate control channels that are available to shareholders. There are two such 
channels for dissatisfied shareholders, namely "voice" and "exit" (Hirschman 1970). 
The former describes the situation where there is direct intervention with managerial 
decision-making either formally through the General Meeting or informally by face- 
to-face contact with managers. Shareholder exit, on the other hand, occurs where 
shareholders vote with their feet by selling their shares either directly to a takeover 
bidder or on the stock market and thus subject incumbent managers to the disciplinary 
forces of the market for corporate control. The important difference between the two 
types of control is that voice entails costs on the part of shareholders while exit 
is 
virtually costless. 
101 This is a we II -established view which is clearly supported by empirical evidence. 
E. g. see Bergl6f 
(1990). 
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The choice of control mechanism is determined by a combination of two 
factors: the costs of exercising direct control ("voice") and the problem of collective 
action. In essence, these two factors are closely interlinked. The costs that accrue 
from exercising direct control constitute the resources expended by shareholders for 
obtaining sufficient firm-specific information as well as for assessing and improving 
managerial efficiency. Whether a shareholder has sufficient incentives to incur such 
costs depends on his private gains as a result of the improvement in managerial 
performance. So, where private gains for all shareholders do not exceed their private 
costs, no individual shareholder will have the necessary incentives to exercise control, 
even if that were beneficial on a collective basis. It is at this point that the collective 
action problem becomes relevant. ' 02 The possibility of collective action is directly 
dependent on the degree of shareholder diffusion (Rock 1991). Provided that any 
improvement in corporate performance is reflected in the company's share price 
and/or dividends, private gains for the monitoring shareholder are directly related to 
the size of his shareholding. The higher his stake in the company the more he will 
capitalise on his monitoring expenditure and vice versa. So, concentrated share- 
ownership automatically increases the likelihood of direct shareholder control 
whereas, if ownership is highly dispersed, the only available option to shareholders is 
"exit" and the only financial mechanism for managerial discipline is the hostile- 
takeover. 
Thus, to the extent that the financial system can determine the structure of 
share-ownership it has an immediate impact on the choice of corporate control. The 
bank-based system, on the one hand, creates significant incentives for financial 
capital providers, i. e. creditors and shareholders, to commit themselves to acquiring 
102 For more extensive theoretical analyses of collective action see Olson (1971) and Axelrod (1984). 
For applications to the shareholder behaviour see Easterbrook and Fischel (1991: ch. 3) and Rock 
(1991: 453). 
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information about the value of the company's operations and thus become insiders. 
On the other hand, in the market-based system such incentives are virtually absent 
and financiers remain uncommitted outsiders to the firm. 
The crucial issue here is whether there is any difference between the insider 
and the outsider system of corporate control regarding the incentives they create for 
managers. From a theoretical perspective, the answer to this depends on the 
combination of two things: the motives of shareholders and the degree of market 
efficiency. If the neoclassical assumption that individuals are rational is accepted, the 
motives of all types of shareholders are homogenous, that is, all shareholders expect 
the maximisation of profit and the distribution of excess cash-flows. Then, in the 
insider system the divergence between shareholders' and managers' interests - i. e. the 
agency problem, to use Jensen and Meckling's terminology- does not arise, since in 
effect there is no divorce between ownership and control. In the outsider system, on 
the other hand, ownership and control are truly separated just as Berle and Means 
observed in the 1930s about large American corporations. The extent of managerial 
discretion is then dependent on the stock-market efficiency variable. If stock-markets 
are efficient so that share prices reflect with relative accuracy the value of corporate 
operations, then the constraints from the market for corporate control will be adequate 
to eliminate managerial discretion. In this case the insider and the outsider control 
systems can be seen as equivalent microeconornic alternatives just as Jensen and 
Meckling predict. 
However, in reality neither the neoclassical version of rationality nor the 
market efficiency hypothesis hold. Regarding the former, 
different types of 
shareholders can have diverse and often conflicting expectations 
from managers. For 
instance, a founder shareholder whose whole income is tied to one company is more 
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risk averse than a diversified investment fund' 03 and5 therefore5 more willing to retain 
excess capital within the company so that it can be used in difficult times or even for 
his personal benefit. ' 04 Similarly, where corporate cro ss- shareholdings exist. 
industrial strategy considerations will tend to prevail over financial returns on equity. 
Moreover, a shareholder who is also a creditor to the company in question, as banks 
often are, may be more interested in securing the prompt repayment of loans plus 
interest rather than the maximisation of shareholder returns. Again such a creditor- 
shareholder will be more risk averse than a diversified non-creditor shareholder and 
will allow the accumulation of undistributed excess cash flow. 
Due to this divergence between the expectations of different shareholder 
types, even where share-ownership is concentrated, current shareholder value 
maximisation as a general characteristic of shareholder supremacy may not be the 
prevalent corporate objective. On the contrary, as the share loses the attributes of a 
pure financial instrument to become something resembling a "club membership" fee, 
shareholder commitment as a characteristic of the bank-based system can even 
translate into enhanced managerial discretion. ' 05 Since, in the absence of a liquid 
stock market, equity finance loses significance, bank-based systems seem to 
encourage the use of shareholdings for purposes other than financial income. Thus, 
one should expect that shareholder value as a measurement of shareholder supremacy 
should be less relevant in such systems. That being so, strategic inter-firm 
cooperation, financial relationship building, and private rent extraction will be more 
103 Even investment fund expectations can differ depending on their investment policies. This is 
illustrated in the growth of ethical investment funds. See for instance Lewis and Webley (1994: 171- 
183) and Mackenzie and Lewis (1999). 
104 In this case the founding shareholder's motives would be no different from those of unconstrained 
managers. Other cultural constraints, such as family heritage considerations, may also 
be important 
determinants of such shareholders' behaviour (Learmount and Roberts: 200 1). 
105 This claim is further supported by the empirical evidence gathered from Germany in chapter 3 
below. 
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important as an objective of owning shares where securities markets are not a central 
part of the financial system. In contrast, in market-based financial systems, where 
stock markets are more important as a source of corporate finance, return on equity 
should be the prevalent criterion for investing in shares. 
Nonetheless, whether this is in itself enough to pull corporate governance 
towards a shareholder supremacy paradigm is not immediately clear. What still needs 
to be determined is whether outside shareholders in the market-based financial system 
have the ability to impose their expectations on managers. Since the only control 
channel for such shareholders is the market for corporate control, the crucial element 
is market efficiency. As mentioned earlier, market-based financial systems rely 
heavily on institutional arrangements that facilitate public information flows which 
reduce the costs of market transacting. What this means, however, is not that markets 
are totally efficient so that transaction costs are zero, but that they are more efficient 
than those in bank-based systems. Therefore, the existence of developed and liquid 
stock markets does not settle the issue of corporate control automatically in favour of 
shareholder- supremacy. 
Even where control-related information is largely available, high transaction 
costs can arise if investors lack the ability to process and use it in order to make 
efficient investment decisions. This will be the case either because they do not have 
the sophistication to do so or because they lack the time required for such an exercise 
or due to a combination of both. In particular, individual shareholders who are not 
professional investors will be in such a position. For this type of shareholder 
transaction costs can be so significant that "exit" is as unavailable as the "voice" 
option. For instance, even in a hostile-takeover bid, where shareholders can 
directly 
show their approval or rejection of management, 
in many cases individual investors 
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would find it difficult to decide whether the best option is to sell their stock or follow 
management and reject the bid. Unless there are clearly visible signs of managerial 
failure - e. g. repeated unsatisfactory dividend distributions and continuous share price 
drops - individual investors should be expected to follow management decisions, in 
which case the market for corporate control will not restrain managerial discretion 
much. As a result, individual investors can become locked in committed financial 
relationships with the companies they have invested in, but without the ability to 
exercise direct monitoring, since they lack the incentive and the resources to obtain 
inside information. So, subject to the impact of other non-financial constraints, where 
diffuse ownership is combined with extensive individual shareholdings the Berle and 
Means thesis should be expected to apply. 
However, the situation can be reversed where the dominant type of investor in 
the stock market are professional investors, such as pension and other investment 
fund managers. These institutional investors are different from individuals in that they 
have the sophistication and the resources necessary to process and utilise the 
information that is publicly available in the market. So, in effect, their presence 
significantly reduces the transaction costs individual investors have to bear. They are 
also different in that not only do they require liquidity and diversification, but they 
also expect shareholder value maximisation; in other words, their investment policies 
are strictly driven by financial considerations. While the combination of these two 
characteristics makes institutional investors inherently uncommitted shareholders, 106 
the fact that they face less transaction costs also allows them to participate in 
106 In recent years, however, a minority of institutional investors -mostly Anglo-American public 
pension funds- have been facing the lock-in effects of concentrated ownership, despite their broad 
diversification strategies, as their assets have grown to unprecedented levels. For those institutions the 
"voice" option or what is most commonly called "institutional activism" is often the only economically 
rational option. Some index funds also resort to corporate monitoring as a way to "beat" the market. 
The literature on the subject is substantial. See Black (1992), Coffee (1991), Stapledon (1996), 
Brancato (1997), Galanis (1997). 
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corporate control contests more actively (Gorton 1999). Consequently. the 
"institutionalisation" of financial assets, and corporate stocks in particular, increases 
the role of the market for corporate control as a disciplinary mechanism for managers 
and therefore is directly related to shareholder-oriented corporate governance. Thus, 
where a financial system combines a liquid stock market with a funded pension 
system - two elements that, as it was shown earlier, are not unrelated -a strong 
tendency in created towards shareholder supremacy as the prevailing principle in 
managerial decision-making. 
Industrial Relations System 
While the financial system undoubtedly has significant determinative power 
over corporate governance by affecting the mode and force of shareholder influence 
in corporate decision-making, the industrial relations system can also give rise to 
managerial constraints by determining the governance role of labour, a production 
input as essential as financial capital. While industrial relations have gained broad 
recognition as an area of academic study, explicit and universally accepted definitions 
for what an industrial relations system actually is do not exist. For Hyman (1975: 12) 
the subject is defined as "the process of control over work relations (emphasis 
added), " thus emphasising the power and conflict factors between interested parties 
which give rise to complex informal institutional arrangements governing personal 
and collective employment relations (Kochan 1980). Others, however, adopt a 
narrower definition that concentrates on a web of generally applicable rules that 
resolve conflict in employment (Dunlop 1958; Bain and Clegg 1974). For instance, in 
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his influential work Dunlop (1958: 7) identifies workers, managers and the state as 
the core players in industrial relations who interact to establish the institutions that 
determine the relationships between them. Building upon this approach, Flanders 
(1965: 10) defines the industrial relations system as the set of all those institutions 
that can vary from statutory rules to collective agreements, arbitration awards, social 
conventions, accepted practice, and even managerial decisions. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the institutional approach is preferable for two 
reasons. Firstly, in a static analysis, like the present one, the process of institution 
building is irrelevant, since the quest is to identify institutional constraints and 
analyse their effect on the behaviour of labour and management. Secondly, placing 
the emphasis on rules rather than power differentials facilitates the comparative 
analysis of industrial relations systems, since it is differences in institutional 
arrangements resulting from historical contingencies (Zeitlin 1987) that are 
responsible for industrial relations systems' diversity (Roche 1986, and Streek 1988). 
By regulating transaction costs in labour markets, industrial relations systems 
determine the relationship between labour and the firm. Of course, the aim here is not 
to analyse the effect of specific institutions but to provide a general analysis of how 
an industrial relations system as a whole determines the role of labour in corporate 
govemance. 
To begin with, in their endeavour to fulfil their human capital needs 
companies have two basic choices: they can either tap the external labour market to 
find the skills they require or develop their workforce interrially through firm-specific 
training. The difference between these two choices is substantial not only regarding 
the nature and volume of resources deployed but also in respect of the type of 
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employment relationships they create. The crucial elements that influence industrial 
relations choices are asset-specificity and opportunism. 
The former element describes the degree to which each party to the 
employment contract makes investments that are specific to the particular 
relationship. On the employer's side such investments can be the provision of on-the- 
job training, active reliance on the continuation of the employment relationship, 
redundancy pay promises, vested pensions and other benefits that enhance job 
satisfaction. What the employer relies on while making all these investments is that 
the employee will not unilaterally withdraw. Similarly, an employee can invest in a 
particular employment relationship by developing firm-specific skills and knowledge, 
by accepting to work more than he is being paid for, and by tying his present and 
future welfare to a particular company, e. g. by moving to a specific location and 
making non-transferable pension contributions. Since all these investments are 
relation- specific, if the employment contract is terminated, they automatically 
become liabilities. 1 07 The implication is that the larger such investments are, the 
greater the costs arising from the employment contract's termination, because 
relation-specific assets are not re-deployable. Consequently, each party that invests in 
such assets limits his exit option. Where both employers and employees face high exit 
costs, the likely effect is that the employment contract will be a long-term one based 
on mutual commitment and trust. 
108 In other words, the two parties exclude the 
possibility of resorting to the external labour market by internalising 
it. 109 
107 The costs arising to the employer from the lost production during the search 
for a replacement 
employee, and to the employee due to the lost wages as a result of the redundancy will also 
be added to 
these liabilities. 
10' Where relation-specific investment is only unilateral, then the party making such 
investment will be 
vulnerable to the other side's opportunistic behaviour. 
In the absence of governance mechanisms 
safeguarding the disadvantaged party the result is conflict and 
inefficiency. 
I" Scientific precision requires that this type of internal resource allocation be distinguished 
from 
market transacting since it is not governed the price mechanism 
(Hodgson 1988: 176). However, the 
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The choice between external and internal labour markets has important 
organisational effects. Firstly, long-term commitment goes side-by-side with 
cooperative relationships between managers as the firm's controllers and employees 
in order to deal with potential adverse economic conditions. In such situations it is 
employees who face the higher risk of not capitalising on their investment by not 
receiving what is implicitly promised to them. 110 It is at this point that the fear of 
employer opportunism substantiates, since, unless employees have sufficient 
information about the firm's real economic situation, they may assume that their 
employer is breaching their implied agreement and discontinue their firm-specific 
investments. Resolving informational asymmetries between managers and the 
workforce when such circumstances arise is crucial in order to prevent the 
relationship from collapsing due to increased worker scepticism about whether to 
trust their employers (Williamson 1984: 1209; and Hart 1983: 23). So, the necessary 
governance mechanisms for resolving disputes must be in place, which can vary from 
formalised employee consultation to board representation, both carrying the 
corresponding degree of influence in corporate governance. 
Moreover, since in internal labour market systems the threat of dismissal in 
case of underperformance cannot be used by the employer to motivate the workforce, 
other alternative motivational mechanisms are required. These usually take the form 
of internal promotion-assessment schemes based on seniority and productivity as the 
main criteria, profit sharing arrangements and higher wages than those that can be 
obtained in the external labour market. Such institutions, however, make the 
sustainability of operating internal labour markets highly dependent on continuous 
term "internal labour markets" is prevalent in the industrial relations literature and therefore will also 
be preferred here. 
' 10 For instance, they may not get the training, salary and other benefits they expect or they may even 
lose theirjob if circumstances are very negative. 
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growth, because the size of the organisational hierarchy determines the promotion 
opportunities available (Rubery and Wilkinson 1994: 49). The establishment of 
internal labour markets, therefore, creates an inherent bias towards growth- 
maximisation similar to that identified by managerial theorists. Thus, one can expect 
that those firms that choose such industrial relations policies are more prone to invest 
their cash flow in organisational expansion"' rather than distribute it to shareholders. 
On the other hand, where the external labour market option is chosen as a 
source of human capital, industrial relations will be diametrically different from those 
associate with internal labour market systems. Firstly, since no significant relation- 
specific investment takes place, the possibility of unilateral opportunism within the 
firm is minimal. In the absence of the significant lock-in effects that characterise 
internal labour markets, each party that is unsatisfied with the employment contract 
has the exit option more easily available. For instance, where the employer believes 
that the employee under-performs, he can replace him at a relatively low cost. 
Similarly, an unsatisfied employee will leave his job and look for another in a 
different company more easily if his skills are transferable and, therefore, do not 
become a liability outside the firm in question. Thus, since neither party is 
sufficiently interested in maintaining the longevity and stability of the employment 
contract no information or power sharing mechanisms are necessary. The relatively 
unrestricted availability of exit is sufficient to ensure that neither party to the 
employment contract loses out as a result of unilateral withdrawal. Thus, in firms 
where external labour markets are the prevalent source of human capital, industrial 
relations will be of an adversarial nature as opposed to a cooperative one. Moreover, 
"1 Expansion may also include close cooperation with other similar firms resulting to group structures 
that encourage labour mobility between affiliated firms. This has been a common occurrence in Japan. 
See Odagiri (1992: 57) and other case-studies mentioned therein. 
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since no internal Promotion mechanisms are needed these finns are more prone to 
shareholder distribution than investing their cash flow in organisational growth. 
These differences between the two labour systems gain more substance in 
restructurings such as cost-cuttings and hostile-takeovers, two things that are often 
combined, because it is in such situations that the conflict between labour and 
shareholder interests becomes more apparent. As regards the former, employers that 
rely on internal labour market systems cannot easily use workforce reductions in 
order to cut their costs, because they would lose their ability to recoup their relation- 
specific investments. Moreover, they also face informal constraints, since extensive 
redundancies will be damaging for their reputation as "good" committed employers 
and, consequently, their ability to attract the right employees in the future would be 
curtailed. For this reason, when cost-cuttings require the reduction of labour costs 
those companies that intemalise labour markets face more pressure to find less drastic 
alternatives that are less disadvantageous to employees than companies which use 
external labour markers. 112 Thus, labour market internalisation imposes constraints on 
managerial choices by creating a bias in favour of employee interests. Where this bias 
cuts into the expectation of shareholders that excess cash-flow is distributed to them 
instead of being used to "subsidise" employment relations, a clear conflict anses. For 
instance, the company may have to favour employee satisfaction over dividend 
distributions, in which case shareholders will be asked to bear a higher share of the 
costs of the restructuring than they would have to, had the company not implemented 
internal labour market processes. 
The significance and extent of this conflict between shareholder and employee 
interests is then directly dependent on the shareholders' investment horizon. If 
112 Such less drastic measures can include overtime cuts, temporary lay-offs during which the 
employee receive a reduced salary, transfers of employees from unprofitable to profitable divisions or 
even affiliate companies, or even postpone dividend distributions. See Odagiri (1992: 56-64). 
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shareholders are committed, because it is beneficial for the company and for them in 
the long-term, they will be more willing to sacrifice some of their current earnings in 
order to ensure long-term profitability. 113 If, on the other hand, they are more 
interested in receiving current returns than in capitalising on the company's long-terrn 
prospects, i. e. if they are not locked into their financial relationship with the 
company, the conflict becomes substantial and insurmountable. As the degree of 
shareholder commitment is determined by the financial system, labour market 
internalisation is thus positively related to the degree of financial intermediation. 
Hence, the relationship between the industrial relations system and the financial 
system is a complementary one. 
In the case of a hostile-takeover the divergence between the interests of 
employees and of shareholders becomes even more striking. Usually, in the absence 
of minimum safeguards the most disadvantaged corporate constituency after the 
completion of a takeover transaction are employees who often have to face 
redundancies as a result of operational overlaps between the merged entities or of 
cost-cutting policies so that post merger financial liabilities can be met. 114 Of course 
for employees who have not made any relation-specific investments and who can 
expect to be absorbed by other companies if they lose their job, the costs will be 
relatively low. However, where at least one of the companies involved in a takeover 
operates an internal labour market system, the effects on the employees will be much 
greater. In effect, the completion of the transaction will constitute a wealth transfer 
from the workforce to the shareholders, since the latter will not accept an offer for 
their shares unless they receive a premium (Coffee 1986: 7). Thus, where labour 
113 On the relationship between financial commitment and investment in human resources see Lazonick 
and West (1995) and Lazonick, and O'Sullivan (1996). 
"' See Coffee (1986: 7) claiming that employment security and hostile or friendly takeover actlv'tN' 
cannot easily co-exist. 
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markets are internalised the interests of employees and managers may coincide as 
both are the ultimate losers on the completion of a hostile-takeover. ' 15 Of course, 
once again the factor of shareholder commitment discussed above will be a decisive 
one on whether the industrial relations system and the financial system are 
complementary. 
Having shown that finns' industrial relations choices have significant 
implications for managerial decision-making by determining whether discretion is 
used in favour of employees or not, what requires examination are the factors that 
determine such choices in the first place. In other words, it needs to be clarified what 
external institutional constraints affect companies employment policies. Firstly, as 
already mentioned, institutional constraints from the financial system are crucial in 
the formulation of a firm's employment system. The interaction between shareholder 
commitment, the degree of which is directly dependent on financial regulation, and 
industrial relations has already been mentioned. ' 16 As a more specific illustration of 
the interaction between the two sub-systems, takeover regulation, essentially part of 
the investor protection regime, regulates the ability of managers to resist unsolicited 
bids. It, therefore, constitutes an institutional factor indirectly affecting industrial 
relations and subsequently determining the governance role of employees. 
The skill-development system in a society can also affect finns' choice 
between internal and external markets. The extent to which formal education 
institutions and organisations - e. g. schools, universities, etc. - within a society are 
capable of providing a pool of specialised skilled labour from which firms can select I- 
their workforce will determine the levels of investment in intra-firm training (Rubery 
115 Where, of course, managers are awarded stock-options or are protected by golden parachutes this 
coincidence will not materialise. Such measures, therefore, are incompatible with the sustainability of 
labour market interrialisation policies. 
116 Franks and Mayer (1990) have also made a similar claim on the complementarity between insider 
ownership and labour market interrialisation. 
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and Wilkinson 1994: 5 1). Thus, where the skills required by firms are readily 
available in external labour markets, the incentive for hiring unskilled employees with 
the intention of providing them with in-house training will be low. However, where 
the supply of skills does not match the demand in terms of quality or quantity or both 
then firms will have increased incentives to provide additional training themselves 
(Osterman 1984). 
Furthermore, employment law and other employment-related rules also 
impose significant constraints on firms' industrial relations choices. A great variety of 
legal rules covering among other things issues such as job protection, part-time work, 
union recognition and power, collective bargaining, employee consultation and 
participation, and pension transferability regulate the availability of exit from 
employment contracts and shape industrial relations. Where such regulations as a 
whole raise considerably the costs of firing employees, they constitute externally 
imposed lock-in factors which are common to all companies operating within the 
same set of rules. Such regulatory environments, therefore, limit the discretion that 
firms have in the formulation of their internal employment policies and create 
pressures for labour market internalisation with the corresponding implications for 
corporate governance as explained above. 
Finally, other firms' labour policies may also give rise to external constraints 
by affecting labour supply and demand conditions. For instance, if most employers, 
especially large corporations whose choices carry more social weight, operate internal 
market systems, a firm that prefers the external market option will face more 
difficulties in finding and attracting the skills it needs. This illustrates how vertical 
complementarities between such informal constraints and formal employment rules 
operate. 
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Inspite of all these institutional constraints that determine industrial relations 
systems, employers are still left with sufficient room to manoeuvre. At the micro- 
level a company will usually combine labour market intemalisation and 
externalisation depending on its particular needs. For instance, for jobs that do not 
require any firm-specific skills, and therefore no additional internal training, tappinzg,,, 
the external labour market can be more preferable. In contrast, a core of jobs that 
needs to be carried out by employees with firm-specific training will require more 
committed relationships that external markets cannot provide. 
However, the external institutional constraints mentioned here can be 
sufficient to determine whether a system as a whole creates pressures towards one 
direction or another. Thus, industrial relations systems can generally be dichotomised 
between those where labour market internalisation and employment commitment 
prevail, and those where external markets and lack of commitment are most common. 
The mechanics of the former type of system pull corporate governance towards what 
can be called "labour-oriented" managerialism, where a coalition between managers 
and employees constitutes the most important source of decision-making power. The 
latter type of industrial relations system can better sustain and be sustained by a more 
outside shareholder-oriented governance model. 
Macroeconomic Structure: Competition Policy and Effective Demand 
The important role of competition as a determinant of managerial choice and 
performance has been widely recognised in the literature on corporate governance 
and the theory of the firm. For instance, Gilson and Roe (1993: 891-895) state that 
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"the most elegant monitoring mechanism is intense product market competition". 
Firstly, as already mentioned in section 1.3.2 above, according to the neo-classical 
model the existence of perfectly competitive markets can be sufficient to ensure that 
the profit-maximisation hypothesis applies. The threat of bankruptcy is more 
imminent where competition is fierce. In a classic formal examination of the 
relationship between competition and managerial discipline, Hart (1983) has shown 
that competition per se is negatively related to managerial slack. Similarly, Mayer 
(1997) claims that the degree of product market competition may function as a 
control over management decisions in that it provides clear performance benchmarks 
and "swift retribution for erring managers. " 
117 
However, Jensen (1993: 850) believes that the role of product market 
competition has been overstated. While he recognises its potential effect, he only sees 
it as a mechanism of last resort, since, he claims, not only is it a slow constraining 
force but also a weak one if all competitors incur agency costs. Nevertheless, 
according to managerial theory, where managers are not fully constrained, firms will 
primarily pursue growth, and since the pursuit of growth usually translates into sales 
maximisation, managerial firms will compete for market share and, thus, the presence 
of agency costs becomes of little relevance. This point has been emphasised by 
Odagiri who views competition as complementary to the growth maximization 
objective and, therefore, not merely confined to its neoclassical conception. " 
8 
However, to be sustainable, this type of competition requires either the continuous 
117 See also Fama (1980). 
118 See Odagiri (1992: 316) claiming that for managers to feel the pressure of product markets 
competition does not necessarily have to be based on output prices. 
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increase of existing markets' capacity or the penetration and, if possible, the creation 
of new markets usually through innovation. 119 
At first sight this may seem as if managerial discretion can co-exist with 
strong competition. However, a closer look reveals that, if Odagiri's product market 
conditions are met, one ends up with something approximating the marginal situation 
described in section 1.3.2 where growth maximisation is proportional to profit 
maximisation. This is precisely Kester's view: 
So long as growth opportunities were abundant and product and factor market 
rivalry was fierce, corporate managers were likely to deploy resources in a 
highly disciplined way. High rates of real growth, moreover, can do much to 
attenuate disputes among corporate stakeholders by relieving pressures to 
compare one [company's] gains to those of another from a zero-sum 
perspective... [Outside Shareholders] may tolerate agency costs associated 
with the separation of ownership from control ... if the offsetting gains from bearing such costs are greater efficiency in production arising from higher 
levels of relationship -specific investment and substantially reduced 
transaction costs arising from a greater use of flexible, implicit contracts; the 
mitigation of hazards associated with relationship- specific investment; 
reliance on non-legal dispute resolution techniques instead of costly legal 
adjudication; and so forth. (Kester 1996: 127) 
However, the above statement contains a contradiction: if managerial discretion leads 
to greater efficiency in production, the issue of agency costs is irrelevant not because 
shareholders "tolerate" it, but because it simply does not arise. In other words, 
managerialism is an efficient corporate system. 
The difference between Odagiri's competitive model and that of Hart seems to 
be that the former is associated with relatively high growth rates of market capacity 
without which excessive discretionary cash flows would accumulate, whereas the 
"' This in effect constitutes a type of Schumpeterian competition based on continuous product, 
technological and organisational innovation in a process of "creative destruction". (Schumpeter 1942: 
84). This has led some economists to talk about a tradeoff between the neoclassical static efficiency 
and the Schumpeterian dynamic efficiency (Nelson and Winter 1982: ch. 14; Klein 1977). However, 
commenting on neoclassical and Schumpeterian competition, Langlois (1986: 11-12). claims that in 
fact the distinction is not between two differentforms of competition but between two views of it; one 
that sees competition as a state of affairs and another that regards it as a process. 
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latter is a model that simply concentrates on the competitive allocation of resources 
according to a given or perhaps low rate of market growth. Indeed, expanding market 
capacity and new market creation, the ability of firms to increase the scale and scope 
of their operations, have been fundamental elements in Chandler's story about the 
success of managerial capitalism (Chandler 1990). Chandler's account is also 
consistent with other theoretical studies presenting a causal link between innovation 
and large oligopolistic firms. 
120 
Given these theoretical insights into the role of competition as a factor 
constraining managerial slack, institutional arrangements that determine the structure 
of product markets as well as the nature and effects of competition can have a 
significant influence on corporate governance. 121 While competition policy usually 
has a narrow meaning that merely comprises antitrust regulation, 122 here the term is 
defined more broadly in order to encompass all those institutions that shape the nature 
of competition as a determinant of corporate governance. Such institutions can vary 
from express or implied cartel agreements between firms and antitrust regulation to 
export and import barriers. By defining the structure of product markets, all these 
institutions determine the competitive conditions within national borders as well as 
outside of them. 
The main purpose of cartel agreements is to insulate firms from the effects of 
competition either between them or from potential rivals. Of course, the extent, 
structure and sustainability of cartels fluctuate according to the wishes of 
participating companies as well as the influence of other institutions. For instance, a 
"I See Fisher and Temin (1973), claiming that large firms tend to innovate more that small ones. 
121 See Demsetz (1974) on the important role of legal institutions in determining competition and 
market structure. 
122 Hoekman and Kostecki (1995: 252) define competition policy as 'the set of rules and disciplines 
maintained by governments relating either to agreements between firms that restrict competition or the 
abuse of dominant position. ' 
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cartel may be a loose agreement establishing rules for production quotas and prices in 
order to control the price mechanism and shift competition to other functions such as 
innovation. Such an arrangement is inherently vulnerable to unilateral opportunism, 
especially if the individual firm's benefits from breaching the agreement are larger 
than the costs of rival retaliation. However, a cartel may also be more rigid and stable 
by including formal and often state-supported governance structures and enforcement 
mechanisms or even the exchange of shareholdings and company board members, 
something that has the effect of increasing the costs of breaching the agreement and 
thus ensuring its stability. In sum, cartelisation can be seen as a mechanism of 
avoiding the effect of "neoclassical" competition. Moreover, due to the co-operative 
nature of inter-firm relations where markets are dominated by cartels and cartel-like 
agreements, hostile takeovers cannot be expected to occur. This is especially so where 
cooperative relationships crystallise as cross-shareholding arrangements which are a 
form of stable and committed ownership with minimal financial expectations in terms 
of distributed profits. For these reasons, different forms of cartelisation can constitute 
a classic tool of managerial entrenchment. 
However, the ability of corporations to create anti-competitive agreements 
depends heavily on whether antitrust regulation is permissive or not (Whitley 1999: 
18; Chandler 1990: 71-78). Where there are strict regulations prohibiting anti- 
competitive practices, cooperative relationships between firms are difficult to 
establish or maintain and, as a result, the possibility of managerial insulation from 
either product or stock market control mechanisms is reduced. In contrast, if 
competition regulation does not prevent or even supports cartelisation then, 
obviously, one could not easily expect that product market conditions will provide 
serious constraints on managerial discretion. Of course, this will also depend on the 
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growth potential of product markets since, where Odagiri's competitive conditions 
are met, the impact of anti-trust regulation becomes less relevant. 
In order for this latter "expansionist" competitive model to operate, however, 
institutional arrangements must at least not restrict the growth potential of product 
markets. For instance, where trade barriers of any sort and at any level segregate or 
restrain markets, to the extent that this is not offset by innovation the growth 
preference of managerial firms will create a tendency towards overcapacity and 
inefficiency. In other words, market share maximisation will be negatively related to 
the profit maximisation objective as firms will have to grow against each other with 
the obvious consequence being destructive price wars or cartelisation without the 
element of innovation competition. 
Thus, managerialism can lead to better results only where institutional sets 
facilitate or promote the expansion of existing markets or the creation of new ones. In 
Keynesian terms, managerialist growth preference can be sustainable and indeed lead 
to increasing welfare only where there is sufficient effective demand to absorb 
growing output. For this reason, financial systems that have a tendency to insulate 
managers from the direct or indirect control of shareholders seeking profit 
maximisation can operate better with institutional macro-level arrangements that 
guarantee growing demand. Where this type of complementarity exists managerial 
discretion has positive effects since managers' interests tend to coincide with those of 
all stakeholders amalgamated in the corporate interest as defined in section 1.3.3 
above (pp. 55-56). In the opposite case where this coincidence of interests does not 
hold, managerial discretion turns into slack because managers will be able to abuse of 
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the firm's resources according to their own free will and for their own benefit. 123 
Thus, where, for example, trade barriers are significant, or where macro-economic 
policy cannot guarantee that effective demand is sufficient, strict anti-trust rules and 
efficient capital markets may be necessary to ensure that product market competition 
as well as direct or indirect shareholder monitoring provide sufficient constraints on 
managerial slack. 
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Finally, complementarities also exist between competition and industrial 
relations. As discussed above, a system that contains incentives for labour market 
internalisation can only be sustainable in the long term if there is sufficient corporate 
growth potential. It is due to this inherent growth-maximisation bias in this type of 
industrial relations system, that the market/demand growth factor described here 
becomes a crucial variable if managerial corporate resource allocation is to be 
efficient. 
1.4.3. Efficiency, 'Workability' and Institutional Complementarity 
The analysis so far has demonstrated the significant role of institutional 
contexts in detennining corporate governance, as their ftinction is to regulate 
transaction and agency costs. Generally, where institutional sets as a whole have the 
effect of reducing overall transaction costs for economic actors the effect 
is that 
corporate governance is more efficient. Outside the theoretical 
laboratory, where 
uncertainty and bounded rationality are the norm due to market 
imperfections, it Is 
123 This is the situation feared by Jensen when he dismisses managerialism altogether. See Jensen 
(200 1) and supra. note 55 and text. 
124 Whether this is practicably feasible, however, is questionable for the same reasons that a Coasean 
transaction cost-free market is far from a real one. 
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difficult to imagine an institutional system that is Pareto-optimal. For example, the 
market-based system relies heavily on the efficient market for corporate control 
hypothesis which, as already mentioned, cannot hold in its absolute form. So some 
inefficiencies, such as agency costs or shareholder rent extraction, will unavoidablý, 
accrue; e. g. where the market for corporate control is not perfect either managers can 
n, k abuse their discretion or uncommitted and thus imperfectly informed shareholders 
may be given too much influence which they can use to extract present cash-flows 
that could otherwise be invested in projects that would maximise profitability and 
growth in the long term. Of course, as already noted, neoclassical theory does not 
distinguish between short-term and long-term profitability. However, this distinction 
is very real where markets are imperfect. Hence, one should expect that in this type of 
corporate governance system inherent inefficiencies will tend to translate into short- 
termism and under-investment due to (institutional) investor pressure for 
maximisation of short-term returns (Bushee 1999; Laverty 1996; Jacobs 199 1; 
Lowenstein 1988). Similarly, as the insider model relies on the power of banks, large 
shareholders and employees for the control of managerial decision-making, outsiders 
such as small minority shareholders may become the expropriated party. This is 
because insiders will usually have expectations that go beyond the maximisation of 
current shareholder financial returns and will use their informational advantage to 
extract private rents to the detriment of outside shareholders (Bebcuck and Zingales 
1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 
It is due to such unavoidable externalities which are endemic in either system 
that a Pareto-optimal equilibrium is not realistically achievable. Although some 
corporate governance institutions may be efficient others are not, so that at least some 
stakeholders are bound lose out while others gain. What is realistically possible, 
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however, is to establish an institutional system that is near-efficient, in the sense that 
transaction costs are relatively limited, as institutional inefficiencies are largely offset 
by efficiencies. In order to describe this characteristic of a corporate governance 
system, Schmidt (1997) uses the term 'workability' which implies that, although a 
system is sub-optimal, as a whole, stakeholders' transaction costs are relatively low 
and, therefore, there is a better welfare result in comparison to other systems where 
transaction costs are relatively high. 125 This gives workable systems a 'comparative 
institutional advantage' against those corporate governance systems which are 
unworkable (Soskice 1999: 102). 
Regarding the workability of a corporate governance system the concept of 
institutional complementarity is crucial. As the above discussion has demonstrated, 
institutions in one subsystem are only operable if institutional configurations in other 
subsystems are compatible. For instance, due to its dependence on employer and 
employee commitment, labour market intemalisation cannot be sustainable in the 
long term if shareholders are uncommitted and have a short-term market value 
orientation. Employees will be unwilling and employers will be unable to commit 
themselves to stable relationships between them; otherwise hostile takeovers, direct 
shareholder intervention or a combination of both would result in inefficient wealth 
transfers to the shareholders. Thus, a market-oriented financial system, especially if it 
is dominated by institutional investors, can only be compatible with well-developed 
external labour markets combined with a good general training system ensuring that 
the workforce acquires the necessary skills. Moreover, product markets must not be 
dominated by monopolies or oligopolies, as the ensuing cooperative relations 
between firms would distort the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control 
125 Of course, as North (1990: 109) claims, the gap between 'better' and 'efficlent' outcomes Is still 
vast. 
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and of price competition on managers. Where one of these three complementary 
institutional elements is missing, the whole system of corporate governance will be 
incoherent and thus create a comparative institutional disadvantage with obvious 
negative effects on corporate performance and general welfare. 
In sum, two general workable equilibria can be identified corresponding to the 
two main theoretical visions of the firm outlined above. 1 26 The first is an outsider 
model of corporate governance which relies on a market-based financial system with 
powerful institutional shareholders enhancing stock market efficiency, on flexible 
labour markets, on a good training system, and on a strict competition policy regime 
that prevents managers from forming inter-corporate alliances to insulate themselves 
from the market for corporate control discipline. The strong limitations on managerial 
discretion and, therefore, on the firm growth propensity imposed by this model make 
it particularly suitable for macro-economic conditions characterised by relatively 
slowly expanding markets where effective demand is low relative to production 
output. The availability of the exit option in both the labour and the financial markets 
makes the system relatively flexible so as to accommodate price competition by 
allowing or even encouraging rapid and radical cost-cutting and restructuring 
strategies of firms. 127 That is, in the outside shareholder-oriented system the emphasis 
is on flexible arm's length, market-based transactions, so that the firm tends to lose its 
organisational nature and resemble the nexus-of-contracts model developed 
by 
Alchian and Demsetz or Jensen and Meckling. In accordance with the old tradition of 
nominalism, as the firrn's entity disappears, its assets, i. e. what remains after all 
126 The term equilibrium is qualified by the word 'workable' in order to differentiate from the Pareto- 
optimal equilibrium. See below. 
127 See Cunningham (1999) at 1144 emphasising the flexibility and adaptability of the outside 
shareholder model. 
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contractual obligations are met, become the property of the shareholders to whom 
managers should be directly accountable. 
The second workable equilibrium is an insider or outsider model based on 
enhanced managerial discretion, and which comprises a financial system that 
enhances long-term commitment between financial and productive capital, an 
industrial relations system that facilitates labour market internalisation by providing 
formal and informal mechanisms for cooperation and conflict resolution between 
employers and employees, and a competition policy regime that allows inter-firm 
competition on the basis of technological and organisational innovation as opposed to 
output prices. As already mentioned, the workability of this system relies heavily on 
expanding markets and effective demand that is sufficient to absorb the relatively 
higher growth of output. The restrictions imposed on the exit option for stakeholders 
limit the cost-cutting and restructuring potential of firms and the ability of the model 
to withstand slow macro-economic growth and severe price competition. Moreover, 
free from shareholder domination the emphasis in this manager-dominated model is 
on organisation building as there is a tendency to remove transactions from the 
market and place them within the firm as a governance hierarchy. Assets such as 
excess cash flow can be generated that are externally redeployable but nevertheless 
stay in the firm as corporate property to be invested internally. Moreover, other firm- 
specific assets, such as organisational commitment and know-how, are also created 
that are not externally redeployable because they tend lose their value outside the 
firm. In this fashion, the firm resembles the entity of corporate realism which is not 
identified with its shareholders but is itself an owner and controller of its assets. 
The two models outlined here, the managerial and the shareholder-oriented, 
are both workable as combinations of complementary institutional sub-systems. 
This 
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has led several contemporary observers to put forward the "equal fitness" argument, 
i. e. that at any time or place the adoption of either model is a corporate governance 
choice that is equally competitive - though not pareto-optimal. This point will be 
taken up and elaborated on in section 2.4 below. For now, however, it is sufficient to 
state that the equal competitive fitness claim is neither theoretically nor empirically 
sustainable. From a theoretical perspective, the fact that the two models are workable 
only within specific macroeconomic conditions that are different for each model - 
one relies on higher effective demand and growth conditions than the other - renders 
comparison between them solely at a micro-level misleading. Their competitive 
fitness can be empirically tested only if the two models are placed within the same 
macroeconomic environment. But this would again lead to pre-determined and thus 
distorted results because the macroeconomic component of one workable model 
would be altered and would therefore render it automatically unworkable and inferior. 
So instead of treating the managerial and shareholder corporate governance systems 
are equally fit, one should regard each of them as fit only within its appropriate 
macroeconomic context. 
1.5. THE NATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
So far, either expressly or impliedly, this paper has placed its focus on 
systemic differences that exist at national level. This constitutes a de facto recognition 
that an institutional system's dimensions are cletennined by national borders. While 
this is normal practice in comparative institutional analysis, it is somewhat arbitrary. 
Therefore, it would be necessary to elaborate on the idea that the basic point of 
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reference for institutional systems should be the state. 128 To put it differently, one has 
to explain why national models of corporate governance arise as distinct and 
homogenous units of analysis. 
The key here is the concept of isomorphism which Hawley (1968: 328-337) 
defines as "a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble 
other units that face the same set of enviromnental conditions. " To understand what 
drives isomorphism in corporate governance one has to begin with examining the 
environmental forces that shape the nature and behaviour of firms. Firstly, the use of 
the word "constrain" in Hawley's definition can be perceived as a direct reference to 
institutional factors such as those described above. When these forces are common 
among a number of firms, then it is clear that organisational similarities will arise. So, 
existing and new firms who place themselves under the umbrella of a particular 
institutional context automatically acquire several common characteristics, the 
elements of a particular governance model, so as to constitute a recognisable group. 
This mechanism of institutional determination is what DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 
68) terrn "coercive isomorphism". 
Secondly, a governance model can be promoted through imitation as some 
firms, due to their own incapacity to innovate, model themselves by adopting the 
organisational innovations of others who appear more successful or compatible with 
the common institutional environment. DiMaggio and Powell (ibid. at 69) call this 
66mimetic isomorphism". It is important to emphasise that in this process, competitive 
or co-operative interaction between firms is crucial for the dissemination of 
organisational know-how. This means that mimetic isomorphism is more intense 
within a single marketplace. Since it is constraints, such as trade barriers, capital 
128Admittedly, from a political science perspective there is a great definitional difference between a 
state and a nation. However, for the purposes of this thesis the two terms will 
be regarded as 
equivalent. 
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controls, currency differences, that to a great extent determine the boundaries of 
markets, the influence of institutional factors is once again very significant. ' 29 
Thus, it is shared institutional systems that, by promoting homogeneitý, in 
organisational. structures, make firms not only look similar but also follow similar 
evolutionary paths so that generalisations about a model's evolution are possible. 130 
Thus, the boundaries of a corporate governance model are broadly defined by the 
economic area that falls within the influence of an individual institutional structure. 
Given the above considerations, to make the standard link between corporate 
governance models and states one has to establish that the boundaries of institutional 
sets tend to coincide with national boundaries. In a world where national govem-ments 
constitute the central "producers" of institutions this is not a particularly difficult link 
to establish. Certainly, private organisations are also important either as suppliers of 
institutions, such as contractual agreements, or as bargaining parties in political 
processes. However, so long as the legal system, as the core of an institutional 
framework, is the result of national government action, the coincidence between the 
boundaries of institutional systems and national territory should remain strong. So, 
coercive isomorphism is more intense within national borders due to the existence of 
national laws that are uniformly applied. Similarly, mimetic isomorphism is also 
more intense within national borders due to the higher interaction between agents 
within a national marketplace. Thus, the more nationally determined institutional sets 
are, the more firms within each national market will tend to acquire those similar 
characteristics that differentiate them from foreign firms so that corporate governance 
models remain nationally embedded. In this case, competition remains national and 
therefore institutional differences between national systems lose their relevance. At 
119 of course, this does not mean that the influence of geographical and other factors is not important 
here - 130 The complex issue of institutional evolution will be discussed more extensively in chapter 2. 
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least in theory, so long a system is workable, institutional differences between 
different countries will have no effect and multiple nationally determined institutional 
equilibria can exist simultaneously. 
Logically this leaves open the possibility that differences in national corporate 
governance systems can become important if institutional barriers segregating 
national markets are removed. In this case, as firms actively or passively detach 
themselves from national institutional environments, the mechanisms of isomorphism 
lose their national character. This results in competition between corporate 
governance models within a common economic context and thus places the 
competitive fitness arguments outlined above at the centre of the study of corporate 
governance. This possibility along with its consequences will be further pursued and 
developed in the remaining chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GLOBALISATION AND NATIONAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: THE DYNAMICS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY AND CONVERGENCE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Having established that within one (national) marketplace common 
institutional constraints can subject otherwise diverse firms to the forces of 
isomorphism, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the interaction between 
globalisation and national institutional structures detennining corporate governance. 
Before doing so, however, some conceptual clarifications are essential. 
Since 1983, when Levitt (1983: 92) used it for the first time, the term 
"globalisation" has become a popular buzzword that has appeared in countless texts. 
Nonetheless, it remains one of the most obscurely defined words despite numerous 
efforts to explain its meaning. This definitional problem is further aggravated by the 
lack of consensus even about the nature of globalisation as some regard it as a theory, 
others as a historical epoch or new paradigm, and others as a process (Reich 1998). 
In this study the latter view is adopted, as it seems to be the most accurate for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, globalisation cannot be a theory because it does not 
contain and prove any hypotheses that would help us understand or explain any 
phenomenon. On the contrary, it is itself that requires a theory or theories to explain 
it 
as a socio-economic phenomenon. Secondly, globalisation cannot 
be regarded as a 
specific historical epoch or a new paradigm, because as the following section will 
show, it is a phenomenon that has occurred on at least two different occasions and 
it 
can also be reversed as well as reoccur in the future. Finally, the grammatical ending 
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of the word itself signifies that it is a process rather than a static state of affairs. 
Globalisation should therefore be distinguished from the term "globalism". As 
Rosenau observes: 
Globalisation is not the same as globalism, which points to aspirations for an 
end state of affairs wherein values are shared by or pertinent to all the world's 
five billion people, their environment, their roles as citizens, consumers or 
producers with an interest in collective action designed to solve common 
problems. (Rosenau 1996: 3-4, emphasis added) 
The term should also be distinguished from the process of 
internationalisation. 131 This ten-n, which is also a process, contains the word "nation") 
as one of its main ingredients whereas globalisation does not. This is because 
internationalisation describes a world of nations which increasingly act and interact 
with each other as separate and autonomous units, either directly or through their 
citizens. Globalisation on the other hand, does not contain this national element. This 
is because it is a view of the world in which national units are going through a 
process of becoming increasingly integrated, until they eventually disappear as 
separate entities and are replaced by the holistic state of affairs that globalism 
describes; that is, globalisation contains the element of loss of national (economic) 
autonomy. However, internationalisation and globalisation are processes that are 
closely linked with each other, because, as it will be shown below, the former can 
ultimately lead to the latter. That is, increasing international activity and interaction 
can cause and promote global integration. This perhaps explains why the two terms 
are often used interchangeably. However, the concepts of "globalism" and 
"internationalism", as the outcomes of globalisation and intemationalisation 
respectively, must be regarded as mutually exclusive. 
"' On the distinction between an "inter-nationalised" and a "globalised" world economy see Hirst and 
Thompson (1999: 140-14 1). 
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Certainly, the facets of internationalisation and globalisation are extremely 
complex and diverse since they reflect the complexity and diversity of all aspects of 
human activity. Without rejecting the significance of all other aspects of the M, o 
processes, this study focuses only on the economic activities that nations and the 
agents operating within and without them undertake. There are two reasons for this, 
one practical and one contextual. Firstly, the limited space of a Ph. D. thesis does not 
allow for the detailed consideration of all aspects of globalisation, i. e. economic, 
cultural, political, etc. Secondly and most importantly, in the field of corporate 
governance economic factors are by far the most dominant in the creation of 
determinant institutions such as those analysed in the preceding chapter. 
Since globalisation is a process rather than a static state of affairs, in this 
chapter the analysis of corporate governance institutions will be predominantly 
dynamic. The hypothesis presented is that as a global market emerges shared 
institutional constraints therein can give rise to identifiable forces of global corporate 
governance isomorphism which interact with those created by national institutional 
systems as defined in chapter I above. After a brief account of the key facts and 
figures of economic globalisation, sections 2.3 will attempt to assess the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic implications of the phenomenon in order to 
determine the emerging dynamics as sources of change in corporate governance 
institutions. It will be argued that, through a process characterised by increasing direct 
and indirect competitive interaction between national institutional frameworks, these 
dynamics create pressures that are not favourable to managerial governance models, 
especially those which rely on insider relationships. In the increasingly liberal 
economic environment of the current globalisation wave, the strengths of managerial 
models not only wane but also become sources of inefficiency. The globalisation of 
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finance, trade and production are conducive to corporate governance arrangements 
that favour outside shareholders over other stakeholders without, however, resolving 
the inefficiencies that result from market imperfections. 
Section 2.4 will then turn to examine the potential dynamic responses of 
national corporate governance systems as determined by the latter's internal 
institutional forces. For completeness purposes, two paradigms will be discussed: one 
that adopts the neoclassical postulations of perfect markets and zero transaction costs, 
and one that includes market imperfections. It will be argued that the more realistic 
analysis within the latter theoretical paradigm leads to two possible responses of 
corporate governance systems: global convergence towards an inferior outside 
shareholder model or persistent diversity with equally inferior systems co-existing 
within a global macroeconomic context which is unfavourable to growth. Since the 
final outcome of any responses of corporate governance systems will depend on their 
internal dynamics, only case-by-case empirical studies can produce conclusive results 
about the direction of global corporate governance. Such evidence will be gathered 
and interpreted in chapter 3 below from the German corporate governance system. 
2.2. KEY FACTS AND DATA OF ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION 
2.2.1. The First Intern ationalis ation-Globalisation Wave and Its Collapse 
The academic and popular literature on current economic affairs confers a 
common impression that the current wave of globalisation, which 
began after the end 
of World War 11, is an unprecedented phenomenon. 
However, an overview of 
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economic history shows that what the world has been experiencing during the last 
few decades is not unprecedented. In fact, it seems that to a certain extent history is 
repeating itself one century after the previous globalisation wave of the early 1900s, 
which eventually ended with the Great Depression and the return to protectionism in 
the 1930s. Among those observers who have studied world economic trends from this 
perspective Baldwin and Martin (1999) have presented evidence showing that, in 
some respects, global economic integration was more intense a century ago that it has 
been until relatively recently. 
For instance, in the 1860s and 1870s numerous predominantly bilateral 
treaties established a largely liberal intemational trade regime. Although there was a 
reversal of trade liberalisation between developed countries in the last two decades of 
the I 9th century by 1910 world trade as a proportion of GDP was impressively high 
with the only exception being the US (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Generally, the trend 
was for developing countries to specialise in exports of raw materials and imports of 
manufactures, while developed countries followed the opposite pattern (Bairoch and 
Kozul-Wright 1996). 
Table 2.1. Total Trade as a Percentage of GDP for Selected Developed Countries 
circa 1870 circa 1910 circa 1950 1995 
UK 41 44 30 57 
France 33 35 23 43 
Germany 37 38 27 46 
Italy 21 28 21 49 
Denmark 52 69 53 64 
Norway 56 69 77 71 
Sweden 28 40 30 77 
us 14 11 9 24 
Canada 30 30 37 71 
Australia 40 39 37 40 
Japan 10 30 19 17 
Source: Baldwin and Martin (1999), Table 11, 
130 
Table 2.2. Merchandise Exports as a Percentage of GDP (Three Year Annual 
Average, except for 1950) 
Western us W. Europe Japan 
Developed Countries* 
1870 n. a. 5.4 13.6 n. a. 1890 11.7 6.7 14.9 5.1 
1913 12.9 6.4 18.3 12.5 
1929 9.8 5.0 14.5 13.6 
1938 6.2 3.7 7.1 13.0 
1950 7.8 3.8 13.4 6.8 
1970 10.2 4.0 17.4 9.7 
1992 14.3 7.5 21.7 8.8 
* Western Europe (excl. Yugoslavia), US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. 
Source: Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996). 
Moreover, much of that trade was intra-firm. trade, i. e. trade occurring within a 
single firm comprised of a parent and its foreign and domestic subsidiaries, as foreign 
direct investment (FDI) grew significantly during the pre-World War I era accounting 
for one third of total foreign investment flows and over 9 per cent of world output as 
of 1913 (ibid). Most of these high FDI levels resulted either directly or indirectly 
from firms' efforts to gain access and exploit natural resources in developing 
countries. However, FDI flows towards developed countries, albeit fewer than those 
directed to developing countries, were often in the manufacturing sector therein, 
mainly as a result of rising tariffs around the 1900s (Kenwood and Lougheed 1994: at 
35). 132 As Dunning (1983) reports, in 1914,55 percent of the FDI stock was in the 
primary product sector, 20 percent in railroads (a sector linked to natural resources 
exploitation), 15 percent in manufacturing and only 10 percent in services. Cross- 
border financial flows 133 were also exceptionally large during the first globalisation 
"' On the theoretical explanations of FDI see infra. section 2.3.2. 
133 While the distinction between FDI and pure financial (portfolio) flows is not always clear, there 
seems to be a general understanding that the former contain an element of long-term control over the 
investment which the latter do not. UNCTAD defines FDI as "an investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy (foreign 
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wave, indicating that financial markets were highly integrated. Generally, as Table 
2.3 shows, global capital mobility for several major countries measured by the 
nu absolute value of the average current account to GDP ratios reached particularly high 
levels during the pre-World War I years. 
major contributing factor was the institutional environment that was 
provided by the "Gold-Sterling Standard" as a fixed exchange rate system of that era. 
That was a monetary system where most cross-border transactions were denominated 
in sterling as a world currency based on direct convertibility into gold. The 
hegemonic role of Victorian Britain as an enforcer of Pax Britannica and the position 
of the City of London as the world's clearing house were instrumental for the 
sustainability of the system (Ingham 1994: 32-39). Although Britain ran a trade- 
balance deficit, the proceeds from the City's financial activity and the large inflows of 
short-term capital maintained a significant balance-of-payments surplus which 
supported the world"s main currency (ibid). In this environment capital flows grew 
rapidly seeking the highest returns mainly from long-term investments in railways, 
infrastructure, and industry (Baldwin and Martin 1999: 16-21). The Gold-Sterling 
standard was more of an international than a global system. As Ingham observes, 
while it was not planned, it was the creation of complementary state and private 
strategies pursuing separate interests that existed in Britain during the I 9th century 
(Ingham 1994: 38). 
direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the 
foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate)" (UNCTAD 1999: 
Annex B at 465). 
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Table 2.3. Capital Flows 1870-1996 (Average Absolute Value of Current Account 
as Percent of GDP) 
UK US CAN FRA GER ITA JPN ARG DNK NOR SWE AUS All 
1870-1889 4.6 0.7 7.0 2.4 1.7 1.2 0.6 18.7 1.9 1.6 3.2 8.2 3.7 
1890-1913 4.6 1.0 7.0 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.4 6.2 2.9 4.2 2.3 4.1 3.3 
1919-1926 2.7 1.7 2.5 2.8 2.4 4.2 2.1 4.9 1.2 4.9 2.0 4.2 3.1 
1927-1931 1.9 0.7 2.7 1.4 2.0 1.5 0.6 3.7 0.7 2.0 1.8 5.9 2.1 
1932-1939 1.1 0.4 2.6 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.6 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.2 
1947-1959 1.2 0.6 2.3 1.5 2.0 1.4 1.3 2.3 1.4 3.1 1.1 3.4 1.8 
1960-1973 0.8 0.5 1.2 0.6 1.0 2.1 1.0 1.0 1.9 2.4 0.7 2.3 1.3 
1974-1989 1.5 1.4 1.7 0.8 2.1 1.3 1.8 1.9 3.2 5.2 1.5 3.6 2.2 
1989-1996 2.6 1.2 4.0 0.7 2.7 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.9 2.0 4.5 2.3 
Source: Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Table 2.1. 
However, after the devastation of World War I the international system was 
destabilised and gradually abandoned in favour of a floating exchange rate regime. 
An attempt by the British government to re-join the Gold Standard in 1926 was 
doomed to failure because Britain's loss of its hegemonic role, due to its continuous 
economic decline and increasing trade deficit, made fixing sterling at its pre-World 
War I parity unsustainable. In the absence of a stable management regime, the world 
monetary system was flooded with speculative financial flows which stifled economic 
growth and challenged governments' efforts to control exchange parities. In effect, 
there was a passage from an managed international system to a denationalised global 
disorder. Eventually, the Great Depression of 1929 and the sterling's departure from 
its peg in 1931 signified the violent end not only of the Gold-Sterling standard but 
also of the first globalisation wave. Nations turned to protectionism and the 
imposition of capital controls in their hope to regain their autonomy from global 
financial markets and solve their huge socio-economic Problems (see Tables 2.2 and 
2.3 above). 
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134 For an overview of the events see Obstfeld and Taylor (1997). 
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2.2.2. From Post-War internationalisation to Contemporary Globalisation 
After the brief account of the pre-Warld War I events above this section will 
now seek to provide a more detailed description of economic developments in world 
markets during the second half of the 20ffi century. It will be shown how international 
cooperation at the end of World War 11 led to the institutionalisation of an 
international regime for capital flows and trade. It will then be argued that some flaws 
inherent to that economic regime led to its partial collapse and the emergence of the 
current globalisation process. 
Internationalisation Under the Bretton Woods-GA TTRegime 
It took the devastation of a five-year long world war for powerful (winner) 
nations to act collectively for the establishment of an international economic order of 
managed world trade and finance that would undo the international trend of 
uncontrolled protectionism. This task was undertaken by the United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 
1944. The major figures at the convention were Harry Dexter White and John 
Maynard Keynes, representing the US and Britain respectively, who had been 
developing their ambitious plans for the world economy since the early 1940s on the 
basis of exchange rate stability and international cooperation. There were, however, 
significant differences between the two sides' proposals; White's plan placed the 
emphasis on price stability, while Keynes' primary goal was fostering economic 
growth. Eventually, the final set of agreements, collectively known as the Bretton 
Woods agreement, mostly reflected the views of the US, which had emerged from the 
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two wars as the largest economic and military power. Although it initially had an 
economy largely insulated from world markets, the US was able to be the world's 
economic hegemon due to its role as the largest creditor nation with a significant 
balance-of-payments surplus. 
Generally, the main principle underlying the Bretton Woods agreement was 
the promotion of free trade in goods and services but with the simultaneous 
imposition of restrictions on capital flows (Rajan and Zingales 2001). The world 
monetary system was based on a Gold-Dollar exchange standard where the American 
currency was fixed to gold while all other currencies were pegged to the dollar with 
only a very narrow margin of fluctuation. ' 35 Managed currency readjustments were 
allowed in cases where parities were not sustainable in the long term. The 
management of payments difficulties by governments was to be facilitated by two 
international agencies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Bank for the Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which later became the World 
Bank. The former was responsible for the provision of financial relief to countries 
facing short-term payments difficulties and the latter's mission was to promote and 
fund the long-term development of less-develoPed economies. 136 Moreover, the 
Bretton Woods agreement legitimated the imposition of controls on capital 
movements that were not related to trade and most countries used this right in order to 
prevent speculative attacks on their currencies and retain control over their 
macroeconomic policies. Curbing speculation was seen as the antidote to the causes 
of the Gold-Sterling Standard's collapse and of the Great Depression. 
135 To be precise, the Bretton Woods agreement simply provided for the flexible fixing of exchange 
rates. However, due to the dominant role of the US in the world economy the dollar emerged as the 
key currency for world payments (Stubbs and Underhill 1994: 15 1). 
136 The US also created the Marshall Plan which was aimed at the reconstruction of Europe after WWII 
- the funding provided 
by the Plan by far exceeded that of the World Bank. 
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As regards trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
established independently from the Bretton Woods system in 1947 to regulate and 
promote the liberalisation of international trade through the reduction of tariff 
barriers. After consecutive rounds of renegotiations and the almost universal 
expansion of signatory countries over the following decades a dramatic reduction in 
tariff barriers was achieved and eventually the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was 
formed in 1995 as the main international agency regulating international trade 
matters. Table 2.4 summarises the effect of GATT agreements on tariff rates in 
manufactured products which by 2000 averaged around a mere 3.9 percent. More 
specifically, Figure 2.1 shows the impact of successive international negotiations on 
US trade, traditionally one of the most protectionist among developed countries. As a 
result of these reductions on tariff barriers, total cross-border trade as a percentage of 
GDP has now exceeded the pre-World War I levels for almost all major economies 
(Table 2.1 above). All this evidence indicates that with the liberalisation of world 
trade the globalisation of product markets has now progressed more than ever before. 
The creation of regional free trade areas, the most important of which are the 
European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), have also been imPortant 
contributing factors to the liberalisation of trade. Arguably, this latter type of 
agreements has resulted to an observable regional bias, a "thadisation", in world 
trade, though the opening up of regional trade blocs in recent years is gradually 
offsetting this effect (Ietto-Gillies et aL 1997: 99-100). 
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Table 2.4. Average Tariff Rates on Manufactured Products in Major economies 
(Percent of Value) 
1913 1950 1990 2000* 
France 21 18 5.9 3.9 
Germany 20 26 5.9 3.9 
Italy 18 25 5.9 3.9 
Japan 30 - 5.3 3.9 
Netherlands 15 11 5.9 3.9 
Sweden 20 9 4.4 3.9 
Britain - 23 5.9 3.9 
United States 44 14 4.8 3.9 
Based on full implementation of 1994 Uruguay agreement. 
Source: Hill (1998), Table 1.1. 
Figure 2.1. Weighted Average US Tariff Rate After GATT Rounds 
(Pre-Geneva = 100) 
Pre-Geneva 
Geneva (1947) 
Annecy(1949) 
Torquay (1951) 
Geneva (1956) 
Dillon (1960-61) 
Kennedy (1964-67) 
Tokyo (1973-79) 
U rug uay (1986-94) 
Source: Siebert and Klodt (1999), Figure I 
Regarding the nature of international trade the post-World War 11 era can be 
divided into two main phases. During the first, i. e. between 1959 and 1979, trade 
flows were mainly between developed economies with developing ones only playing 
a small role mostly limited to exporting primary goods. In the second phase, 
from 
1980 onwards, developing countries increased their share of total international trade 
as a result of a significant increase in their role as exporters of 
labour-intensive 
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manufactured goods. 137 As Baldwin and Martin (1999: 33) report, the share of 
manufactured goods imports from developing countries for all OECD countries rose 
from a mere 6 percent in 1970 to 13 percent in the late 1990s. By 1994, 
manufacturing exports accounted for over 66 percent of total exports from developing 
countries, up from just 23.5 percent in 1980 (Baker, Epstein and Pollin 1998a: 7). 
Generally, the Bretton Woods-GATT regime should be characterised as 
international, rather than global, since it was a product of government planning and 
was directly instituted through international government cooperation; it was a regime 
created by nations for nations, who retained considerable autonomy in the 
formulation of their economic policies either on their own or with the help of the IMF 
and the World Bank. The system promoted the managed liberalisation of trade, on the 
one hand, but at the same time, departed from liberal orthodoxy, by restricting short- 
term financial flows within national borders. As Keynes himself observed: 
Not merely as a feature of the transition but as a permanent arrangement, the 
plan accords every member government the explicit right to control all capital 
movements. What used to be heresy in now endorsed as orthodoxy. (reported 
in Moggridge 1980: 149) 
Current Globalisation Wave 
As it will be seen in section 2.3.1 below, the Bretton Woods-GATT system 
was extremely successful in promoting stability and economic growth which reached 
unprecedented levels for almost three decades after World War Il. However, 
it also 
contained some latent flaws which eventually surfaced as the causes of the system 
Is 
final collapse. Firstly, the unilateral character of the regime with the US as its main 
137 This new trend will be further explained in section 2.3.2 below. 
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guarantor was potentially problematic, as it meant that the perpetuation of American 
hegemony was necessary. Moreover, due to a failure of the negotiating parties to 
reach an agreement, the issue of payments imbalances was not sufficiently dealt with, 
despite Keynes' assertions that the accumulation of surplus by some countries could 
be as detrimental for the world economic system as the accrual of deficits (Walter 
1991: 154-156). 138 The US, as a surplus country and a major creditor, did not want to 
compromise its advantage and pursued their ambition of bringing the international 
economic system under their control (Stubbs and Underhill 1994). 
Ironically, the very mechanisms that the US supported in order to perpetuate 
its economic dominance had the opposite effect. As the European economies 
recovered and grew stronger, they began to challenge the US economic superiority. 
By the late 1950s the US balance-of-payments surplus had been eliminated and had 
turned into a deficit which continued to expand well into the 1960s. By 1968 the US 
current account also went into deficit and the first signs of a devaluation of the dollar 
began to appear. Growing military spending for Cold War purposes further 
exacerbated the problem as American competitiveness vis-a-vis other western 
countries and Japan eroded. The absence of a mechanism for dealing with payments 
imbalances proved to be the Achilles heel of the Bretton Woods system as 
implemented under US hegemony. 139 The American government was then faced with 
a dilemma of adjusting the dollar's parity to its real value or maintaining its status as 
the world's currency. 
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the strict capital controls 
that Keynes advocated were never fully implemented. Most importantly, the British 
138 On this issue see section 2.3.1 below on pp. 155-156. 
139 Stubbs and Underhill (1994: 150-15 1) go as far as to claim that the Bretton Woods agreement was 
never fully implemented since the IMF and the World Bank were under-resourced and 
largely 
substituted by the Marshall plan so that the world economy was ultimately run 
by the US Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve. 
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government's aspirations to revive the role of the City as an international financial 
centre by allowing the operation of offshore markets dealing in dollars and other 
currencies gave rise to unregulated financial flows. These markets, known as the 
Eurodollar markets, first appeared in the 1950s and have grown enormously since 
then. The supply was there as the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries, 
fearing a blocking of dollar balances in the US in the event of hostilities, moved their 
overseas dollar holdings into London. 140 Similar moves were made by other 
governments as well as companies engaged in international activities earning dollars. 
The motive for the latter was that the lack of regulation in the City's offshore markets 
permitted banks to pay higher rates of interest which were also not subject to the 
levels of taxation charged onshore (Hill 1998: 331-332). The demand was also there 
since American and other companies sought to finance their international operations 
with cheap offshore money as the lack of regulation allowed banks to charge 
borrowers less than they did in regulated markets (ibid). Additionally, developing 
countries were keen to tap this source of cheap money. Thus, by the late 1960s the 
value of the Eurodollar market had already grown to $40 billion from a modest $11 
billion in 1964 (Martin 1994: 257). But even these amounts were dwarfed by the huge 
inflows of petrodollars that OPEC countries accumulated after the oil crises which in 
turn fueled the further growth of the Eurodollar market in the following years which 
reached $4.5 trillion by 1988 (Hill 1998: 330). This was truly global capital which not 
only existed outside national regulatory regimes but also challenged the latter's very 
existence since it made regulatory arbitrage possible. 
The emergence of these global capital flows made exchange rate movements 
not only larger and more unpredictable, but increasingly uncontrollable even by the 
140 For a more extensive discussion on the emergence of the Euromarkets see Pilbeam (1998). 
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strongest central banks. The combination of speculative financial flows and the 
unsustainable parity of the dollar meant that the end of the fixed exchange rate regime 
was a matter of time. Indeed, in August 1971 the Nixon administration abandoned the 
gold-dollar standard and allowed the dollar to float. Other countries, challenged by 
currency speculators, soon followed the same path, so that by 1973 a new financial 
(dis)order of floating exchange rates was established and the Eurodollar market 
expanded to become the Eurocurrency market. This signified the passage from the 
international financial order of the first three post-war decades the current wave of 
globalisation. 
With the availability of global finance offshore, financial and non-financial 
firms could easily sidestep national financial systems so that restrictions on capital 
movements became unsustainable as they were subjected to the pressures of arbitrage. 
The abolition of capital controls was therefore inevitable. The first of the major 
countries to lift these measures were Canada, Germany and Switzerland in 1973, who 
were then followed by the US in 1974, Britain in 1979 and Japan in 1980. The 
liberalisation of capital controls led to an explosion of short-term financial flows as a 
result of exchange rate speculation. The value of average daily foreign exchange 
transactions rose from just $10-20 billion in 1973 to $80 billion in 1980 and to the 
then inconceivable $1490 billion in 1998, that is about one hundred times the total 
value of world trade in the same year (Figure 2-2). 
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Figure 2.2. Average Daily Foreign Exchange Transactions 
Source: BIS, Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity, (several 
issues). 
While foreign exchange markets now seem to be truly globalised, the 
globalisation of securities markets has also progressed rapidly since the 1980s with 
the growth of the Eurobond and Foreign bond markets, with the former accounting 
for the lion's share. 141 Just as with Eurocurrency markets, immunity from government 
regulation, tax advantages and adaptability to exchange rate expectations are the most 
attractive features of Eurobond finance for corporate and sovereign borrowers. Over 
the years, the market has expanded not only in volume but also in scope with the 
introduction of a broad range of securities instruments such as warrants, global 
depository receipts, international floating rate notes and Euro-commercial paper. 
Thus, by 2000 the total value of international debt securities' net issues amounted to 
$1243,5 billion (BIS 2002). Moreover, since the demise of the Bretton Woods system 
a whole host of derivative financial instruments has been created for the purpose of 
managing investment risks resulting from floating exchange rates. As of December 
2000 the gross value of over-the-counter derivative contracts was $3,183 billion 
(ibid). However, the global integration of equity markets has been comparatively 
slow, but it has nevertheless accelerated from the mid 1980s (Ayuso and Blancol 
14 1 Eurobonds are bonds issued in countries other than the one in whose currency they are 
denominated. Foreign bonds are sold outside the issuer's country but are denormnated in currency of 
the countries where they are issued. 
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2000). As of 2000 the total value of cross-border equity issues was $316.7 billion 
(Figure 2.3). Overall, cross-border investment in securities has reached extremely 
high levels with its value by far exceeding most major countries' GDP (Table 2.5). 
Figure 2.3: Value of Announced Cross-border Equity Issues 
(Billion Dollars) 
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Source: BIS, BIS Quarterly Review, (several issues). 
Table 2.5. Gross purchases and sales of securities between residents and non- 
residents in six major OECD countries (% of GDP) 
1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
us 4 9 35 101 89 96 107 129 131 135 164 
Japan 2 8 62 156 119 92 72 78 60 65 84* 
Germany 5 7 33 66 57 55 85 171 159 172 200 
France 5 21 52 54 79 122 187 201 187 227** 
Italy 1 1 4 18 27 60 92 192 207 253 468 
Canada 3 9 27 55 65 81 113 153 212 189 258 
Based on settlement data 
** January- September at an annual rate 
Source: BIS (1998), table V. I. 
The dominant force behind global financial flows and integration are 
institutional investors who have been constantly increasing the share of total 
household assets under their control since the 1960s. The stress on pay-as-you-go 
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pension systems, due to a combination of higher unemployment and lower tax 
revenues with increasing pressures on governments to cut their spending 142 and the 
retirement of the baby-boomer cohort during the past two decades, has produced a 
rising demand for retirement products managed by professional investors. 
Additionally, the advancement of financial deregulation since the abolition of capital 
controls has intensified competition in the savings business between institutional 
investors and banks who have now turned from savings and loans to capital market 
transaction fees and commissions as their main source of revenue. As a result, the 
growth of institutionalised holdings has seen a dramatic rise in all OECD countries, 
especially during the past ten years (Table 2.6). For instance, in countries such as the 
UK, the US and the Netherlands the value of assets managed by institutional investors 
is more than double the value of GDP. The OECD has estimated that in 1999 total 
institutional assets exceeded $37 trillion, of which about 80 percent was invested in 
bonds and equities (Figure 2.4). 
Table 2.6. Financial assets of institutional investors in OECD Countries (Percent 
of GDP) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999P 2000p 
Australia 61.6 71.9 65.9 86.2 92.4 105.2 115.6 127.9 131.2 
Austria 24.1 28.5 30.4 35.0 40.3 47.0 54.6 68.4 
Belgium 47.2 57.6 56.0 58.1 64.5 73.3 88.1 101.9 
Canada 68.6 76.8 80.2 83.1 92.1 100.3 108.8 112.7 111.3 
Czech Republic 22.8 17.3 17.8 21.4 19.0 16.8 20.3 
Denmark 55.7 63.9 62.2 65.1 70.6 77.5 84.8 98.0 
Finland 41.1 43.8 49.3 49.6 61.7 65.6 77.1 92.1 
France 61.9 73.9 71.8 77.7 86.6 97.0 107.3 125.4 133.3 
Germany 34.0 38.9 41.3 45.3 50.6 58.7 66.1 76.8 79.7 
Greece 3.0 6.7 8.4 12.8 16.9 26.6 29.9 40.1 
Hungary 2.5 2.8 3.9 4.4 6.1 7.5 8.9 10.7 12.8 
Iceland 55.3 62.4 66.7 71.7 79.6 86.6 96.3 111.3 110.1 
Italy 21.8 28.2 32.2 32.0 39.0 53.9 79.6 96.9 
Japan 78.0 83.4 81.6 89.3 89.3 87.6 91.7 100.5 
Korea 51.8 55.2 53.7 54.7 57.3 63.3 88.1 88.5 72.6 
Luxembourg 1574.3 2119.1 1945.6 2020.6 2057.0 2612.7 3049.0 4172.3 
142 These are pressures largely created by globalisation. See infra. section 2.3.1. 
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Mexico 5.6 7.3 5.4 4.5 4.6 4.9 6.1 8.3 8.3 
Netherlands 131.5 149.1 144.5 154.5 167.6 181.9 193.2 212.8 209.6 
Norway 36.4 42.0 41.4 42.4 43.5 46.6 47.7 53.9 
Poland - 0.6 1.9 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.2 4.2 5.4 
Portugal 18.3 27.5 29.8 38.3 43.2 53.4 48.7 50.8 
Spain 21.9 29.3 32.3 33.4 44.3 56.0 66.5 65.4 62.1 
Sweden 88.8 105.7 97.9 102.9 118.5 136.8 123.2 137.8 
Switzerland 122.5 70.0 141.3 75.3 164.2 93.1 200.4 83.2 
Turkey 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.7 1.6 1.7 3.4 
United Kingdo m 131.3 163.0 143.8 164.0 173.4 195.5 203.6 226.7 
United States 127.2 136.3 135.9 151.9 162.9 178.4 192.0 207.3 195.2 
p: Provisional. 
I. Insurance companies, investment companies, pension funds and other forms of institutional savings. 
2.1992: excluding pension funds. 
3.1992: excluding investment companies. 
4.1992-96: excluding pension funds. 
5.2000: excluding non-life insurance companies. 
6.1992-93: excluding insurance companies. 
7.1993,95,97: excluding pension funds. 1999: includes only insurance companies. 
Note: Data are not available for Ireland and Slovak Republic. New Zealand is not included, while data 
coverage and definitions are different. 
Source: OECD (2001: 46). 
Figure 2.4. Size and Composition of Institutional Investors' Financial Assets 
Source: OECD (2001: 52). 
Thus, in the absence of capital controls, the growth of institutional investment has 
become the driver behind the globalisation of securities markets as a matter of 
necessity. National prudential regulations can certainly differ with some restricting 
global portfolio diversification more than others. Similarly, some investment products 
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can be specialised and thus invest in specific countries or regions. However, with the 
vast expansion of assets under institutional control, the globalisation of portfolios, 
especially for index funds, has become a necessary strategy for prudent fund 
managers who must now view the world as one large market. 143 
The same also holds for firms and this is indicated by the remarkable growth 
of FDI levels since the 1980s as an indication of the increasing role of Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) in the world economy. 144 During the 1960s and 1970s the 
growth rate of FDI more or less followed that of exports. However, since the mid 
1980s the former has accelerated dramatically so that by 1995 the world stock of FDI 
as a percentage of output has even exceeded the 1913 levels (Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7. Foreign Direct Investment Relative to Output, Capital Formation and 
Exports 
1913 1960 1975 1985 1991 1995 
World FDI Stock as 
% of World Output 9.0 4.4 4.5 5.4 7.2 10.1 
World FDI inflows 
as % of World Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.9 5.2 
World sales of Foreign 
Affiliates as % of 
World Exports 8.4 9.7 9.9 12.2 - 
Source: Baker, Epstein and Pollin (1998), Table 5A. 
While the overall numerical difference between the two eras is not significant 
(only 1.1 percent), a closer look at the quality of contemporary FDI shows that, 
contrary to the trends during the first globalisation wave, the vast majority of flows 
are now between developed countries which are the top hosts of FDI (Table 2.8). 
Certainly, the data in Figure 2.5 and Table 2.9 also show that FDI levels towards 
143 on international portfolio diversification by institutional investors see Davis (1991); Bartram and 
Dufey (200 1). 
144 On the causes and effects of TNC activity see infra. section 2.3.2. 
146 
developing countries as a percentage of GDP, especially in South East Asia, Latin 
America and Central and Eastern Europe, has been growing faster than those towards 
developed countries in recent years. The performance of China is indeed impressive. 
However, this element does not signify a return to the old FDI trend of the 1900s due 
to a very important qualitative difference: contemporary investment in factors located 
in developing countries is predominantly directed to the manufacturing sector rather 
than primary resources. This is also reflected in the increase of manufacturing exports 
originating from such countries. As section 2.3.2 below shows, since the 1980s TNCs 
have been pursuing the reorganisation of their manufacturing production activities 
along global lines. Finally, since the 1990s FDI has been mostly taking place in the 
form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), an issue that will also be further explored 
later. 
Table 2.8. Leading Host Economies for FDI Based on Cumulative Inflows 1985- 
95 
FD1 Per Capita 
Rank Country FDl $ Billion (in US Dollars) 
I United States 477.5 1830 
2 United Kingdom 199.6 3410 
3 France 138.0 2380 
4 China 130.2 110 
5 Spain 90.9 2320 
6 Belgium-Luxembourg 72.4 6900 
7 Netherlands 68.1 4410 
8 Australia 62.6 3470 
9 Canada 60.9 2060 
10 Mexico 44.1 470 
11 Singapore 40.8 13650 
12 Sweden 37.7 4270 
13 Italy 36.3 630 
14 Malaysia 30.7 1520 
15 Germany 25.9 320 
16 Switzerland 25.2 3580 
17 Argentina 23.5 680 
18 Brazil 20.3 130 
19 Hong Kong 17.9 2890 
20 Denmark 15.7 3000 
Note: Economies in bold are also among the 20 leading home economies for FDL 
Source: WTO (1996), Table IV. 1. 
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Figure 2.5. Changes in Annual Inflows of FDI from 1988 to 1993 
(Billion Dollars) 
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Source: UNCTAD (1994), Table 1.5. 
* Developed Countries-ý 
* Developing Countries ý 
Table 2.9. Inward and Outward FDI stock (% of GDP) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 
World Total 
Inward 5.0 6.9 8.7 9.9 11.7 
Outward 5.3 6.3 8.4 10.2 11.9 
Developed Countries Total 
Inward 4.8 6.1 8.4 9.0 10.5 
Outward 6.4 7.4 9.9 11.7 13.9 
Developing Countries Total 
Inward 5.9 9.8 10.5 14.1 16.6 
Outward 0.8 1.4 2.3 4.7 5.8 
of which: Latin Am. & Carib. 
Inward 6.4 10.5 10.1 15.1 17.2 
Outward 0.4 1.1 1.2 1.7 2.3 
S, E& SE Asia 
Inward 9.9 11.1 11.6 14.8 18.4 
Outward 1.4 1.4 2.8 7.3 9.3 
C&E Europe 
Inward 1.5 5.5 8.3 
Outward - 0.7 1.2 
Source: UNCTAD (1999), annex table B. 6. 
Certainly, critics of the globalisation thesis have disputed the significance of 
current economic trends on the basis that in the early 1900s total capital flows were 
larger than they are now and that trade figures are not much greater either (see Tables 
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
2.2 and 2.4 above). 145 Moreover, they point at the "triadisation" effect to indicate the 
lack of global integration. While these claims may have had some validity a couple of 
decades ago, the differences between the current economic developments and the first 
globalisation wave are significant. A close look at the data reveals some fundamental 
differences between the two eras, which suggest that world markets may be more 
integrated today than ever before even if they still have a long way to go before they 
become truly global. 
Firstly, as Balwin and Martin (1999: 20) observe, short-tenn capital 
movements are much more important today and by far exceed long-term investment, 
with foreign exchange markets closely resembling globalism as a state of affairs. The 
lack of an effective mechanism for regulating exchange rates since the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods exchange rate regime and the resulting liberalisation of capital 
controls are the main factors behind this. Secondly, the increased share of 
manufactured goods') exports from developing countries mainly attributed to FDI in 
manufacturing from developed economies is also an unprecedented characteristic of 
the current globalisation wave due to complex macro- and micro-economic factors. 
According to Hoogvelt (1997), these developments are the essence of the current 
wave of globalisation, which lies in the deepening of capitalist integration in recent 
years. Thus, the rest of this chapter will show that, even that which critics may still 
regard as the limited integration of world markets, is already beginning to put national 
institutional arrangements determining corporate governance under pressure to 
conform along specific lines. The purpose of the following section 
is to identify, 
explain and assess these pressures from continuing economic globalisation. 
145 See Hirst and Thompson (1996,1999); Krugman (1996); and Wade (1996). 
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2.3. MACROECONOMIC AND MICROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF 
GLOBALISATION 
2.3.1. Global Financial Flows, International Trade and Effective Demand 
The emergence of the international economic order in the second half of the 
20th century is a classic illustration of how academic theory and real events interact in 
the institutionalisation process. As already mentioned, the experiences of the Great 
Depression and World War 11 gave rise to an unprecedented consensus for the 
establishment of a stable international system, along Keynesian interventionist lines, 
which would provide the foundations for the reconstruction of devastated economies 
worldwide. The institutional arrangements that emerged from the Bretton Woods 
agreements ensured that a stable macroeconomic environment was in place to ensure 
continuous investment and growth. Within that international order, national 
governments were able to implement expansionary policies which ensured that 
effective demand was sufficient to absorb increasing industrial output. The result was 
four decades of unprecedented economic growth and wealth creation often referred to 
as the "golden age of capitalism" (Marglin and Schor 1990). 
Post-war economic progress resembled the Kaldorian model 146 of "circular 
cumulative growth" where sustained demand supports increases in industrial output 
which then boosts profits. Provided firms can retain and use their earnings, 
147 higher 
profitability translates into increased investment in organisational and production 
technologies and results in an increase of productivity and output. It is at this second 
stage that the effect of government demand-management policies is crucial for the 
146 See Kaldor (1996). For a good synopsis of Kaldor's model see Toner (1999) ch. 6. 
117 Kaldor as well as others have emphasised the central role of retained earnings in financing 
industrial investment. See Kaldor (1985); and Cuff ie (198 1). 
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completion and perpetuation of this "virtuous circle" of cumulative economic growth. 
If sufficient demand is ensured to absorb increased output, a new cycle can begin 
which will further promote growth and economic welfare. Contrary to the 
neoclassical orthodoxy of Say's Law, i. e. that supply creates its own demand, Kaldor 
followed the Keynesian approach to identify effective demand not only as the key to 
sustainable economic growth but also as the weak link which markets cannot always 
provide automatically without outside intervention; hence the important role of 
government as a regulator of effective demand mainly through the implementation of 
full employment policies and public investment spending. High employment rates 
with appropriately adjusted 148 real wages as a source of income and production cost 
(Kalecki 1971: chs. 1-8) should sustain a sequence of rising industrial growth leading 
to consumption, leading to profitability, leading to investment, leading to industrial 
growth. However, in the absence of effective corrective mechanisms, demand slumps 
can lead to "vicious circles" of diminishing output, investment, growth and demand 
with equivalent welfare consequences (Myrdal 1957). 
Indeed, the post-war era saw national governments in most inclustrialised 
countries pursuing expansionary monetary and fiscal policies with the aim of 
sustaining effective demand. Structural differences between national economic 
systems led to variations in both the methods and the extent of such policies (Epstein 
and Schor 1990: 127-13 1). For instance, systems which enhance labour power and 
create close ties between finance and industry are associated with more expansionary 
macro-policies, 149 whereas central bank independence and high 
international 
significance of national currencies are linked to more restrictive tactics 
(ibid. ). 
148 Appropriately adjusted wages are wages that are positively linked to productivity. See Marglin 
(1990: 17). 
149 On the former element see Lange and Garrett (1985). On the latter element see Epstein and Schor 
(1990: 127-129). 
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However, more or less the general trend at least until the 1970s was for monetary and 
fiscal policies to aim for demand-led growth based on full employment. 
Characteristically, until the mid-1970s the objectives of US macropolicy were set 
according to a mandate in the Employment Act 1946 which called for the fostering of 
"conditions under which there will be useful employment opportunities ... 
for those 
able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, 
production, and purchasing power" (Meyer 2000). Such employment-growth policies, 
combined with an expansion of welfare state provisions, maintained high levels of 
consumption so that somewhat miraculously the major concern was for some 
countries how to ease effective demand rather than increase it (Glyn et al. 1990: 60). 
Crucial for the sustainability of such national policies was the relative 
macroeconomic stability at the international stage. Despite its flaws, which unravelled 
during the late 1960s, the international economic order largely established by the 
Bretton Woods agreement was instrumental for the effectiveness of state-level 
Keynesian interventions. The key element was the restriction on capital mobility 
across borders which allowed national authorities sufficient financial autonomy to 
pursue their full employment and welfare state policies designed to maintain 
sufficient levels of effective demand. Moreover, in the absence of exchange rate 
fluctuations national authorities were able to adjust interest rates according to 
investment and growth targets. The IMF provided guarantees against short-term 
balance-of-payments problems and the World Bank often supplemented by the 
Marshall Plan funding programme ensured that high levels of long-term investment in 
reconstruction and development were maintained. Even if few national crises 
occurred, they were short-lived and not contagious (Epstein and Schor 1990: 137). 
Moreover, rising industrial output also led to the increase of international trade from 
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the 1950s onwards with substantial increases after each successive GATT agreement. 
However, as Glyn et aL (1990: 5 1) report, high domestic demand ensured that at least 
until the mid 1960s growth was mostly domestically based. 
In sum, as the data in Table 2.10 show, the stable macroeconomic 
environment during the golden age led to the achievement of unprecedented real 
growth rates for the world economy with low unemployment and an average of 4 per 
cent inflation. An unprecedented consensus between capital and labour was achieved 
where both sides were winners as increased profitability meant satisfactory earnings 
for shareholders as well as for employees. Stable macroeconomic growth conditions 
nationally and internationally and a managerial microeconomic model based on the 
coincidence between stakeholder interests were complementary elements of a highly 
successful system versions of which were found in most major economies. As 
macroeconomic stability allowed for real interest rates to be kept at historically low 
levels, cash flow retention and internal reinvestment by firms provided higher returns 
for shareholders than its distribution and external investment in deposits, bonds, and 
other instruments. So, provided demand was sufficient, high growth rates of firms 
suited not only managers, shareholders and employees, but also society as 
unemployment was kept low and general welfare increased. 
Table 2.10. Post-War Economic Performance 
Real GDP Growth Rates (916 Annual Change) 
World OECD countries Developing countries* 
1950-73 n/a 5.9 5.5 
1966-73 5.1 4.8 6.9 
1974-80 3.4 2.9 5.0 
1981-90 3.2 3.1 3.3 
1991-93 1.2 1.2 4.6 
1994-95 2.8 2.6 4.7 
* Excluding Eastern and Central Europe and former USSR countries 
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Average Growth Rates of Advanced Capitalist Countries Since 1820 (016 Annual 
Change) 
GDP GDP per capita 
1820-1870 2.2 1.0 
1870-1913 2.5 2.5 
1913-1950 1.9 1.2 
1950-1973 4.9 3.8 
1973-1979 2.5 2.0 
Consumer Prices (1/o Annual Change) 
1950-73 1973-79 1979-83 
us 2.7 8.2 8.2 
UK 4.6 15.4 10.7 
France 5.0 10.7 12.1 
Germany 2.7 4.7 5.1 
Italy 3.9 16.3 17.5 
Japan 5.2 10.0 4.3 
Average Unemployment in OECD Countries 
1951-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-95 
us 4.3 4.6 3.5 7.3 8.8 
UK 2.1 2.7 4.4 9.9 9.1 
France 1.8 1.7 3.8 9.0 10.7 
Germany 4.6 0.7 2.3 6.0 6.3 
Italy 7.0* 3.9 4.4 7.0 10.7 
Japan 2.2 1.3 1.7 2.5 2.5 
Australia 1.1 2.1 3.8 7.5 9.4 
Belgium 4.3 2.3 4.8 10.8 8.3 
Canada 3.9 4.7 6.6 9.3 10.1 
Netherlands 2.1 1.2 3.9 9.7 6.6 
Spain 2.2 2.4 4.3 17.7 19.8 
Sweden 1.9 1.3 1.7 2.1 6.6 
OECD av. 2.9 2.2 3.5 7.3 
8.8 
*1953-59 
Volume of Exports (916 Annual Change) 
1950-73 1973-79 1979-83 
us 6.3 4.9 -1.6 
UK 3.9 4.7 -0.1 
France 8.2 6.1 2.3 
Germany 12.4 4.7 4.1 
Italy 11.7 7.1 1.2 
Japan 15.4 7.6 10.2 
Source: Marglin and Schor (1990: 42 and 47); Davidson (2000); Baker (1998), Table IA. 
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However, the collapse of the fixed exchange rate system between 1971 and 
1973 due to the reasons outlined earlier signalled the beginning of a new era for the 
international economic order. According to Eatwell, when governments and Bretton 
Woods agencies stopped bearing the full costs of currency management with the 
imposition of capital controls, foreign exchange risk was Privatised (Eatwell 1996). 
Floating exchange rates not only created vast profit opportunities for currency 
speculators, but also made hedging against volatility risks a necessity for both 
financial and non-financial corporations. In order to deal with these new private 
demands governments had to remove exchange controls and financial regulations that 
restricted capital flows and were therefore seen as 'inefficient' by the new players in 
financial markets. The globalisation of finance led to the construction of "the modem 
infrastructure of speculation" (ibid. ) as the majority of transactions in global financial 
markets are now not intended to finance trade or production but to capture gains from 
speculative predictions about currency movements. 
The growing size of capital flows has now made actual and potential 
movements in exchange rates much larger, more unpredictable, and uncontrollable. 
With so much capital available for speculation, apparent exchange rate problems can 
quickly turn into full-scale crises. Indeed, by 1973 speculators had challenged and 
defeated almost every central bank, including the US Federal Reserve (Moffit 1983: 
71-92). The globalisation of capital has the potential to both cause and exacerbate 
fundamental disequilibria with no practical means of resolving these problems. 
Consequently, significant constraints have been imposed on national authorities' 
discretion to formulate macroeconomic policies (Simmons 1999: 63; Keohane 1996). 
As Martin (1994: 268) states, global financial integration has led to a loss of national 
autonomy, at least in the sphere of macroeconomic policy-making. 
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Policyrnakers now need to maintain their market "credibility" and in doing so 
they are forced to consider the reaction of international financial markets to each and 
every policy move, otherwise they risk being punished by capital outflows, currency 
depreciation and ultimately financial crisis. Failure to meet market demands imposes 
a premium on the interest costs governments have to pay for financing their 
programmes. This dynamic has completely shifted macroeconomic priorities from the 
objective of fostering employment and demand to maintaining given exchange rate 
parities or the levels of money supply. Governments now face what has become 
known as the Fleming-Mundell "trilemma" between the policy objectives of full 
capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate, and expansionary policies, of which only two 
can be pursued simultaneously if a crisis is to be avoided (Fleming 1962; Mundell 
19605 1963). So, once commitment to capital mobility is made, or rather imposed by 
the markets, 150 the growth objective becomes antagonistic to currency stability. 15 1 As 
the main remaining regulatory tool for balancing between the two goals are short- 
term interest rates (Felix 1996), global liberalisation of capital markets exacerbates 
interest rate volatility which then increases business uncertainty. Most importantly, 
due to the extent and impact of currency speculation, in their attempt to maintain a 
desired exchange rate, governments lose control over long-term interest rates which 
are now largely determined by global financial markets. 
Market discipline would of course have been a blessing rather than a problem 
if markets were efficient. In fact, conventional neoclassical analysis based on the 
efficient markets hypothesis provides support for this very claim about the "healthy" 
150 In fact, contrary to their original remits under the Bretton Woods agreements, the IMF and the 
World Bank have also become major forces behind financial deregulation due to the conditional nature 
of their loans. 
151 it was precisely the attempt by the British government to pursue all three objectives that led to the 
20 per cent devaluation of the pound against the German mark and its forceful exit from the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism on "Black Wednesday" 16 September 1992. 
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discipline on governments' irrational spending (Woodall 1995). With worldwide 
financial market liberalisation, the argument goes, a global pool of capital is created 
which is allocated efficiently to the most productive investment offering better 
opportunities for investors and lower costs of capital for borrowers so that there is 
more long-term investment and growth (Friedman 1953c; Bayoumi 1995). 
However, in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money Keynes 
argued that market views are not formed according to the efficient market hypothesis 
but by a process that is similar to the beauty contest competitions that were conducted 
by some British tabloid papers at the time. To win, rather than forming and 
expressing their own view about women's pictures, each competing reader had to 
guess "what average opinion expects average opinion to be" (Keynes 1936: 156). 
Similarly, speculative financial flows in the global market are directed by what 
average opinion of investors expects average opinion about monetary policies to be 
and so an enormous premium is placed on signals about market reactions to specific 
events without the need of sophisticated interpretations of economic data (Eatwell 
1996). Simplistic slogans that larger fiscal deficits lead to higher interest rates, that 
increased money supply leads to inflation or that public spending is bad and private 
spending is good, tend to dominate investment decisions despite the contrary findings 
of empirical research (ibid. ). Even worse, where investment decisions are formed in 
this fashion, investors have the tendency to move as a herd to the same direction 
irrespective of the economic fundamentals so that waves of excessive optimism are 
followed by excessive pessimism and vice versa (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein 1992). 
Consequently, as the long series of financial crises since the liberalisation of 
capital controls demonstrates, markets are unable to provide the healthy discipline 
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that the efficient market hypothesis asserts. 152 Since the liberalisation of capital 
controls, such crises have not only become very common but also highly contagious 
so that the default of even one emerging economy can quickly spread across the globe 
due to extensive financial exposures of global investors. 
The growth of institutional investors represents a critical element in the 
transformation of global financial markets. While this phenomenon is often attributed 
to demographic changes, one cannot ignore the fact that the pressure on governments 
to reduce their spending combined with high unemployment or under-employment 
have been major contributing factors to the retreat of the state from pension 
provisions and the shift from pay-as-you-go to defined-contribution systems. Thus, as 
mentioned above, on a collective basis institutional investors have emerged as the 
largest managers of liquid financial assets and therefore as the main generators of 
global financial flows. Logically, this has led analysts to hold them responsible for 
triggering destabilising shocks to financial markets (Blommenstein 1997: 37). Due to 
their ability to pool financial assets on a global scale, institutional investors' financial 
decisions not only increase dramatically the speed of financial movements, but also 
amplify their speculative effects on markets. Herd behaviour and the "beauty contest" 
decision-making Of fund managers are further exacerbated by the fact that their 
performance is evaluated according that of their peers (Annaert 1999: 58). 
For all the reasons mentioned so far, it is not surprising that the focus of 
national macroeconomic policies is now on market credibility instead of 
full 
152 E. g. the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the "Black Monday" stock market crash in 1987, 
the collapse of the Japanese "bubble" in 1990, the speculative attacks on ERM currencies in 
1992 and 
1993, the Mexican balance of payments crisis in 1994, the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in 
1998, the Turkish crisis in 1999, the Argentinean crisis in 200 1. See Calvo and Mentoza (1996); Sachs, 
Tornell and Velasco (1996); Chang and Velasco (1998); and Krugman (2000). 
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employment and demand management. 153 While such macropolicy-making may 
indeed help preventing capital flight at least in the short term, it surely does not lead 
to higher economic growth rates. On the contrary, what global financial markets tend 
to perceive as sound policies has led to the dramatic increase of real interest rates 
with significant negative effects. While during the "golden age" interest rates were 
deliberately kept low to promote growth, since the liberalisation of capital controls in 
the late 1970s real interest rates have constantly exceeded real GDP growth even in 
the most powerful countries (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7). As a result there has been a 
reduction in national investment rates, which have slowed down growth and have 
suppressed effective demand. Moreover, public spending cuts have been imposed and 
the public sector is now seen as a burden rather than a tool for sustaining high levels 
of demand (Simmons 1999: 64). 154 So the current global financial environment tends 
to punish expansionary policies and reward contractionary ones based on prolonged 
austerity programmes. The effects of such deflationary pressures are even more 
severe in crisis-struck countries which are left unable to adopt those policies that 
would reflate their economies with analogous consequences for global effective 
demand. 
153 See for example the British Labour Party's dropping of Clause 4 of the party manifesto combined 
with the emphasis by Chancellor Gordon Brown on financial "prudence". 
154 See also Stephens, Huber and Ray (1999) reporting decreases in welfare state spending since the 
mid 1970s. 
159 
Figure 2.6. Real long-term rates in G3 countries 
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Figure 2.7. Real Growth and Real Interest Rates in the US 1960-1997 
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In addition to the negative impact of high real interest rates and deflationary 
policies, since the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, both financial 
and non-financial corporations have had to commit portions of their cash flows or 
borrowed money to derivatives and other instruments in order to hedge against 
financial risk. This means that an enormous amount of finance is now capitalised on 
pure finance rather than real asset creation through production. This has further 
increased the cost of capital for financing investment in the real economy with 
equivalent consequences for growth and welfare. Moreover, trading risk-hedging 
instruments is itself an extremely complex and unpredictable activity that entails the 
possibility of heavy losses if something goes wrong. The examples of Orange County, 
Barings Bank, Daiwa Bank, Metallgesellschaft, LTCM and Enron indicate the reality 
and extent of the risks involved in derivative trading. ' 55 
While all this has been a major factor contributing to the global economic 
slowdown by dampening effective demand, the simultaneous liberalisation of trade 
has exacerbated the problem. Where governments are unable to stimulate domestic 
effective demand an obvious solution to domestic industries is to resort to export-led 
growth often with the assistance of govermnents. But where there is no coordination 
of international trade, such policies can lead to situations where exporting nations 
with low domestic demand grow at the expense of importing ones with higher 
demand, so that in the end there is no growth in overall global output (Toner 1999: 
142). In fact, it is this very effect, widely known as the "balance-of-payments 
constraint" (Thirwall and Hussain 1982), which led to the decline of the US economy 
in the late 1960s and its inability to support the Bretton Woods system (Marglin 1990: 
24). As Myrdal (195 7: ch. 11) and Kaldor (1991: 607) have argued in their influential 
155 See Jorion (1995); Fay (1997); Mello and Parsons (1995). On the Metal Igese II schaft affair see 
section 3.7.2 below. 
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works, unless there is a system of planned trade, nations with a competitive advantage 
tend to undermine the position of less advantaged ones with significant consequences 
for the global economy. Alternatively, as Keynes himself states in his General 
Theory, if appropriate demand management policies are adopted globally, such 
international trade conflicts should not arise: 
if nations can learn to provide themselves with full employment by their 
domestic policy ... there need be no important economic forces calculated to set 
the interest of one country against that of its neighbours. ... International trade 
would cease to be what it is, namely, a desperate expedient to maintain 
employment at home by forcing sales on foreign markets and restricting 
purchases, which, if successful, will merely shift the problem of 
unemployment to the neighbour which is worsted in the struggle, but a willing 
and unimpeded exchange of goods and services in conditions of mutual 
advantage. (Keynes 1936: 382-383) 
However, for the reasons given above, expansionary, full-employment 
policies are no longer viable. Thus, due to the combination of global financial market 
orthodoxy, which tends to "punish" demand-driven government planning, with the 
current international trade regime, which is built upon uncoordinated liberalisation, 
balance-of-payments problems are very common. Where trade deficits are generated, 
e. g. due to competitiveness problems, they result to current account deficits and 
simultaneous increases in foreign borrowing in order to finance them. In turn, 
increasing levels of debt as a proportion of GDP exert downward pressure on 
exchange rates and raise the risk of speculative financial outflows. As the normal 
reaction of national monetary authorities to such currency dynamics is to defend the 
exchange rate by increasing interest rates, investment decreases and growth slows 
down. But even trade surplus countries do not remain unaffected in the long run, 
since the effects of balance-of-payments imbalances tend to spread. As effective 
demand slows down in deficit countries, there is a resulting negative effect on surplus 
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countries' exports with analogous consequences for their domestic profitability. 
investment and growth. Thus, international trade acts as a transmission mechanism of 
recessions and leads to a worldwide economic slowdown. 
In sum, the combination of global finance with uncoordinated international 
trade liberalisation has a negative overall effect, as it leads to a 44vicious circle" of 
slowing global market capacity and output growth, lower profits and investment and 
further decreases in effective demand. Where there is a demand slowdown the general 
dilemma for firms wishing to maintain profitability is between cost-cutting and 
reducing out put. 
156 While in a closed economy this dilemma is inescapable, the 
advent of economic globalisation may have created some alternatives. So, among 
other things, the following section will examine in more detail firms' responses to the 
challenges that this new global economic environment creates and their macro- and 
microeconomic effects. 
2.3.2. The Globalisation of Production, the New International Division of Labour 
and the Global Market for Corporate Control: Causes and Effects 
The recorded data on trade and FDI presented in section 2.2 above are 
evidence of the dramatic changes that have been taking place in the world economy 
regarding production patterns. This subsection will now turn to examine in more 
detail the causes, nature and economic significance of the increasing activity of 
TNCs. It will be argued that economic globalisation combined with slowing demand 
156 For a theoretical examination of this dilemma see Fazzari, Ferri and Greenberg (1998). 
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have been a cause as well as a result of a dramatic reorganisation of production on a 
global scale with further consequences for firms' strategic choices. 
Certainly, the dramatic reduction of trade barriers after a series of GATT 
negotiations during the second half of the 20th century has enabled firms to gradually 
view the world, rather than each particular country, as a single product market. The 
large ratios of international trade to world output (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 above) 
signify this trend. However, if that is so, then what explanation can be given to the 
fact that in recent years foreign direct investment has surpassed international trade? 
Why do firms increasingly invest in facilities abroad to service the world markets for 
products instead of doing so from their home countries as exporters? Indeed, this 
contradicts standard neoclassical theory of foreign investment which tends to regard 
trade and FDI as substitutes so that "an increase in trade impediments stimulates 
factor movements and ... an increase in impediments to factor movements stimulates 
trade" (Mundell 1957: 32 1). 
Resolving this issue is crucial for understanding firms' responses to economic 
globalisation and their effects. Since the 1960s, when FDI rates began to grow, 
several alternative but not mutually exclusive theories have been developed to explain 
this seemingly puzzling relationship between trade liberalisation and the factor 
movements. While none of them appears able to fully explain the causes and 
illuminate all the aspects of FDI and the globalisation of production, each theory has 
some useful insights to provide. It is for this reason that they should be regarded as 
complementary rather than as alternatives. Generally, these theoretical approaches 
tend to focus either on the microeconomic or the macroeconomic factors that 
determine firms' strategic choices. 
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The pioneer of the microeconornic approach is Hymer (1960) whose path- 
breaking work provided the basis for modem theory of FDI and multinational 
production. His main insight was that FDI, as a form of foreign factor ownership. 
encompasses the element of control by the investor over products and processes and 
this helps offset the investment risks involved when markets are imperfect. Thus, 
where an investment entails significant risks arising from information asymmetries 
between the investing firm and local competitors in the host country, from volatile 
exchange rates or from unfavourable host government interference with trade or 
production, FDI can provide sufficient control over the venture and thus reduce the 
overall costs. Moreover, according to Hymer, since in imperfect markets not all firms 
have the same capabilities, FDI may constitute a means of exploiting a particular 
oligopolistic advantage over specific processes such as production or distribution 
which foreign rivals lack. 
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Hymer's notion of control through factor ownership as an explanation of 
reducing risks bears a close resemblance to Coase's and Williamson's theory of the 
firm. In fact, Hymer has himself recognised a relation between the Coasean 
transaction cost theory in his own work (Hymer 1968). Indeed, this common ground 
between the two theories has led subsequent authors to develop the point further into 
a theory of FDI based on the internalisation of transaction costs. 
The main 
proponents of this approach are Buckley and Casson (1976), Teece 
(1977,1982) and 
Rugman (1986) who regard the TNC as an organisational structure which has 
emerged to resolve international product market imperfections 
by bringing them 
within the firm, i. e. by intemalising them. The main claim of the 
intemalisation 
school is that alternatives to FDI, such as subcontracting or 
licensing of intangible 
157 For similar theses see Caves (1982) and Kindleberger (1984). 
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assets -managerial skills, technological know-how, etc. - involve significant 
transaction costs, because such assets are easily appropriable. Therefore, the nature of 
FDI as direct factor ownership abroad is a transaction cost economising mechanism 
which ensures that assets remain under the control of the firm (Hennart 1991). This 
approach, however, tends to regard the TNC as a more efficient alternative to 
international product market contracting (exports) and thus overlooks the fact that 
resource allocation by command is not always efficient. This is something Hymer 
was aware of as he recognised that FDI and the emergence of the TNC constitutes 
both a response to and a cause of market imperfections (Ietto-Gillies 1992: 118). As it 
will be shown below, what is regarded as efficient from the firni's perspective is not 
always efficient in terms of general economic welfare. 
Moreover, both Hymer's ownership theory and the internalisation thesis suffer 
from a further deficiency. While they explain why FDI is preferred over other types 
of investment, such as non-controlling portfolio investment or licensing, they do not 
provide sufficient reasons for the multinationalisation of investment. In order to deal 
with such theoretical deficiencies, Dunning (1977) developed his "eclectic" approach 
to TNC activity which is more elaborate as it attempts to combine the two theories 
above with considerations of locational factors. The most important aspect of this 
approach is that internalisation will occur only if certain locational advantages that 
are specific to the host country's economy are sufficient to attract the particular 
investment. So, according to Dunning's "OLI" theory, for FDI to take place there 
must be a consummation of the ownership (0) of advantages enjoyed by the firm with 
locational (L) comparative advantages that the host economy has developed and it 
must be profitable for the firm to intemalise (I) those advantages it owns rather than 
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merely sell them on foreign markets (Dunning 1980: 275). To use Dunning's own 
words: 
Foreign production then, implies that location- specific endowments favour a 
foreign country, but ownership endowments favour the home country's firms. 
(Dunning 1977: 399). 
Finns' "ownership endowments" can include size and established position, product 
and process diversification, the ability to take advantage of division of labour, 
production technologies and managerial know-how, access to inputs (capital, labour, 
raw materials), market access, government protection and the ability to exploit 
differences between national and international/global markets. Countries' locational 
advantages, on the other hand, include natural and mamnade resources, low taxes, 
low labour costs, high labor productivity, or state-supported monopolies and stable 
political enviromnent, as well as favourable trade and financial regulations (Dunning 
1981: 80-81). 
While Dunning's OLI approach can be considered as an attempt to integrate 
micro- and macroeconomic elements into a theory of FDI and multinational 
production, other theories tend to give more emphasis to the latter elements. Vemon"s 
product life cycle approach is such a theory, as it regards the demand for a particular 
product as a central factor in a finn's decision to produce abroad (Vernon 1966). 
More specifically, Vernon divides a product's life cycle into three phases. The initial 
phase constitutes the introduction of the product to the market. At this stage, 
production takes place in the home market where the relevant technology and ideas 
originate. The product is still not standardised and there is an increased need for 
flexibility and adaptability to customer preferences, which makes spatial proximity to 
the market necessary. In addition, as product development is still a crucial element of 
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the finn's activities, highly skilled labour is a necessary input. In the following phase, 
as demand expands the product becomes increasingly standardised and its mass 
production becomes possible. Growing sales build up the product's reputation not 
only in the home market but also abroad so that in this second phase, to the extent that 
trade barriers permit, export markets begin to absorb an increasing portion of sales. 
Simultaneously, as product standardisation progresses the need for skilled labour 
declines and the ability of rivals to copy the product in question increases. Price 
competition gradually tends to prevail over innovation and there is an increasing 
requirement for low-cost unskilled labour so that labour cost differentials between 
countries become increasingly relevant. Thus, Vernon argues, provided low-cost 
labour is available abroad, FDI becomes an inevitable cost-cutting strategy for firms 
with mature products who want to remain competitive. Similarly, the presence of 
tariffs and other trade measures affecting the product's price will also create an 
incentive for allocating production within foreign markets to capture demand therein. 
However, as Vernon (1979) himself and others' 58 have acknowledged, in the 
new macroeconomic environment of increasing product market globalisation the life 
cycle theory has lost some of its explanatory power. Due to the dramatic reduction of 
tariffs, products can now be introduced in different national markets simultaneously 
irrespectively of their life cycle stage. Moreover, the technological gap and income 
disparities between developed countries have declined considerably since the 1960's 
when Vernon developed his theory, so that product life cycles not only 
have become 
significantly shorter but also they cannot explain high FDI 
levels between high per- 
capita income countries. Nonetheless, this approach can provide 
important 
explanations for the allocation of production facilities to 
developing countries, where 
"' See letto-Gillies (1992: 99-10 1) and Buckley and Casson (1976). 
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labour is less skilled but abundant and cheap. It is an attempt to combine the demand 
variable with the finns' cost-cutting strategies. 
However, as Pitelis (1998: 198) observes, Vernon's theory focuses on the 
demand for individual products and not on aggregate demand. He has therefore 
proposed an alternative approach to explaining the multinationalisation of production 
which is based on aggregate effective demand conditions and which should be seen as 
complementary to other theories focusing on microeconomic factors. In this way, 
Pitelis seeks to fill the gaps in the theories outlined so far by providing explanations 
for the cross-border element of FDI of all firms and irrespectively of their products' 
life cycle phases. 
Pitelis' main premise is quite simply that the multinationalisation of 
production can be attributed to deficient effective demand. As that deteriorates, say 
within one country, all fin-ns therein, albeit in different degrees, will see the demand 
for their own products decline too with corresponding negative effects on rates of 
return on capital. That being so, firms will then have to face the dilemma mentioned 
earlier: they can either reduce prices to boost sales or cut production. In imperfect 
(oligopolistic) markets the former option may not be particularly attractive as it can 
lead to catastrophic price wars. If, on the other hand, the latter option is followed, the 
effect in the medium and long term will be to further depress demand due to lower 
investment rates. What Pitelis' model then suggests is that the way out of this "no 
win" situation is for firms to exploit effective demand outside their national economic 
boundaries. In other words, where domestic demand is deficient, foreign markets can 
create the economies of scale and scope that domestic markets cannot and thus reduce 
the cost of internalisation of foreign activities through outward investment. Of course, 
this model is not intended to and does not predict what form of foreign investment 
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will be chosen by the demand constrained firm; its purpose is to illuminate the 
"foreignness" of investment. As Pitelis puts it, 
It provides a partial answer to the question 'Why interriationalisationT but has 
little to say on 'Why TNCs? ' as opposed to exporting, licensing and/or 
subcontracting. To answer these questions, it is necessary to go back to the [microeconomic] theories. An this sense, a synthesis of supply-side micro 
reasons ... and demand side reasons represents a reasonably powerful ex ante 
reason for TNCs. (Pitelis 1998: 198-200). 
In the light of the findings in section 2.3.1 about global demand conditions, this 
approach acquires particular value as it can explain the explosion of FDI flows since 
the 1980s, especially between developed countries. The demand slowdown since the 
liberalisation of financial controls and international trade regulations has led demand- 
constrained firms to expand their operations abroad in order to exploit opportunities 
arising in global product markets. Pitelis' empirical analysis of FDI data between 
developed economies since the Great Depression confirms his premise that flows tend 
to follow favourable demand conditions (ibid. ). 
Moreover, as Pitelis suggests, only a synthesis of the available theoretical 
approaches can help the observer form a fully informed interpretation of the data 
presented in section 2.2 above. As already stated, the vast majority of FDI flows tend 
to be of two types, those from developed countries to developing ones and those 
between developed countries themselves. In the light of the above theoretical analysis 
these two types of FDI flows reveal three main corresponding trends/strategies of 
TNCs regarding their organisation of production in response to the challenges of 
globalisation. The first is cost-driven, the second is demand-driven, and the third is 
technology-driven. 
Cost-driven FDI flows are almost exclusively directed from the developed 
world to countries where inputs, mainly unskilled labour, are available at a low 
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comparative cost. This is part of firms' efforts to exploit input price differentials 
between different countries. Thus, for production processes that require low-skilled 
labour, less developed countries with low labour costs in terms of wages and 
employment protection enjoy significant locational advantages over those countries 
where wages are high and redundancies are costly. Provided those low cost countries 
do not restrict trade, firms seeking to remain globally competitive will have an 
incentive to transfer their low-skill operations there. This explains the large flows of 
FDI from developed countries with high labour costs to less developed ones. 
Moreover, the closer those low labour cost countries are to the main "demand 
markets", the better their locational advantage will be. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that Eastern European, Latin American and South East Asian countries have been 
significant hosts of cost-driven FDL Their proximity to the "Triad", i. e. the EU, North 
America and Japan, makes them particularly competitive as they can easily serve the 
major product markets. Of course, whether FDI actually takes place or another 
method of shifting production, such as licensing or sub-contracting, is preferred also 
depends on the internalisation incentives of the firm. It is reasonable to expect that 
such incentives will be higher, and thus FDI more likely, where the technological or 
managerial know-how involved in the production process is firm-specific and/or 
where high quality standards are required. 
Demand-driven FDI, on the other hand, tends to flow mainly between 
developed countries. The higher the per-capita income and the larger the population, 
the more attractive a market is. In the current macroeconomic environment aggregate 
demand has become a locational advantage which can attract FDI from firms that face 
constraints in their home markets and who compete in the global marketplace. As 
Ohmae (1985) argues, firms have to establish themselves in all Triad countries 
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constituting the major consumption powerhouses in order to become and remain 
competitive. Presence is these vast product markets carries significant intemalisation 
advantages, because it enables TNCs to adapt their products to local tastes and needs 
as well as to exploit local distributional channels. Trade barriers, where present may 
also be a significant reason for a local presence to avoid their penal effect. 
Simultaneously, another important factor affecting a country's locational advantage 
as a host of FDI is the growth potential of its economy. China is a clear case of a host 
country of this kind due to its vast population and consistently high growth rates in 
recent years. It is then no surprise that TNCs from most Triad countries have been so 
keen to invest in Chinese industrial plants making China the largest developing 
country recipient of FDI (see Table 2.8 above). 
Finally, technology-driven FDI flows can be more mixed. Technology, of 
course, should be given a broad meaning so as to include not only scientific 
knowledge but also organisational and other capabilities. Given that patent or 
copyright laws can bar access to scientific knowledge and that know-how and 
capabilities tend to be highly firm-specific, the direct investment option contains 
significant internalisation incentives. Obviously, developed countries score better 
in 
the area of technologies and therefore enjoy a clear locational advantage which makes 
them the largest hosts of this type of FDI. On the other hand, investment flows can 
originate from both developed and developing countries, since 
firms on either side 
have the incentives to acquire the highest technology available. However, subject to 
few exceptional cases, firms from developing countries usually 
do not have the 
necessary resources to make such investment. This is shown 
by the low levels of FDI 
originating from such firms. So, just as in the case of 
demand-driven FDI, 
technology-driven investment flows mainly between developed countries. 
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Although these three types of FDI can be considered as separate strategies, 
often they are interrelated and are pursued simultaneously by firms that compete in 
global product markets. This is because, faced with saturated markets, firms need to 
both tap as much of global effective demand as possible and reduce their costs to the 
minimum in order to remain price-competitive. At the same time, firms' struggle for 
global competitiveness may also require that they ensure their access to the latest 
technological capabilities (Howells 1993). The globalisation of competition in 
product markets since the liberalisation of world trade and finance has been exerting 
pressures not only towards the multinationalisation of production but also towards the 
adoption of such integrated approaches in order to fully exploit OLI advantages. 
Regarding the nature of global competition and firms' strategic reactions to it 
in oligopolistic markets, Knickerbocker (1973) has offered some very useful insights 
by distinguishing between "aggressive" and "defensive" investments, the foriner 
being the establishment of a subsidiary in a particular country and industry by a firm 
as a first mover, while the latter being the responsive establishment of a subsidiary by 
a rival firm in order to offset its competitor's initial advantage. Knickerbocker, 
therefore, argues that the strategic behaviour of firms operating in global oligopolistic 
markets tends to follow a pattern of action and reaction so that an aggressive 
FDI 
move by one firm can spark a defensive reaction by its competitors who seek to 
minimise the risk of being out-competed. In this way, a "bandwagon effect" 
is created 
and FDI tends to "bunch up" so that a move by one firm has the tendency to 
become 
amplified as rivals choose to mimic it. 
As a result of all these dynamics the global economic landscape is being 
transformed into one dominated by TNCs, industrial as well as financial, usually 
operating in oligopolistic markets that transcend national boundaries. 
Enabled or 
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forced by the new economic order, such corporations have been reorganising their 
activities so as to reap diverse OLI advantages in multiple countries across the globe. 
As Gilpin (2000: 165-166) observes, while in the early post-war era multinationals 
pursued "horizontal investment" strategies by establishing self-sufficient subsidiaries 
in foreign (developed) countries, since the 1980s they have moved to a "vertical 
investment" tactic where different production facilities are scattered around the world 
as interdependent units heavily reliant on outsourcing in an integrated manner. Goods 
can now be produced all around the world and ultimately be exported back to the 
country where the TNCs' head offices are based. 
Of utmost importance is that with the shift of assembly and other low-skill 
activities to low labour cost locations the old international division of labour, by 
which the role of underdeveloped countries in the world economy was to supply 
unprocessed raw materials to industrialized countries, has now largely come to an 
end. As Fr6bel et al. (1978,1980) argue, a single world market for labour and 
industrial sites has emerged, encompassing all nations irrespective of their 
development stage. Thus, for the first time in history, production of both semi- 
processed and processed goods is being located in underdeveloped countries 
according to the demands of global competitive forces. As a result, a trend for a "new 
international division of labour" has emerged by which TNCs from leading countries 
relocate their production sites in favour of less developed countries. An 
unprecedented situation has arisen where such countries now export manufactured 
goods to the industrial world at competitive prices mainly due to low labour costs. 
In sum, international trade liberalisation and the revolutionisation of transport 
and communication technologies have made such strategies possible and have given 
rise to what Flamm and Grunwald (1985) call the "global factory". In oligopolistic 
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markets, this "global switching" (Howells 1993: 223) is not seen merely as a matter 
of choice but as a necessity for survival. Just like financial capital, industrial capital is 
also becoming increasingly global, i. e. beyond the control of individual governments 
and national regulatory frameworks; the latter not only can now be by-passed through 
FDI, but have also become more interdependent. 159 
So far this discussion has concentrated on the impact of economic 
globalisation on firms' strategies. However, it is particularly important for the 
purposes of this thesis to also examine the effect of these strategies, i. e. the global 
reorganisation of production, on the economic environment itself. While the 
theoretical approaches to FDI and the globalisation of production discussed above 
aim at explaining firms' adaptive reactions to their environment, they fall short of 
exploring the ability of firms operating in imperfectly competitive markets to 
influence prices and their environment according to their own needs. The importance 
of this power of firms over macro- and microeconomic pricing is even greater once 
the vast size of TNCs and their dominant role in product markets are accounted for. 
Accordingly, a comprehensive effort to study the power of TNCs over the 
markets in which they operate has been made by Cowling and Sugden (1994) who 
found that the globalisation of production often gives rise to more imperfections than 
it resolves. TNCs, they argue, have the ability to subvert intemational trade, to 
"divide and rule" governments and labour, and as a consequence to create significant 
stagnationist pressures. These points are very important for understanding the nature 
and effects of TNC activity and therefore deserve a closer look. 
The first issue, the ability of TNCs to subvert international trade, is a direct 
outcome of the globalisation of production as described above. The very essence of 
159 For the nature and significance of this interdependence see section 2.4 below. 
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this strategy is that numerous companies scattered around the world, affiliated and 
organised under the umbrella of a single TNC parent firm are able to exchange goods 
and services with each other for the purposes of completing the production and 
distribution of the final product. In other words, trade takes place across national 
borders but within the boundaries of one single firm in the sense that these exchanges 
do not constitute market transactions but are intemally managed according to the 
needs of the TNC. While it is difficult to be accounted for due to the lack of data, 
with the intensification of the globalisation of production, this type of intra-firm trade 
has undoubtedly become a significant portion of total international trade especially in 
manufactured goods accounting for 40 percent of world trade (European Commission 
1995: 2). More specifically, Dicken (1992: 49) has placed the figures for the US and 
Japan to over 50 percent and to as much as 80 percent for the UK. The high levels of 
intra-firm. trade mean that TNCs place international trade under their control. 
Consequently, Cowling and Sugden (1994: 69) argue, increasing portions of trade 
flows are being managed in the interests of those firms and not of nation states so that 
"a system of free international trade is in fact one of TNCs' subverted trade. " As a 
result, increasing intra-firm trade can impose considerable constraints on government 
trade policies. In particular, the wide scope for the manipulation of transfer prices - 
i. e. the invoicing of internal transfers at non-market prices- by TNCs can affect 
governments' tax revenues, their ability to impose exchange controls and to regulate 
the balance of payments and exchange rates, so that Keynesian demand management 
policies can become ineffective (letto-Gillies 1992: 36,169 and 181). 
Regarding the "divide and rule" strategies towards governments, Cowling and 
Sudgen claim that the ability of TNCs to organise production on a global scale 
according to OLI advantages means that industrial capital can migrate towards 
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countries with the best combination of locational advantages. In this way, national 
economic systems are placed in competition with each other in their efforts to attract 
FDI in manufacturing plants. This has increased TNCs' bargaining power vis-a-vis 
governments so that taxation, employment, education and infrastructure policies are 
often formed according to what the former regard as efficient. ' 60 Thus, a situation has 
arisen where "TNCs call the tune and governments dance; TNCs dictate strategy and 
goverm-nents respond" (Cowling and Sudgen 1994: 76). According to Cowling and 
Sugden, similar "divide and rule" strategies are also pursued towards labour which, 
just like national governments, is rather immobile. Factor mobility, therefore, gives 
the bargaining power to TNCs to dictate the terms of employment as they think fit. 
More specifically, the availability of low labour cost production locations creates a 
downward pressure on employment protection and wages for less skilled labour in 
industrial countries (Albo and Roberts 1998). Non-conformity can result in the 
relocation of production from high-cost to low-cost countries and thus create 
unemployment problems in the former. Conformity, on the other hand, leads to 
increasing wage disparities and the Polarisation of income distribution. Moreover, as 
the new international division of labour progresses, the global dispersion of a TNC's 
workforce limits the possibility for concerted action on behalf of the latter that would 
level the bargaining position of employer and employee (Fr6bel et al. 1980: 40). 
The macroeconomic effect of all this is not negligible. As Cowling and 
Sudgen (1994: 99) assert, the imbalance of power between capital and labour holds 
down national income with analogous repercussions for effective demand. 
Considering that developed economies are the powerhouses of the world economy in 
terms of aggregate demand, the negative effect of TNC activity on wages or 
160 See Frerikel, Razin and Sadka (1991); Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995: 29-37); Kurzer (1993). 
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employment in those countries can lead to persistent, demand-driven stagnationist 
pressures on a global scale. This induces further reorganisation of production based 
on cost-cutting so that a new vicious circle of stagnation begins with corrective 
government intervention being virtually impossible due to the policy constraints 
imposed by the global economic system. 
The repercussions of the ensuing global demand slowdown, whether as a 
result of financial globalisation or of TNCs' activities or both, go beyond the drive for 
increased FDI and global reorganisation of production as strategic choices. Low 
aggregate demand also affects the form of such investments. Accordingly, Pitelis 
(1991) associates such macroeconomic conditions with the tendency of FDI to take 
the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) rather than "greenfield" 
investments. Empirical data confirms this contention. The number and value of cross- 
border mergers and acquisitions has been on the rise since the mid 1980s and have 
reached unprecedented levels in recent years accounting for most of FDI. In 1998, for 
instance, over 85 per cent of the value of all FDI flows in OECD countries was made 
up of cross-border M&A exceeding $984 billion (see Table 2.11). The number of 
transactions has also been on the rise. As UNCTAD (1999: 95) reports, in 1998 there 
were 89 "mega" cross-border deals of over $1 billion value each compared to just 35 
in 1995,45 in 1996, and 58 in 1997. 
All this indicates that the intensification of economic globalisation since the 
mid 1980s is gradually giving rise to a particularly active global market for corporate 
control. Current and potential leading firms across the world strive to maintain or 
acquire those ownership advantages that will help them remain globally competitive 
and survive as independent firms. The pursuit of scale economies and technological 
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Table 2.11. International M&A Deals in OECD Countries 
(Billion US Dollars) 
Inward Outward 
1996 1997 1998 1999 1996 1997 1998 1999 
United States 70.6 64.3 190.8 293 65.5 80.8 132.8 145.7 
United Kingdom 39.2 55.4 85.6 123 34.8 32.6 117.1 246.2 
Sweden 2.6 3.8 6.1 59.7 1.5 6.3 14 10.8 
Germany 6.7 19.3 37.9 42.4 27.4 15.7 60.4 93 
France 11.4 13.7 24.3 35.6 11.5 21.6 36.5 83 
Canada 10.4 12 15.4 29 22.1 24.7 42.3 16.3 
Netherlands 3.6 8.8 18.4 26.9 20 20.7 39.1 52.1 
Belgium 2 6.4 21.7 16.4 1.2 1.9 2.1 17.5 
Japan 4.8 1.1 13.8 15.8 12.5 11.7 7.5 20.4 
Italy 5.2 9.2 5.6 11.4 3 4 15.6 14.4 
Korea 0.7 1.4 7.1 11 3.2 6.6 2.2 - Switzerland 4.4 3.1 6.3 7.7 10.3 38.7 12.6 18.5 
Australia 10 12.7 7.5 7.1 5.4 9.9 7.7 2.4 
Denmark 0.4 4.5 0.5 6.2 3.8 1.3 1.3 5.3 
Poland 1.2 2.1 1.8 5.8 - - - - Spain 1.8 6.2 5.9 5.4 6.3 13.2 11.8 25.4 
Finland 1.2 0.4 5.4 4.5 
Norway 0.5 1.4 2 4.3 4.9 1.8 0.7 1.7 
Ireland 0.6 1.6 1.2 4.3 3.9 3.3 4.1 3.5 
Czech Republic 0.2 0.8 0.7 2.6 0.7 1 - - 
Mexico 2.8 8.2 1.4 2 0.7 0.7 0.7 2.9 
Portugal 0.7 0.9 0.2 1 0.2 0.4 3.7 1.2 
Luxembourg 0.1 0.9 2.9 0.9 0.2 2.7 1 2.6 
New Zealand 3.5 1 3.4 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Austria 0.9 1.3 3.1 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.6 1.5 
Hungary 0.6 1.2 0.2 0.1 - - - - 
Greece 0 0.5 - 0.1 0 0.5 0.8 2.1 
Turkey 0.5 1 0.2 - 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Iceland 0 0 - - - 
Total 186.6 243.2 469.4 717.8 240.9 301.6 515.4 767.3 
Source: Miyake and Sass (2000). 
know-how that are not domestically available can be significant motives for foreign 
acquisitions. Nonetheless, the significance of M&A activity is that concluded deals 
constitute investments in existing factors rather in the creation of new ones so that, 
although they can lead to an increase in the acquitting finns' capacity, they do not 
represent an equivalent net increase in the overall capacity of the world economy. 
Chaisnais describes this as follows: 
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The type of corporate behaviour which may prevail when there is room in the 
market for many rivals to develop is likely to change as soon as slow or very 
slow growth sets in. This of course is what has occurred since the 1980s. Corporate growth and multinational expansion must now take place at the 
expense of other firms and thus FDIs occur principally in the form of mergers 
and acquisitions. (Chaisnais 1993: 17; emphasis added) 
Most importantly, recent theoretical and empirical studies have shown that, 
just like in other forms of FDI, M&A activity has an inherent propensity to create 
herding effects, so that efficiency enhancement can become an objective of secondary 
importance. In an argument that bears similarities with Knickerbocker's "bandwagon 
effect" in FDI, Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2000) distinguish between aggressive and 
defensive acquisitions to show that firms may engage themselves in M&A as part of a 
strategy of discouraging other firms from launching hostile bids for them. This 
objective of clear managerial origin, they argue, eventually leads to merger waves 
where efficiency is often sacrificed in the name firm independence, so that M&A 
activity becomes itself an end rather than a means to exploiting OLI advantages. This, 
of course does not undermine the importance of the latter as causes of increased 
M&A in recent years. In fact, one could combine the argument of Gorton et al. with 
OLI motives to argue that firms often pursue defensive M&As in order to create and 
maintain "strategic comfort" (Schenk 1999). The outcome, however, is similar; one 
deal leads to another as a response. It is, therefore, not surprising that Black (2000) 
finds that the current cross-border M&A boom amounts to "the first international 
merger wave. " Certainly, the direction and extent of this wave can depend on whether 
hostile takeovers are realistically possible in the context of institutional sets such as 
those described in section 1.4 above. However, there is no doubt that the evidence on 
M&A activity presented above suggests that such a wave has indeed been underway 
since the mid 1990s or so. 
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The effects of the emerging global market for corporate control are anything 
but negligible. On top of the general effects of cost-driven FDIs on employment 
mentioned above, M&A transactions in most cases lead to workforce reductions in 
merged entities and, unless other jobs are available elsewhere, they result to intense 
downward pressures on employment and/or wage levels. In a restrictive environment 
where full employment policies are hard to pursue due to all the factors analysed 
earlier it is clear that merger waves should translate into increased unemployment or 
lower wages or, in the worst cases, both. Skilled and semi-skilled middle 
management employees are the most likely victims of staff redundancies, due to 
organisational. overlaps between the merging firms. While some may find jobs 
elsewhere, it is likely that even then, due to increased labour supply, their salaries will 
be lower than in their previous posts and they should therefore be added to the low- 
skilled labour affected by FDI flows to less developed countries. This results to 
decreasing income levels and thus perpetuates the aggregate demand problem by 
completing the vicious circle of economic slowdown. The extent of these negative 
effects on labour should not be underestimated because of the relatively small number 
of deals that occur annually in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of firms that 
do not participate in the global market for corporate control. This is because, those 
who are directly involved are giant firms that not only employ millions of people on a 
collective basis but also constitute major economic units wherever they operate. One 
only has to consider that among the corporations that were parties to M&A 
transactions in 1998 were BP, Daimler-Benz, Alcatel, Total, Akzo Nobel, Coca-Cola, 
General Electric, Cable and Wireless, BT, Monsanto, Bayer, Nestle, to name but a 
few. 
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Moreover, there are additional effects deriving from emerging global market 
for corporate control which are specific to corporate finance and which signify how 
financial globalisation can interact with the globalisation of production and with 
M&A activity in particular. On the one hand, such transactions, especially when large 
corporations are involved, require enormous amounts of money which often exceed 
not only the funds available internally but also the capacity of national financial 
markets. For large TNCs, however, this is not a significant constraint because they 
have the capacity to tap global capital markets in order to obtain the funds they may 
need. Not only do they often enjoy credit ratings that are better than those of many 
governments, they also possess the necessary expertise to take advantage of global 
financial markets and thus bypass domestic banks as providers of external finance. 
This would not have been possible without the liberalisation of controls on financial 
flows and the emergence of global finance. Where capital controls are present, funds 
raised in the parent firm's country become capital exports when used to finance 
subsidiaries' operations abroad and therefore subject to regulatory measures. In a 
liberalised financial environment, on the other hand, money can be raised wherever it 
is most cost effective and it can be used to finance investments anywhere in the 
world. Thus, TNC activity goes hand in hand with financial liberalisation in a 
mutually reinforcing manner. 
Supranational markets such as Eurobond markets have been a source of trade 
and FDI finance for TNCs since the 1960s due to tax advantages and the lack of 
regulatory interference (Mellors 1974: 235). With the liberalisation of capital controls 
during the 1980s, however, TNCs' financial options have increased dramatically. The 
growth of Eurobond markets during the past two decades has already been 
mentioned. Although the globalisation of equity markets is still in its infancy, TNCs 
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have already begun to finance their activities through multiple equity offerings 
tapping most major stock markets simultaneously. In this way, firms overcome the 
severe cost and volume restrictions imposed by the thinness of domestic markets on 
their ability to raise the capital required; this is especially so in large M&A 
transactions. On the other hand, several deals are completed by a share swap between 
the merging firms and thus do not require new external capital. But even in these 
cases the integration of equity markets is not irrelevant because by listing their shares 
on each other's stock markets the two firms can establish a market for the swap and 
thus facilitate the transaction (Mittoo 1992: 43). 161 
Finally, irrespectively of what FDI strategies are followed financial 
globalisation and the gradual opening of formerly strictly national equity markets 
represents a whole set of new opportunities for those firms that can participate in 
them. In fact, the securing of access to the world's most liquid markets through 
foreign listings of stock has emerged as a significant competitive advantage for firms 
operating in world markets. The benefits are numerous and may differ for each 
individual company. Apart from the need to raise capital that domestic markets are 
unable to provide, some of the general advantages are the lowering of the cost of 
capital, the increase of stock liquidity, higher profile and visibility of the firm abroad 
(Pagano, RM and Zechner 1999). It has been documented that companies pursuing 
expansionary strategies and which rely on export markets are the major users of the 
cross-listing vehicle (ibid). Despite all these benefits accruing, as section 2.4.2 below 
will show, the globalisation of corporate finance also entails costs, mainly in the form 
of securities regulation, with important corporate governance implications. 
161 On the increased use of ADRs listed on the NYSE as "currency" for takeovers of US firms see 
Euromoney Magazine (1999: 80-82). 
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2.3.3. International Organisations as Agents of Global Corporate Governance 
Isomorphism 
While globalisation in its current form seems to have a negative impact on the 
workability of managerial systems through competition in world markets, some 
international organisations have also formulated strategies for the promotion of the 
shareholder supremacy principle and therefore deserve a brief mention. 
The most important effort has been initiated by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the formulation of its Corporate 
Governance Principles. These were the outcome of an Advisory Group set up in 1996 
with the mandate of the OECD Ministers to review international corporate 
governance matters and propose minimum standards that should be followed in 
Member Countries. The Advisory Group reported in April 1998 and the following 
year a Task Force was set up to develop the final set of principles which were 
eventually adopted by the OECD Ministers in June 1999. 
Both the Advisory Group's Report (OECD 1998) and the Principles that 
sprung from it follow an approach that limits the meaning of corporate governance to 
the alignment of managerial decision-making to shareholder interests (Dignam and 
Galanis 1999). Although the Principles recognise the importance of other 
stakeholders' rights, by advocating for managerial accountability solely to current 
shareholders both directly and through the market for corporate control, they adopt 
the Jensenian model of the firm. 
Certainly, the OECD Principles do not constitute either a legally enforceable 
instrument or even a code of best practice adopted by corporations across the world. 
However, since their formulation they have been gaining acceptance, not least due to 
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their promotion by the OECD itself and other organisations such as the World Bank, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions and the IMF. Characteristically, the OECD 
Secretary General and the World Bank's President have signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding aiming for the "improvement" of global corporate governance 
standards on the basis of the Principles. As part of this joint initiative, a Global 
Corporate Governance Forum and several Regional Policy Dialogue Roundtables 
have been formed to promote the acceptance of the Principles. In other words there 
are systematic efforts by intemational organisations for the institutionalisation of 
shareholder supremacy as a globally accepted corporate governance norm. 
Simultaneously, further pressures in the same direction arise from the role of 
the IMF and the World Bank as lenders due to the "conditionality" that accompanies 
their loans to member countries. Generally, these conditions constitute pressures on 
borrowers for institutional reforms that seek to enhance the role of markets, domestic 
and global, based on the assumption that their discipline on government policy 
making is the best solution to economic crises and their prevention (Pauly 1994; 
Pieper and Taylor 1998). Prolonged austerity programmes, current and capital 
account liberalisation, capital market reregulation enhancing outsider investor 
protection, not only impair the sustainability of (insider-)managerial systems but also 
promote shareholder supremacy through the mechanisms identified in this thesis. 
Such policies of Bretton Woods organisations, which contradict the latter's original 
remits, should also therefore be regarded as important drivers of globalisation and 
should be added to the forces of global isomorphism. 
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2.3.4. Significance 
As the brief historical overview in section 1.2 above demonstrated, the 
influence of market conditions on the organisation of production is immense. 
Chandler's account of the evolution of the capitalist firm shows how the expansion of 
markets and demand from the late 19"' century onwards led to the gradual 
replacement of the entrepreneurial firm by the large managerial corporation with the 
separation of ownership and control. The economic developments presented above, 
i. e. the increasing integration of national economies with the advent of globalisation, 
certainly constitute a dramatic transformation of market conditions. Following, the 
Chandlerian thesis one possibility is that the spatial enlargement of product markets 
in the current globalisation wave should create vast opportunities for growth in scale 
and scope and thus lead to the promotion and entrenchment managerial capitalism. 
Indeed, Hymer (1972) has noted that the multiclivisional form of the managerial firm 
gave it the appropriate administrative structure for its multinationalisation. 
However, a closer look at the emerging global economic order as described 
above reveals that the current environment is not conducive to the necessary 
macroeconomic preconditions that could sustain a growth trajectory based on the 
managerial firm. On the contrary, significant pressures in the opposite direction seem 
to have arisen due to the recent slowdown of global effective demand and the ensuing 
needs for firms to reorganise their production processes. In such a macro- 
environment, managerial growth-oriented microeconomic models, such as those 
outlined in the previous chapter, cannot be easily sustainable. On the one hand, as the 
Kaldorian growth model of the golden age fades due to economic globalisation, 
production systems that used to rely on high output growth and financial stability face 
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increasing pressure to reorganise in order to deal with slower demand and the 
increased frequency and persistence of financial crises. On the other, this 
reorganisation leads to the re-evaluation of established relationships between the firm 
and its main resource providers, i. e. financial capital providers and employees. 
Regarding the former, the opening of new financial opportunities in global financial 
markets combined with the increased financial needs constitute direct challenges to 
the sustainability of long-term financial relationships. Similarly, the new international 
division of labour and the global market for corporate control impose significant 
obstacles to the creation and the maintenance of committed employment contacts, for 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour. Moreover, the dominant role of 
institutional investors in world financial markets and their tendency to maximise 
short-term returns on their investments in corporate securities creates additional 
pressures on managers to rethink long-term commitments. Recently, these pressures 
have taken a more "institutionalised" forrn since they have become part of 
international organisations' agenda. Given these pressures from the emerging global 
economic (dis)order the following section will now turn to examine the ways in 
which corporate governance systems can respond on the basis of their internal 
institutional dynamics. 
2.4. GLOBALISATION AND DYNAMIC RESPONSES OF NATIONAL 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 
In chapter I above, corporate governance systems were examined as static 
constellations of institutional subsystems. Stability is, of course, a 
fundamental 
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characteristic of institutional configurations. It is the stability of institutions that 
resolves transactional problems by introducing elements of certainty and 
predictability in markets that are full of unknown contingencies and informational 
asymmetries. Due to the existence of institutions, economic agents' behavioural 
patterns become more predictable, so institutional stability is ca necessary condition 
for complex human interaction' (North 1990: 84). This is because, by improving the 
predictability of available choices, established institutions facilitate the supply of 
information to economic actors and thus reduce the transaction costs even of highly 
complex transactions (Hodgson 1993: 132-133). For example, as mentioned earlier, 
financial disclosure rules for companies are designed to reduce uncertainties for 
investors. 
However, in the presence of resource scarcity and, therefore, of competition 
institutional sets are also characterised by continuous transfon-nations. The causes of 
institutional transformations are changes in the opportunities perceived by economic 
agents. These are the result of external changes in the economic environment - e. g. 
changes in preferences and factor prices - or of the acquisition of skills and 
technological knowhow by agents (North 1990). 
The developments in the global economy described above constitute a 
dramatic environmental change for firms and the national systems within which they 
operate. As the previous section shows, the opportunities and challenges stemming 
from economic globalisation have significantly altered the nature of basic input costs 
and of competition 162 resulting to a shift in the preferences of corporations who want 
to adapt to the challenges of the emerging economic order and exploit the 
opportunities within it. Financial and industrial capital mobility have altered the role 
162 See Baldwin and Martin (1999: 3 8-4 1). 
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of nationally bound resources, such as unskilled labour and domestic savings, as well 
as of national institutional structures which are now subjected to competitive forces 
through the firms that are active in global markets. 
As the globalisation of economic activity intensifies, corporate governance 
isomorphism is being transformed from one that is nationally embedded to a new type 
that is increasingly determined by global market forces and institutional arrangements 
that are not bounded within one nation. The opening of economic borders allows 
firms' operations to transcend national institutional systems and thus facilitates the 
interaction between national systems themselves and between national systems and 
the global economy. So, it is argued here that, due to the existence of a direct 
interaction between firms' activity and the institutional infrastructure within which 
that takes place, the potential consequences for nationally determined corporate 
governance systems could be enormous. Therefore, a systematic theoretical 
examination of institutional responses to economic globalisation is essential. 
As already mentioned in chapter section 1.4, the traditional neoclassical 
methodology a la Walras excludes institutions altogether from its analysis. However, 
as the microeconornic nexus-of-contracts model of Jensen and Meckling shows, 
attempts have been made to incorporate institutional analysis into the neoclassical 
theoretical framework though in such a way that it does not conflict with general 
equilibrium theory. In a similar fashion, others have attempted to stretch the 
neoclassical methodology beyond its static equilibrium limitations so as include a 
macro-dynamic institutional analysis. 
' 63 Institutionalists proper, however, have 
attacked such attempts as futile from a normative perspective, because the 
teleological postulates of neoclassical tradition are retained as their general theoretical 
163 For instance, the "property rights" literature analyses the implications of institutions for 
performance. See Alchian (1965); Demsetz (1967,1964); Furubotn and Pejovich (1972). 
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basis (Dulbecco and Dutraive 2001: 59; Myrdal 1957: 10). 
164 These two approaches 
and their normative implications for the evolution of corporate governance 
institutions in the context of a globalising economy will be discussed next. 
It will be shown that, despite some claims of neoclassical origin that 
globalisation can give rise to optimal governance arrangements, in a world of 
imperfect markets the institutional responses of corporate governance systems are not 
easily predictable due to each national system's internal dynamics. However, in the 
light of the previous section's analysis, this thesis argues that, even in the presence of 
diversity in systemic responses, current developments in the global economy not only 
have destabilising effects on governance models based on the managerial -stakeholder 
consensus, but also exert increasing pressures towards a shareholder-oriented 
tra . ectory without, however, resolving the problems stemming from the fact that real j 
markets do not function as the efficient market hypothesis assumes. Therefore, where 
convergence of corporate governance models occurs at all it is towards a sub-optimal 
system. 
2.4.1. Neoclassical Theories of Institutional Change: The Convergence to 
Optimality Claims and Their Validity 
As already noted, in a market where competition is perfect, prices are formed 
automatically by the market as firms are too small to influence them. Profit- 
maximising choices are then made according to those given prices so that a Pareto- 
164 Accordingly, North (1994) states: 'the neo-classical paradigm is devoid of institutions and Pareto 
efficiency is meaningless when it comes to exploring different institutional structures and their 
implications for economic performance through time'. Similarly, Nabli and Nugent (1989b: 9) state 
that "the explicit or implicit assumption of given institutions is, of course, especially unrealistic and 
limiting in the context of economic development. " 
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optimal equilibrium is achieved. When a price changes, e. g. due to an alteration in the 
availability of an input factor, an optimal adaptation of output occurs to 
accommodate the new equilibrium price. Similarly, if a new technology becomes 
available all firms will adopt it provided that is the profit-maximi sing course of 
action. 165 This optimisation process is traditionally based on the axiom that firms as 
entrepreneurs are fully informed and rational agents. How does institutional change 
fit into this paradigm? 
The precise answer to this question is that it does not. The reason for this is 
that neoclassical theory assumes that where markets are perfectly competitive rational 
economic agents design perfect institutions which lead to optimality. This is the claim 
encapsulated in the Coase theorem according to which when transaction costs are 
zero, that is when there are no informational asymmetries and, therefore, no risk of 
unilateral opportunism, institutions do not matter (Coase 1960). So, when rational and 
well-informed agents perceive a new opportunity they immediately choose to take it 
without being constrained by past institutional choices. In order for such a Coasean 
market to exist competition has to be perfect so that price arbitrage and informational 
feedback can eliminate informational asymmetries thus enabling all agents to make 
optimal choices (North 1990: 5 1). 
In this neoclassical line of thought the possibility of mutual interaction 
between agents and institutions is completely excluded as it is only the former that 
shape the latter. So, given a change in the resources available or in market conditions, 
if any incumbent institutional constraints stand in the way of this process, they will be 
consciously abolished and replaced by others that are optimal so that a new optimal 
equilibrium is reached. In this sense, institutions are not seen as constraints but 
165 For this condition to be satisfied it is assumed that intellectual property rights are imperfect and 
cannot prevent agents from ultimately having access to new technology. 
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simply as efficient transaction cost minimising mechanisms which eliminate market 
failure before it even arises. 166 They constitute integral elements of efficient markets 
by facilitating information flows between economic actors, and thus support the role 
of the market as a resource allocation mechanism. So, in this optimisation process 
agents are the masters of institutions, since they are able to determine them according 
to their rational choices and expectations which in turn are independent of any 
institutional influence. To use Langlois' terminology, neoclassicists regard 
institutions as instances of market contracting between agents rather than as 
alternatives to market coordination (Langlois 1986: 16). Since institutions have no 
independent role or existence above and beyond the individual or the firm, they can 
be treated as irrelevant to the analysis of economic change. As Skott and Auerbach 
put it: 
If institutional structures represented an optimal choice of instruments for the 
matching of exogenously given preferences and opportunities, then 
institutional change would have no more significance than, say, changes in 
consumption bundles as incomes increase; institutional change would be 
reduced to the status of epiphenomena. (Skott and Auerbach 1994: 14) 
Similarly, all those factors that constitute sources of economic change are 
regarded as exogenous or given to the economic system so that ultimately economic 
analysis is limited only to resource allocation and exchange matters. Thus, just as the 
rationality premise excludes any discussion of agents' preferences, 
167 the availability 
of production resources is simply determined by non-economic factors - e. g. natural 
disasters, demographic changes, etc. - that are beyond the scope of economic science. 
Production-related technology, i. e. scientific and organisational know-how, is also an 
166 This was indeed Coase's claim in his seminal work when he claimed that the firm and the market 
are complementary resource allocation mechanisms. 
167 Since the neoclassical 'economic man' can only be a rational utility-maximiser, the possibility of 
changing preferences as a result of institutional or other factors is by definition expelled from 
economic analysis. See Knight (1942). 
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exogenous non-economic variable, since it is assumed to be created outside the 
economic system and then uniformly disseminated across the market as a public good 
rather than being a private asset (Hall 1994: 12-15). 168 Any change in those 
exogenous factors, that is any external shock to the economic system, causes an 
automatic and optimally adaptive reaction within the system as agents pursue their 
ends in a competitive marketplace. As Hayek writes, "a spontaneous order results 
from the individual elements adapting themselves to circumstances" (Hayek 1982: 
36). 
Admittedly, when compared to the Walrasian static equilibrium, Hayek's 
thesis is indeed revolutionary, because it introduces a dynamic approach to 
institutional evolution that appears to break away from the strictly static tradition of 
general equilibrium theory. His model is one where an equilibrium occurs after self- 
interested agents form plans and strategies which eventually come into mutual 
consistency after an adaptive process of leaming within a changing environment. ' 69 
However, his insistence, though indirect, on the ability of agents to eventually make 
rational decisions and form correct expectations excludes any constraining influence 
of institutions on individual choices and thus defeats the whole purpose of 
institutional analysis. So, in essence Hayek's concept of 'spontaneous order' is not 
much different from Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'. 
That conscious rational optimisation constitutes a rather unrealistic postulate 
is not disputed even by some of the most faithful adherents to the neoclassical 
118 Certainly, technological progress has been incorporated in some neoclassical models as the product 
of research and development or the by-product of "learmng by doing"; see Arrow 
(1962); Levhari 
(1966). However, it is again assumed that even if a new technology is created endogenously it 
automatically becomes a public good so that all firms or nations can benefit from 
it irrespective of their 
own technology investment policies. In this way, increasing returns to scale in physical 
inputs become 
externalized so that, provided markets are competitive, equilibrium can occur (Shaw 1992). 
"' See Hayek (1948: ch. 2). Indeed the neoclassical evolutionary model presented herein is founded 
upon this revolutionary attempt to expand general equilibrium theory. 
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methodology. The requirement of conscious rational choices and expectations is too 
stringent to have a real application. So, as noted in the section 1.3.2 above, Alchian's 
competitive selection argument has often been used to support the neoclassical 'black 
box" analysis of the finn (Alchian 1950). However, Alchian's theory is equally 
relevant to the macroeconomic analysis of institutional change and, therefore, 
neoclassical scholars, often identified with the Chicago School (Bratton and 
McCahery 1999: 243), have embraced it wholeheartedly to defend the orthodox view 
that a free market economy is able to develop institutions that are efficient without 
non-market intervention. Accordingly, in his classic essay on methodology Friedman 
(1953b) claimed that, although conscious optimisation may be impossible in an 
uncertain and complex world, the maximisation postulate could still hold because 
competitive selection forces agents to act as if their rationality was not bounded and 
therefore optimal institutional arrangements are established. 170 
The argument is that, just as firms who fail to maximise profit are selected out 
by the system, institutions that prevent firms from making rational profit-maximising 
choices are outcompeted and eventually weeded out. In other words, those institutions 
that fail to deal effectively with transaction costs are eliminated and only optimal 
ones survive competition. Ultimately, institutional change as a result of exogenous 
shocks takes the form of a continuous evolution from one efficient institutional 
outcome to the next. The adverse selection process is usually indirect in the sense that 
it is agents that compete against each other rather than institutions. 
171 So efficient 
170 Nonetheless, Alchian himself was more hesitant in assimilating competitive selection with rational 
optimisation: "The economist may be pushing his luck too far in arguing that actions in response to 
changes in environment and changes in satisfaction with the existing state of affairs will converge as a 
result of adaptation or adoption toward the optimum action that should have been selected, if foresight 
had been perfect" Alchian (1950: 220). 
17 1 As Matthews (1984: 92) observes, "[o]ptirrusation is direct choice by the economic agent, 
competitive selection is indirect social choice through changes in the relative weight of different 
decision-makers, brought about through the working of the system. " 
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institutional outcomes emerge because some firms are rational profit-maximisers ex 
ante and those firms who are not and are associated with inefficient institutions fail or 
copy the former by altering their institutional preferences. 
Matthews (1984: 92) identifies two possible ways in which competitive 
selection can operate. The first is one where uniformly defective knowledge prevails 
among economic agents so that conscious optimisation is not possible. In this case, 
some firms, or groups of them, achieve optimal institutional results only because they 
happen to make the right choices by chance. Competition, then, ensures that all other 
institutional choices are abandoned by those agents who chose them or are replaced 
by optimal ones. The second neoclassical version of competitive selection is one 
where there is differentially defective knowledge, i. e. informational asymmetries, 
among agents so that some can consciously make optimal institutional choices while 
others cannot. Thus, while there is a difference in the cognitive features of agents in 
these two versions of competitive selection, the final institutional outcome in both is 
an efficient one. 
So, if a general neoclassical approach can be constructed to deal with the 
process of institutional change, it would be founded upon a combination of 
optimisation, conscious or fortuitous, and competitive selection. It must be 
emphasised that the most crucial element in this process is the intensity of 
competition. Unless the market is perfectly competitive so that individual agents 
cannot influence prices, an efficient institutional system will not emerge. The general 
neoclassical belief is that markets that operate freely are sufficiently competitive. 
What restricts competition is non-market interventions in the form of government 
regulation that constrain individual choices and destroy the equilibrium of the market. 
In Hayek's view, a "spontaneous order" cannot come about when governments 
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impose price regulations, trade barriers, quality standards and so on, because markets 
are so complex that no central authority can acquire the necessary information and 
knowledge to make efficient institutional choices; decentralised decision making by 
individual agents is thus more efficient than government planning (Hayek 1945: 524). 
The faith in market forces is epitomised by Lachmann. as follows: 
It would be wrong to think that a market economy, when faced with the 
problems just outlined, could, or in the ordinary course of events would, find 
no answer to them. History shows that whenever left sufficiently free from 
political interference to evolve its response to such challenges, the market 
economy has 'grown' the institutions necessary to deal with them. (Lachmann 
1978: 67) 
This neoclassical evolutionary model has some very important implications 
for the direction of institutional change. Firstly, if agents within a single economic 
system face common problems and opportunities, the institutional adaptation process 
will result to one optimal structural solution that is common to all. Competitive 
selection will ensure that institutional choices which diverge from that new model 
will disappear, either due to the failure of those who chose them or because less 
successful agents imitate those whose performance is superior. That is, competition 
ensures that superior institutional technologies are disseminated evenly across the 
market so that a universal 'best practice' prevails (Boyer 1996: 46). This has given 
rise to the popular neoclassical theory of institutional convergence which claims that, 
through the process just described, competition leads initially diverse institutional 
structures to converge towards a unique superior outcome that is adopted or supported 
by all (surviving) agents in a single market. 172 Ultimately, optimal institutional 
172 Originally the optimal convergence thesis was limited to economic growth rates; e. g. see Sala-i- 
Martin (1996). However, once institutions are considered as relevant for economic performance, 
convergence of growth rates should also imply institutional convergence; this is a point not expressly 
made by neoclassical economists since they do not regard institutions as economic factors. An 
exception to this is North's early work on institutional evolution from which he retreated later in his 
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convergence will lead to the disappearance of economic perfon-nance disparities 
within each particular marketplace. 
The optimal convergence thesis is founded upon a further sub-argument which 
springs from the neoclassical model of economic change outlined earlier; namely, the 
premise of institutional reversibility. This notion implies that markets can not only 
move freely from one institutional equilibrium to another but also they can as easily 
return to previous equilibria if that is an optimal choice. To illustrate this David 
(1997: 13) has borrowed from physics the concept of "ergodic systems", i. e. systems 
that are connected in such manner that "it is possible to transit directly or indirectly 
between any arbitrarily chosen pair of states, and hence, eventually, to reach all the 
states from any one of them. " It was shown earlier that, since in the neoclassical 
framework institutions do not constitute constraints to agents' maximising strategies, 
past institutional choices do not exhibit a controlling influence in present or future 
strategic decisions unless agents themselves so desire. In this fashion, institutional 
equilibria at any given moment are ergodic and can move both backwards and 
forward so that eventually concepts such as the past or the future become meaningless 
and history is irrelevant. So, perhaps not surprisingly, in the neoclassical approach to 
institutional change the dimension of time is ultimately as irrelevant as it is in the 
static general equilibrium theory of Walras; they both belong to the same tradition 
that David (1997,200 1) would call "ahistorical economics". 
The implications of the neoclassical theory of institutional change for 
corporate governance are quite obvious. The starting point is that performance is 
directly linked to the efficiency of corporate governance techniques. Due to the 
determinant influence of institutions the efficiency of these techniques depends on the 
career; see North and Davis (1971) and North and Thomas (1973). For applications of the optimal 
convergence thesis on corporate law and governance see infta n. 175 and text. 
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effectiveness of related institutional arrangements in dealing with transactional and 
allocational. issues and in enabling firms to fully exploit profit opportunities that may 
arise. 173 On the basis of this link between performance and corporate govemanceý 
competitive selection as described above ensures that from those institutions that 
determine firm behaviour only optimal ones survive. Furthermore, as the convergence 
thesis asserts, in a single perfectly competitive market one unique and efficient 
corporate governance model emerges as all other inferior models are selected out and 
fade. 174 Of course, free-market competition is the driving force towards optimality; 
therefore, any non-market intervention constitutes a distortion of the competitive 
selection mechanism and should be avoided. Thus, mandatory government regulation 
of corporate governance is inherently inefficient because it constitutes a constraint to 
rational individual choice and should, therefore, be avoided. Similarly, institutions 
that restrict competition by imposing direct and indirect barriers on economic activity 
are artificial imperfections imposed by governments. It is these non-market 
institutions that segregate national markets and distort competition between corporate 
governance systems at the expense of efficiency. 
Thus, with the advent of globalisation as an integration process of formerly 
segregated national markets into a global marketplace, the emergence and universal 
adoption of a new and efficient model of corporate governance is inevitable. The 
argument is that, as the deregulation in financial, factor and product markets 
progresses and national economic borders erode, global competition will eventually 
drive costs and prices towards unique equilibrium levels. Thus, firms will not only 
"' On the influence of institutional structures on economic performance see Myrdal (1957). 
Accordingly, Boyer (1996: 41) states: "Complex interactions between economic convergence and 
institutional diversity and, conversely, an inadequate institutional harmonisation may all induce 
economic divergence. " 
174 E. g. Easterbrook (1997) argues that free-market competition between corporate law and governance 
systems leads to a unique efficient outcome. 
198 
compete on an equal footing but they will also face the same challenges and 
opportunities. Consequently, in order to survive they will have to develop and adopt 
the same optimal corporate governance solutions. Best practices will either be 
adopted as rational optimal choices of efficient firms or they will be "imposed" by the 
market as inefficient corporate governance institutions and those firms associated 
with them are driven out by global competition. To the extent that rational firms' 
optimising choices are constrained by inefficient national institutions that impose 
unnecessary costs, globalisation has opened up the exit option so firms can choose the 
national systems they regard as more facilitative for capitalising on their OLI 
advantages. As Bratton observes: 
We come to a moment -whether in the immediate past, the present, or in the 
near fature- at which intensifying competition in international product markets 
for the first time turns endowments derived from national governance systems 
into factors relevant to finns' competitive survival. (Bratton and McCahery 
1999: 240) 
Eventually, with the emergence of a global marketplace, competition is between 
different national institutional sets within which firms operate as promoters of 
change. As firms become increasingly mobile, regulatory arbitrage - e. g. through 
foreign listings, shifts of production operations or even re-incorporations in what 
firms regard as the best jurisdictions - results to an institutional "race to the top". 
175 
Once globalisation is complete - i. e. when a perfectly competitive global market is 
established -a process combining rational optimisation and competitive selection 
between national systems will give rise to a unique, universal and optimal equilibrium 
175 For classic expositions of the "race to the top" argument in the context of US state competition for 
corporate regulation see Romano (1993,1998) and Winter (1989). It is important to note, however, 
that this literature on corporate governance systems' competition takes as given the superiority of the 
shareholder model. In the absence of this assumption this interpretation of corporate governance 
developments can become much more complex and inconclusive. For instance, if one took the view 
that the managerial model were superior, the race to the top argument would then have to be reversed. 
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model of corporate governance formed by the market forces. According to Matthews, 
there will be: 
Imitation of the advancing country's institutions or its other modes of 
economic behaviour; adaptation by means of optimisation to changes in 
comparative advantage brought about by events in the advancing country; 
adaptation by means of competitive selection to those changes in comparative 
advantage; and achieved by emigration of entrepreneurship and management 
from the advancing country. (Matthews 1984: 114) 
Following an essentially neoclassical methodology many observers have been 
suggesting that a process of global corporate governance convergence towards one 
"best-practice" model is already underway. 176 Thus, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) 
follow the example of Fukuyama's "end of history" claim 177 to categorically argue for 
the coming of the end of history in the sphere of corporate law and governance with 
the universal acceptance of the shareholder-oriented model's superiority over other 
mo e s. 178 They contend that "experimental" regulatory interventions by governments 
during the 1950s and 1960s reinforced managerial discretion and curtailed 
shareholder power in a way that hampered the efficient operation of product and 
capital markets. 1 79 Thus, the failure of managerial and stakeholder models in the 
1970s and 1980s was not only inevitable, but also proved the superiority of 
shareholder supremacy as a guiding principle of corporate governance. 
1 80 Therefore, 
Hansmann. and Kraakman claim that, with the intensification of global competition, 
institutional systems supporting managerialism, being the outcomes of government 
intervention rather than market forces, are being selected out by investors and TNCs 
176 For an early exposition of this argument see Karmel (1991: 90). 
177 See Fukuyama (1989) arguing for the final triumph of western free-market capitalism and its 
universal acceptance. 
178 Interestingly, Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge that national differences may in fact persist 
but they do not explain how this is reconciled with their end of history claim. 
179 On the idea that government controls constitute barriers to convergence see also Ramseyer (1998: 
544) and Berger (1996: 1). 
180 For a forceful presentation of this "superiority" claim see Macey (1998). 
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as locations for their investments and production activities due to their inefficiency as 
they contradict the market value maximisation objective. Thus, institutional systems 
which ensure that the principle of shareholder supremacy is observed enjoy a 
locational advantage. They provide firms with a more efficient organisational 
structure which ensures easier access to global capital markets and therefore give 
them a significant competitive advantage in the global marketplace. As a result of 
competitive pressures, all jurisdictions should be expected to develop similar 
locational. advantages by converging towards what Hansmann and Kraakman call "the 
standard model of the corporation", that is the model put forward by Jensen and 
Meckling in which the only corporate objective is to pursue the interests of current 
shareholders as residual claimants and managers' principals. With the removal of 
government-imposed "distortions", such as capital controls, markets will succeed in 
enhancing mechanisms of shareholder monitoring over managers, either directly or 
indirectly through the market for corporate control, global and national. Efficient 
corporate governance institutions will emerge through private market-contracting 
rather than mandatory regulation of corporate activity. 181 
Certainly this would not be a problem if the outside- shareholder model could 
generate a high growth trajectory. Indeed, if one accepts the neoclassical postulations 
that markets are able to eliminate agency and other transaction costs, then all 
profitable opportunities can be exploited without firms having to intemalise financial 
or production investment decisions, except when markets believe it is efficient to 
do 
so and provide the necessary incentives to corporate decision makers. In such a 
theoretical construct, global capital markets should be able to allocate finance 
efficiently so that firms across the world have unrestricted access to the 
funds they 
"' Goddard (1996) identifies an ongoing global trend towards this direction. 
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need as long as they have profitable growth opportunities to pursue. Simultaneously, 
by relocating their activities to what they regard as the most advantageous locations, 
profit-maximising TNCs and other firms will reward efficient systems and punish 
inefficient ones giving them the incentives to adopt the global model. The objectives 
and form of financial, employment, macroeconomic and other policies must then be 
determined by free market forces without "distorting" interference by govenu-nents. 
If that is so, Hansmann and Kraakman's claim that the "expenmental" 
government interventionism, which created and sustained the managerial 
microeconomic governance model in a Kaldorian macroeconomic environment, was a 
recipe for economic failure is indeed valid. Just as Friedman and other Chicago 
School free-marketeers have been arguing all along, government controls over 
financial flows, international trade and labour markets during the "golden age" were 
inefficient, because they constrained good fim-is' access to financial capital and their 
ability to adopt the right organisational structure for doing so. Thus, the coming of 
globalisation and the "end of history" with the adoption of shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance as the standard global and uniquely superior model will 
apparently bring the final efficient resolution to a long-standing debate. 
Implausibility of the optimal convergence thesis 
The optimal convergence thesis is difficult to defend if the neoclassical 
laboratory conditions do not apply. Given the record of financial markets as 
inherently inefficient and unstable due to "beauty contest" speculation and investors' 
herding strategies described earlier, the idea that the shareholder model is optimal 
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automatically loses its validity. It has already been shown that where markets are 
imperfect and the efficient market hypothesis does not apply, running the firm solel), 
in the interests of shareholders could be damaging, as the extraction of cash flows. 
e. g. in the fon-n of dividends, will constrain the firm's ability to invest and capture 
profitable growth opportunities. So, if one recognises that financial markets are not 
efficient enough to create strong complementarities between financial assets and 
growth opportunities, the shareholder model ceases to be superior to the managerial 
one in both allocative and macroeconomic growth terms. This means that, where the 
neoclassical "laboratory" preconditions do not apply, i. e. in reality, adaptation 
towards the outside- shareholder model constitutes part of a vicious circle leading to a 
process of cumulative instability, low investment and slow growth. 
Similarly, as already argued above, the globalisation of production capital 
creates inefficiencies that markets are unable to resolve without outside intervention. 
Even if firms pursue what they honestly regard as profit maximisation strategies, the 
negative externalities can be severe. Consequently, competition for FDI cannot 
provide a healthy discipline for government policies. As many authors have 
acknowledged, where markets are imperfect free competition between states and 
jurisdictional arbitrage can lead to a regulatory race to the bottom rather than to the 
top. 182 That being so, non-market interventions, such as demand management macro- 
policies, capital controls, employment protection or other regulations to reverse this 
circle, become necessary and not "experimental" or "inefficient". 
182 For a collection of essays on the topic see Bratton, McCahery, Picciotto and Scott (1996) and 
especially ch. 9 therein. For an early exposition of the "race to the bottom" argument in the sphere of 
corporate regulation see Cary (1974) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2001). However, the same caveat in 
respect of the shareholder model's superiority assumption also applies to the "race to the bottom" 
argument; see supra. note 175. 1 
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Inconsistency of Convergence to a Hybrid Optimal Model 
In the light of the analysis so far it is perhaps surprising that not all advocates 
of the optimal convergence thesis seem to agree on the shareholder model's 
superiority claim. Kester (1996) for instance, argues that while competitive selection 
can lead to corporate governance convergence to best practice, the new global model 
will be neither the managerial nor the shareholder model. Instead, a hybrid model will 
emerge which will combine the best elements of each system. Before the advent of 
global competition, national systems of corporate governance could maintain their 
diversity in the ways they dealt with the transaction costs of production processes. 
This diversity, Kester argues, does not mean that one model is necessarily superior to 
the other. On the contrary, he claims that both the shareholder model and the 
managerial model, though not optimal, have offsetting strengths and weaknesses that 
make them equally fit (ibid.: 127). If the shareholder model is more efficient in 
minimising agency costs in the shareholder-manager relationship but less so in 
dealing with transaction costs in the production process, the managerial model has 
exactly the opposite qualitative characteristics. Thus, as globalisation progresses and 
competition between systems intensifies, the two corporate governance systems will 
gradually merge by adopting institutional arrangements that combine both production 
efficiency and agency cost minimisation. Certainly, if the two corporate governance 
models are different but equal in terms of efficiency, then their respective systemic 
costs and benefits should work out roughly the same so that systemic 
differences do 
not affect bottom line results (Bratton and McCahery 1999: 242). Thus 
Kester's 
convergence thesis is based on the competitive selection scenario where agents 
have 
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uniformly defective knowledge, so that, if convergence to optimality occurs, it will be 
because optimal institutional choices are made within each system by chance. 
In fact, by accepting the equal fitness argument what Kester does is to 
misconstrue the concepts of workability and complementarity, part of which, of 
course, are the macroeconomic growth considerations mentioned above. Indeed, he 
does identify the complementary relationship between macroeconomic factors and 
corporate governance; he correctly recognises the superiority of the managerial model 
in the context of high rates of growth and its inferiority in a slow growth environment 
(Kester: 127). However, by subsequently putting forward his equal fitness claim, he is 
led to contradict himself-, one can either accept the efficient markets hypothesis or 
reject it, but cannot do both. Either self-regulated markets are able to create the 
necessary macroeconomic conditions and organisational structures that will enable 
firms to maximise profit or they are not so that non-market intervention is necessary 
in order to correct market failures. If complementarity and workability are to be 
understood in their complete form as described in this study, it is difficult to explain 
how the managerial and the shareholder model can be equal from an efficiency 
perspective within the same global macroeconomic context. If markets are efficient, 
as Kester appears to assume, shareholder supremacy should be the only principle 
underlying corporate decision-making. 
Eventually, this contradiction in Kester's model arising from its failure to 
incorporate complementarities between the macro-envirom-nent and corporate 
governance leads to the outright rejection of the concepts of complementarity and 
workability. That is so because his convergence scenario is based on what Bratton 
and MacCahery (1999) call cross-reference, that is the exercise of selecting the best 
institutions from each model in order to combine them and construct a third model 
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that is superior to the two original ones. But, as the analysis in the previous chapter 
has shown, due to the implications stemming from the notion of institutional 
complementarity and its relation to systemic workability, convergence by institutional 
cross-reference is ab initio inefficient. So, even if the optimal convergence thesis is 
valid, its final outcome will have to be a "spontaneous order" that is workable. For 
these reasons, Kester's optimal convergence hypothesis based on institutional cross- 
reference must be rejected as theoretically inconsistent. Thus, one can partly concur 
with Schmidt and Spindler's (2000) and Bratton and MacCahery's (1999) claims that, 
unless global competition led to the emergence of a system along the lines of either 
the shareholder model or the managerial model, convergence would be towards an 
unworkable outcome. Still, in a context of imperfect markets, even these claims are 
incomplete and muddled because they are based on the equal fitness misnomer. In 
doing so, they exclude the macroeconomic considerations analysed above and, thus, 
impose an unnecessary and distorting limitation on the concept of complementarity. 
In sum, given the current nature of globalisation, if the global corporate 
governance convergence thesis is well-founded, only two corporate governance 
outcomes are possible depending on the theoretical postulations used. If one adheres 
to the neoclassical paradigm of efficient markets and zero transaction costs, an 
outsider-shareholder system should emerge which will not only be suitable to global 
economic trends, but will also create the necessary complementarities between global 
financial assets and investment opportunities so as to promote sustainable economic 
growth and prosperity. Free from government interventions, global markets and 
firms 
operating in them will by themselves create a "spontaneous order" establishing all 
institutions necessary for aligning the interests of managers with those of 
206 
shareholders, just as Jensen and Meckling assumed in their seminal work. Indeed , in 
accordance with the neoclassical theory's predictions, national corporate governance 
systems would converge to optimality. 
On the other hand, outside the neoclassical lab, where markets are not 
assumed to be perfect or able to construct efficient spontaneous orders of the 
Hayekian type, a completely different picture emerges. As it was argued above, to the 
extent that competitive markets can impose their wishes on institutional structures, 
convergence towards the shareholder model would constitute an adaptation to a 
systemic trajectory characterised by inefficiency and slow growth. Even then, once 
transaction costs are introduced into market contracting even this second version of 
the convergence thesis cannot hold in its absolute form. As the following analysis will 
show, outside the neoclassical laboratory conditions optimal corporate governance 
convergence or any other type of convergence is anything but inevitable. This is 
because while competitive forces may push towards systemic convergence of some 
kind, a whole set of other institutional forces may simultaneously pull corporate 
governance systems towards their original position so that predicting where the 
resultant force will lead becomes an impossible empirical exercise. 
2.4.2. Institutional Complementarity, Path Dependence and the Possibility of 
Convergence in Imperfect Markets 
Viewed through the prism of institutional economic theory, corporate 
governance developments can be interpreted in a way that is very different from the 
convergence claims discussed above. As already mentioned, institutionalist criticism 
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of the neoclassical assumptions as unrealistic has gained momentum over the years. 
As stated in chapter 1, the focus, or rather the beginning, of the institutionalist 
critique is the zero transaction cost-perfect market assumption of conventional 
economics. By recognising the existence of positive transaction costs in market 
contracting, institutionalists have sought to introduce realism into economic 
theorising in order to explain real phenomena, such as persistent underdevelopment 
and performance differentials, that cannot exist in the utopian world envisaged by 
Coase. Thus, they have reversed the Coase theorem to claim that, because in the real 
world transaction costs are significant, institutions do matter as endogenous 
constraints on agents' behaviour and therefore their independent role in economic 
activity cannot be ignored. 
Once the theoretical analysis of institutional change is modified to include 
market imperfections and deviations form the global rationality postulate, its 
predictions are significantly different from those of the approach outlined above. 
While neoclassicists regard institutional change as a process that is driven by 
exogenous environmental factors that temporarily push the economic system out of 
equilibrium until a new optimal equilibrium is found, institutionalists acknowledge 
that institutional systems may not always evolve efficiently. As Hodgson observes: 
Economic evolution does not always proceed slowly and smoothly in 
Darwinian terms so that a permanent equilibrium is maintained. It can also 
proceed by succession of periods of stability and crisis, i. e. of apparent 
equilibrium and cumulative instability. (Hodgson 1988: 144) 
This is because, where transaction costs are positive neither rational optimisation nor 
competitive selection are capable of producing optimal outcomes. As regards the 
former, it is obvious that agents' bounded rationality prevents them from consciously 
designing optimal institutional sets. This is not denied even by neoclassicists who, as 
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mentioned above, resort to competitive selection as a "corrective" mechanism with 
results equivalent to those of rational optimisation. But even this position is difficult 
to defend. 
To begin with, there is a fundamental difference between the two processes; 
while in rational optimisation the choice of efficient institutions is made ex ante, 
competitive selection operates ex post. This means that the former, as a process of 
continuous and conscious optimal change, by definition excludes institutional 
imperfections. The retrospective nature of competitive selection, on the other hand, 
implies that there has to be a reversal or modification of past institutional choices 
which have become inefficient as a result of changes in prices and agents' 
preferences. For Friedman's claim that competitive selection can be regarded as 
equivalent to rational optimisation in terms of efficiency to be valid, the costs 
generated during such institutional reversals or modifications must be zero. 
According to Matthews (1984: 103-106), this can be the case only if institutional 
adaptation is instantaneous, so that there is no loss of output during the change, and if 
institution-specific assets can be fully redeployed within the new optimal institutional 
183 framework. While the former condition is as arbitrary as the process of tatonement 
in Walrasian equilibrium economics, the latter is simply paradoxical. Consequently, 
institutional reversals or modifications may involve significant costs due to potential 
loss during the adjustment period and to "ex post non-malleability", i. e. the dumping 
of past investments that were specific to the old institutions (ibid: 104). This means 
that the process of competitive selection is itself subject to significant transaction 
costs, which can be called adaptation costs, and it therefore cannot be regarded as 
equivalent to rational optimisation. 
"' Monement is the process of price adjustments following a change in demand, during which it is 
assumed that no exchange takes place until equilibrium prices have been established by the operation 
of the law of supply and demand. 
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The significance of adaptation costs in institutional change is not exhausted 
with the observation that competitive selection can lead to sub-optimal but still good 
results. On the contrary, their most important consequence is that where they are 
above a certain level that agents are willing to bear, change may be delayed or not 
pursued at all so that a situation of temporary or permanent institutional inertia can 
arise. In this case, the very nature of institutional evolution is altered, for it has to also 
encompass the scenario of a systemic failure to adapt to changing circumstances. The 
implication is that institutional change can become locked in an evolutionary path that 
not only diverges from optimal adaptation but from wealth-enhancing efficiency 
altogether (Eggertsson 1996: 12). In other words, the presence of adaptation costs 
makes possible the perpetuation of institutions that were built to serve needs of the 
past and which through their stability determine the path of systemic change. Thus, as 
stagnant and new institutions are randomly mixed together, institutional choices of 
the past can have a direct impact on the form institutional change takes in the present 
and thus create historically rooted trajectories of evolution (Zysman 1994). This 
process, described by the concept of path dependence, provides the theoretical basis 
for explaining the persistent diversity in form and performance between institutional 
systems (Boyer 1996; Boyer 2000; Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997: 51; North 1990: 
7; Soskice 1999; Whitley 1999) as well as for rejecting the notions of ergodicity and 
systemic reversibility due to the introduction of historical influences in institutional 
change (David 2001). 
Thus, in a world of imperfect markets, where institutions can have a 
significant and independent role above the individual economic agent, the mechanics 
of change are ftmdamentally different from those in the neoclassical paradigm. 
Firstly, institutionalists reject the deterministic nature of neoclassical theory where 
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agents' choices, actions and preferences are reduced to mere mechanistic reactions to 
external changes imposed by market forces. 184 As already mentioned, since 
institutional sets are not perfect, they never totally determine agents' economic 
behaviour. Instead, the significance of institutions lies in their role in shaping 
economic choice by simply defining its boundaries, which then allows sufficient 
freedom for real deliberative action (Lewis 1978: 142). Thus, while institutions 
introduce a certain degree of predictability in the system, much of economic activity 
remains outside the ex ante determinant influence of institutions and therefore is 
indeterminate and unforeseeable (Hodgson 1988: 12). 
It is the interaction between the existing set of constraints and agents' 
purposeful activity, i. e. their effort to exploit the opportunities that arise 185 and they 
perceive, that drives institutional change. More specifically, while incumbent 
institutions will often permit and help the exploitation of available opportunities, 
there will also be instances where there are mismatches between agents' capacities, as 
shaped by institutional constraints, and tasks (Zysman 1994: 259). To put it 
differently, by operating as constraints on agents' choices of action, institutions 
simply determine which opportunities or preferences are "exploitable" or legitimate 
and which are not. This means that some opportunities and preferences will be within 
the limits imposed by the existing institutional set and others will not, irrespective of 
whether this is efficient or not. It is when this situation arises that institutional 
adaptation may become necessary in order to expand or alter agents' capacities so as 
to match the new tasks. So, as North (1990: 79) argues, dissatisfied agents will have 
184 See above section 1.3.2. notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
"' Unlike neoclassical theory, which ultimately treats these opportunities as the by-product of 
exogenous changes (see supra. notes 167-169 and text), institutionalists claim that they can also be 
endogenously derived. 
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an incentive to devote resources to changing the restrictive institutions. 186 Whether 
they eventually pursue this course of action or simply abandon the extra-institutional 
opportunities will depend on their subjective perception of the costs and benefits. 
However, this is not a straightforward process. The presence of externalities 187 
gives rise to a conflict between the interests of those agents who would benefit from 
alterations in the institutional framework and of all others who have made institution- 
specific investments and who as a result would have to bear the adaptation costs if 
change occurred. Thus, where transaction costs are positive, institutional change 
inevitably creates winners as well as losers. The efficiency of change, that is its 
wealth-enhancing effect, is then just a matter of how many winners as opposed to 
losers are created both in numerical and in value terms. Since informational 
asynu-netries between agents as a typical characteristic of imperfect markets translate 
into power differentials, institutional change becomes dependent on the relative 
bargaining power of those seeking it and not on neoclassical rationality. As such 
institutional change may not proceed to serve general social needs but what Veblen 
(1924: ch. 8) calls "'vested interests" of the "conservative class", that is the group of 
agents interested in maintaining the status quo and who then become the "carriers" of 
inertia and path dependence. Accordingly, van Tulder and Ruigrok (1997: 13 1) argue 
that "core firms" in a particular economy have the ability to occupy a central position 
in the supply, distribution, financial and political networks and, thus, have a 
significant influence in the design of institutional frameworks. 
"' Certainly, agents might as well pursue their objectives without prior alterations in their 
institutionally determined capacities, e. g. by violating a law or a convention. In this case the agents 
would have to balance the costs of punishment, if any, with the benefits of the violation. Such cases are 
not uncommon. However, they constitute exceptions rather than the rule and so do not deserve a more 
extensive analysis for the purposes of this study. 
187 The economic definition of externalities is that people involved in actions do not bear the full cost 
or receive the full benefit of their actions. 
212 
Furthermore, institutional change may not occur even when all leading agents, 
share a common perception that existing institutions are disadvantageous and that 
their change would be beneficial. The root cause of this type of inertia is the classic 
collective action problem as originally analysed by Olson (1965,1982) and Hardin 
(1968) and then further enriched by Hirschman (1970) with the introduction of the 
"exit" and "voice" concepts. Thus, in order to surmount inertia, a "critical mass" of 
interested parties must be formed who are willing to engage themselves in voicing 
their dissatisfaction with the status quo and actively seek to change it (Granovetter 
1978). The formation of stable constellations, such as lobby groups, trade unions and 
political alliances, may be necessary in order to overcome the free-rider problem 
which may frustrate the process (North 1990: 87). Alternatively, change may also 
come indirectly as agents may exercise the exit option, provided institutional factors 
and relocation costs allow this, by leaving a system they regard as inefficient for 
another one and thus potentially cause the decline of the former. 188 Ultimately,, 
systemic decline may raise the costs accruing from inertia relative to adaptation costs 
and therefore result to institutional change. 
Furthermore, while, as mentioned above, institutional complementarity does 
not deserve specific analysis in a neoclassical context, where the independent role of 
institutional constraints is recognised the notion becomes extremely important. The 
horizontal and vertical interactions 189 between institutional forces that 
complementarity implies are crucial for the process of institutional change because 
they can affect both its direction and its speed. Generally, institutional 
complementarity can be regarded as having a dual role as a transmission mechanism 
of adaptation costs as well as of systemic change. 
"' Obviously, the availability of alternative and competing institutional systems is a precondition for 
this. 
See section 1.4 above. 
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Firstly, institutional interactions may constitute obstacles to adaptation by 
introducing rigidities into the system. For instance, even where a group of agents 
have the ability and incentives to design a new fully adapted institution to replace an 
old one, before its implementation the new institution will have to be modified so as 
to fit complementary institutions. Modification may be direct and prospective during 
the formation process or indirect and retrospective through enforcement after the 
institution's adoption. Ultimately, institutional change takes the fon-n of a 
compromise between adaptation to environmental factors and suitability to existing 
institutional configurations. The significance of this is that, even if information were 
sufficient for an efficient adaptation to changed circumstances, new institutions as 
single units can eventually lose at least some of their optimal attributes. It is for this 
reason that the function and performance of one particular institution often vary 
considerably within different institutional contexts (Amable 1999). In a more extreme 
but not uncommon case, a desired institution may be totally unfit for the existing 
framework and as a result be abandoned altogether either before its implementation or 
after it by becoming unenforceable and obsolete. In fact, these complementarities 
create a significant rigidity bias in institutional change by establishing a link between 
the adaptation costs of institutions that change and of institutions that remain in force. 
This accumulation of adaptation costs creates important obstacles to institutional 
adaptation, hence the role of institutional complementarity as a factor of systemic 
stability and therefore of Path dependence. As Dulbecco and Dutraive (2001: 
58) 
affirm, once institutional complementarity is taken into consideration, the claims of 
efficient adaptation and "spontaneous order 99 cannot hold. 
On the other hand, the other side of the compromise between institutional 
adaptation and suitability that complementarity implies is that the successful 
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implementation of a change will have an effect on the function of existing 
complementary institutions. This is because the resulting functional change of an 
existing institution will almost inevitably affect its overall adaptation costs either 
directly or indirectly through an alteration in the relative bargaining power of agents 
who are interested in the stability of that institution. It is reasonable to assume that 
when the implementation of a new institution is successful, the tendency will be 
towards a net reduction of at least some complementary institutions' adaptation costs. 
Thus, during a process of this kind, institutional complementarity has the potential to 
become the vehicle of change and cause a domino effect of alterations in the system. 
This is what more than a century ago Veblen (1898; 1924: 201 and 208) described as 
an ongoing process of cumulative causation. Of course, the final outcome of a change 
shall depend on the interaction between adaptation costs that are specific to existing 
institutions and the forces of change. In practice, these are normally very difficult to 
calculate in advance, so that predicting the speed and the direction of this cumulative 
process is hardly a simple task. Accordingly, Myrdal has outlined his cumulative 
causation model as follows: 
The point is not simply that 'many forces are working in the same direction'. 
They are, in fact, not doing so. In general there are periods when opposing 
forces balance one another so that the system remains in rest until a push or a 
pull is applied at one point or another. When the whole system starts moving 
after such a shock, the changes in the forces work in the same direction, which 
is something different. (Myrdal 1957: 17) 
In the light of the discussion above one can read into Myrdal's statement the dual role 
of institutional complementarity as a factor of stability and change. Amable (1999) 
takes the argument further by drawing a distinction between "destabilisation" and 
"change". The former amounts to a breakdown in the pattern of a complementary 
system, whereas the latter describes institutional alterations that do not affect the 
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general logic of relations within that system. 190 In this fashion, what Myrdal, perhaps 
somewhat metaphorically, regards as a "balance" is Amable's "change", i. e. a normal 
process of systemic evolution along a pre-selected path. Destabilisation, on the other 
hand, is the result of a "shock" which triggers a process of cumulative change and 
which pulls or pushes the system away from its initial path. 
In order to elaborate on this distinction it is necessary to introduce into the 
equation the concept of workability as defined in chapter I above. Where the 
destabilisation of a workable system occurs, there are two possible outcomes. The 
first is one where cumulative causation progresses until a new workable equilibrium 
is found. In this case there is full adaptation to the shock and destabilisation is only 
temporary. The second possibility, however, is one where the initial shock is not 
radical enough so as to produce a complete overhaul of the system. This is where the 
concepts of path dependence, complementarity and workability come to meet. 
Change may progress so as to affect only a few less path dependent institutions or 
sub-systems and leave all other more path dependent ones unaffected. Due to strong 
complementarities that exist between institutions and sub-systems the result will then 
be a system that is unworkable. In this case, full adaptation fails to take place and 
destabilisation becomes a more permanent condition with significant negative effects 
on the system's performance. 
Finally, another important link can be made between path dependence and the 
concept of workability due to the effect the latter has on a system's adaptation costs. 
To a great extent adaptation costs arise as a result of the uncertainty about what 
effects the new regime will have. Shelpse (1986: 51-81) argues that this uncertainty 
"' In a similar fashion, Hollingsworth (1997: 267-8) claims that "[flnstitutional arrangements are 
always changing, but with a logic that is system specific[ ... ] Being path 
dependent, a social system of 
production continues along a particular logic until or unless or until a fundamental societal crisis 
intervenes. " 
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about the impact of structural change on economic outcomes is enough to stabilise a 
system. Of course, the more successful a system, the more preventive the effect of 
this uncertainty will be. Hence, due to the link between performance and workability 
established earlier, 191 the more workable a system is, the greater its path dependence 
and vice versa. In fact, this is simply another formulation of the argument that, 
subject to the path dependence issues described so far, good performers have a lesser 
incentive to change than bad performers do. 
All these insights of institutional theory about the workings of institutional 
change in imperfect markets have led to the imposition of important limitations on the 
claim of efficient convergence of corporate governance systems as a result of 
globalisation. Once it is accepted that institutions have a significant role in economic 
development as shown above, even quasi-efficient adaptation of all systems to 
exogenous changes is anything but certain. Whether it eventually occurs will depend 
on the nature and significance of overall adaptation costs. Of crucial importance will 
be the ability of systems to resolve collective action problems and to create 
mechanisms for compensating those parties who have to bear the costs of adaptation. 
North (1990: 80-3) defines this quality of institutional systems as "adaptive 
efficiency"' which he distinguishes from allocative efficiency. Accordingly, he states: 
[Institutions] will not only determine the kinds of economic activity that will 
be profitable and viable, but also shape the adaptive efficiency of the internal 
structure of firms and other organizations by, for example, regulating entry, 
governance structures, and the flexibility of organisations. At is essential to 
have rules that eliminate not only failed economic organization but failed 
political organization as well. ... Moreover, the very nature of 
the political 
process encourages the growth of constraints that favor today's influential 
bargaining groups. But adaptively efficient institutional frameworks have 
existed and do exist, just as adaptively inefficient frameworks have existed 
and do exist. (ibid.: 81-2). 
See section 1.4.3 above. 
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In sum, once the teleological assumptions of neoclassical theory are relaxed so 
that institutions are not neutral, the theory of convergence towards a unique optimum 
model is not inevitable even in an increasingly global economy. There are two 
reasons for this. 
Firstly, the fact that national systems adapt to the forces of globalisation does 
not mean the resulting convergence will inevitably lead to real productive and 
allocative efficiency. As already argued above, the globalisation of economic activity 
has created more inefficiencies than it has been able to resolve so that global 
competition is unable to eliminate national market imperfections. It simply elevates 
them to the global level by creating pressures on national systems to converge 
towards an inferior model. Thus, convergence would be undesirable since it would 
not constitute a race to the top as neoclassical theorists claim. 
Secondly, at least in the foreseeable future it is unreasonable to expect that the 
boundaries defining national economies as distinct institutional systems will be totally 
eliminated. In the absence of a fully integrated global marketplace the focus remains 
on the reactions of national systems to global forces of change. As the institutionalist 
analysis of change shows, even in the global presence of such pressures, depending 
on their internal dynamics institutional systems may not adapt fully and uniformly. Of 
course, the possibility of convergence as a process cannot be completely excluded; 
but, before a truly global marketplace is established, if it occurs it is more likely that 
it will be incomplete and within the margins set by different institutional systems. As 
already explained, these margins can be very different depending on the institutional 
complementarities and adaptation costs involved. As Boyer (1996: 55) observed, "a 
unique equilibrium is not warranted: the multiplicity of equilibria in an institutionally 
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rich economy is the rule not the exception. " 192 After the initiation of a convergence 
process, depending on the institutional dynamics within each system change may be 
slow or fast, complete or incomplete, and thus the final institutional outcomes can be 
workable or unworkable. Therefore, differences in the nature, extent and transmission 
mechanisms of adaptation costs within particular systems do not allow for general 
predictions of convergence or non-convergence without specific analyses of 
particular systems' internal dynamics. 
There have been several recent attempts to introduce these general insights of 
institutional theory to the analysis of corporate governance. The pioneering attempt to 
introduce market imperfections as sources of systemic inertia and path dependence 
was made by Milhaupt (1998) who argued that, contrary to the belief of optimal 
convergence advocates, the evolution of corporate governance institutions is all but 
straightforward due to the persistence of inefficient institutions. This claim has been 
taken further by Bebchuck and Roe (1999) who have predicted that path dependence 
as a force of diversity will probably prevail over the pressures of global competition 
for convergence at least in the short and medium-term. Building upon earlier work by 
R1 193 oe arguing that corporate governance institutions are formed by historical and 
political factors that are country- specific, they come to the conclusion that rationality 
and optimality considerations may have less influence in the institutional choices of 
firms and states. Instead, historically and politically rooted institutions in national 
financial, labour and product markets constrain institutional choices of the present 
and, thus, prevent the "efficient" adaptation of corporate governance to modem 
challenges. This is because past institutional choices have created powerful interest 
groups of stakeholders, such as managers, workers, creditors and various types of 
19' See also Zysman (1994: 268). 
193 See Roe (1994,1996). For a more recent formulation of this claim see Roe (1999). 
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blockholders who have an overriding interest in entrenching themselves by preserving 
the status quo and who are, therefore, determined to prevent the divergence of 
corporate governance evolution from the pre-selected path. The reason for those 
stakeholders' resistance to change is that under the current regime they enjoy 
privileges, mainly in the form of private rents, and make firm-specific investments 
that would be lost or devalued if radical institutional changes were implemented. 
Due to these internal workings of institutional structures, Bebchuk and Roe 
are of the view that an external shock, such as globalisation, would not lead to an 
immediate "destabilisation" and reorientation of a national corporate governance 
system. The pervasiveness of rent extraction by those dominant stakeholder groups 
translates into high adaptation costs that eventually impede reform unless its aim is to 
46 strengthen" existing rules and thus perpetuate the existing system. On the other 
hand, less entrenched stakeholders lack the resources and the necessary bargaining 
power in a polity to push through their reforms against the will of dominant parties. 
Moreover, Bebchuk and Roe argue, even if some path dependent corporate 
governance institutions were in fact replaced by non-path dependent ones, 
convergence would still not be inevitable, because rules that remained unchanged 
could ensure that established practices are perpetuated. This is, in fact, the 
institutional complementarity argument reiterated. On the one hand, if firms decide to 
evade what they consider inefficient legal rules by using private contracts, they may 
find their plans being frustrated by courts' and other organisational structures' 
unwillingness to uphold them in order to maintain what they would consider as 
64 public good". Since private contracts are less formal institutions than legal rules, this 
is a clear example of vertical complementarities' effect on systemic change. 
On the 
other hand, even if some "non-private" institutions were altered, Bebchuk and 
Roe 
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claim, other legal rules could still neutralise the impact of these changes; horizontal 
complementarities between equal institutions would maintain the system's stability. 
If these arguments are accepted, then obviously the convergence thesis about 
corporate law and governance is indeed implausible. However, by overemphasising 
the stabilising effect of institutional complementarity what Bebchuk and Roe fail to 
recognise is its dual role as a mechanism transmitting both adaptation costs and 
systemic change. It is with this theoretical one-sidedness that Schmidt and Spindler 
(2000) took issue to argue that, although the persistent diversity scenario is plausible, 
it is equally possible that corporate governance systems could converge to an inferior 
outcome. The theoretical basis of this claim is provided by the close relationship 
between (horizontal) institutional complementarity and the concept of workability as 
a superior characteristic of a system. As already mentioned this link between the two 
concepts is the reason for rejecting institutional cross-reference as inefficient. 
Nonetheless, Schmidt and Spindler admit that despite its negative impact, cross- 
reference is a real possibility, mainly because in the presence of adaptation costs a 
leap from one workable system to another is highly unlikely - for this to happen all 
component sub-systems would have to be reformed simultaneously in an ergodic 
manner. 
Thus, competitive pressures may indeed lead to the alteration of a less path 
dependent institution or subsystem - something that Bebchuk and Roe also accept - 
which would then make the system as a whole unworkable and therefore potentially 
inferior to the original. It is the unworkability of the new system that makes it 
unstable and thus reduces the adaptation costs of further changes. 
194 Further change, 
Schinidt and Spindler argue, could take two directions: a reversal to the initial 
194 See supra. note 191 and text. 
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workable equilibrium as advocated by Bebchuk and Roe or further away from it 
towards a totally different workable system. However, nothing could possibly 
guarantee that the outcome of the latter scenario, which resembles the cumulative 
causation process outlined above, will be the most efficient solution. This is because 
systemic instability creates an emergency situation which demands "some kind of 
order immediately" rather than "the best order later". In other words, Schmidt and 
Spindler assert that in the presence of horizontal complementarities the efficiency of 
convergence depends on how easy or difficult it is to establish the potentially superior 
system. 
Despite Bebchuk and Roe's path dependence contention mentioned above, 
attempts have also been made to demonstrate the potential of vertical 
complementarities to promote corporate governance change and convergence. The 
pioneer of this argument is Gilson (2000) who has distinguished between what he 
calls "convergence of form" and "convergence of function". 195 Although he does not 
specifically define the terms "form" and "function", one can deduct fTom his analysis 
that the former comprises formal legal rules while the latter describes private inter- 
and intra-firm. contracting within the general legal framework. The starting point of 
Gilson's argument is that corporate governance systems may allow sufficient margins 
for firms to adapt their behaviour and function in accordance to changing 
circumstances without alterations in formal institutional structures. This type of 
adaptation, which resembles Amable's "institutional change", will not be sufficient to 
push a system away from its path (ibid.: 12). 
196 Where competition is imperfect, 
different systems can develop diverse but equally effective institutional solutions to 
195 For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that Gilson regards convergence based on contractual 
agreements as a third type of institutional change. However, the nature and effect of this third type and 
of functional convergence as described in his paper allow for their treatment as equivalent. 
196 See also Gilson (1996: 334). 
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common problems without their destabilisation or their convergence. 197 However, 
contrary to Bebchuk and Roe's view, Gilson accepts that functional convergence may 
also "disarm" path dependent institutions and their supporting stakeholder coalitions 
even if no change in formal rules is effected. Once a formal institution is rendered 
obsolete, its adaptation costs are dramatically reduced so that convergence of function 
can eventually facilitate convergence of form. 
This link between vertical institutional complementarities and corporate 
governance convergence towards a global model has been further explored by Coffee 
(1999). 198 In a three-stage argument, which follows a similar line to that of Gilson, 
Coffee argues that forces of path dependence in formal corporate governance 
institutional arrangements can be neutralised and eventually overcome by the pace of 
functional convergence which should eventually "dominate formal convergence". 
The main vehicle for this process, the argument goes, will be the increasing pressures 
on and incentives of large firms to list their stock on those stock exchanges that are 
most developed in terms of liquidity and investor participation. As securities 
transactions become more spatially concentrated to those countries which enjoy better 
locational advantages as hosts, a few major stock markets emerge as dominant in the 
trading of international stocks. Effectively, cross-border corporate securities' listings 
should be seen as a type of regulatory arbitrage between national financial systems 
and those dominant stock markets. If capital markets in one system are not suitable to 
a finn's needs, financial globalisation has now opened the possibility of partial or 
197 However, this proposition can be problematic, since to some extent it seems to coincide with the 
equal competitiveness hypothesis which, as already mentioned, is difficult to support. More 
specifically, Gilson (2000) uses Kaplan's (1994) empirical findings on the relation between 
managerial turnover and firm performance to argue that different systems can provide equally effective 
managerial accountability measures. In a more recent study than Kaplan's, however, Abe (1997) found 
that variations in measuring firm performance affect CEO turnover differently, since some systems 
place more emphasis on sales and employment growth -two measures that are related more to 
managerial rather than shareholder objectives- than others. 
198 Note that Gilson (2000) incorporates Coffee's conclusions on convergence. 
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total exit based on a balancing between the costs and benefits that such a move 
entails. 
While, as already mentioned, there are significant micro-economic benefits 
from this type of corporate migration to foreign stock markets, for the convergence 
argument the costs' side is more important. This is because, the listing of a finn's 
securities on a foreign market constitutes the subjection of that firm to different 
securities regulations, including financial disclosure and even corporate governance 
standards that apply therein. It is reasonable to expect that the orientation of such 
regulations in developed capital markets is towards enhancing transparency from the 
outside investor's perspective. The institutional analysis in the previous chapter has 
already provided some explanations for this. Thus, Coffee's first claim is that firms 
seeking to remain competitive in global markets are increasingly adopting more 
outside shareholder-oriented governance policies without the need of formal 
institutional changes in their home systems. Indeed, cross-listings of securities are a 
good example of functional convergence pursued by firms seeking to remain 
competitive by exploiting OLI advantages in the sphere of corporate finance. 
However, contrary to Coffee's and to a lesser extent Gilson's contentions that 
functional convergence precedes and dominates formal convergence, foreign 
securities' listings, would not have been possible without prior changes of 
laws 
governing international capital movements and foreign exchange rules, to name 
but a 
few, which have opened the door to regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, without the 
growth of Euromarkets - themselves a creation of government policy 
decisions not to 
regulate international capital markets unilaterally when it was still possible - as 
sources of corporate finance, firms would not have had the bargaining power to push 
forward the abolition of financial regulations that restricted global securities 
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investments. Therefore, convergence of function and form should be seen as two 
interdependent aspects of one process, i. e. of institutional convergence, rather than 
two separate ones. 
In any case, as regulatory arbitrage by firms seeking to optimise their financial 
structure gains momentum, competition between national securities markets across 
the world for international securities' offerings intensifies. Therefore, Coffee's 
second argument is that the globalisation of corporate finance creates pressures for 
secunties regu ation and disclosure standards' convergence with dominant stock 
exchanges providing the benchmarks. Thus, the deregulation of global corporate 
finance is an illustration of how institutional changes on one side of the financial 
system (cross-border capital movements) alters firms' opportunity sets and 
preferences so as to trigger further institutional changes on another side (securities 
regulation). Arguably, the change of securities regulation rules should entail relatively 
low adaptation costs for two main reasons. Firstly, as an increasing number of large 
and, therefore, "core" firms are becoming subjected to higher investor protection 
standards, it should be reasonable to expect that they will be less inclined to oppose 
change and they may even use their bargaining power to promote it. Secondly, as 
Coffee (1999: 670) claims, securities regulation convergence should be less 
politically sensitive and, therefore, less path dependent, because it comprises rules 
that are largely "neutral and technocratic that does not, on its face, challenge long- 
established social policies. " 
The third stage of Coffee's argument is that progress in the sphere of 
corporate securities regulation and financial disclosure will eventually lead to 
corporate governance convergence without the implementation of changes in national 
company laws. To reach this conclusion, Coffee concurs to some extent with the view 
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presented in 1.4.1 above on the neutrality of company law as a determinant of 
corporate governance. Recalling similar experiences with the interactions between 
state corporate laws and federal securities regulation in the US, he concludes that the 
harmonisation of national securities laws will be the driving force behind global 
corporate governance convergence, even if diverse national corporate laws persist. 
Even if one accepts the first stage of Coffee's convergence argument, the 
second and third stages are not satisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, regarding the 
third argument, Coffee overemphasises the determinant role of securities regulation 
alone. Even though it is an important set of institutional constraints on corporate 
governance, without "supporting" developments in financial markets, as well as in 
other sub-systems, the impact of securities regulation convergence alone may prove 
to be insufficient to push managerial models towards a shareholder-oriented one. As 
stated in the previous chapter, disclosure rules and investor protection regulations are 
mechanisms for reducing transaction costs for outside shareholders. More 
specifically, they aim at reducing the ability of insiders to extract private rents to the 
detriment of outsiders. If insiders lost the private benefits associated with their 
incentive to make firm-specific investments, their incentive to diversify would 
increase causing the externalisation of financial relationships. Hence, convergence to 
higher market transparency standards in securities markets constitutes a re-orientation 
of one set of financial rules towards the outsider corporate governance model. As 
already shown in 1.4.2 above, share-ownership dispersion in imperfect markets may 
not be able to constrain managerial discretion if shareholders are individual investors. 
in that case, if anything, securities rules' convergence may simply lead to a shift from 
one type of managerialism based on insider control to another through the de- 
concentration of insiders' shareholdings, i. e. global corporate governance 
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convergence would be towards an outsider managerial model. Thus, for a more 
radical shift away from managerialism towards a shareholder model further 
institutional changes would be needed, such as the growth in the percentage of 
corporate securities held by institutional investors and the increased bargaining power 
of the latter that results from this. Indeed, as the discussion in the preceding sections 
shows, pressures for such changes already exist as a result of financial and production 
globalisation, but these are not part of Coffee's argument. 
Secondly, in respect of the second stage, even if financial re-regulation along 
the lines described above commences, adaptation outside the financial system may 
not progress enough to bring about a workable' 99 shareholder oriented system. The 
reason for this is that, although securities regulation is more "technocratic", 
institutional complementarities with other institutional sub-systems may eventually 
make the impact of regulatory changes in securities markets more obvious to 
adaptation cost-bearing stakeholders. 200 If complementarity is a carrier of change, it is 
also a carrier of path dependence, and this is something Coffee fails to recognize. 
Therefore, path dependence in one sub-system can also prevent the complete re- 
orientation of another. This is a recipe for unworkability not only within a system as a 
whole but also within its particular sub-systems. Certainly, one possibility is that the 
"technocratic" changes that do get implemented are eventually reversed so that the 
system as a whole reverts to its original position. However, such a reversal to the old 
regime can be difficult, as new vested interests may have emerged supporting the new 
regulations. Therefore, when the complexity of dynamic institutional interactions is 
taken into account, unworkability becomes a very real scenario once systemic change 
begins. In sum, Coffee's three-stage convergence argument has to be qualified and 
" On the definition of the term "workability" in this thesis see section 1.4.3 above. 
200 Recent experiences in Germany show exactly this; see chapter 3 below. 
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significantly altered by the fact that adaptation depends on how institutional 
complementarities resolve themselves, either as carriers of change or of path 
dependence. When forces of change prevail systemic adaptation progresses, but when 
they are overcome by path dependence forces adaptation stops until the dynamics of 
change re-emerge. 
2.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The current wave of economic globalisation has created forces that challenge 
the viability of corporate governance models based on managerial discretion. It calls 
for a redefinition of basic institutional arrangements in financial and industrial 
relations systems which have in the past made the managerial firm the most 
successful and dominant business form since the turn of the last century. 
The negative impact of aggregate demand problems on the sustainability of 
managerial models that rely on high output have already been discussed. If manager- 
controlled firms, whether dominated by insiders or outsiders, do not find the 
necessary markets for their output, overcapacity or price-based competition can 
constrain their ability to bear the costs of internalising labour and capital markets and, 
thus, lead to the deconstruction of the main sources of their competitive strength. In 
this sense, managerial capitalism is too inflexible for a macroeconomic environment 
that is stagnant or grows relatively slowly. 
Simultaneously, the continuing growth of institutional investors as the largest 
managers of financial assets is becoming a global phenomenon. The combination of 
the institutionalisation of securities trading with the potential dispersion of 
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shareholdings is perhaps the most crucial factor affecting global corporate 
governance. If institutional investors emerge as the dominant type of shareholders 
who have the necessary sophistication to influence managerial decisions, the 
globalisation of equity markets can become the vehicle for convergence towards an 
outsider shareholder model. Institutional investor growth being a phenomenon closely 
connected to the intensification of economic globalisation, both as a cause and an 
effect, and the fierce competition among fund managers creates increasing pressures 
on corporate managers to focus on generating value for current shareholders. 
Moreover, the emergence of the global market for corporate control provides the 
forum in which institutional investor influence can also be exerted in an indirect 
manner. As globalisation progresses in its current form, with the continuing 
integration of securities markets and globalisation of shareholdings, these pressures 
should be expected to escalate. 
Further pressures on managerial models also derive from the globalisation of 
production and the new international division of labour. As already explained, the 
persistent slowdown of growth since the 1980s has been forcing managers to 
reconsider, water-down or completely abandon their role of balancing different 
stakeholder priorities in order to promote their companies' overriding interests. Cost- 
cuttings and production efficiency enhancement are now objectives that are often 
being pursued against the interests of the current workforce so that the old manager- 
stakeholder consensus is being severely undermined. The intensification of domestic 
and global M&A as a result of macroeconomic conditions further exacerbates the 
problem. While employment relationships become more adversarial, the global 
reorganisation of production is also eroding labour's bargaining power inside and 
outside the firm. Consequently, the influence of labour in corporate -decision making 
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diminishes at the same time as (institutional) shareholder power increases. 
Simultaneously, as micro -management tends to reflect stakeholder power 
differentials, governments' ability to re-establish a balance via the implementation of 
macro-management measures aiming at full employment and unemployment 
compensation is significantly curtailed. In an interplay between functional and formal 
changes direct pressures from global portfolio investors or from core employers and 
their associations who can easily use the "exit" option as a tool for influencing 
government decisions do not allow policy-makers much discretion if they wish to re- 
establish a balance between various interest groups. 
As the analysis so far has shown, these developments in financial, industrial 
relations and macroeconomic structures are closely linked with each other through 
causal relationships. This means that their overall effect as well as their cause is the 
emergence of a global trajectory away from managerial corporate governance and 
towards an outside shareholder-oriented model. The latter is not only dependent upon 
the increased ability of firms to redesign their internal governance arrangements and 
contracts in a flexible manner, but is also better equipped to deal with radical demand 
fluctuations. Ironically, the shareholder model seems to be the only workable 
corporate governance solution to the challenges that the current wave of globalisation 
creates. 
In 1.4.3 above the workability element of corporate governance systems was 
related to the concept of efficiency. It was argued therein that, while workable 
systems are superior to unworkable ones, it would be meaningless to proclaim the 
shareholder and the managerial model as equally fit. More elaborate explanations 
for 
this were given above, when it was argued that in imperfect markets an outside- 
shareholder model is unable to sustain high levels of growth and prosperity. On the 
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contrary, theoretical as well as empirical evidence was presented showing that, 
provided the necessary government regulations are in place, the managerial corporate 
governance model, as the microeconomic component of a Kaldorian virtuous circle, 
can and has achieved much superior growth levels with analogous benefits in terms of 
economic welfare. Therefore, the better ability of the outside-shareholder model 
compared to the managerial one to cope with the current economic globalisation 
processes is not an indication that it is the superior optimum, unless of course one 
regards slow growth better than high growth. Consequently, if the current wave of 
liberal globalisation leads national corporate governance systems to converge to some 
degree, it will be towards an inferior but still workable outcome. It seems that 
convergence to an inferior system is easier than the coordinated reorganisation of the 
world economic structure. 
Of course, the institutional dynamics within diverse systems can vary 
considerably so that national corporate governance models should be expected to 
react differently to the common stimulants of globalisation. The intensity, extent and 
r, final outcome of any process of institutional change and thus the degree of global 
convergence towards an outside- shareholder model will ultimately depend on the 
nature and strength of complementarities that are particular to each national system. 
Given all the above insights the following chapter will seek to provide 
evidence of the impact of globalisation on managerial systems through the 
investigation and interpretation of recent institutional developments in German 
corporate govemance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON AN INSIDER 
MANAGERIAL MODEL: THE CASE OF GERMANY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Having identified the dynamics of isomorphism in world markets during the 
current globalisation wave this thesis will now proceed to a case study investigation 
of their impact so far on managerial governance with the main focus being on 
Germany's insider managerialism. 
After providing an analytical overview of the main institutions of German 
managerialism in sections 3.3 and 3.4, the main aim of this chapter is to assess how 
these are affected by globalisation as defined and analysed in the preceding chapters. 
It will be argued that in recent years the systemic stability and workability of the 
German model of insider-managerialism have been under threat by the new economic 
environment. Firstly, section 3.5 will follow the developments in industrial relations 
to argue that functional changes have been destabilising the traditional micro- and 
macro-level consensus between capital and labour, and that the perseverance of some 
formal labour market institutions in a slow growth macroeconomic environment has 
been contributing to high levels of unemployment. Secondly, section 3.6 will show 
that financial market globalisation has also been affecting traditional financial 
relations and has been leading to a gradual reorientation of the German financial 
system towards a more market based one. Section 3.7 will then argue that this 
1h reorientation of the financial system is associated with a series of legal changes whic 
are closely related to corporate governance and which have the effect of promoting 
the principle of shareholder supremacy in Germany by redefining some of the basic 
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legal arrangements that used to support managerial discretion. Section 3.8 will then 
assess the impact of these legal reforms on relationships between traditional 
stakeholders and follow simultaneous changes in non-legal institutional arrangements 
in which corporate governance is also embedded. It will be argued that a redefinition 
of intra- and inter-firm relations is already underway which is leading to the 
curtailment of managerial discretion. Finally, evidence will be presented that the 
concept of shareholder value with its implication of shareholder supremacy is already 
taking root in German corporate decision-making as a benchmark of performance. 
However, before embarking on the analysis of developments within the 
German system of institutions determining corporate governance, this chapter will 
begin with a brief analysis of corporate governance change in the two most influential 
outsider-managerial models of the US and the UK, where, for several reasons that 
will be identified, adaptation to globalisation with the establishment of shareholder 
supremacy as a guiding governance principle has already occurred. This exercise is 
essential for understanding the developments in German insider-managerial ism 
because of significant interactions between the two systems as globalisation 
progresses. For instance, Anglo-American institutional investors have not only 
emerged as dominant players in global financial markets but also as champions of 
shareholder supremacy, either directly or through the market for corporate control. 
Moreover, securities markets in these jurisdictions are by far the largest in terms of 
liquidity and therefore constitute major sources of corporate finance for corporations 
seeking to establish a global presence. German firms that take advantage of Anglo- 
American securities markets unavoidably subject themselves to institutional 
constraints that are not compatible with the equivalent at home. 
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3.2. ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND OUTSIDER MANAGERIAL 
MODELS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SHAREHOLDER SUPREMACY IN 
THE US AND THE UK 
For almost a century, beginning with the late I 9th century managerial 
revolution in the US, corporate practice and theory had set the shareholder supremacy 
principle aside either as irrelevant or as unfounded and undesirable. The economic 
success of managerialism legitimated managerial theory and vice versa to such an 
extent that a virtual consensus had emerged against shareholder supremacy (see 
sections 1.2 and 1.3 above). Managers were left unchallenged to pursue their growth 
objectives and continually develop their corporations' organisational capabilities by 
retaining excess cash flow rather than distributing it to shareholders. Corporate 
expansion ensured the balanced and sustainable distribution of corporate income to 
the main resource providers, including financiers and labour, with managers of large 
corporations seeking to balance diverse interests and to promote cooperative intra- 
firm relationships (Brody 1980). Although this privately established consensus broke 
down during the Great Depression, the subsequent coming of unionisation, 
government welfare programmes such as the New Deal, and renewed prosperity after 
the 1940s fostered a fairly balanced relationship between employers and employees. 
On the other hand, capitalism in the UK did not follow the same pattern as in 
the US. Characteristically, the country's largest finns were still controlled by 
founding families until well into the 1960s (Chandler 1990: 235-294). Therefore, the 
managerial corporation did not play a major role in the British economy during most 
of the 20 th century, which is perhaps reflected by the constantly mediocre economic 
performance of the country even during the post-war era in comparison to other major 
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economies. The separation of share ownership from control came relatively late with I 
an impressive merger boom during the second half of the 1960s as a response to 
changes in competition regulation and an obvious need for reorganisation to compete 
against foreign rivals who had gained access to UK markets (Channon 1973: 35). 
Thus, the capitalist consensus mentioned in sections 1.3.3 and 2.3.1 (esp. p. 146) 
above seems to have never had the opportunity to arise in British firms as the golden 
age of capitalism was already in its last years when the managerial firm begun to 
emerge in the UK. 
As a result of the events described in section 2.2 above, i. e. the global 
economic slowdown, and with the oil crises further deteriorating economic 
conditions, by the end of the 1970s expansion strategies had reached their limits. 
Rising unemployment and severe industrial disputes, such as those during the 1979 
"Winter of Discontent" in the UK, meant that change was necessary to reverse the US 
decline and the UK underperformance. This economic environment, as discussed 
earlier, proved fertile ground for the anti-managerial arguments based on 
neoclassicism and advocated by prominent American economists such as Milton 
Friedman. Thus, by the late 1970s Keynesianism had already fallen out of fashion. In 
such an enviromnent only one option was available, and that was not the 
reestablishment of the post-war international macroeconomic order with the 
imposition of capital controls. Instead, a different path was chosen which aimed for 
the creation of a model based on the economic discipline imposed by free market 
forces. The election of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US 
signified the turning point for both countries. 
As full employment policies became unsustainable they were quickly 
abandoned. Deregulation and privatisation programmes were widely pursued in order 
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to balance government budgets and promote competition for the re-establishment of 
"efficient" market discipline. Certainly, due to some differences in political 
institutional structures, reforms were more drastic in the UK than in the US'20 1 but 
nonetheless the former had a longer road to walk towards liberalisation than the latter. 
In sum, there was a shift of government policy from Keynesian objectives to the 
promotion of national firms' competitiveness as well as of locational advantages that 
would attract FDI and prevent capital flight even if those policies involved significant 
social costs. An important element of this shift was the reorientation of labour market 
regulation. Job-protection and union power were no longer regarded as efficient 
because they kept labour costs high in times of slowing demand and limited the 
, A., ability of employers to adopt flexible industrial relations arrangements. As a result of 
this direct attack on institutions affecting labour power within and without the firm 
employees' bargaining power vis-a-vis their employers was significantly curtailed. 
At the same time as the reduction of labour's power was pursued, dramatic 
changes also occurred in financial markets, which completed the transformation of 
the corporate landscape with the entrenchment of shareholder supremacy as the 
dominant principle of corporate governance practice in both the UK and the US. At 
the centre of this change has been the combination of two related events. Firstly, there 
was a dramatic growth of institutional investors as owners of listed shares, and 
secondly, there was a hostile takeover boom that peaked in the mid 1980s. 
Since the emergence of the managerial firm with dispersed share ownership, 
individuals have been the dominant type of shareholder in both the US and the UK. 
However, during the 1970s and 1980s the assets controlled by institutional investors 
such as mutual funds, pension funds, and life insurance companies saw a dramatic 
20 ' The federal structure of the US govermnent constitutes a constraint on federal authorities' policy 
implementation. See King and Wood (1999). 
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increase. Significant steps towards the privatisation of retirement funding were made 
in order to deal with the funding problems created by the type of fiscal constraints 
and demographic changes mentioned in section 2.3.1 above. Characteristically, in 
both the UK and the US generous tax incentives were provided for collective savings 
and pension funds in particular. 202 Furthennore, regulatory restrictions that existed 
during the 1960s preventing pension funds and life insurance firms from investing in 
equities were significantly relaxed. 203 
At the same time, high inflation, mainly as a result of the two consecutive oil 
crises, meant that fixed income securities like bonds provided mediocre yields that 
could not cover the needs of the institutional investors' beneficiaries. This induced 
institutions to seek higher returns in riskier assets. With the steady growth of stock 
markets the obvious solution was investment in equities and other high-risk securities. 
Most importantly, institutions invested in low-value bonds ("junk-bonds") which are 
risky but high-yield securities issued by companies lacking an established or sound 
earnings history. Moreover, with the growth of institutional assets the abolition of 
fixed commissions for securities transactions which held up trading volume became 
inevitable. The elimination of fixed commissions first in the US204 and later in the 
UK 205 dramatically increased trading volume and unleashed unprecedented amounts 
of capital into equity markets. 206 As a result, institutional investors became the largest 
202 See for example the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 in the US and 
the Social Security Act 1986 in the UK. 
203 In the UK there were no restrictions on the formation of institutions' investment portfolios. In the 
US, ERISA was amended in 1978 to permit the investment of substantial proportions of pension funds' 
and insurance companies' assets in stocks and other high-risk securities. 
204 The Securities and Exchange Commission prohibited fixed commissions on May 1,1975. This 
decision was enacted a month later by the Securities Acts Amendments 1975. 
205 The prohibition of fixed commissions by the London Stock Exchange officially came in October 
1986 as part of the financial "Big Bang". However, LSE brokers had been giving discounts to 
institutional investors since 1983 (Poser 1991: 25). 
206 For instance, the UK equity turnover in the London Stock Exchange jumped from about 160.8 
million pounds in 1986, the year fixed commissions were abolished, to 520.9 million in 1987 and has 
grown steadily since then to reach almost 2 billion in 2000. (Data: London Stock Exchange, Historical 
237 
owners of stock especially in large listed corporations with pension funds acquiring 
the lion's share. For instance, in 2000 almost half of all listed equities in the US were 
held by domestic institutions (see Table 3.1). In the UK institutional holdings peaked 
during the mid 1990s when they exceeded 61 percent in 1994 (Table 3.2. ). Since then 
there was a considerable drop in domestic institutional ownership which, however, 
can only be attributed to the increase of foreign, mainly American, institutional 
holdings. 
Table 3.1. Equities Held by Domestic Institutional Investors in the US 
Type of Investor 1950 1970 1990 1995 1999 2000 
Private pension funds 0.8 8.0 16.8 15.2 11.0 11.4 
State & local pension funds 0.0 1.2 7.6 8.0 6.9 7.6 
Life insurance companies 1.5 1.7 2.2 3.7 4.9 5.4 
Other insurance companies 1.8 1.6 2.3 1.6 1.1 1.1 
Mutual funds 2.0 4.7 6.6 12.1 17.4 18.5 
CIosed-end funds 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Bank personal trusts 0.0 10.4 5.4 2.6 1.7 1.6 
Total 7.2 28.2 41.4 43.6 43.2 45.8 
Source: NYSE (200 1). 
Table 3.2. Equities Held by Domestic Institutional Investors in the UK (Percent 
of Total) 
Type of Investor 1963 1969 1975 1981 1989 1994 1997 2000 
Insurance 10.0 12.2 15.9 20.5 18.6 21.9 23.5 21.0 
Pension Funds 16.4 9.1 16.8 26.7 30.6 27.8 22.1 17.7 
Unit Trust 1.3 2.9 4.1 3.6 5.9 6.8 6.7 1.7 
Investment Trusts 1.6 2.0 1.9 1.9 
& Other Financial 
Institutions Excl. Banks 11.3 10.1 10.5 6.8 2.7 3.3 3.9 6.7 
Total 39 34.3 47.3 57.6 59.4 61.8 58.1 48.7 
Source: Central Statistical Office (2001). 
Statistics) On the impact of institutional investors on capital markets see Davis (1996) and 
Blommenstein (1998: 46). 
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These developments have had a remarkable impact on capital markets with 
equally important spillover effects on corporate governance in both the US and the 
UK. Firstly, as stocks and bonds were placed in direct competition with each other in 
terms of yields they could offer, a general preference for higher short-term returns on 
equity was created which in turn pushed for higher dividend distributions by listed 
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corporations (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1996: 22) . As real interest rates constantly 
exceeded real growth rates (see Figure 2.7 above) shareholders had no interest in cash 
retention by firms and preferred the distribution of cash-flows and their reinvestment 
in high-yield securities (Block 1998). The pressure for higher returns on equity has 
intensified because, in contrast to individual investors who are relatively slow in 
restructuring their limited portfolios and generally follow a "buy-and-hold" pattern, 
institutional investors generate most of their income from fees and capital gains 
through trading. As a result, the institutionalisation of corporate stocks combined with 
the macroeconomic conditions led to the erosion of financial commitment (Lazonick 
1992: 456). 
The second effect has been even more dramatic. As collective investment 
instruments gave higher yields than deposits in savings banks, unprecedented 
financial market deregulation programmes were initiated in order to create a level 
playing field in the financial sector. 208 Fierce competition within deregulated financial 
markets made investments in high-risk securities a very attractive activity for banks 
as well as for other institutional investors. Thus, by the 1980s both the demand and 
207 indeed, recent empirical evidence reveals a link between institutional ownership and dividend 
payout increases; see Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002). 
208 Apart from the abolition of fixed commissions on securities transactions, deregulation programmes 
included the liberalisation of interest rates and the lifting of restrictions on the types of assets in which 
financial institutions could invest. For instance, the Garn-St. Germain Act 1982 pennitted US banks to 
hold junk-bonds. More recently, the final enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
effectively repealed the Glass-Steagal Act of 1933 and the Holding Company Act of 1956 which 
segregated commercial banking from the securities sector has epitomised financial market reform in 
the US. 
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the supply were present for the establishment of a large market for equities and junk- 
bonds. It was this market that by the early 1980s created the conditions for an 
unparalleled wave of hostile takeovers in both the UK and the US with financial 
209 institutions being the main participants (Henwood 1997) . In particular, the high 
demand for junk-bonds facilitated the financing of hostile takeover bids (leveraged 
buyouts) for even the largest corporations 210 so that in effect, what had emerged was a 
direct application of Jensen and Meckling's model. A very active market for 
corporate control had been established where firms with excess cash flows became 
targets and where acquirer firms ended up with massive amounts of debt to pay off 
after the transaction's completion. This created enormous pressures on managers to 
boost the market value of their companies by implementing downsizing or labour 
reduction strategies or a combination of both to pay off the amassed debts (Lazonick 
and O'Sullivan 2000: 18). In other words, as a result of the financial policies of the 
1970s and 1980s, at least two of the Jensenian management constraints were enacted: 
there was a increase in corporate debt which implies a reduction of discretionary cash 
flow and a higher risk of bankruptcy, and there was an increase in hostile takeovers. 
Consequently, the rise of the institutional investor and of the market for 
corporate control in the US and the UK has led to a drastic re-orientation in 
managerial motivation towards creating value for the shareholders by maximising 
current profitability even if that entails disposing of company assets. Moreover, 
where market discipline is unable to enforce outside shareholders' priorities, 
managerial compensation packages based on stock-options and other similar 
209 A major turning point, at least in the US, was the successful takeover of Electric Storage Battery by 
International Nickel Company of Canada financed by Morgan Stanley in 1974. Allegedly this changed 
the attitudes of investment bankers who until then regarded hostile takeovers as "dirty business" 
(Lipton and Panner 1993: 117). For similar attitudes that persisted in Germany until well into the 
I 990s see chapter 3 below. 
2 10 According to an SEC study junk bonds accounted for 33% of the financing in the largest tender 
offers in the US (Coffee 1986: n. I 11). See also Yago (1990) and Taggards (1988). 
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instruments have fostered a coalition between institutional investors and managers. 
Thus, during the past two decades the principle of shareholder supremacy has been 
encapsulated into the concept of "shareholder value", first introduced by American 
business consultants in the 1980s, 211 which provided the justification of corporate 
restructuring strategies based on downsizing and spin-offs. An indication of how 
significant this change in managerial motivation has been is the fact that equity 
finance eventually became negative in both the US and the UK 212 mainly as a result 
of extensive cash redistributions to shareholders in the form of share repurchases 
(Corbett and Jenkinson 1996). In addition, dividend payouts rose to unprecedented 
levels despite the decline in profits (Lazonic and O'Sullivan (2000: 22-23). These 
developments often led to allegations that the system forced managers to pursue 
short-term profit to the detriment of long-term performance (Cosh, Hughes and Singh 
1990) -a clear example of shareholder opportunism against the corporate interest as a 
balanced promotion of all stakeholder interests collectively. 
Of course such concerns about systemic short-termism would have no validity 
if the neoclassical assumptions mentioned in 1.3.2 above applied. However, as Coffee 
(1986: 104) observes, in the real world outside neoclassical models of perfect or 
efficient markets "shareholder wealth and social wealth are not synonymous. " Thus, 
the takeover boom of the 1980s led to excesses, high speculation and eventually to 
the "Black Wednesday" stock markets' crash in October 1987. Ironically, in 1990 
Drexel Burnham Lambert, the Wall Street investment bank that pioneered junk 
bonds, went bankrupt symbolising the end of an era. Moreover, the large increase in 
"' See Rappaport (1986). Major consultancy firms gradually developed their own metrics for 
shareholder value, such as Economic Value Added (EVA 
TM), Market Value Added (MVA), Cash Flow 
Return on Investment (CFROI), Total Shareholder Return (TSR), and so on. For a comparative 
overview of such metrics see Froud et aL (2000). 
212 This is also shown by the fact that while the aggregate value of shares repurchased by NYSE listed 
corporations was $1.1billion in 1975 and $6.3 billion in 1982, by 1985 it had reached $37.1billion 
(Brudney and Chirelstein 1987: 541). 
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job-losses following takeovers, which in the UK was combined with redundancies 
due to privatisations, meant that a large share of the risk of doing business was 
transferred from shareholders to employees. Meanwhile, higher rank managers who 
were supposed to be the most disadvantaged party in an active takeover market were 
protecting themselves with the introduction of high contract termination payments 
('Cgolden parachutes"). Such payments increased not only the costs of takeover bids 
but also social costs due to rising unemployment or under-employment; the manager- 
labour consensus had already broken down. 
Interestingly, these excesses combined with persistent underperformance in 
comparison to foreign competitors during the 1980s and early 1990s strengthened 
pro-managerial arguments and eventually led to the deflation of the takeover boom. 
In the US the decision of the Federal government to delegate the responsibility for 
takeover regulation to individual states allowed the enactment of "Corporate 
Constituencies Statutes" allowing incumbent company directors to balance the 
interests of shareholders with a large number of non-shareholder interests including 
those of employees, customers, suppliers and the community. 213 Moreover, the 
widespread adoption of takeover defences such as poison pills, super-majority vote 
requirements, dual-class shares, and "greenmail" by several companies often impeded 
the operation of the market for corporate control. Of course the collapse of the junk- 
bond markets in 1992 had already made the financing of takeovers more difficult. 
In the UK, although there were no such legislative responses, the concerns 
about systemic short-termism were taken seriously as they were expressed by several 
influential voices with institutional investor backing, such as the National Association 
of Pension Funds (NAPF 1990) and the Institutional Fund Managers' Association 
213 See, for instance, Fort (1995); Orts (1992); Myers (1994); Wallman (1991). Court decisions often 
complemented the statutes' effect. See for example Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 
571 A. 2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
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(Marsh 1990). These events, combined with collapses of notorious private and 
privatised corporations created a pervasive general and academic interest in corporate 
governance (Dignarn 2000). However, the widespread feeling was that the main 
problem with corporate governance had been that managers still enjoyed too much 
discretion. Excessive compensation packages, including stock options, awarded to 
executives of even underperforming companies fortified anti-managerial attitudes. 
Thus, the quest was for increased managerial accountability to shareholders as a 
panacea to corporate governance problems, a view that goes back to the Industrial 
Reorganisation Corporation of the 1970s. 214 The most important attempt to provide 
some answers came with the report of the Cadbury Committee (1992) which was set 
up with the general support of the business community. 215 Among the Committee's 
many and important recommendations were the appointment of independent non- 
executive directors, the establishment of audit and director nomination and 
remuneration committees, the re-election of directors every three years, better 
financial reporting directly to shareholders and the enhancement of the audit function 
by ensuring external auditors' independence from management. This initiative 
continued with the report of the Greenbury Committee (1995) on directors' 
remuneration until the final consolidation by the Hampel Committee (1998) of all 
recommendations into what is now the Combined Code which is appended to the 
listing requirements of the London Stock Exchange. 
However, none of these regulatory efforts have the force of law. Rather, they 
are based on a long British tradition of self-regulation (Holland 1996; Dignam 1998: 
"' The IRC was indeed keen to promote institutional investor activism to "revitallse flagging 
managements". See Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (1970: 6), cited in Channon (1973: 37). 
215 Dignam (1998) explains the business community's participation in this and other initiatives as an 
effort to prevent mandatory corporate governance regulation. For an earlier committee on corporate 
governance in the US see Riley (1994). 
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73). 216 Thus, as all these Committees stress in their reports, a lot depends on the 
support by all interested parties and most importantly institutional investors. This is 
not surprising due to the size of their shareholdings and their relative sophistication 
and larger resources in comparison to individual shareholders. In fact, many of the 
Committees' recommendations had been on the agenda of institutional investors and 
the financial community in general since the early 1980s. For example in 1980 the 
Bank of England with the support of City institutions set up PRO NED, a body 
dedicated to the promotion of the wider use of non-executive directors. Moreover, 
institutions have been campaigning for minority shareholder rights' protection by 
opposing the abolition of pre-emption rights 217 or the issuing of non-voting shares 
(Rabinowitz 1989: paras. 3-805), something that also appears in the Institutional 
Shareholder Committee's (ISC) 1991 code of practice together with other 
recommendations that resemble those of the Cadbury Committee (ISC 1991). 
Institutions have also been supporting the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
which prohibits the implementation by management of any post-bid defensive 
measures. 
This involvement of UK institutional investors in corporate governance not 
only persisted in the 1990s but has also intensified and become more direct through 
face-to-face meetings with managers in their portfolio companies in order to ensure 
that current shareholder value maximisation is pursued. This direct monitoring has 
been combined with the implementation of incentive compensation schemes for 
managers, such as stock-options, which are designed to align managerial motivation 
with the maximisation of the firm's market value. 
216 This regulatory method is a prime example of how formal institutions based on contract are 
supported by social norms and peer group pressure to ensure compliance. 
217 See Business International Money Report (1987: 146). 
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Thus, the growth of institutional investor activism has been a catalyst in the 
re-orientation of corporate governance during the 1990s. By pooling their 
shareholdings and fonning control coalitions institutions have been able to exercise 
direct control over managers and thus challenge directly the Berle and Means thesis 
of managerial unaccountability. 218 Trade associations such as the Association of 
British Insurers,, the NAPF, IFMA, umbrella organisations such as the ISC to which 
institutions belong, as well as specialised consultants like the Pensions and 
Investments Research Consultants (PIRC) have facilitated concerted action. 
According to Black and Coffee (1994) on at least three occasions between 1991 and 
1993 such a coalition undertook to remove a board of directors. In a more recent 
example, institutions exerted pressure upon the management of NatWest Bank to 
restructure the company's entire strategy to haul itself free of takeover speculation 
due to major concerns about the incumbent management's performance (Finch 1997). 
However, institutional monitoring action is not always observable since UK 
institutions prefer to exert their influence behind closed doors saving adversarial 
methods such as proxy contests and ultimately hostile-takeovers as a last resort after 
all other efforts have failed (Holland 1996: 133 et sec). 
US institutional investors have also been very active monitors of managerial 
conduct. However, their methods of corporate governance activism are generally 
more adversarial as they often resort to proxy fights and create target lists comprised 
of underperforming companies. Thus, in 1990 there were more than 120 proxy 
resolution proposals by institutions, up from 70 in 1989 and just 28 in 1988 (Taylor 
1990: 74). Regarding the outcome of such initiatives a report by Analysis Group, a 
proxy research and advisory firm, has shown that the vast majority of dissident 
"' Such claims have been put forward even before the current level of financial assets' 
institutional i sation. See Florence (1953). 
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institutions' proposals get passed (ibid. ). This type of institutional activism has been 
assisted by the fact that, apart from takeover regulation, all other important aspects of 
securities' regulation remains the responsibility of the powerful Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) which has actively pursued the involvement of 
institutions in corporate governance. For instance, in 1992 the SEC amended its proxy 
rules, 219 which had previously significantly increased the costs of co-ordinated 
activism, by abolishing reporting requirements formerly imposed on institutions for 
discussions with other shareholders on voting issues. Thus, consultancies and 
institutional investors' organisations such as the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) and the Investor Rights' Association of America (HZAA) now 
facilitate co-ordination and often issue specific guidelines on proxy voting. Another 
significant incentive for pension fund activism was provided in a ruling by the 
Department of Labor - known as the "Avon Letter" - according to which under 
ERISA the pension plan managers' fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries also applied to 
the decision to exercise the right to vote at General Meetings (US Department of 
Labor 1988). Thus, despite the retreat of the hostile-takeover as a disciplinary 
mechanism for managers and the enactment of constituency statutes, the pressure for 
current shareholder value maximisation is now more direct as a result of institutional 
investor activism. Furthermore, devices similar to those put forward by the various 
corporate governance Committees in the UK, such as independent board members 
and committees, are also present in the US either because of institutional pressure or 
because they are demanded by regulators such as the SEC. 220 
"9 SEC rules 14-a- I and 14-3 (a). 
220 For instance, the SEC has made the establishment of audit committees comprised only of 
independent directors for listed companies mandatory. See also IRC's corporate governance 
requirements (code of practice). 
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The rise of the institutional investor as a corporate monitor in the UK and the 
US has transformed corporate governance in these two countries and has signified the 
re-establishment of shareholder supremacy. It has done so not just indirectly through 
the market for corporate control, but also directly by means of the traditional channels 
of shareholder control. The pressure on managers to pursue profit maximisation and 
to redistribute excess cash flows, the main source of discretionary spending, is so 
intense that an Anglo-American model of shareholder capitalism has now emerged 
after almost a century of managerialism. However, this is not the full story as not all 
types of institutional investors have the incentives to exercise direct control. In fact, 
with the exception of some public pension funds, such as CalPERS, TIAA-CREF in 
the US and Hermes in the UK, most institutions are rather passive shareholders 
without a crisis to prompt them. 22 1 Thus, the market for corporate control, even after 
the collapse of the takeover boom of the late 1980s, has not lost its importance as a 
managerial constraint completely. The hostile takeover is still around and many non- 
activist institutions are eager to participate in such transactions and often play the role 
of arbitrageurs speculating on the stock of potential targets. But even activist 
institutions - to some extent with the help of regulators - ensure that the takeover 
option is at all times open to them, as they are obviously eager to capture takeover 
premia. In sum, it seems that now the game is played according to the "restructure or 
be taken over" rule. 
Thus, in effect most of the Jensenian constraints on managerial discretion as a 
tool for balancing stakeholder interests now appear to be operative in the UK and the 
US in a complementary manner. On the one hand, bonding devices, such as 
management stock-option plans or independent board committees, fulfil an ex ante 
22 1 For analytical accounts of US and UK institutional investor activism see Brancato (1997); Useem 
(1996); Stapledon (1996). 
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monitoring purpose. On the other, the market for corporate control through the 
hostile-takeover endures as an ex-post disciplinary force for managers. Institutional 
investors, either as activists or as traders, constitute the backbone of this system of 
controls as they play a central role both in the implementation of ex ante governance 
devices and in the market for corporate control by opposing takeover defences as well 
as by organising or supporting hostile bids. These developments occurred in the UK 
and the US long before there were any significant signs of corporate governance 
change in other countries where the managerial firm has been dominant. For instance, 
as it will be shown below, German managerialism has persisted well into the 1990s. 
What then can explain the comparatively swift response of the UK and US corporate 
govemance systems? 
Several factors, particular to these two countries, can be identified which 
facilitated reform. Firstly, the passage from an outsider managerial model to an 
outside- shareholder one is simply one step shorter; in systems with insiders as 
important players an additional step is required in order to facilitate a dilution of those 
concentrated blocks of control. As already observed, powerful insiders may seek to 
frustrate institutional changes that can affect the structure of financial claims if they 
are unwilling to surrender their controlling interests and the private rents that accrue 
from them. Where such complications do not arise, as in the case of the US and the 
UK, the shift towards an outside- shareholder system where arm's-length relationships 
are the rule involves fewer adaptation costs. 
Secondly, for historical reasons in both the UK and the US securities markets 
have been important institutions through which public funds are channelled to the 
private sector (Coffee 2001; Cheffins 2001). Particularly in the US the banking sector 
has been highly fragmented as an effect of the Glass-Steagall Act. In contrast, 
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regulation in other countries, including Germany, hindered the development of such 
markets with the effect that for over a century big business' external finance was 
almost exclusively provided by banks instead. Moreover, parallel to the early 
development of British and American stock markets was the formation of investor 
protection institutions that ensured the smooth functioning and reliability of those 
markets. Initially those institutions were of mere private character, mainly in the form 
of stock exchange self-regulation with the New York Stock Exchange and the London 
Stock Exchange being the pioneers. But gradually private sponsored regulation 
influenced the formulation of and was codified in government statutory rules 
designed to protect outside shareholders (Coffee 2001). Thus, by the 1970s British 
and American capital markets already had the liquidity, depth and institutional 
mechanisms necessary for providing the infrastructure for the market for corporate 
control as an indirect mechanism of shareholder control or for direct shareholder 
activism. 
Thirdly, despite several government attempts, industrial co-operation and 
coordination never took root in either the British or the American economy as they 
did in other countries (King and Wood 1999: 377). As already discussed, 222 in the US 
strict antitrust regulation since the early 1900s prevented any form of collusion 
between firms, either informal or formalised with exchanges of equity stakes. In 
Britain, competition rules became more restrictive only after the implementation of 
the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act of 1948, but even so cartelisation had 
never taken the form of extensive formal cooperation between firms crystallised with 
cross-shareholding arrangements. The rarity of inter-firm cooperation and cross- 
shareholdings is important because it means that industrial partners never became 
I" Supra. section 1.2. 
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insiders through the acquisition of friendly and strategic equity stakes, so that inter- 
finn relationships were largely arm's length. Thus, any informal institutional 
obstacles to a change of managers' attitudes in relation to predatory action against 
each other were rather weak and insufficient to prevent hostile takeover bidding. 
Finally, persistent underperformance in comparison to other major economies 
during the 1970s and 1980s reduced the uncertainty about what institutional change 
would bring and therefore there were fewer adaptation costs. Certainly, already 
disadvantaged groups had to bear most of those costs, mainly in the form of 
unemployment, lower incomes and worse employment conditions. However, the very 
fact that reform did take place is an indication that these groups did not have the 
collective bargaining power to prevent it. On the contrary, financial institutions and 
related interest groups were powerful enough to induce the deregulation of financial 
markets which was key event in the transformation of corporate governance in the 
UK and the US. 
3.3. HISTORIC ROOTS OF GERMAN MANAGERIALISM 
The German model of corporate governance is also a prime example of a 
system where management has, at least until recently, been significantly alienated 
from external financial forces. However, managerialism in Germany followed a 
different path from that of the US and the UK mainly because German securities 
markets did not develop as they did in the latter countries. Certainly, the lack of stock 
securities markets meant that the market for corporate control could not constitute the 
medium through which outside-shareholder objectives could be enforced through the 
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hostile takeover exit. Thus, in the absence of liquidity other more direct mechanisms 
of information flows evolved, mainly through concentrated ownership of financial 
claims and board representation. 
Moreover, securities markets" underdevelopment was also the reason for 
German banks leading role in financial markets as the main institutions through 
which savings have been channelled through to industry. A well-developed universal 
banking system -i. e. a system with no legal separation of deposit-taking and lending 
activities from underwriting, holding and trading securities- initially gave German 
banks the incentives and ability to provide the industrial sector with the enormous 
funds required during the pre-war inclustrialisation era. This led to the formation of 
close relationships between non-financial finns and universal banks, particularly the 
Big Three, i. e. Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank, who have also 
been able to acquire stock in some of their long-term corporate customers. 
Due to the central role of universal banks in Germany's financial system many 
commentators have characterised the German model of corporate governance as 
bank-based - i. e. with banks being the main controlling and disciplinary force for 
managements. However, the following section will show that this mainstream view is 
not completely accurate. As firms grew and became more self-reliant during the early 
1900s by generating their investment funds internally, their dependence on bank 
finance diminished considerably. The influence of banks in the formulation of 
corporate policies was also undermined by the high inflation crises during the inter- 
war and early post-war years, since extremely high interest rates rendered bank 
finance very unattractive compared to retained earnings (Chandler 1990: 419,495,512- 
513). Even after the post-war recovery, banks have not been able to re-establish 
themselves as major players in corporate decision-making, despite their improved 
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ability to provide investment finance, their continual involvement in the securities 
underwriting business and their remaining presence on company boards. According to 
Chandler (ibid), their role has diminished to one of facilitating co-operation among 
their corporate clients rather than controlling them. 
Inter-firm co-operation dates back to the era of the second industrial 
revolution in the beginning of the 20th century. As the German business landscape 
was increasingly dominated by large oligopolistic firms that were no longer 
entrepreneurial or family-controlled but managerial, co-operation was more 
preferable to price competition that could threaten profitability. Inter-firm contractual 
agreements and cartels became common, since not only were they not illegal but they 
were also enforceable in German courts. However, as the threat of arbitrageurs 
circumventing those arrangements could never be totally eliminated, many firms 
begun to form profit pooling associations (Interessengemeinschafte or "IGs") and 
corporate groupings (Konzerne) that were commonly accompanied by interchange of 
share blocks. During the economic downturn in the inter-war era such arrangements 
became even more common and to some extent substituted bank borrowing as a 
source of corporate finance (Chandler 1990: 512-513,590-591). Thus, by 1930 
representatives of affiliated industrial firms already outnumbered bankers on 
company boards. 
These developments have contributed to the significant alienation of German 
managers from external financial pressures, and have, thus, allowed them broad 
discretion over corporate policy. Co-operation rather than rivalry among firms and the 
managerial insulation from external financial pressures and the market for corporate 
control, that could have placed the emphasis on dividend distribution as opposed to 
cash-flow retention, became the cornerstones of German managerialism. Retained 
252 
earnings provided most of the financial capital for the investments necessary for the 
continuous growth and competitiveness of German industry. Moreover, banks, xN, ho 
provided most of the external finance, have been committed financiers that preferred 
co-operative arrangements that ensured stability and long-term profitability to 
adversarial confrontation (Wengenorth 1999: 142). For most of the 2 Oth century, 
managerial discretion has been the basis of German corporate governance as a stable 
and successful system that Chandler (1990) defines as "co-operative managerial 
capitalism". The German firm has not been regarded as solely the property of the 
shareholders, but as an organisation which exists in its own right. 
An important building block of German managerialism has also been the co- 
operative nature of intra-firm. relationships, especially between employers and 
employees (Wengenorth. 1999: 172). German managers realised early the importance 
of long-term investment in human capital for the full exploitation of technological 
and organisational opportunities. They also understood that commitment to long-term 
growth and competitiveness requires commitment to cooperation with the labour 
force. Thus, they used their control over the allocation of funds in order to not only 
continually upgrade the quality and skills of the workforce but also to reward it with 
'stability, good career prospects within the firm and satisfactory salaries. The basic 
element of and prerequisite for this co-operative arrangement has been the mutual 
commitment to it by employers and employees. This would have not materialised 
without the availability of "committed" capital, mainly retained earnings but also 
bank finance, and the insulation of management from the market for corporate control 
which could otherwise have focused managers' attention on current shareholder 
return maximisation. 
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Manadatory labour representation on company boards did not come until after 
the Second World War. However, the basis for this formal institutionalisation of 
balancing capital and labour interests was already there. The influence of the German 
Soziale Marktwirtschqfý 23 (Social Market Economy) model on managements' 
attitude and German corporate governance in general has been emphasised by a 
number of commentators. Streeck, for instance, in analysing the origins of the 
economic institutions in Germany, finds that they are the result of an 
historical compromise between liberal capitalism [ ... ] and two different 
countervailing forces, Social Democracy and Christian Democracy - as well 
as between traditionalism and two alternative versions of modernism, 
liberalism and socialism, and of course between capital and labour. (Streeck 
1995: 7-8) 
Most authors trace the initial origins of this compromise even before the First World 
War to Bismark's social policies introduced in order to silence the most radical voices 
of socialists and trade unions (Gardner 1998: 320-321; Smith 1994: 3-5 and 19; 
Wood 1997). However, the most revolutionary industrial democracy measures, such 
as the compulsory inclusion of labour representatives on the boards of large German 
companies, were implemented during the reconstruction efforts initiated after the two 
World Wars and aimed at the mobilisation of the workforce. 224 These policies played 
a crucial role in the balance of interests within and outside companies as well as in the 
evolution and success of the German post-War economic order. They 
formally 
introduced and maintained the "stakeholder" element in corporate deciSion-m ing 
that remained intact for almost half a century. 
"I Some commentators have placed particular emphasis on the influence of the Hegelian vision of a 
socially responsible free market economy as well as the concepts developed by the renowned 
Freiburg 
School. See Hegel (1942); Emmons and Schmid (1998: 22-25); Smith (1994: 16-20). 
224 it now seems ironic that board-level co-determination was envisaged and implemented for the first 
time by the British Administration in 1947, during the de-concentration and democratisation 
programme devised for Germany by the Allies. See Smith (1994: 300). 
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3.4. INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE GERMAN 
MANAGERIAL GOVERNANCE MODEL 
Given the above-described socio-economic background it is not surprising 
that the German system of corporate governance has not evolved around the stock 
market. Moreover, shareholder interests have not enjoyed the supremacy they now do 
in countries like the US and the UK. Concepts such as shareholder value and return 
on equity have not been central benchmarks in corporate decision-making. On the 
contrary the German model has been build upon long-term relations both between 
employers and employees as well as between shareholders, creditors, industrial 
partners, and the company. The fact that all these interests are represented and 
amalgamated on a typical company board, supports the characterisation of German 
corporate law and governance as managerial rather than shareholder-oriented. 
The discussion that follows will provide an analysis of German managerialism 
by assessing the nature and effect of the main institutional arrangements in which it is 
embedded and which determine corporate governance. After a brief description of the 
two-tier board, industrial relations, share-ownership and voting structure of the 
German public listed company and the macro-structure, it will be argued that for a 
number of reasons the market for corporate control has been historically inactive as a 
managerial discipline mechanism. It will then be examined whether this governance 
66 gap" has been filled by the existence of holders of large voting blocks, such as banks 
or other non-financial corporations, who could have the potential to exert control over 
management. After showing that such blockholders do not actually have the 
incentives to undertake the type of monitoring role that is often attributed to them, it 
will be argued that the discretion German managers have enjoyed has been the 
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quintessence of an efficiently workable system of complementary institutions for 
almost a century. This discretion combined with a whole set of institutional 
constraints enabled corporate controllers to pursue the corporate interest by balancing 
different stakeholder objectives. 
3.4.1. Board Structure and Composition 
The board structure of German public companies is a two-tier one, comprised 
of a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and a separate management board (Vorstand). 
This structure has its roots in the Verwaltungsrat, a body on which shareholders, 
bankers and other entrepreneurs were represented, and which was instituted for the 
first time in the 1870s by a mandatory requirement for a supervisory board separate 
from management with members appointed by the shareholders. The original reason 
behind the creation of such a body was not only to provide a mechanism for 
management control by the shareholders but also to protect the public interest because 
of fears of managerial corruption and exploitation of stakeholders. 225 From its origins 
and design therefore one can easily understand that the German two-tier structure 
constitutes a "representational" model of corporate governance, where different 
interests are expected to be present on the Aufsichtsrat as a body assigned to 
counterbalance the Vorstand's power. 
225 This board structure came as a response to a severe market crash in 1873 which set the stage not 
only for the subsequent marginalisation of the stock market but also for the dominant role of banks 
who then took over the financing of early industrial development. 
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Aufsichtsrat 
Under the German Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act ("AktG")) a stock 
corporation (AG) is obliged to have a supervisory board strictly separate from 
management. The Aufsichtsrat is responsible for the appointment and dismissal of the 
Vorstand members 
226 including the CEO as well as for their supervision 
227 
. However, 
there is a strict separation of two bodies' functions since the day-to-day management 
228 
of the company is exclusively the responsibility of the Vorstand . There are no 
specific statutory requirements as regards the length of tenures; however, they usually 
last for five years before a renewal is necessary. Aufsichtsrat members are not 
professional in the sense that they may accept mandates in several companies 
simultaneously. This operates in practice with relatively infrequent meetings, 
restricted time dedicated by the members, and limited flow of information between 
the two boards. As regards the latter, it is indicative that very often the auditor's 
report is not presented to the board until the actual meeting. Accordingly, Baums and 
Frick (1996) comment that, except in times of financial distress, in practice the 
Aufsichtsrat acts more like an advisory rather than a monitoring body. 229 Thus, it is no 
surprise that since 1976 the number of transactions requiring the supervisory board's 
approval has been decreasing (Bemeier, Mtilder and Schilling 1994: 57-60). 
Generally, the board of all German companies is comprised of a minimum of 
three and a maximum of twenty-one members with an average between nine and 
thirteen members and with only 17.43% of all Aufsichtsrate reaching the maximum 
number (Prigge 1998: 955). Board size for large companies is legally prescribed. 
226 Article 84 AktG. 
227 Article III AktG. 
228 Article 111(4)(1) AktG. 
229The depleted role of the Aufsichurat as a monitoring body has recently attracted criticism which 
eventually led to legislative intervention (see section 3.7.2 below). 
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Thus, in companies with a workforce between two and ten thousand the Aufsichtsrat 
has twelve members, in companies with a workforce between ten and twenty 
thousand the number raises to sixteen, and those companies with more than twenty 
thousand employees have twenty board members. A recent survey on the twenty-five 
largest companies in a number of European countries found that German 
Aufsichtsr1ite are by far the largest in Europe (Russell Raynolds Associates 1999). An 
explanation for this is that the board members' background is not uniform and the 
interests they represent are diverse, i. e. not only shareholder interests. A major 
contributing factor is the labour co-determination regulation which requires that a 
number of employee representatives be appointed on the Aufsichtsrat of large 
cotporations. 
230 
There are three board-level co-determination regimes in which the number of 
labour representatives varies according to the actual number of employees in the firm. 
The first is the full-parity regime. It concerns only the "Montan" coal and steel 
industries and was introduced for the first time in 1951 with the enactment of the 
Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz ("Montan Co-determination Act") which provides for 
eleven Aufsichtsrat members five of which are labour representatives and the 
eleventh member is elected by a three-fifths majority of all members. 23 1 The second is 
the one-third co-determination system which was created by the 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz ("Company Constitution Act") 1952 and applies to 
corporations with more that five hundred and under two thousand employees. It 
provides for one-third employee representation on the supervisory board. Finally, the 
230 Recently, a size reduction of Aqfsichtsrdte as part of a draft law (see section 3.7.2 below) has been 
supported by academics as well as the non-employee members but it has been fiercely and successfully 
opposed by the trade unions. On other co-determination institutions see section 3.4.2 below. 
231 it now seems ironic that this model of co-determination was envisaged and implemented for the 
first time by the British Administration in 1947, during the de-concentration and democratisation 
programme devised for Germany by the Allies (Smith 1994: 300). 
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third regime was created with the enactment of the Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976 
which extended full parity codetermination to all companies with two thousand 
employees or more. While there is not specific prescription regarding the size of the 
board under this Act labour representatives must comprise half of the Aufsichtsrat. 
Generally each board member irrespectively of his background has one vote. 
However, in case of a stalemate in a vote by the board, the chairman, who is not a 
labour representative but is nevertheless elected by a two-thirds majority of the board, 
has a casting vote. In all these co-determination regimes the ma ority of labour i 
representatives are elected by employees and the rest are trade union delegates. 
The rest of the Aufsichtsrat members are elected by the General Meeting and 
are shareholder representatives. In practice, however, it is not uncommon for these 
members to be selected by the management, especially in companies with dispersed 
ownership with no major shareholders (Hopt 1998: 250). Even though there is a legal 
requirement that the Aufsichtsrat be a body independent from management, 
independence under German law is not necessarily perceived in the same way as in 
the UK and the US. 
232 In Germany independence is merely understood as the 
prohibition for company managers to sit on the supervisory board. Thus, a recent 
study has shown that 43% of German supervisory boards include a former manager 
(Kom/Ferry International 1996). Moreover, independence may also be compromised 
by personal links that can arise from the possibility of a company's managers and 
Aufsichtsrat members sitting together on boards of other companies, a common 
practice in Germany. Prigge (1998: 957-958) also notes that the connection 
between 
supervisory boards and management is often manifested by the influence of CEOs 
"' See the discussion on non-executive directors' independence in the Cadbury and Hampel Reports 
(Cadbury Committee 1992; Hampel Committee 1996). 
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and chairmen on the selection of Aufsichtsrat members and the frequency of cases 
where retiring CEOs become chairmen. 
The relationship between management and A ufsichtsrat members 
compromises the motivation and ability of what would otherwise be shareholder 
representatives to supervise management in accordance with the interests of 
shareholders. Indeed, Hopt (1998: 233-235) finds that one of the main aspects of 
supervisory board representation, is the promotion of business networking; perhaps 
an indication of German managerialism's cooperative character. He claims that often 
appointments on the Aufsichtsrat have a relationship dimension, in the sense that they 
constitute a formalisation of relations between the company and its business partners, 
resource providers, advisers or even former managers. A good indication of this is 
that in 1996 13% of Aqfsichtsrdte have at least one retired executive from another 
company, 70% a commercial banker, 13% a government official and 96% a worker 
representative (Kom/Ferry International 1996) - the latter being required due to 
mandatory co-determination provisions. Thus, one observation that can be made, 
bearing also in mind the preceding discussion on the origins of German corporate 
governance, is that the German model of corporate structure is not designed solely to 
protect the interests of shareholders as owners. Rather, through board representation, 
it provides the mechanisms for accommodating stakeholders' diverse interests, 
including of course those of shareholders. 
Vorstand 
The Vorstand is responsible for the day-to-day management and represents the 
company in business and legal affairs. The appointment of its members is usually for 
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five-year terms and dismissals are allowed only when there is just cause. 233 Managing 
directors' remuneration is set by the Aufisichtsrat, which is perhaps one of the reasons 
why management pay in Germany has not reached the extreme levels of the U. S. or 
234 the U. K. (Prigge 1998: 966-967). 
Managing directors have a variety of duties to comply with, such as a dutý- of 
skill and care and a duty of loyalty. 235 Of central importance as regards corporate 
governance is that managing directors owe their duties to the company itself In 
marked contrast with UK law, 236 the corporate entity's interests are not identified 
solely with those of the shareholders. Accordingly, the Aktiengesetz of 1937 provided 
that management was responsible for shareholder interests as well as for the 
workforce and the public good -a view of the corporation that closely resembled 
Dodd's stakeholder model. Even though its replacement of 1965 does not make such 
a specific reference to non-shareholder interests, Hopt and many other authors believe 
that this is because the inclusion of employee and social considerations are legally 
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self-evident. Thus, the right to bring an action against the management rests with 
the Aufsichtsrat which represents the company and not the shareholders vis-a-vis the 
managers. 238 The Aufsichtsrat, however, can be forced to commence an action against 
managers by a General Meeting resolution or by a minority holding at least 10% of 
239 
the equity capital . 
113 Article 84 (3) AktG. Such a "just cause" may arise when there is a serious neglect of duty, 
withdrawal of confidence by the General Meeting on objective grounds, etc. 
234 Another reason can be that until recently stock option awards to company managers were 
prohibited; see section 3.5.3 below. 
235 For a general discussion of directors' duties in German company law see Baums (1998). 
236 See section 1.4.1 above. 
237 See Hopt (1998: 230-231,237) and references provided therein. On employee interests see also the 
discussion on co-determ i nation below. 
238 See, for example, the recent decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) of April 
21,1997, Betriebsberater 1997,1169. 
239The 
position of shareholders has now been strengthened; see section 3.5 below. 
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Nonetheless, the enforcement of director duties by the company's organs in 
the company's interests as well as the composition of the supervisory boards in co- 
determined companies, are clear reflections of corporate realism with additional 
elements from Dodd's stakeholder model since the position of shareholders vis-d-vis 
employees is balanced by board-level co-determination. In general, German company 
law allows management sufficient discretion and incentives to balance diverse 
stakeholder objectives while shareholder supremacy is not considered to be 
paramount in corporate decision-making. Accordingly, Raiser states: 
Under German law, in the public company the power of the managing board is 
rather strong, because Article 76 rules directors to guide the company under 
their own responsibility, free from any binding instructions of either 
shareholders or supervisory board. Only fundamental changes require 
approval of the shareholder meeting, and the supervisory board may exercise a 
veto in certain cases where the by-laws provide such a veto. This widely 
discretionary power of the managing board favours a bias towards managerial 
"absolutism" which sometimes can hardly be stopped. (Raiser 1992: 37). 
Thus, in contrast to the nominalist vision of the corporation where 
shareholders are the only constituency to which directors are accountable and 
therefore the company should be run in order to maximise current shareholder-value, 
German company law does not provide any such clear-cut managerial obligation. At 
least in law, German managers have the ability to channel company cash flow to 
projects and schemes that do not necessarily create value for current shareholders 
without running the risk of being removed or in breach of duty. 
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3.4.2. Works 
Internalisation 
Councils, Collective Bargaining and Labour Market 
While board-level co-determination gives German company law a managerial 
orientation from the top down, other labour market institutions are designed to 
enhance labour "voice" within and without the corporate organisation. 
Firstly, the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Company Constitution Act) of 1952 re- 
institutionalised the role of works councils, which were first introduced during the 
Weimar years in order to isolate the radical left in Germany's labour movement but 
then abolished by the Nazis (Thelen 1991: 63-71). While the underlying intentions 
behind this were to fragment labour power by cutting the link between the shopfloor 
and unions, eventually the latter managed to dominate works councils and thus 
increase their influence inside German firms (Wood 1997). 
Initially the powers of works councils were strictly defined, reflecting the 
aims of the 1952 Act. However, over the years the measure proved to be highly 
successful and accepted by employers who begun to recognise the value of consensus 
based employment relations. This was also confirmed by the Biednkopf Kommission 
(1970) established in 1970 to assess the impact of codetermination in the Montan 
industries, which found that increased labour voice within the firm had resulted to a 
peaceful compromise between employers and employees without any negative effects 
on productivity and profitability. Cooperation between management and labour was 
important for the efficient setting of wage levels without conflict and the smooth 
implementation of new technologies, e. g. by facilitating the coordination of training 
and re-skilling programmes (Backes-Gellner, Frick and Sadowski 1997). 
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These findings were thus followed by the enactment of the 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 1972 which expanded the role of works councils and 
removed any barriers between them and the unions. This law granted a right to the 
election of works councils in all plants with five permanent employees or more by a 
direct vote and for a maximum term of three years. Candidacies for Works Council 
membership have to be supported by at least 10 percent of the plant's workforce. 
According to Wood (1997), this gives the German Trade Union Federation 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) significant influence over the selection of 
candidates and therefore increases the leverage of unions within works councils. 
What is important is that, even though they represent a particular constituency within 
the firm, council members are legally bound to act for the promotion of the welfare of 
the corporation as a whole (Mtiller-Jentsch 1995). This can be explained by the broad 
spectrum of issues in which works councils are involved. More specifically, they have 
extensive codetermination rights over working hours, bonus rates, working 
conditions, employment transfers and dismissals, and information rights regarding 
personnel planning, financial matters and major strategic changes. Obviously, these 
legal rights provide an institutional framework for an enhanced micro-level 
govemance role for employees. 
Besides codetermination channels, labour voice is also influential at a macro- 
level due to the important role of unions in collective bargaining. Unionisation levels 
have traditionally been quite high in Germany and have averaged at about 40 percent 
of the total workforce during the post-war era while at the same time there is a virtual 
monopoly of interest representation due to the dominant position of DGB unions and 
the marginalisation of non-DGB ones. Collective agreements between unions and 
employers' organisations, once concluded, are legally binding to all signatories and 
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usually cover matters that do not fall within the scope of works councils ý, N-Ith the 
focus being wage determination. Generally, the law promotes the centralisation of 
industrial relations policy as its gives higher status to collective agreements than to 
codetermination arrangements unless the former expressly delegate matters to the 
latter (Hassel 1999: 486-487). However, there is no specific legislation governing 
collective bargaining which is simply guaranteed by the freedom of association 
provisions of the Grundgesetz (German Constitution) with courts having formulated a 
general code through their rulings. 
In sum, firm-level codetermination through Aufsichtsrat representation and 
works councils and macro-level collective bargaining agreements between unions and 
employers' associations complement each other as channels of labour voice in 
industrial coordination. Moreover, the linkages between the two channels, e. g. due to 
the dominant role of DGB unions in works councils, have ensured the stability of the 
system. The complex web of German industrial relations institutions has been a 
significant force behind the incentives of managers to use their discretion in order to 
balance shareholder and employee interests. The most important consequence of this 
has been that, without the fear of opportunism, employers and employees have been 
willing to invest extensively in firm-specific training as a building block of 
German 
industrial competitiveness. Empirical evidence showing that human capital related 
investment has been significantly more than in most other developed countries with 
no codetermination demonstrates this (Smith 1991: 276). Moreover, such 
firm- 
specific investment has made labour market internalisation policies 
highly significant 
in Germany. Trainee apprenticeship schemes undertaken by German companies, for 
instance, have constituted one of the major institutions in German socio-economic life 
combining both formal vocational education and on-the-job training (Smith 
1994: 
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268-273). Generally, long-term commitment in employment relationships has been 
the backbone of the German corporate organisation's success. 
3.4.3. Ownership and Voting Structure 
Given the above regarding the identity of the corporation, the inter-firm and 
employment relationships as well as the legal position of shareholders in German 
corporate governance, it would seem appropriate to examine the structure of 
shareholdings in German corporations due to the complementarities involved. This is 
not always an easy task, however, because there is a general lack of transparency 
(Becht and Boehmer (1999). Until 1995, equity stakes below 25% were not subject to 
mandatory disclosure. Recent legislation, however, implemented as part of the 
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Securities Trading Act 1994 ("WpHG'9))240 has made it 
obligatory for listed AGs to disclose equity stakes of 5% and above of outstanding 
equity. Nevertheless, difficulties in determining the ownership structure of German 
firms still exist. 
Several studies have recently emerged examining the structure and identity of 
German shareholdings. Generally, their results show that corporate ownership in 
Germany is highly concentrated and that the market for corporate control is 
dominated by large blockholders. A study conducted by Becht and Boehmer (1998). 
has shown that more than 50% of all listed firms have a single majority shareholder 
and that only 17.4% have no blockholder with a 25% stake or above. The same 
authors have also found that 85% of listed companies have at least one dominant 
240 This piece of legislation is discussed more extensively in section 3.7.1 below. 
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blockholder (Becht and Boehmer 1999). Moreover, Franks and Mayer (1992) have 
discovered that concentration in the largest 200 German companies is even higher 
since such a blockholder is present in almost 90% of them. In addition, Goergen 
(1995) documents that ownership structure tends not to fluctuate significantly over 
time and that, even after German firms list on the stock exchange, their semi-private 
ownership structure is maintained due to the strong presence of large blockholders. 
Particularly interesting is also the identity of shareholdings. Table 3.3 shows 
the identity of the largest blockholders in a sample of two hundred large firms in 
1993. In almost half (96) of them the largest blockholder is another domestic non- 
financial corporation. The second largest group is that of families with 43 largest 
blocks, followed by foreign non-financial companies (2 1), banks (16) and the German 
government (11). These figures also reflect the size of shareholdings owned by each 
shareholder type (Table 3.4). 
Table 3.3. Significance of Blockholders in German Firms 
A. Largest Blockholders in a Sample of 200 Large German Firms in 1993 
Number ot Firms 
Firms without a Blockholder 9 
Firms with a Blockholder 189 
Total 198 
Type of Largest Blockholder Number of Blocks 
Domestic Non-financial firm 96 
Foreign Non-financial firm 21 
Families (incl. Trusts) 43 
Domestic Banks 16 
Domestic Government entities II 
Domestic Insurance Company 2 
Foreign Government Entities I 
Non-profit Organisations I 
Total 200* 
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B. Largest Blocks Held by Domestic Non-financial Firms ('16 of Total Voting Stock) 
Size Number of Blocks 
0-25% 4 
25-50% 14 
50-75% 32 
75-100% 46 
Total 96 
* Two firms had blockholders of equal size 
Source: Saling Aktienfiihrer 1994,1993; Emmons and Schmid (1998), Tables 2 and 3 
Table 3.4. Ownership Structure of Domestic Shares 1984-1996 (% of nominal value) 
Year Banks Insurance Investment Non-financial Households Public Foreign 
Companies Funds Companies Sector 
1984 7.6 3.1 2.7 36.1 18.8 10.2 21.4 
1990 9.4 3.2 3.3 41.4 18.3 6.0 18.6 
1996 9.5 5.6 5.8 37.3 15.7 10.9 15.3 
Source: Prigge (1998), Table 5. 
As regards the high level of non-financial company ownership it is important 
to note that to a great extent it is explained by the high level of cross- shareholdings. 
Given the fact that the most common type of shares in Germany are bearer shares and 
taking also into account the possibilities of avoiding disclosure rules, revealing with 
accuracy the exact level and structure of cro ss- shareholdings in German firms is not 
an easy task. Nevertheless, the Deutsche Bundesbank (1997: 38) has estimated that 
cross-ownership among firms accounts for about three-quarters of all blockholdings 
controlled by the non-financial sector. Moreover, in their analysis of listed firms, 
Wegner and Kaserer (1997) found that the amount of cross-shareholdings is between 
27% and 36% of gross market capitalisation. On the other hand, as Table 3.5 shows 
the degree of cross-ownership is even higher in the banking sector. Also important is 
the link between different segments of the financial sector. For instance, in 1996 the 
insurance conglomerate Allianz and certain banks, Bayerische Hypotheken- und 
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Wechselbank, Dresdner Bank 241 and Münchener Rückversicherung, hold stakes in 
each other of between 28% and 42 % (Wegner 1996). Finally, the big banks appear to 
account for almost half of all bank holdings in all sectors (Deutsche Bundesbank 
1987: 24-33), while in 1995 Allianz and Deutsche Bank controlled 4.87% and 3.43% 
respectively of the gross stock market capitalisation in Germany (Wenger 1996). Still, 
most of the equity owned by banks is not in non-financial firms but in other financial 
institutions. 
Table 3.5. Share in Voting Rights of Five Largest Private Banks at Their Own 
General Meetings in 1992 
Deutsche Desdner Commerz Beyr. Bayr. Hypo Total 
Bank Bank bank Vereinsbank 
Deutsche Bank 32.07% 14.14% 3.03% 2.75% 2.83% 54.82% 
Dresdner Bank 4.75% 44.19% 4.75% 5.45% 5.04% 64.15% 
Commerzbank 13.43% 16.35% 18.49% 3.78% 3.65% 55.70% 
Bay. Vereinsbank 8.80% 10.28% 3.42% 32.19% 3.42% 58.11% 
Bayr. Hypo 5.90% 10.19% 5.72% 23.87% 10.74% 56.42% 
Note: Percentage of present shares, including majority-controlled bank subsidiaries and investment 
companies. 
Source: Prigge (1998), Table 18. 
Perhaps even more significant is the structure of voting rights. There, despite 
their relatively small amounts of equity in non-financials, banks, particularly the 
Grossbanken, are able to act as proxies and thus control voting majorities in many 
large firms. This is because under Article 135 AktG in order to have an exercisable 
voting right shareholders must either deposit their shares with the company or give a 
proxy to a credit institution, a professional shareholder agent or a shareholder 
association. For holders of bearer shares, who normally want to remain anonymous, 
bank proxy voting is most preferable. Table 3.6 shows the importance of proxy- 
241 In April 2001 Dresnder Bank was taken over by the insurance conglomerate Alliaz AG. 
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voting rights held by the banks which on average constituted more than 80 per cent of 
total votes present at the General Meetings of the one hundred largest firms in 1986, 
with the Big Three accounting for more than half of them (45.44 percent of total votes 
present). So it is obvious that these rights can be a very powerful corporate 
governance tool. Certainly, share depositors have a right to instruct their bank on how 
to vote in a general meeting, but in practice such instructions are rare and usually 
banks vote as they think fit. This has led some observers to regard German corporate 
governance as bank based, in that banks use their voting power to discipline 
management. However, a close analysis of the banks' role shows this view is a 
misinterpretation of German corporate governance system. This point along with the 
other governance issues arising from the structure of share ownership and voting 
rights in Germany are more extensively dealt with in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 below. 
Table 3.6. Voting Blocks of Banks at Shareholder Meetings of the Largest 100 
Firms in 1986 
Company 
and 
Ranking 
% of Shares 
Present at 
the AGM Deutsche 
Bank 
% of Shares Voted by 
Dresdner Commerz- All Big 
Bank bank Three All Banks 
I Siemens 60.64 17.84 10.74 4.14 32.52 79.83 
2 Daimler-Benz 81.02 41.80 18.78 1.07 61.66 69.34 
Mercedes- 
Holding 67.20 11.85 13.66 12.24 37.75 57.35 
3 Volkwagen 50.13 2.94 3.70 1.33 7.98 19.53 
5 Bayer 53.18 30.82 16391 6.77 54.50 95.78 
6 BASF 55.40 28.07 17.43 6.18 51.68 96.64 
7 Hoechst 57.73 14.97 16.92 31.60 63.48 98.18 
9 VEBA 50.24 19.99 23.08 5.85 47.92 98.18 
11 Thyssen 68.48 9.24 11.45 11.93 32.62 53.11 
12 Deutsche 
Bank 55.10 47.17 9.15 4.04 60.36 97.23 
13 Mannesmann 50.63 20.49 20.33 9.71 50.53 95.40 
18 MAN (GHH) 64.10 6.97 9.48 13.72 30.17 52.85 
21 Dresdner 
Bank 56.79 13-39 47.08 3.57 64.04 98.16 
27 Allianz- 
Holding 66.20 9.91 11.14 2.35 23.41 60.08 
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28 Karstadt 77.60 37.03 8.81 33.02 78.86 87.27 
29 Hoesch 45.39 15.31 15.63 16.73 47.67 92.39 
34 Commerzbank 50.50 16.30 9.92 34.58 60.81 96.77 
35 Kaufhof 66.70 6.29 13.33 37.18 56.80 98.45 
36 K16ckner- 
Werke 69.13 17.30 3.78 3.55 24.63 53.00 
37 KHD 72.40 44.22 3.82 1.50 49.54 85.29 
41 Metallgesell- 
schaft 90.55 16.42 48.85 0.35 65.62 75.95 
44 Preussag 69.58 11.15 5.60 2.59 19.34 99.68 
51 Degussa 70.94 6.86 33.03 1.89 41.79 67.09 
52 Bayr. 
Vereinsbank 62.40 11.42 2.71 3.59 17.72 68.69 
56 Continental 35.29 22.77 9.99 6.04 38.81 95.55 
57 Bayr. 
Hypobank 67.90 5.86 7.05 1.20 14.11 92.09 
59 Deutsche 
Babcock 67.13 7.58 9.67 5.29 22.54 97.01 
67 Schering 46.60 23.86 17.46 10.17 51.50 99.08 
68 Linde 52.99 22.76 15.73 21.36 59.87 90.37 
73 Ph. Holzmann 82.18 55.42 0.91 6.49 62.82 74.81 
94 Strabag 83.02 6.80 19.15 1.37 27.32 95.24 
96 Bergmann 99.12 36.89 - - 36.89 62.15 
98 Hapag-Lloyd 84.50 48.15 47.82 0.39 96.36 99.50 
On average 64.49 21.09 15.30 9.05 45.44 82.67 
Source: Gottschalk (1988). 
3.4.4. Role of Securities Markets in Corporate Control and Finance 
The theoretical analysis in section 1.3.2. above reveals that the governance 
role of the market for corporate control, that is its ability to resolve "agency" 
problems between managers and shareholders, has come under detailed academic 
scrutiny over the years. The majority of studies, however, refer to the Berle and 
Means type of company where shareholders are widely dispersed and lack the 
incentives to monitor management. As already noted, in this case Jensen's 
neoclassical agency theory argues that even where shareholders are not directly 
involved in management discipline through the General Meeting or through direct 
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contact with managers, shareholder supremacy can be enforced indirectly as 
shareholders show their discontent by selling their shares on the market. Eventually, a 
successful bid will inevitably lead to the replacement of the incumbent management 
by a more "efficient" one. However, this mechanism is subject to two conditions. 
First, the stock market must be relatively liquid because of the trade-off between 
liquidity and active shareholder monitoring (Coffee 1991). Second, it has to be 
efficient in producing the necessary information in order for shareholders to be in a 
good position to make their investment decisions. 242 
These conditions, however, do not seem to be fulfilled in the case of 
Germany. Practice supports this contention, since historically hostile-takeovers in 
Germany have been virtually non-existent, as opposed to the U. S. or the U. K. for 
instance. 243 Two types of factors have been instrumental for the absence of hostile 
takeovers and the subsequent insignificant role of the market for corporate control as 
a mechanism of aligning German managers" interests with those of current 
shareholders. 
Structural Factors - Takeover Barriers 
Prima facie it seems that, at least partially, the absence of hostile takeovers 
can be explained directly by ownership concentration. Edwards and Fischer (1994: 
192) argue that the mere existence of a 25% blockholder can put off a potential 
hostile bidder from making an offer for the target company. This is because the 
242 Certainly, the desirability of the hostile-takeover mechanism in imperfect markets is questionable. 
See sections 1.4.2 and 3.2 above. 
243 There have only been very few hostile takeover attempts in Post-War Germany. However, almost 
all of them were of minor significance apart from some recent attempts that took place within the past 
10 years and may suggest a change in German corporate governance, an issue that will be discussed in 
more detail in sections 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 below. 
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acquisition of a stake below 75% by the bidder would not be enough to remove the 
incumbent supervisory board members and pass successfully resolutions regarding 
important matters such as mergers, acquisitions and changes in the Articles of 
Association. 244 Moreover, buying a blocking minority stake may be rather costly 
because the blockholder would normally require a premium that would render the 
cost of the takeover too high, especially if the block in question is owned by a 
founding family. 
An additional takeover barrier with relation to shareholder structure is the 
high level of cross-ownership between German companies. The inter-firm 
cooperative arrangements that often led to the exchange of stock were mentioned in 
section 3.3 above. Even if not all of those cro ss- shareholdings have been used for 
management entrenchment, a large number of them have indeed been created for this 
sole purpose. A characteristic example is that of Mercedes Automobil Holding which 
held a 25% stake in Daimler-Benz and was created by the latter with the help of some 
of Daimler's main shareholders, namely Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, 
Commerzbank and Allianz Holding, for the sole purpose of preventing unwanted 
hostile-takeover attempts. 245 Because of such management entrenchment effects, 
corporate cross-ownership has attracted some fierce criticism from a number of 
academics who adhere to the shareholder supremacy principle. Wenger and Kaserer, 
for example, claim that: 
The most effective way for management to stave off capital market pressure is 
to build a network of mutual shareholdings financed with retained earnings or 
coordinated capital increases serving the sole purpose to exchange equity 
among colluding companies. (Wenger and Kaserer 1997: 21). 
244 Articles 103 and 179 AktG. 
245 See discussion in Wenger and Kaserer (1997: 7-15). 
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Consequently the possibilities of finding a potential takeover target in Germany have 
I 
historically been limited. After a detailed examination of all German listed 
companies, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1997) found a maximum of only 77 firms out 
of all those listed on the stock exchange with a free float of 50% or more. This shows 
that the ownership structure of German firms constitutes a significant hurdle for the 
n, k auilityof the stock market to exert external pressure on management. 
However, the minimal role of the German stock market and the hostile- 
takeover in corporate governance cannot be explained by the ownership structure 
alone. A number of other management entrenchment devices have been introduced 
over the years. For instance, voting caps have until recentl Y246 been quite common 
particularly where founding families wanted to retain control or in firms that felt 
threatened by the increasing foreign ownership, mainly from oil producing countries, 
during the 1970s (Gordon and Schmid 1996: 9 and n. 17). 247 Furthermore, non-voting 
preference shares as well as shares with transferability restrictions (Vinkulierung) 248 
have also been common types of publicly traded stock. (Becht and Boehmer 1999). 
Multiple voting rights have generally been prohibited subject to the exception that 
state authorities could grant their approval for the use of this type of shares when 
249 
deemed necessary to protect the overriding interest of the economy as a whole . 
Another very significant takeover barrier with regard to voting arises from the 
ability of German banks to act as custodians of shares and proxy-holders. As already 
mentioned, the voting power of banks in General Meetings of large German firms is 
substantial. However, their attitude towards management has usually been supportive 
246 New legislation has now abolished voting caps in German companies; see section 3.7.2 below. 
247 See also Baums (1993: 156). 
248 Some German companies have issued nominative shares that are registered in their stock ledger 
together with the name and details of their owners. Articles 67 para. 1 and 68 para. 2 AktG allow the 
insertion of a clause in the Articles of Association making the transfer of such shares subject to 
approval by the company in question. 
249 Article 12 para. 2 AktG ; see section 3.7.2 below. 
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so that not only would they not damage their reputation among their corporate clients, 
but also so that they would protect their investments as risk averse creditors. Indeed, 
the introduction of restrictions on voting rights has usually been supported by the 
banks, while hostile takeovers have been opposed . 
250 For instance, the involvement of 
Deutsche Bank was instrumental in the implementation of a 5% voting cap during 
two respective hostile takeover bids for Feldmiihle Nobel AG by Veba AG and the 
Flick family in 1988 (Franks and Mayer 1998: 1389). Mercedes Automobil Holding 
is also an illustration of how banks have been helping corporate managers protect 
themselves from outside shareholder pressures. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
banks' proxy-voting function has constituted a significant mechanism of managerial 
insulation from outside financial pressures over the years rather, than a disciplinary 
mechanism against managers. 
Finally, another structural impediment to hostile takeovers arises from the 
corporate board structure itself More specifically, the labour representatives on a co- 
determined Aufsichtsrat will normally be fierce opponents to hostile bids because of 
the risks involved for the workforce in such transactions. Moreover, Roe (1999) 
argues that control of half Aufsichtsrat seats by employees undermines diffused 
ownership because in such a case the bargaining position of shareholders' vis-a-vis 
employees would be inferior. 
According to Roe, a consequence of this capital-labour clash is that the 1976 
extension of codetermination has led to the degeneration of the monitoring functions 
of the Au ichtsrat, mainly through reductions of information flows and of decisions ffs 
requiring its approval. This board is a body whose quality and constructive influence 
is particularly valuable for dispersed owners of stock who do not have the necessary 
150 See Goodhart (1988) on the policy of banks not to participate in hostile bids mainly due to 
reputation reasons among their large corporate customers. On the role of banks as blockholders of 
votes see section 3.4.5 below. 
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information to exercise control and thus entrust the Aufsichtsrat members with the 
function management discipline. Therefore, due to the lack of the necessary internal 
controls that a strong Aufsichtsrat could provide, shareholders in Germany need to 
acquire large and therefore costly equity stakes in order to ensure they have the 
necessary influence to protect their investment. 
Deficient Outside Shareholder Protection 
At this stage it is useful to distinguish between two types of shareholders. The 
first is the committed inside shareholder who makes a large and therefore firm- 
specific investment in the company and who has the incentive to engage in active 
monitoring of management, and the second is the shareholder who lacks monitoring 
incentives and prefers to remain an uncommitted "outsider". If one general 
observation can be made from what is described so far it is that the German system 
has evolved in such a way that it encourages the former type of shareholder and 
discourages the latter. This "systemic" bias against the latter type of shareholder is 
also manifested by and reflected on the deficient investor protection regime when it 
comes to minority shareholder rights and disclosure. 
Firstly, a minority investor in a German company faces a real and significant 
risk of wealth appropriation by insider blockholders or banks who may use their 
proxy votes for this goal . 
25 1 Edwards and Weichenrieder (1999) provide empirical 
evidence for this appropriation of private benefits by the largest shareholders in 
German companies which nonetheless diminishes as the equity held by the second 
largest shareholder increases. However, the ability of large blockholders to acquire 
25 1 For an analysis see Schmidt, Drukarczyk and Honold (1997: 77-93). 
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private enefits to the detriment of minority shareholders is more pronounced xith 
regard to changes of control. This is particularly attributed to the lack of effective 
takeover regulation in Germany. 
252 
The traditional approach of takeover regulation in Germany follows the path 
of ex-post protection of minority shareholders, that is, within the merged entity, rather 
than the ex-ante protection, i. e. before the takeover transaction is complete . 
253 It is 
widely believed that this form of regulation does not provide a minority shareholder 
sufficient protection. Thus, the dilution of minority shareholdings by controlling 
majority shareholders has been both possible and common in German takeovers. This 
is because tender offers to minorities, when they occur, are usually at a discount. 
Wegner and Hecker (1995) have found that in 45 cases between 1983 and 1992 such 
offers were 27.1% below the market price. Similarly, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
(1997) show that in three out of four cases in their sample discounts ranged from 15% 
to 64%. 
In addition, the absence of effective insider trading regulation, at least until 
recently, 254 has also acted as a deterrent for outside investors. Although in 1970 the 
Voluntary Insider Trading Guidelines were adopted, their voluntary character and the 
lack of specific criminal or even civil sanctions as well as of an effective enforcement 
mechanism rendered them ineffective and insider trading a common and even 
accepted practice. For instance, Standen (1995: 198) reports a case where in 1986 a 
member of the AEG AG Aufsichtsrat purchased 700 shares in the company just 
before it was made publicly known that the company would be acquired by Daimler- 
252 The "Guiding Principles" of 1979 merely constituted some non-binding recommendations. 
Regarding the recently introduced regulatory measures see section 3.7.4 below. 
253 Article 311 ff. AktG. The most important rule of ex-ante protection is the requirement for a 
mandatory offer to all shareholders once certain thresholds (e. g. 30% of share-capital) are met. See 
Baums (1996) and Schmidt et al. (1997: 77-93). 
254 it was as late as on July 8,1994 that the passage of the Second Financial Markets Promotion Law 
(Fin anzmarkif6rderungsgesetz) rendered insider trading a criminal offence. See section 3.7.1 below. 
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Benz AG. After an investigation by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the board of 
inquiry characterised the event as a "minor infraction" and found that there was no 
infringement of the rules. 
As regards disclosure, it was stated above that it is often difficult to identify 
the exact ownership structure in terms of ultimate control of German corporations. 
This means that an "outside" shareholder faces increased uncertainty and therefore 
higher risk due to the possibility that an ultimate controlling blockholder or coalition 
of blockholders can have the ability to extract private benefits. Thus, he will try to 
balance this risk by downgrading the shares' target price and as a result increase the 
cost of equity finance for the company. Obviously, the higher the level of information 
provided in the market about ownership is, the lower the costs of raising equity and 
securitised finance in general. 
In this respect, German accounting standards (German GAAP) have not been 
designed on the basis that they should provide the highest possible level of 
information and transparency that is required for outside-shareholder protection. On 
the contrary, they are thought to be manager- and creditor- rather than shareholder- 
oriented (Baetge and Thielete 1998; Schmidt 1998). This is because they allow 
extensive discretion to managers to undervalue company assets (usually land and 
shares) and overvalue liabilities and thus create significant hidden reserves which are 
often used to smooth earnings in less profitable years. The accumulation of hidden 
reserves is clearly not in the interests of outside investors as it distorts the accurate 
picture of investment risks for them. 255 However, it suits creditor banks, because the 
existence of such funds minimises the risk of loan default. It also suits managers 
because the cushion of hidden reserves reduces the risk of bankruptcy. And, of 
255 Nonetheless, it can also be in the shareholders' interest to undervalue the company's assets because 
of the so-called "Conformity principle" which links statutory and tax accounting. See Schmidt (1998: 
745-746). 
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course, it suits labour because hidden reserves can be used to avert redundancies and 
other wage-related cost-cuttings during adverse financial circumstances. In general, it 
would be fair to say that the German GAAP are less informative and less detailed 
than the International Accounting Standards (IAS) or the US GAAP and therefore of 
more limited value for the outside investor. 
All the factors described here have reflected and contributed to the relatively 
low liquidity in the German stock market in comparison to the UK or the US. 
256 
Almost all stock trades with immediate corporate control significance have been in 
the form of large blocks. For a large blockholder, the sale of its equity stake on the 
public market does not seem to be an attractive option, since it would normally be at a 
discount due to the actual size of the block; the sale of a large stake on the market is 
bound to create a downward pressure to the share price. Therefore, the choice of 
selling it as a whole in a "semi-private" manner though negotiations with potential 
buyers is more preferable. But, even when ownership is dispersed, banks can 
accumulate voting control through proxy voting and thus lead to the same result that 
concentrated share-ownership has. 
An additional factor of great significance for the liquidity of German listed 
stocks has until recently been the high capital gains tax imposed on stock trades. 
257 A 
rate levied as high as 50% on capital gains resulting from trading acts as a significant 
hurdle to stock market liquidity. Many shareholders, even if they were prepared to 
divest their holdings in German corporations, would in fact be prevented from doing 
so because of the prohibitive tax rate that would be imposed on their proceeds. Thus, 
unless the tax burden could be significantly overcome due to some other economic or 
256 See further below. 
257 This tax has now been abolished. See section 3.8.1 below. 
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strategic reasons, holding stakes that do not bring the equity returns that investment in 
other companies could give has been the normal choice for German shareholders. 
This, nevertheless, does not mean that the market for corporate control in 
Germany is completely inactive. On the contrary, there is convincing empirical 
evidence that large equity-block trades, which are not always friendly, do occur. 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1997) have identified 17 such trades and hostile stake 
buildings and 139 firms that could become targets for such activity. However, they 
distinguish such transactions from the Anglo-American takeover where management 
turnover is the classic outcome, because the buyer's motive can merely be to gain 
influence or co-operation rather than acquiring majority control in the target firm. It is 
indicative that from the seventeen identified cases only two involved a complete 
dismissal of incumbent management. The main argument in this discussion, therefore, 
is that for the above reasons the hostile-takeover has not had a significant role as 
disciplinary mechanism for German managers. 
Corporate Finance 
From the discussion above it is not surprising that the German stock market 
has remained largely underdeveloped in comparison to other developed economies. 
Sufficient liquidity and outside-shareholder protection, the two main prerequisites for 
stock market growth, have not been present in Germany. Ljungqvist's finding that 
German initial public offerings' (lPOs) post-issue performance is negatively related 
to the degree of ownership that is retained by the original owners is indicative of the 
effects insufficient investor protection may have in raising equity costs and, as a 
result, in reducing the incentives for German corporations to use securitised finance 
280 
(Ljungqvist 1996). 258 It is not surprising therefore that the capital market has never 
played an important role in German corporate finance. 
There are eight stock exchanges in Germany with the Frankfurter 
Wertpapierb5rse being by far the largest and most important of them with 
approximately 75% of total turnover of transactions. Nevertheless, the total market 
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP has been very low (31,4% in 1997) in 
comparison to most other major economies (Figure 3.1). The number of listed 
companies has also been very small. At the end of 1997, there were merely 700 listed 
AGs out of a total of over 3,000 in Germany, when the respective numbers of listings 
on the London and the New York Stock Exchanges were 2,046 and 2,271 (Figure 
3.2). 
Figure 3.1. Stock Market Capitalisation as a Percentage of GDP in Major 
Economies 1997 
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Source: Deutsche Aktieninstitut (1998), Graph 05-2-a. 
258 See also Bessler, Kaen and Sherman (1998). However, see Goergen (1998) to the contrary. 
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Figure 3.2. Listed Industrial Corporations in Five Major Exchanges in 1997. 
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Source: Deutsche Aktieninstitut (1998), Graph 02-2-a. 
Figure 3.3 shows that the largest percentage of corporate finance for German 
corporations is generated internally in the form of retained earnings. Although this is 
not a distinctive characteristic for Germany, the use of internal funds by German 
companies has been above average (Mayer and Alexander 1990; Corbett 1996). 
Figure 3.3. Corporate Financial Structure 
(Percent of Total Financial Resources, Annual Averages 1984-1992) 
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Source: OECD (1995), Figure 23. 
As regards external finance, issues of equity have not been as significant as in other 
economies like the UK. The same can be said about securitised debt in the form of 
bonds and can be explained by similar factors as those that have hampered the 
development of the stock market, i. e. information asymmetries between inside and 
outside investors. On the contrary, the percentage of intermediated debt, i. e. bank 
borrowing, as part of external finance has been high constituting the second most 
important source of corporate finance (Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7. Patterns of External Gross Financing by Instrument 
Instruments 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-96 70-96 
USA (% of Physical Investment) 
Internal Finance 71 82 83 93 103 89 
Bank Loans 64 61 64 75 62 65 
Non-bank Fin. Inst. Loans 15 19 19 26 36 25 
Bonds 39 38 37 55 62 49 
Commercial Paper 4 4 7 11 15 9 
New Equity n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 15* 
Germany ( % of Ph ysical Investment) 
Internal Finance 77 96 94 98 83 88 
Bank Loans 62 74 76 76 75 73 
Insurance Companies' Loans 10 11 10 10 8 9 
Bonds 75 5 7 8 7 
New Equity 33 3 4 5 3 
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Japan (% of Physical Investment) 
Internal Finance 50 72 71 76 75 70 Bank Loans 102 152 152 161 172 152 
Public Financial Institutions' Loans 9 16 16 20 29 20 
Bonds 8 14 12 12 20 14 Commercial Paper 0 0 0 9 11 6 New Equity 4 4 4 7 2 4 
* Available data for the period 1988 -1995 only. Crude estimates on the basis of levels outstanding range from around 20% in the early 1970s to approximately 10% in the mid -1990s. Source: Hackethal and Schmidt (2000), Table VI. 
Thus, even though there seems to be some controversy 259 regarding financing pattems 
in Germany and the significance of different sources of finance for corporate 
investment, it would be a safe assumption to regard securitised finance (i. e., equities 
and bonds) as of minor importance for German corporations. Tax advantages for 
intermediated debt finance, particularly due to high securities transfer taxes, may also 
provide an explanation for the low level of corporate finance securitisation (Edwards 
and Weichenrieder 1999: 20). Moreover, unlike US banks, most German banks have 
not faced any significant regulatory restrictions regarding their geographical and 
services expansion. 260 This allowed them to grow into large all-purpose financial 
institutions that could provide more financial capital than their counterpart in some 
other countries, and therefore an alternative source of industrial finance to securities. 
Nevertheless, this argument does not undermine the significance of all the factors 
analysed in the preceding discussion explaining the underdevelopment of German 
securities markets. 
In sum, securities markets have not had a significant role in corporate finance 
or governance in Gennany. Hostile takeovers have not played a constraining role in 
"9 See Mayer (1988), Corbett and Jenkinson (1997) and Hackethal and Schmidt (2000). 
2" The US Glass-Steagal Act prevented US banks from expanding beyond their states and maintained 
a strict separation of the deposit and loan operations of banks from the securities business. Such 
restrictions have not been present in Germany's universal banking system. 
284 
managerial decision-making since the position of outside-shareholders has been too 
weak to exert any pressure through the market for corporate control. This raises the 
issue whether shareholder supremacy is enforced directly through shareholder 
64 voice". This has indeed been a common suggestion by many observers who argue 
that large blockholders and banks are the key players in corporate control and 
therefore they constitute an "alternative" to the market for corporate control 
mechanism of aligning the interests of management with those of shareholders. This 
hypothesis will be investigated and refuted next. 
3.4.5. Types of Blockholders and Corporate Governance 
In terms of influence the significance of blockholdings is analogous to the size 
of the block. Thus, a block of at least 25% carries with it veto powers for significant 
company decisions such as charter amendments, supervisory board changes as well as 
profit- and control-transfer agreements. In firms with otherwise dispersed ownership 
such a stake should normally have even greater influence. A block of at least 50% 
plus one share gives majority control and therefore control over management subject 
to the existence of a blocking minority with a 25% stake. A block of 75% and over 
means that the blockholder has absolute control over all company activities apart 
from preventing a 10% minority to bring a corporate action against management. 
261 
Consequently, the role of blockholders may be of large significance for corporate 
governance in Germany. 
16 1 Recent legislation has reduced this threshold to 5%. See discussion on KonTraG in section 3.7.2 
below. 
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Certainly, one possible outcome of concentrated ownership is that the 
shareholder-manager "agency" problems that arise in firins with dispersed ownership 
may become irrelevant. Blockholders, due to the size of their stakes in the company, 
may have the incentives to control management because the costs of free-riding may 
be higher than monitoring costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). As noted in section 1.4.2 
above, the larger the stake, the more firm-specific the shareholder's investment and, 
therefore, the higher his incentive to establish the necessary institutional mechanisms 
to safeguard it. However, one needs to be cautious before reaching such a conclusion 
automatically. This is because the possibility of such monitoring can depend on the 
identity of the blockholders. In the case of German firms this particular point is also 
emphasised by Edwards and Fischer: 
It is not obvious that the existence of a large shareholder -one with a holding 
of 25% or more - will result in sufficient monitoring of the management of 
the AG to ensure that it acts in the interests of the suppliers of equity finance 
when the large shareholder in question is another AG with widely-dispersed 
share ownership. In such a case it cannot be assumed that the managers of the 
latter AG will necessarily use the large shareholding in the former AG in the 
interests of suppliers of equity, since these managers may themselves not be 
subject to monitoring and control. (Edwards and Fischer 1994: 187) 
Accordingly, Edwards and Fischer rely on the evidence produced by Schrey6gg and 
SI. teinmann (1981) in their study of a sample of 300 non-financial firms which has 
shown that about 50% of them were manager-controlled and therefore could not be 
presumed to have sufficient incentives to monitor other firms in which they owned 
equity. As manager-controlled were assumed to be those firms that are controlled by 
other AGs with dispersed ownership (about 10% in the sample). Thus, Edwards and 
Fischer (1994: 189) claim that, even though the number of companies with dispersed 
ownership is rather small, such firms are usually large, owning significant equity 
stakes in many other companies and, as a result, create agency problems between 
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shareholder and managers. This latter claim is enforced by the emPirical evidence 
provided in a study by Bayhurst, Fay and Schrey6gg (1994) who find that firm size is 
positively related to control by management. 
It is not surprising therefore that the degree of influence of different 
blockholder types in corporate governance and performance has become the subject 
matter of extensive discussion. Recent empirical evidence provided by Edwards and 
Weichenrieder (1999) shows that the existence of some blockholder types, such as 
individuals or families, banks and foreign firms, has a positive impact on the 
company's market value and that the benefits of close monitoring for minority 
shareholders outweigh the costs of private benefit extraction by blockholders. 
However, other types of blockholders, more specifically, non-bank companies and 
public sector bodies have a negative effect. Edwards and Weichenrieder explain this 
by the fact that managers of such blockholder entities lack the necessary incentives to 
monitor because the market value of the companies they invest in is not tied to their 
wealth. This constitutes strong evidence for the validity of the presumption that cross- 
shareholdings are a significant management insulation device against the pressures of 
the stock market. In conjunction with the high level of corporate ownership by non- 
bank finns as opposed to individuals and banks, Edwards and Weichenrieder's 
findings also suggest that the issue of aligmnent (or rather the lack of it) between 
outside shareholders' and managers' interests in Germany may not be irrelevant after 
all. 
This last finding leads to the examination of the role of banks in German 
corporate governance. As already mentioned universal banks are not only the main 
providers of external corporate finance, but are also allowed to hold equity as well as 
to control proxy-votes. Allegedly, this gives them great powers and influence with 
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regard to corporate control particularly as there are bank representatives sitting on 
German company boards. The mainstream view therefore is that, despite being 
manager controlled institutions themselves, 262 due to this two-fold relationship with 
their borrowers banks are actually able and willing to commit themselves to corporate 
monitoring and, as a result, mitigate any shareholder-manager agency problems 
arising from the separation of ownership and control. This form of relationship 
banking intemalises capital markets and thus reduces the costs of information 
asymmetries that exist in external capital markets due to deficient disclosure and 
transparency. That is, firms with a relationship-bank (Hausbank) have a relatively 
easy access to intermediated finance in the form of bank loans, as opposed to market 
finance, and also enjoy the long-term commitment of their creditors even in situations 
of financial distress (Elston and Albach 1995; Elsas and Krahnen 1998). The structure 
of German corporate finance seems to support these presumptions. 
Nonetheless, banks have also been accused of using their voting power to 
further their interests as creditors rather than as shareholders and, thus, hold back 
corporate performance in current shareholder value creation instead of improving it 
(Wenger and Kaserer 1997; Edwards and Fischer 1994: 214 et sec. ). Firstly, banks 
may lack the incentives to enhance current profit maximization (shareholder value) 
because it carries no direct financial benefits for them as creditors. Additionally, in 
order for Hausbanken to commit themselves to a long-term relationship with a 
customer firm, they should expect to receive adequate returns in the form of private 
gains such as customer loyalty and rent extraction. 263 Accordingly, two studies have 
shown that two-thirds of short- and medium-term loans are collateralised and that for 
262 According to Bayhurst, Fay and Schrey6gg (1994) 100% of banks are manager-controlled. 
263 For example there is empirical evidence showing that Hausbanken tend to require more collateral 
from their debtors in order to increase their bargaining power and exclusivity as creditors; see Elsas 
and Krahnen ( 1999). Private gains for banks may also come as a result of insider trading see Standen 
(1995). 
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long-term loans the degree of collateralisation can be even higher (Drukarczyk, Duttle 
and Rieger 1985; Drukarczyk 1993). This means that banks may lack the incentives 
to actively engage in corporate monitoring, especially in the case of large firms who 
have the ability to diversify their borrowing by having many creditor banks. 
The above presumptions have led the long-standing debate on the impact of 
universal banking and relationship-lending on corporate performance. Nevertheless, 
the empirical evidence on this matter is anything but conclusive. The first empirical 
study was conducted by Cable (1985) who found that in his sample, comprised of the 
100 largest German companies in 1974, ownership concentration and bank voting 
power were positively related to firm performance. However, two subsequent studies 
by Edwards and Fischer (1994: 221-226) and Gordon and Schmid (1996) have 
disputed Cable's results due to some flaws in his methodology and find no significant 
connection between bank involvement and corporate performance. Edwards and 
Fischer, in particular, interpret Cable's findings more as evidence of a positive 
relation between performance and ownership concentration rather than monitoring by 
banks. Nibler (1995), on the other hand, finds a significant negative relation between 
bank influence and corporate performance. Moreover, Edwards and Fischer's (1994: 
198 et sec. ) study shows no significant connection between banks' proxy-voting 
rights and the appointment of bank representatives on the Aufsichtsrat, which may 
mean that banks are not using their voting power to monitor management. 
This does 
not appear to be the case, however, when banks are also shareholders, since 
ownership of shares is Positively related to Aufsichtsrat representation (Franks and 
Mayer 1997). Nevertheless, it has already been shown above that banks' 
shareholdings in non-financial companies are relatively small. Thus, even 
if there is a 
link between bank shareholdings and managerial accountability, it is bound to be of 
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minimal practical importance. Additionally, Gerum, Steinmann and Fees (1988) 
claim that banks' Aufsichtsrat representation is rather insignificant in terms of 
influence, firstly, because even if all bank representatives acted in concert they would 
still be a small minority against other shareholder representativeS264 , and, secondly, 
because they would still have to rely on management-controlled inside information. 
This is illustrated by the case of Karstadt AG where two of the Groftanken could not 
remove the CEO, even though they held a 20% stake between them in the company 
265 
and were also represented on the Aufsichtsrat. 
Thus, if one conclusion can be drawn from the empirical evidence available so 
far, it should be that the mainstream view about the corporate control role of German 
universal banks seems to be somewhat misplaced. There is no clear connection 
between control rights owned by banks and shareholder value maximisation. 
However, the explanation for this may simply be that banks do not intervene unless 
there is clear evidence of a crisis, such as an insolvency situation. This point has been 
emphasized by Hackethal and Tyrell (1998) who argue that the strong creditor 
orientation in German insolvency law gives banks, at least theoretically, the 
incentives to involve themselves in corporate rescue operations and reorganisations. 
This of course could give a competitive advantage to firms with a Hausbank vis-a-vis 
those without and therefore positively affect performance in the long-run. 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence does not provide any clear support for such an 
assumption. Rent extraction and conflicts of interest between banks and shareholders 
may be the explanation for this. Indeed, private benefit acquisition as a result of a 
reorganisation may constitute the main incentive for bank involvement. Thus, the role 
of Hausbanken may simply be to "sell" liquidity insurance rather than maximize 
... In 1979 bank representatives occupied 16.4% of shareholder seats and 8.2% of all Aufsichtsrat seats 
in AGs with 2,000 employees and over. See Gerum et al. (1988). 
265 Figures reported by Andr6 (1998: 146). 
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corporate perfon-nance, however that is measured, through continuous monitoring. 
For large and established firms, however, the value of Hausbank relationships should 
be lower than it is for smaller ones, because the risk of insolvency for such firms is 
smaller. Empirical support for this contention can be found in Harhoff and K6rting's 
(1998) study of firm-bank relationships where it is shown that smaller firms tend to 
rely more heavily on exclusive lending relationships than larger ones. More 
significantly, Edwards and Fischer (1994: 142) find that in the case of large listed 
firms competition amongst creditors is higher and a Hausbank is "seen as the first 
among equals in a group rather than a monopoly supplier of financial services". This 
means that, even where there are no alternative external sources of capital to bank 
finance, banks' leverage over management is much less than some observers would 
like to believe. Thus, as the synthesis of the empirical evidence in this and the 
previous section has demonstrated, banks should be seen more as manager-controlled 
organisations who are willing to provide support to their industrial clients and co- 
members of the German big business network rather than as their watchdogs and 
champions of current shareholder value maximisation. 
3.4.6. Macroeconomic and Competition Policy 
In the managerial models presented in chapter I above effective demand 
conditions were projected as a vital element that complements the microeconomic 
structure. What makes Germany particularly interesting, however, is that, while its 
basic corporate governance structure as described above is clearly managerial, 
contrary to "textbook" Keynesianism the role of government agencies in macro- 
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management has been less significant than one would normally anticipate. In fact., 
demand targeting has not been a central feature of German macropolicy-making 
during the post-war era as it has in other countries. A general aversion to excessive 
statism due to the experiences of the totalitarian Nazi rule and the Allied occupation 
gave rise to a preference for a self-regulating private sector within the general 
framework of the Sozialmarktwirtschaft (Allen 1989). The powerful and independent 
Bundesbank was more concerned about inflation rather than full employment and so 
it followed a tight monetary policy with a focus on keeping money supply stable. 
However, it is misleading to assume that, since demand management has not 
been a fundamental goal for the federal government, German managerialism could 
operate in a demand-constrained environment. Firstly, the very essence of the 
Sozialmarktwirtschaft has been a well-developed social welfare system which 
benefited working classes and tempered the effects of joblessness. 266 Secondly, while 
unemployment in the immediate post-war years was high, gradually high annual GDP 
growth rates until the late 1960s not only increased employment but also raised 
wages. The role of codetermination and collective bargaining institutions has been 
instrumental in this as they provided the basis for the setting of wages at appropriate 
levels linked to overall productivity. Thirdly, government spending on infrastructure, 
education and business subsidies has been generous and contributed greatly to the 
reconstruction and competitiveness of industry (Smith 1994: 117-118) - Marshall 
Plan assistance has been highly significant too in this respect. Fourthly, managerial 
discretion combined with other fiscal measures gave the private sector the incentive 
to plough profits back into production, as the financial system encouraged savings 
which were channelled to industry mainly through banks (Allen 1989). Last but not 
266 For a detailed overview of the evolution and main features of the German welfare system see Smith 
(1994: ch-5). 
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least, great emphasis was placed by the authorities on export-led growth, in that 
Germany promoted and relied on the post-war liberalised regime of international 
trade under GATT and later the EU in order to tap effective demand in the US and 
other European countries for its products so that current account and trade surpluses 
were the norm. 
In sum, while textbook Keynesianism tends to concentrate on external 
government intervention in the market mechanism in order to temper its destabilising 
effects, the German system has provided a framework facilitating coordination from 
within the private sector (Allen 1989). Hence, ftill -employment and demand targeting 
by monetary authorities did not become popular simply because it was not necessary. 
On the contrary, due to the expansionary tendencies of the managerial microstructure 
the independent Bundesbank and its restrictive policies were important constraints 
balancing the economic forces within the system. Thus, high industrial investment 
and growth, wealth redistribution through a complex system of fiscal, labour and 
welfare institutions of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft, and a combination of domestic 
and foreign effective demand led the German economy to a Kaldorian virtuous circle 
of cumulative causation for most of the post-war era. 
Complementary to this type of coordination of the German economy has also 
been competition policy which has generally allowed cooperation between firms. 
Indeed, cartelisation and market concentration in vital industries had been widespread 
during the first half of the 20th century as successive Gennan govermuents were 
sceptical about the detrimental effects of excessive competition (Smith 1994: ch. 8). 
Even after the legislative programmes of clecartelisation and cleconcentration 
implemented by the Allies after World War II, competition law enforcement was lax 
in accordance with the a rather dubious notion called "workable competition" that 
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was developed during the early 1960s (Hoffmann and Schaub 1983: 105). Price 
competition was not seen as a central goal of competition policy and this was 
reflected in the Gesetz gegen Wettbewrbsbeschrdnkungen 1957 (Law Against 
Restraints of Competition (GWB)) which protected resale price maintenance; this did 
not change until 1973. Similarly, until the 1973 amendments to the GWB came into 
force, merger control was virtually non-existent and did not prevent inter-firm 
cooperation and the development of extensive cross-shareholdings. According to 
Smith (1994: 426), even after 1973 few mergers have been prohibited by German 
competition authorities. Subsequent amendments during the 1980s and 1990s have 
widened the scope of the GWB and combined with parallel developments in EU 
merger contro 267 have established a more restrictive competition environment, but 
they came too late to prevent concentration in German industries (ibid: 430). It is not 
surprising therefore that German industrial strength has not been built on price 
competitiveness in world markets, but on the superiority of German products in terms 
of quality. As Wengenroth (1999) explains the leitmotif of German manufacturing 
has traditionally been "competition abroad-cooperation at home". 
3.4.7. The German Managerial Model as a Workable System of Complementary 
Institutions 
Despite some ambiguities that may still exist regarding the role of different 
types of blockholders, it is sufficiently clear that a simple analysis of corporate 
control in terms of managerial accountability to shareholders cannot provide an 
267 For an analysis of see Galanis (1996). 
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accurate assessment of German corporate governance. The preceding discussion in 
this section has shown that German corporate governance has not been based on the 
idea that managers act solely in the interests of shareholders. Deficient disclosure and 
minority shareholder protection rules as well as codetermination provisions have been 
a reflection of the fact that shareholder interests do not enjoy the absolute supremacy 
that a neoclassical economic model would assume. 
As the shareholdings' analysis shows, the most common blockholders, 
especially in larger firms, are other non-financial companies whose wealth is not 
necessarily tied to equity value. Moreover, banks, despite their strong presence in 
financial markets and in General Meetings as custodians of proxy-votes, do not seem 
to have been exercising the corporate control role that has often been attributed to 
them. Their role has been more as a shield against stock market pressures and as 
liquidity insurance providers rather than as management monitors. The argument 
presented here therefore is that the German model of corporate governance is not 
bank-based, as it is often assumed, but managerial. As neither shareholders, either 
directly or through the market for corporate control, nor banks as proxy-vote 
custodians seem to be able or willing to enforce shareholder supremacy, managers in 
large German corporations are able to pursue their policies with relative 
independence from shareholder pressures. At the same time, the interests of other 
constituencies, especially employees and affiliated companies, are also very 
important so that the interests of no particular stakeholder are paramount in corporate 
decision-making and that a notion of long-term commitment exists between the 
company and its various resource providers. 
This would not have been possible without the systemic aversion to arm's 
length relationships and the insignificance of the market for corporate control as a 
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disciplinary mechanism for management. Entrenchment devices have enabled 
German managers to deviate from a pure current shareholder-value orientation that 
could render stakeholder interests subjugated by the profit maximisation objective. In 
such a system shareholders can maximise the returns on their investments only if they 
become committed insiders. Banks can also receive private benefits from their 
corporate clients only when they commit themselves as long-term financial capital 
providers. In other words, the institutional framework encourages firm-specific 
investment which is the basis of insider dominance in German corporate governance. 
Most importantly, the fact that financial capital in Germany has been "patient" 
with a long-tenn orientation is of great significance for the sustainability of stable 
employment relations because patient capital enables employers to invest in 
workforce training and retraining instead of seeking to hire or replace existing 
employees with new ones from external labour markets, who would not have 
sufficient firm-specific knowledge. If managers were subjected to capital market 
pressures and focused only on maximizing returns for outside uncommitted 
shareholders such investments with long-term maturity would not be easily 
sustainable. The internalisation of labour markets has led to high wage levels and 
relatively inflexible labour relations that discourage drastic cost-cuttings and 
encourage investment in the refinement of existing products. It is this ability to 
generate trust and commitment among different corporate resource providers that has 
been the driving force behind the Gennan model's success. As Mayer (1996) argues, 
the element of commitment is crucial for productive activities, such as complex 
manufacturing processes, that require involvement and investment by a large number 
of stakeholders. It is not surprising therefore the German corporate champions come 
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almost exclusively from the manufacturing sector (e. g. high-precision electrical 
machinery, industrial chemicals and road vehicles). 
At the same time, competition policy encouraging inter-firm cooperation has 
been crucial for the German system's workability. As Streeck (1995) claims, the 
German model's success has not been based on its ability to withstand pnce 
competition or on fast product turnover. Stakeholder commitment cannot 
accommodate this easily. On the contrary, German industry has established its 
leadership because of its ability to "evade" price competition by relying on product 
quality and innovation instead. This dedication to quality improvement would not 
have been possible without the continuous improvement of firm-specific labour skills 
which, as already explained, is dependent on the availability of patient capital. This 
shows how important the workability of complementary subsystems is for the 
stability and success of the German model. Hand in hand with this, by following a 
pattern of export-led growth, German industry has relied on the competitiveness of its 
products abroad and on global demand conditions. So long as those remained high, 
German managerialism was able to sustain its high investment-high growth levels. 
Thus, the German model of corporate governance has been based on the 
workable complementarity of its institutional components as described above. The 
interaction between underdeveloped capital markets, corporate ownership 
concentration, co-determination provisions and collective bargaining, and the role of 
universal banks has provided the foundations for a workable system which performed 
extremely well for most of the post-war era and has achieved and maintained a high 
level of social welfare and cohesion (Schmidt 1997). While managers have enjoyed 
considerable discretion vis-a-vis shareholders as a corporate constituency, the set of 
institutional constraints and incentives in the three major sub-systems - the financial 
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system, the industrial relations system and the macroeconomic structure - have 
ensured that managerial autonomy was used for the efficient balancing of stakeholder 
objectives, i. e. the promotion of the interests of the company as a real entity. 
However, as the theoretical analysis in chapter 2 above demonstrated, 
institutional complementarity also implies that a change in one or more of its 
component subsystems may cause the destabilisation of the system as a whole. The 
discussion in the following sections will show that as a result of globalisation, the 
long-term commitment between major company stakeholders described so far is 
being subjected to increasing pressure to reform and that the first signs of change are 
already visible. 
3.5. GLOBALISATION, COMPETITIVENESS AND COMMITMENT IN 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Given its strengths in promoting social stability and cohesion together with 
economic success, one possibility could be that the German model of corporate 
governance could be exported as it is through the process of global isomorphism. 
However, this is unlikely for two reasons. First, the German model derives from and 
has been designed for the particular needs of a domestic market. The complementary 
institutions described above emerged from a complex combination of arrangements 
and concessions among institutional actors in specific historical circumstances that 
are particular to Germany. It may be difficult, if not impossible, 
for these 
circumstances to be reproduced in full outside the German socio-economic 
environment. Second, global markets have been evolving in such a manner that they 
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undermine the sustainability of managerial systems. As the analysis in chapter 2 
above demonstrated it would be unrealistic to think that a balance among institutional 
actors, such as that sustaining German managerialism, could be reached at least in the 
foreseeable future, due to the nature of forces in the current globalisation wave which 
are not conducive to managerialism. 
As a result, the German model's ability to adapt to the pressures of the 
emerging global economic order must be seriously questioned as problems are 
already visible with potentially severe destabilizing effects. 268 The nature of 
competition in global markets now makes fast product turnover and flexibility of 
business and industrial relations more necessary than in the past. As a result, the 
balancing of high labour costs with the advantage of high quality products has 
become more difficult to achieve and therefore cost-cutting in the form workforce 
reductions and/or the option of moving low-skill jobs to low labour-cost countries 
have become more attractive. 
The first signs of a systemic crisis in Germany begun to appear in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The dramatic increase of unemployment has been the most 
important due to its direct relation to the workability of the German model. As 
O'Sullivan (1998) reports, by 1983 about 40% of the jobs in the consumer electronics 
industry that existed during the 1970s had been lost. Obviously, the German model 
was beginning to face a competitiveness crisis. Streeck (1995) claims that this 
phenomenon could be attributed to labour market rigidities, high labour costs in a 
slow growth environment, and deficient product innovation, the latter a result of 
decreasing profits. The emergence of foreign competitors, such as the Japanese or 
268 Apart from the pressures arising from globalisation, the reunification of Germany may have also 
been a factor contributing to the destabilisation of the German economic model. However, the signs of 
systemic change away from the traditional path were already present prior to 1989. If anything, 
reunification simply exacerbated the pressures that German capitalism was already faced with since the 
1970s. 
299 
later the Koreans and other "Asian Tigers", who were able to produce high quality 
products faster and more cheaply, meant that German producers could no longer rely 
on their quality competitiveness to outweigh higher production costs. The 
intensification of global competition begun to challenge directly the superionty of 
German manufacturers in traditional industries, such as iron and steel, coalmining, 
shipbuilding, consumer electronics, and motor vehicles (Esser and Fach 1989: 240; 
Bosch 1990: 54). In other words, German firms were beginning to lose their export 
markets to foreign rivals, an issue with direct impact on the system's viability. 
Indeed, by the late 1980s and early 1990s Germany's share of total world exports was 
in decline and a current account deficit appeared for the first time (see Table 3.8). 
Table 3.8. Trade and Export Performance of Germany 
Trade in Visible Exports Trade Current Account 
Goods and % of Total Balance Balance % 
and Services World Exports" % of GDP of GDP 
% of GDP* 
1988 54.9 12.0 6.5 4.0 
1994 51.0 10.1 2.7 -1.1 
Note: 1988 West Germany, 1994 unified Gen-nany. 
Trade data calculated on a balance of payments basis. 
Exports calculated on an international transactions basis. 
Source: Streeck (1995), Table 1. 
A way out for German industry could have been provided by placing more 
emphasis on product development and turnover in order to meet the standards of 
foreign rivals. However, the institutional arrangements in the German model do not 
encourage such an approach, because commitment to long-established relationships 
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between resource providers, especially between employers and employees, does not 
allow sufficient flexibility. Accordingly Herringel claims: 
Each time a new product or a new technology is introduced -as opposed to an 
old one that is customized for a customer- the various roles that each of the 
categories of skill and management will play in the production and development of the new product must be bargained out. [ ... ] Few producers. large or small, have had success up until now in being able to overcome the 
opposition of entrenched groupings of skilled workers threatened with the loss 
of status through incorporation into teams that deny the boundaries of former 
jurisdictional specializations or of independent departments, reluctant to have 
their functional areas of power within the firms redefined and diluted through 
recomposition with other areas. It is difficult, after all, to tell workers and 
managers who with considerable legitimacy understand themselves as having 
contributed significantly to the traditional success of high quality 
manufacturing in Germany that their roles have become obstacles to 
adjustment. (Herringel 1996: 42-43) 
Thus, due to such path dependence problems, the general inability of German 
companies to restructure their basic organizational methods by adopting techniques 
such as lean production, and exploit new business opportunities in high technology 
sectors also affected their chances of reversing the decline in profitability and 
investment rates. The very strengths of traditional organisational arrangements in 
Germany which in the past contributed to the creation of accumulated organizational 
knowledge now seem to have become impediments to the development of high 
technology industries which are more dependent on entrepreneurial rather than 
organizational skills (Block 1998). 
At the same time, a constrained government could not fill the investment gap 
by increasing public spending. Thus, in 1993 Germany entered its worst and longest 
recession in the post-war era which was followed by slow growth during the rest of 
the 1990s and still rising unemployment. 
During the 1980s, German companies had been able to smooth the pressures 
from global competition by taking advantage of the European Community's 
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protectionist measures against non-Community exporters which were already in place 
since 1977 (Tsoukalis and Strauss 1987) and by resorting to reductions in working 
time, leisure allowances, retirement and hiring-freeze policies. However, in the early 
nineties such actions had already reached their limits. 269 Thus, German employers 
begun to abandon their commitment to stable employment relations by resorting to 
mass dismissals. According to an estimate by the Kiel Institute of World Economy, as 
much as 1.3 million jobs accounting for 15 percent of Germany's manufacturing 
employment was lost between 1991 and 1996 (cited in New York Times 1996), while 
the current number of unemployed is well above the important threshold of 4 million. 
Rising unemployment and job insecurity have indeed been direct blows to the Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft and thus the German model as a whole. Just as German traditional 
industries were losing ground in global export markets, high unemployment 
aggravated aggregate demand conditions further and made the sustainability of high 
cost-high output managerialism even more questionable. As Figure 3.4 shows while 
reunification gave an initial boost to domestic demand conditions in 1990, the effect 
was only temporary and overcapacity levels continued to increase and remained high 
during the 1990s. 
119 it must be noted here that the reunification shock exacerbated even further the effects of the crisis. 
This does not mean, however, that it was the only factor that led to the economic slump in Germany 
since, as it was mentioned above, ibid, the symptoms of the recession were visible even before 1989. 
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Figure 3.4. Domestic and Foreign Demand Conditions in West Germany 
(Percentage Points Contribution to GDP Growth) 
I MTotal domestic demand 13 Foreign balance 
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Source: OECD (1993), Diagram 4. 
However, as national boundaries have become less significant for economic 
activity and mobility of production factors more intense with the post-war free trade 
and investment agreements, German employers have become less dependent on their 
domestic high-cost workforce and general institutional framework. Thus, low labour- 
cost locations, especially in the post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, have 
become more attractive for the allocation of production plants by German companies. 
For instance, countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary which 
are close enough for just-in-time production and can also offer labour skills similar to 
those in Germany but at a much lower cost, have become particularly attractive 
production locations for low and semi-skilled operations (Streeck 1995). 
Accordingly, the scientific advisory board to the Ministry of Economic Affairs in its 
analysis of "long-term unemployment" has commended: 
Sustained unemployment is above all a concomitant of increasing competition 
in a rapidly-integrating world economy. [ ... 
] Germany as a location (Standort 
Deutschland) competes internationally with its institutional framework and its 
factor cost for mobile capital that creates new jobs. Those countries that fall 
short in competition have to face unemployment, a declining propensity to 
invest and lower growth rates. (Bundesregierung 1993) 
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Thus, the problem of unemployment must be considered also in relation to the option 
of transferring labour intensive production abroad which trade liberalisation has 
opened up for German employers who have been keen in the past decade to take it 
rather than follow the traditional route of investing in production innovation (Welge 
and Holtbrtigge 1997: 337). The rising gap between inward and outward FDI flows in 
favour of the latter is indicative of the production globalisation strategies undertaken 
since the late 1980s (Figure 3.5). This is also reflected in the increasing significance 
of employment in foreign affiliates as a percentage of total employment (Table 3.9). 
While much of German FDI outflows are demand driven since they are directed 
towards other developed economies in order to secure export markets, the 
significance of cost-driven FDI cannot be ignored. In a 1996 poll among 7000 firms, 
mainly from the industrial sector, 62 percent of those industrial companies who 
intended to expand their production abroad identified high domestic labour costs as 
their main motive (Deutsches Institut für Herrenmode 1996). 
Figure 3.5. German Inward and Outward FDI Flows 1980-1998. 
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Source: UNCTAD (1999), Annex Table B4. 
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For instance, Veba, RWE and Thyssen, three of the largest domestic 
conglomerates in Germany, in the 1990-1997 period changed dramatically the ratio of 
their domestic to international employment in favour of the latter (Bendt 1998: 41). It 
is worth noting that for Veba and RWE, in particular, this was combined with the first 
workforce reduction in their entire history. Siemens has also followed a similar trend 
by reducing its employees in Germany from 203,000 in 1996 to 194,000 in 1998 and 
increasing its international workforce from 176,000 to 222,000 in the same period 
(Siemens AG 1998: 57). And while German firms' investments abroad accelerate, 
foreign firms seem unwilling to offset these outflows by investing in German factors 
due to high wage and non-wage labour costs and prefer locations such as Portugal and 
the UK where the relative costs are comparatively lower. As rising unemployment 
can only have a negative effect on domestic demand, it can give rise to a vicious 
circle of economic slowdown and thus encourage further cost-driven FDI and so on. 
Table 3.9. Significance of Employment in Foreign Affiliates of Manufacturing 
Firms (Thousands of Employees and Percentage of Total Workforce) 
Germany 
1985 638.0 6.6% 
1996 1058.0 13.0% 
Japan 
1985 78.1 0.6% 
1995 163.1 1.2% 
Source: UNCTAD (1999), Annex Table A. 1.7. 
United Kingdom 
1985 677.1 13.7% 
1992 784.2 18.2% 
United States 
1985 1455.2 7.0% 
1996 2213.6 10.8% 
This "rationalization" process in Gennan industry has resulted in a clear shift in 
stakeholder priorities as profit generation and competitiveness are becoming 
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antagonistic to employment stability, the backbone for the German model and its past 
successes (Economist 1998: 63). The exit opportunities that globalisation creates go 
against the German governance model since their effect is to neutralise and 
undermine the institutions upon which the intra- and extra-firm consensus between 
capital and labour was based. 
Given these pressures what has the institutional response within the German 
industrial relations system been? A close look at the developments since the 1980s 
reveals a somewhat mixed picture. The first reformist attack on codetermination 
institutions was attempted by the coalition led by the Christilch Demokratische Union 
(CDU) - CDU being the traditional ally of employer interests against the union 
sponsored the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD) - that came into power 
in 1982 and aimed at the weakening of works councils' influence by containing the 
dominant role exercised by the DGB within them and by establishing potentially rival 
firm-level bodies representing middle management. These legislative proposals gave 
rise to a fierce and prolonged debate among stakeholder representatives and their 
political counterparts. 270 The length and the intensity of this debate could only be 
expected due to the large stakes involved and therefore the high adaptation costs most 
of which would have to be borne by the labour's side. Not surprisingly, due to major 
concessions that had to be made to gain the support of several interested parties over 
the four years of the political contest, the initial proposal was significantly modified. 
What is startling, however, is the ultimate course that negotiations took. According to 
Wood (1997), employers' fears that as a result of the reforms the intra-firm consensus 
could break down with severe economic consequences, e. g. by blocking employees' 
incentives to adapt to technological changes, led them to finally resist an attack on 
270 See Wood (1997) for an analytical overview of the events surrounding the debate. 
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codetermination even if ideally they would have preferred it to be a voluntary 
institution. Thus, once the mandatory codetermination provisions were to remain 
intact, employers preferred the maintenance of existing workable institutional 
arrangements; despite its disadvantages, as they perceived them, they recognised the 
superiority of a workable system over an unworkable one. Thus, the final version of 
the law which was eventually passed in 1988 was so different from the initial 
legislative proposal that it barely had any effect on the spirit and function of 
codetermination or the role of the unions in it. 
Path dependence in the development of codetermination, however, does not 
stop at legislative institutional inertia. Recent legislative developments show that 
interest groups supporting the current orientation of the formal institutional 
framework in German industrial relations is still powerful. Following strong union 
pressure and the recommendations of a report by Kommission Mitbestimmung (1998) 
set up in 1996 by the Bertelsmann and Hans B6ckler Foundations, the SPD 
government that came into power in 1997 initiated negotiations for actually 
strengthening the role of works councils. This time the government succeeded in 
passing a new Works Constitution Reform Act (BetrVerf-Reformgesetz) which came 
into effect on July 2,2001. Among other things, this new piece of legislation has 
made possible the formation of inter-group works councils (e. g. a joint works council 
for several plants or a regional works council for separate parts of a company), has 
increased the number of councillors, has included temporary employees and 
teleworkers in the works council constitution and has strengthened the participation 
and co-determination rights, particularly with regard to qualification decisions and 
job security (Addison et al. 2002). 
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The new Works Councils legislation should be considered as a great victory 
for labour. in Germany because it comes as aformal response to significant functional 
changes in industrial relations that have been going on since the 1980s as employers 
have been trying to reduce their wage and non-wage labour costs. According to 
Hassel (1999), during the past twenty years both firm-level codetermination and 
macro-level collective bargaining have been losing ground in terms of employee 
coverage. For instance, by 1997 only 14.4 per cent of West German and 12.3 percent 
of East German plants were covered by a valid collective agreement and a works 
council, whereas as much as 29.5 and 46 percent of plants respectively had neither 
(ibid: 487). Thus the coverage of private sector employees by works councils has 
shrunk from 52.4 percent in 1981 to 41.6 percent in 1994 (ibid: 488). 
Simultaneously, there has been a decentralisation tendency in collective bargaining 
which is indicated by the fact that the number of legally binding agreements has been 
increasing; the corresponding figures between 1990 and 1997 are from 2100 to 3300 
in the west and from 2700 to 5000 in the east (ibid: 493). Withdrawals of employers 
from their representative associations and therefore from centralised collective 
bargaining have also been on the increase, since membership has dropped from 57.5 
percent in 1980 to 42.8 percent in 1993. Similarly, unionisation has also been in 
decline due to the increase of part-time workers, the rising share of employment in 
services as opposed to traditional industries and) of course, due to high 
unemployment. It is indicative that faced with financial problems and apprehending 
their waning power most unions in the services sector decided to merge into what is 
now the Vereinigte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, a super union with more than 3 
million members (Prevezanos 2001). 
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Generally, it seems that formal and functional changes in German industrial 
relations have become antithetical. While legal change is highly path dependent and 
leads to the fortification of codetermination provisions that were already in place, 
functional changes move in the opposite direction. The effect of this process is that as 
the intensity of codetermination increases, its incidence and therefore the number of 
those who benefit from it seem to be in decline. Moreover, even with the new 
amendments to the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, recent difficulties in reaching 
agreements on wage increases through collective bargaining and the increasingly 
adversarial nature of negotiations show that the macro-level consensus cannot be 
taken as a given. A series of strikes during May and June 2002 affecting Gennany's 
most influential industries and companies like DaimlerChrysler (Williamson 2002) is 
evidence that cracks are beginning to appear in the German industrial relations 
system. Even the construction industry did not remain unaffected, as building workers 
went on strike for the first time since World War 11 demanding higher wage increases, 
despite the severe hits the sector has received in recent years which led to the 
spectacular collapse of Holtzmann. 271 As unemployment rises and remains at record 
levels - 4.2 million in October 2002 - the pressures on German industrial relations 
can only intensify while at the same time a split within labour seems to emerge 
between those with a job demanding better protection or higher salaries and those 
without a job seeking changes that will create employment. Adaptation costs will 
eventually need to be borne by someone; either by those possessing low skills and 
have to stay out of work for long periods of time and those in work but who do not 
fall within the scope of codetermination, or by those who are covered by 
codetermination and therefore have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. 
See BBC (2002). On Holtzmann's collapse see section 3.8.1 below. 
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The former group are affected by functional change, the latter would be affected by 
non-path dependent formal change. 
In the light of these findings, the rigidity of statutory institutions cannot be 
objectively regarded anything more than a Peirian victory for labour as a whole. It 
should be seen as an illustration of a system which selects inefficient inertia instead of 
inefficient change. Either way, in a globalisation process (large) employers are in a 
better position to adapt than are employees because they are able to relocate 
production wherever it is more suitable to them. Still, so long as unemployment 
remains high as a result of such relocation, it is doubtful whether legal inertia will 
continue to characterise German industrial relations, since a point may be reached 
where unemployed labour refuses to bear the lion's share of adaptation costs. In other 
words, lower or more divergent wage rates may become more preferable to 
unemployment, especially now that the government is required to reduce welfare 
spending due to the mounting budget deficits occurring recently. 272 
3.6. GLOBALISATION, MONETARY POLICY AND THE PRESSURES FOR 
FINANCIAL MARKET REFORM 
Apart from the challenges with regard to long-e stabli shed organisational and 
production-related institutions, Germany has also been facing pressures in its 
financial system as a result of financial globalisation. The German economy, being 
one of the largest in the developed world as well as one that is highly integrated into 
272 Germany's budget deficit is poised to breach the 3 percent EU Stabilility Pact threshold for the first 
time since its inception. See http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hilbusiness/233447 Lstin. 
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the international trade regime, could not remain unaffected by the globalisation of 
financial markets. 
Despite any Keynesian concerns about capital movements, post-war Germany 
has generally not used fully the discretion that the Bretton Woods system allowed for 
the imposition of capital controls and has been one of the first countries to liberalise 
its capital markets, mainly because of its typical current account surpluses. For 
example, many capital movement restrictions - e. g. on FDI and on purchases of 
foreign securities - were largely lifted by the end of the 1950s and interest rates were 
liberalised as early as 1967. Relatively small inflows of foreign capital allowed the 
Bundesbank to keep money supply and inflation under control. 
However, as current account surpluses continued, during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s capital inflows largely due to speculation about the Deutsch Mark's (DM) 
revaluation intensified and Germany was faced with the dilemma of either hurting its 
export industries by revaluing its currency or imposing capital controls (Goodman 
and Pauly 1993). Initially, the authorities tried to tackle the problem with the 
imposition of controls some of which, as Smith (1994: 366-367) claims, remained in 
place until as late as the mid 1980s preventing the complete globalisation of the 
German economy. Most importantly, a 25% coupon tax on non-residents' income 
from bonds introduced in 1965 was not abolished until 1984. Moreover, non-residents 
were not allowed to issue DM denominated bonds unless the lead manager was a 
German bank and the actual issue took place in Germany. However, as speculative 
flows into Germany continued to grow, necessitating two consecutive revaluations, in 
1973 the govemment was forced to float the DM. 
While the currency's floatation temporarily eased the tensions, the increasing 
role of the DM in the world economy, not least due to Germany's large surpluses, led 
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to the deregulation and globalisation of German financial markets (Goodman and 
Pauly 1993: 62-63). Capital controls were abolished in 1981 in response to short- 
lived deficits after the second oil shock, but when the current account showed a 
surplus again in 1982 the liberal policies were not reversed. On the contrary, as the 
globalisation of the German economy continued, the pressures for further 
liberalisation intensified. The vast development of the Eurobond markets in the early 
1980s became a direct challenge for German monetary authorities, since a large 
market for German bonds was created that was outside their control. For example, by 
the late 1980s virtually all German government bond transactions took place in 
London, Luxembourg and Paris (Deeg and Ltitz 1998). In order to keep their 
business, German banks established subsidiaries in those less regulated markets from 
where they conducted those activities that were not permitted in Germany (Smith 
1994 368). For instance, in 1984 Deutsche Bank who dominated the German capital 
market moved all its capital market operations to London thus giving a clear signal to 
policy makers that something had to be done to prevent large financial institutions' 
exit (Goodman and Pauly 1993: 64). 
As a result of these developments, the only choice the Bundesbank and the 
government were left with was to continue the deregulation of financial markets in 
order to bring German bond transactions and financial business in general back under 
their control. Thus, since April 1984 foreign banks were gradually allowed to 
underwrite DM Eurobonds, the requirements that all bond issues should be governed 
by German law and listed on a German stock exchange were abolished, restrictions 
on different types of bonds were lifted and the restrictive tax regime for securities was 
reversed. Consequently, financial liberalisation made issues of DM Eurobonds more 
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attractive and less costly and contributed to the development of Germany as an 
international bond market and a financial centre in general. 
The liberalisation and growth of the German bond markets could not leave the 
stock market unaffected because of the increased liquidity that emerged. Moreover, 
tax disincentives as well as minimum reserve requirements for equity issues were 
gradually removed. Thus, irrespectively of the aforementioned institutional factors 
explaining the minimal significance of the stock market in Germany, since the late 
1980s there has been a stock market boom as a result of financial liberalisation and 
the increasing liquidity in capital markets. Moreover, the introduction of the Euro is 
also bound to have a positive effect on the development of the stock markets in the 
Eurozone. For instance, about E370 billion were expected to move from the bond 
markets into stocks in 1999 (Finanzplatz e. V. 1999). It is reasonable to assume that a 
substantial amount of these funds went to Frankfurt as the major financial centre 
within the Eurozone. 
Stimulants for further develoPment of the stock market have also originated 
from the increased capital needs of German companies. Global competition has 
resulted in an increased need for capital. The economic downturn of the 1990s 
anything but facilitated the ability of German firms to draw sufficient 
finance in the 
domestic market. As Waller observes: 
Germany's traditional capital account surplus has swung into a deficit and 
companies are realizing that they will be competing with the cash-hungry state 
for capital throughout the 1990s. (Waller 1993: 11) 
Thus, large German companies could not continue to rely merely on domestic 
capital markets in their struggle to compete in the global marketplace 
because, as they 
pursued their globalisation strategies with FDI and gross border M&A, their 
financial 
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needs had begun to outgrow the potential of German capital markets - neither banks 
nor the domestic securities markets were able to meet the increased demand of large 
corporations for capital. Lack of transparency and information weaknesses, high 
transaction costs as well as the unavailability of risk-management financial products 
prevented sufficient entry of global investors who could provide the necessary 
liquidity in the German stock market. In this regard financial liberalisation created 
new financing opportunities for large firms since it enabled them to tap foreign 
markets with larger investor bases. Thus, as Deeg and Uitz (1998) report, already in 
1990 the most liquid Gen-nan stocks' trading in London was equal to about 13% of 
their turnover in Germany. 
The clear implication from this is that, since the liberalisation of capital 
controls, German stock exchanges have been facing direct competition from abroad 
with which they have been unable to cope so long as the traditional institutions 
responsible for their underdevelopment remained in place. For example, in 1989 the 
Chairman of the International Stock Exchange in London proposed the creation of a 
pan-European equity market based in the City (Story 1997: 257,265). This intensified 
the pressures for reform in Germany. The largest German exchanges realised the need 
for financial change and, thus, began to implement development programmes. In 
1990, in an effort for modernisation and expansion, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
was turned into an AG which in 1993 became the core subsidiary of Deutsche Mrse 
AG, the holding company for all German exchanges. This provided the basis for 
major efforts to promote securities markets as a source of corporate finance in 
Germany and the emergence of the Finanzplatz Deutschland ("Germany as a 
Financial Centre") concept which was formally announced with a package of reforms 
in 1992 by the then finance minister Waigel. (Financial Times 1992). Fierce 
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competition, not only between different European financial centres, but also between 
cities and regions within Germany, for the allocation of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) was also another pressure factor for financial "modernisation". The final bid 
for Frankfurt would have been unsustainable without developed and transparent 
securities markets in place. 
However, it was not only German securities markets that were affected as a 
result of financial globalisation and liberalisation. The ability of large German firms 
to draw funds from foreign financial markets meant that banks had been losing their 
big business customers. This is something they could not afford due to the increased 
competition by foreign banks and the decreasing profits from the loan business. 273 
Moreover, because of their increased investment banking needs, non-financial 
companies preferred foreign investment banks to their traditional domestic financial 
partners who lacked sufficient expertise (Fischer 1997; Harris 1998: 5). In response, 
and fearing that they were becoming laggards in the global financial markets, German 
banks begun to acquire foreign investment banks especially in London and New 
York. For instance, Deutsche Bank acquired the UK firm Morgan Grenfell in 1992 
and the New York investment banking house Bankers Trust in 1998, whereas 
Dresdner Bank bought Kleinwort Benson in London. Thus, German bankers, 
especially the Grossbanken, became some of the most committed proponents of stock 
market modernisation as they realised that investment banking was essential to their 
survival both domestically and abroad due to the increased returns involved compared 
to the deposit and loan business (Moran 1989). 
In June 1989, November 1994 and April 1998 the First, Second and Third 
Finanzmarktfdrderungsgesetze (Financial Markets Promotion Laws) were passed 
273 The recession and the increased capital reserve requirements for banks imposed by the Basle 
Accord were major factors constraining the ability of banks to finance "big business". Declining profit 
margins due to increased competition in financial markets were also instumental. 
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with the objective of enhancing the attractiveness of Germany as a place for 
conducting financial business. The first law intended to promote the development of a 
new futures market in Germany, the DTB, which started operating in January 1990. 
The creation of such a market had the dual effect of enabling investors to hedge 
against risks in the equity market and therefore facilitate investment in stocks. The 
second IaW274 was the long-waited implementation of the EEC Large Holdings and 
Insider Dealing Directives. This measure tightened disclosure requirements and 
prohibited insider trading which in 1994 became a criminal offence. The Third 
Financial Market Promotion LaW275 among other things implemented important 
amendments to the stock market and securities trading legislation as well as the law 
governing investment companies ("KAGGs") and venture capital firrns ("UBGs"). 
Another important development was the introduction of a new market segment, the 
Neuer Markt, at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 1997 for small and medium sized 
innovative companies, thus making access to equity finance for such firms easier. All 
these measures were intended to promote market finance and investment in equities 
by increasing the scope, transparency and confidence in the quality of the stock 
market and, thus, improve the competitiveness of German financial markets as part of 
the Finanzplatz Deutschland project. 
Despite these regulatory reforms, changing the German investment culture 
was not an easy task. During the post-war period the German public had a general 
aversion to risky investments, mainly as a result of past monetary instability 
experiences, which was conductive to a preference for fixed-income securities. 
However, the bullish stock market during the 1990s made investment in equities more 
attractive and helped to increase the flow of funds into stocks. Private investors began 
274 See analysis in section 3.7.1 below. 
275 For comments on the draft law see Baums (1997). 
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to buy shares either directly or indirectly though investment funds, so that, as the data 
in Figure 3.6 show, between 1990 and 1998 direct shareholdings of private 
households rose by 277.4% reaching E250.8 billion, and indirect shareholdings saw 
an almost tenfold rise from E7.2 billion in 1990 to E67.3 billion in 1998. At the end of 
1998, out of E2.9 trillion of private household assets almost 11% was invested in 
equities either directly or through investment funds - these figures were previously 
unheard of in the German context (Finanzplatz e. V. 1999b). This increase in stock 
market liquidity has also served large privatisation programmes, such as the Deutsche 
Telecom IPO in 1996. That particular share- issue was five times oversubscribed so 
that more than E4 billion could have been raised just from private investors (Rosen 
1997). Further privatisation programmes - e. g. Deutsche Bahn and Deutsche Post- 
have continued to attract more investors into the stock market. 276 
Figure 3.6. German Households' Investment in Equities 1990-1998 
a. Value ofShares and Investment Funds Owned by Private Households (Billion Euro) 
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276 Although, the crash in world equity markets since September 2001 will have had an effect on 
investor enthusiasm. 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (I 999b); DAI (I 999b). 
All this shows that an equity culture has been gradually emerging in Germany. 
Most active in the stock market are the younger generations since it is estimated that 
40% of German shareholders are under 35, which reveals that the traditional aversion 
to equities may be fading away (Smith 1994: 372; Deutsche Bank Research 1999), 
but also that there is much uncertainty in young generations about their retirement 
income from state pensions. Thus, in 2000, an average of 6.2 million individual 
investors owned shares directly compared with just 3.1 million in 1988. Shareholders 
made up 9.7 percent of the population over the age of 14 in 2000, compared with 6.8 
percent in 1988 (DAI 2000). A reflection of this is that the German stock market 
capitalisation has jumped from just 31.4% of GDP in 1997 to 59.51% in July 1999 
(ibid. ) which, although may not seem impressive relatively to the equivalent figures 
in other economies, is not only a percentage never seen before in Germany but also 
constitutes a dramatic increase (approximately 100%) within the very short period of 
two years. Moreover, while the regime of high tax rates on capital gains (about 50%) 
has constituted a major handicap for the development of the stock market in the past, 
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b. Equities as a Percentage of Total Households 'Assets 
the government has now managed to pass a law for its abolition which came into 
effect in January 2002 as part of the German tax reform (Steurreform). 277 
It should be noted here that the pending reform of pensions provisions will 
also have an enormous impact. Due to decreasing employment, cutbacks in 
government spending and demographic reasons - i. e. increasing older population 
combined with decreasing younger population - there is a growing need for a shift 
from the traditional pay-as-you-go to an at least partially funded pension system (Sinn 
1999). In addition, developments at the international level are also under way. Thus, 
recently proposed European measures, namely the EU Pensions Directive, are also 
intended to establish pan-European US-style pension funds as part of the internal 
market initiative and as a solution to the EU-wide pensions' crisis. At the moment 
pension fund assets in Germany compared to the US and the UK are minimal (see 
Figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7. Financial Assets of Pension Funds in 1997 (in Billion Dollars) 
Source: Rosen (1999), Table 5. 
117 On the effects of the capital gains tax abolition on cross-shareholdings see 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 below. 
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However, the pressures to restructure the pension system are bound to increase over 
time, due to both domestic and international reasons, and this could lead to enormous 
funds being invested in shares and other securities in a similar fashion as in the US 
and the UK. Accordingly, Werstschulte, a director in Bayerische Hypotheken -und 
Weschsel- Bank has predicted that: 
Pension funds could total between DMI, 600bn and DM2,000bn in 10 years if 
the right legal and tax conditions were created. This could double the size of 
the present equity market. (Financial Times 1997) 
It currently seems that the realisation of such developments is only a matter of 
time. Without underestimating the significance of the demographic issues or the other 
causes of unemployment, globalisation has also been one of the factors contributing 
to the retirement provision crisis. Company pension funds in particular have been 
severely hit by the implementation of cost-cutting policies in German firms and are 
now in a state of erosion. While company pension funds in 1976 covered two-thirds 
of the employed, in 1990 their share had decreased to 50% and is still declining. 
(Finanzplatz e. V. 1998). Thus, the Working Committee on Company Pension Funds 
has recently proposed that the current Law Relating to Company Pension Plans be 
amended to provide for the creation of "Investment-oriented Pension Funds" which 
will be governed by the Law on Investment Companies (KAGG) and be similar to 
those in Anglo-Saxon counties. According to Professor Gerke, Chairman of the 
Working Committee: 
the proposed system will strengthen the competitive position of Finanzplatz 
Deutschland, and as a new means of implementation, investment-oriented 
pension funds in particular offer the benefits of foreign pension funds, without 
breaking with the tried-and-proven fundamental principles of company 
pension plans. (Gerke 1998) 
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As the increasing value of assets controlled by private investment funds show 
(Figure 3.6 above) retirement funding needs also require greater reliance on private 
pension schemes. With regard to this, the Third Finanzmarktf6rderungsgesetz 
allowed the creation of pension plan investment funds that are obliged by law to 
invest at least 51% of their assets in equities and real estate. In general, pension 
reform in Germany will definitely contribute greatly to the development of the stock 
market in the near future. Most importantly, it will foster the growth of domestic 
institutional investors as owners of stocks, a development that could alter the nature 
of shareholdings and through it the direction of corporate governance as it did in the 
UK and the US. 
To summarise, financial markets globalisation has been a driving force behind 
a number of important reforms in German financial markets. All these changes in 
financial market regulation and structure have had and are expected to have a 
significant impact on the German equity market by making it broader, deeper and 
therefore more attractive to both domestic and international investors. They also 
result in decreasing transaction costs and consequently increase the incentives for 
German firms to use equity issues as a source of finance. However, despite all these 
developments and regulatory changes, the systemic aversion to outside- shareholders 
described in section 3.4 is detrimental for the Finanzplatz Deutschland project. Thus, 
in recent years, the discussion on the enhancement of the Aufsichtsrat'S monitoring 
role, the role of takeover regulation and the significance of globally acceptable 
accounting principles and disclosure rules has gained momentum in Germany and has 
even led to important institutional reforms. The direction and potential impact of 
those reforms will be discussed next. 
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3.7. RECENT LEGAL REFORMS SHIFTING THE BALANCE TOWARDS 
THE OUTSIDE-SHARIEHOLDER 
As the effort to transform Germany into a global financial centre continues, 
market transparency and investor protection are gradually becoming widely accepted 
values and, as this section will demonstrate, specific regulatory measures are being 
designed and implemented for a more outside investor-oriented corporate governance, 
even if elements of path dependence are also observable in some areas. The mere fact 
that corporate govemance issues have reached the legislative stage reveals the 
importance German regulators and business people are beginning to attribute to them. 
The most important regulatory developments with regard to corporate governance are 
the amendments to the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Securities Trading Law (WpHG)) 
as part of the second FinanzmarktförderungsgesetZ2 78, the Gesetz zur Kontrolle und 
Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (Law on Control and Transparency in the 
Enterprise Sector (KonTraG)) amending the Aktiengesetz, the passing of the 
Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz (Facilitation of Capital Raising Law 
(KapAEG)) amending the Handelgesetzbuch (German Commercial Code (HGB) and 
the adoption of a voluntary Obernahmekodex for listed AGs (takeover code (Kodex)) 
later replaced by a controversial Ubernahmegesetz (Takeover Law). These measures 
and their significance for German corporate governance will be discussed next. 
278 Gesetz Über den Wertpapierhandel und zur Änderung Börsenrechtlicher und Wertpapierrechtlicher 
Vorschriften, 1994 BGBl 1 1749. 
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3.7.1. Strengthening Disclosure and Insider Trading Rules 
It was previously noted that on January 1,1995 the second 
Finanzmarktf5rderungsgesetz came into effect as part of the Finanzplatz Deutschland 
programme. The first purpose of this legal instrument was to transpose the EEC Large 
Holdings Directive 279 into German law with the enactment of Articles 21-30 WpHG 
which tighten the disclosure requirements with regard to ownership and control. Its 
second purpose was to make insider dealing a criminal offence and thus bring 
domestic law in line with the EEC Insider Dealing Directive 280 as transposed in 
Articles 12-20 WpHG. Moreover, the WpHG provided the legal basis for the creation 
of the Bundesaufsichtsamt ftir den Wertpapierhandel (German Securities Trading 
Commission (BAWe))281 which was to have the responsibility of the implementation 
and enforcement of regulations relating to insider trading, ad-hoc disclosure of price 
relevant information and of the supervision of securities houses and markets in 
general. It is noteworthy that the actual implementation deadlines for the two 
Directives were January 1,1991282 and June 1,1992 
283 
respectively. The long gap 
between these dates and the actual implementation of the WpHG reveals that, 
contrary to Coffee's expectations (see section 2.4.2 above), even securities markets 
promotion measures are affected by the forces of path dependence, due to opposition 
by entrenched interest groups. Nonetheless, and despite the three-year delay, German 
securities markets reform did take place eventually. 
279 Council Directive 88/627/EEC. 
280 Council Directive 89/592/EEC. 
28 ' Following the adoption on 22 April 2002 of the Law on Integrated Financial Services Supervision, 
the BAWe has become part of the Bundesanstalt flir Fin anzdienstleistungsaus ich (BAFin), the 
umbrella authority for financial market supervision. 
282 Supra. note 279, Article 17 1. 
283 Supra. note 280, Article 14. 
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The old regime had been problematic because of the high thresholds for 
disclosure Thus, the AktG provided for the disclosure of all stakes owned in an AG 
that are above 20%. Moreover, the GWB required the disclosure to the 
Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office (BkartA)) of very detailed ownership 
structure information when companies file a change in their share or voting control 
that is above 25% or 50% of total share capital or votes. It is noteworthy that these 
provisions applied to all AGs and therefore there was little difference between 
disclosure rules of listed and non-listed corporations. Moreover, the thresholds for 
disclosure under the pre-WpHG regime were so high, as mentioned earlier, that it was 
very difficult to determine who controlled German companies. This is indicative of 
how little significance was attributed to the protection of minority investors in the 
stock market from undisclosed controlling blockholders who could then exploit their 
dominant position. 
In this sense the enactment of the WpHG should be regarded as a 
breakthrough from the past regime of insufficient investor protection. Pursuant to 
Article 21 the disclosure requirement is now triggered when the voting rights owned 
by a natural or legal person exceed or fall below 5%, 10%, 25%, 50% or 75% of the 
total votes of an AG listed on the official market segments. 
284 Moreover, Article 22 
imposes a mandatory disclosure requirement on votes controlled by a person 
indirectly, e. g. through a company, a voting trust, a family pool etc. Such indirect 
control can also arise when the voting rights are owned by a company controlled 
by 
the person in question, by a third party in the interests of the person in question or a 
company controlled by it, or by a third party and a contractual voting agreement with 
the person exists, if the person can exercise a purchase option with regard to the 
284 For all other AGs the requirements are less strict according to the old regime. 
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votes, and if the votes are deposited with the person who can exercise the rights in its 
own interests. As regards the last case, it is worth noting that bank proxy-voting does 
not fall under Article 22 because banks are legally obliged to vote in accordance with 
the interests or under the instructions of the actual shareholders and not on their own 
Will. 
285 Finally, for the purposes of the WpHG, disclosure means that after receiving 
the report by the shareholder who acquired the stake in question, the company is 
required to publish the information in one of the selected newspapers designated by 
the stock exchange. The BAWe accumulates all publication references and makes 
them publicly available every two months on its Internet site. 
Although, the new regime constitutes a significant departure from the pre- 
1995 situation, the WpHG is far from radical and some authors have criticised it for 
its remaining shortcomings as an instrument that is intended to promote ownership 
transparency. Becht and Boehmer (1999) provide a number of examples where either 
because of inadequacies in the formulation of the legal provisions or due to the 
BAWe's inefficiencies, the WpHG fails to provide sufficient corporate control 
information. They show that a number of loopholes still allow German listed 
companies to bypass disclosure rules. 286 The most common method is through the use 
of pyramids with non-listed firms as holding companies (ibid). In such cases, even 
though the immediate owners are visible, the identification of the ultimate owners is a 
difficult task since the WpHG applies only to listed AGs. It is always possible, 
however, that these gaps in the law be filled after constructive interpretation of the 
legal provisions by the courts of law. 
... Some changes on banks proxy-voting powers have been effected with the enactment of KonTraG 
(see section 3.7.2 below). 
... By 1996 there were no disclosure reports for 34 out of 436 AGs trading in the German official 
markets which equals to 7.6% of all listed AGs that come under the WpHG (Becht and Boehmer 
1999). 
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As regards the regulation of insider dealing, the WpHG is a novelty for the 
regulatory system in German financial markets. The deficient regulatory regime due 
to the lack of strict and specific legal rules on insider trading was briefly mentioned in 
section 3.4.3 above. Even though the consequences of such activity were recognised 
in Germany as early as in 1968, when the Ministry of Finance instructed the creation 
of a special committee responsible for tightening the regulatory regime, the adoption 
of a set of Voluntary Guidelines in 1970287 was anything but effective in preventing 
the occurrence of insider dealing. Their voluntary nature and the absence of any form 
of penalties for those who breached them did not deter the occurrence of insider 
dealing. According to section 2 of the Guidelines, insiders were all the members and 
legal representatives of the Aufsichtsrdte of the company, its banks and its affiliates, 
owners of more than 25% equity stakes, agents of a corporation who in connection 
with their agency function in the ordinary course of business obtain inside 
information, as well as investment advisors and consultants. 288 However, as Standen 
(1995: 196) observes, the Guidelines not only did not cover the conduct of two most 
common inside information traders, namely tippees and secondary insiders, but they 
were also "dulled by a host of limitations and exceptions" (ibid: 197). 
Obviously, this form of insider dealing regulation could not be maintained 
once the need to reform financial markets and promote the development of the 
securities markets appeared. The idea of Finanzplatz Deutschland was incompatible 
with the frequent and unpunished occurrence of insider dealing. Moreover, criticisms 
from international investors and regulators as well as the legal pressures created by 
the impending direct effect of the Directive under European law could not be ignored 
by the Gennan authorities. For instance, foreign investors had been deterred by 
287 Ins iderhandels-Richtlin ien 1970, amended in 1976 and 1988. 
188 The last category was added by the 1988 amendments to the insider trading guidelines. 
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informational asymmetries they would have had to face vis-a-vis domestic investors 
when investing in German securities markets. Moreover, the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission had been challenging the German regulatory regime indirectly 
by prosecuting cases of US insider dealing laws' violations which originated in 
Germany (Pitt and Hardison 1992). Under these direct and indirect global and 
international pressures, with the passing of the second Finanzmarktfeirderungsgesetz 
and the emendment of the WpHG, insider dealing became a criminal offence for the 
first time in Germany bringing past tolerance of such practices to an end despite 
initial opposition by entrenched interests. 
The scope of the WpHG provisions are much broader than the Voluntary 
Guidelines and satisfy the Directive's criteria. The sanctions, which go beyond the 
minimum requirements under the Directive, are strict and the law provides for 
imprisonment for a maximum of five years or fines up to El. 5 million. Nonetheless 
they are not flawless and there has been some criticism of the measures. For example, 
as Standen (1995: 204) states, the banks have managed to block far-reaching 
provisions of an early draft of the Finanzmarktf, 5rderungsgesetz and thus keep their 
disclosure duties to a minimum. However, on the whole disclosure requirements for 
the corporate sector are stringent and broad covering most kinds of price sensitive 
infon-nation about the financial position or the general business activities of the 
company. This minimises the possibilities for insider dealing and market 
manipulation in general, because the more quickly information becomes public, the 
more difficult it becomes for insiders to abuse their position. The information must be 
disclosed first to the BAWe and then to the public through an electronic information 
system or one of the national official stock exchange gazettes. The BAWe also makes 
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information available through teletext and its web site on which it provides updates. 
clarifications and guidelines for companies on a regular basis. 
In general, despite some shortcomings that continue to exist, the BAWe has 
been quite an effective and vigorous supervisory authority. The first conviction under 
the WpHG insider dealing provisions took place in August 18,1995 with the 
imposition of a total fine of E9,000,000. Moreover, according to its 1999 Annual 
Report, in 1998 alone the BAWe commenced 67 investigations for insider dealing 
and filed 16 cases of suspected violations with the public prosecutor's office 13 of 
which were resulted in the imposition fines of up to E75,000 (BAWe 1999). 
3.7.2. KonTraG 
A series of spectacular corporate crises and collapses during the 1990s, 
involving high-profile companies, such as Daimler-Benz, Metallgesellschaft, 
Klocker-Humbolt-Deutz and, more recently, Holzmann and Kirch, has undermined 
the past confidence in the German governance model and has damaged the credibility 
of managers and the alleged governance role of universal banks. The case of 
MetallgeselIschaft AG, in particular, apart from questioning the effectiveness of the 
Aufsichtsrat as a governance body, has also been a prime example of how easily the 
challenges of global financial markets can expose give rise to corporate control 
problems due to the increased risks involved. Thus, in the early nineties the New 
York subsidiary of the company adopted a high-risk strategy involving oil futures 
contracts in several American exchanges which eventually by 1993 it could not meet. 
Due to insufficient understanding of the subsidiary's derivatives strategy, 
328 
Metallgesellschaft's Aufsichtsrat in Germany ordered the premature liquidation of 
most oil futures resulting to a loss of over $I bn for the group (Wenger and Kaserer 
1997). Such failures undermined the confidence not only of domestic but also of 
foreign investors and stirred public criticism regarding the effectiveness of 
Aufsichtsrdte and auditors. Simultaneously, Gen-nan companies and regulators 
realised that the new financing opportunities arising from the development of 
domestic and foreign equity markets could not be exploited without "improving" 
corporate governance to meet outside investors' demands. Accordingly, Ulrich 
Seibert, of the Federal Ministry of Justice, comments: 
The turbulence on global financial markets at the end of last year has illustrated 
to us the extent to which financial markets have grown together. National 
capital markets are no longer isolated. Our quoted companies raise finance 
internationally. German stock corporations are in direct competition with other 
demands for venture capital worldwide. 
I ... I For the legal and political framework, this means that against a background of 
institutional competition, there is growing pressure for changes and adaptation 
of our company law, stock market law and accounting law. (Seibert 1998) 
In this context, on I May 1998 the KonTraG was enacted amending the AktG 
with the aim of strengthening the governance role of the Aufsichtsrat. In particular, 
the new law amended the rules for governing supervisory boards, auditors and 
managing directors aiming at the improvement of information flows from the 
management towards the Aufsichtsrat. The KonTraG also covers other important 
corporate governance related areas, such as voting rights, share buy-backs and the use 
of stock options. The enacted instrument has not brought a revolutionary change in 
the fundamentals of German corporate structure, especially if one considers some 
initial proposals for the complete abolition of the two-tier board and its replacement 
by a unitary one (Grub 1999: 44). The adoption of such a change would have either 
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undermined codetermination or would have given labour representatives excessive 
powers against other stakeholders. Since radical change could have upset vested 
interests within the German corporation the KonTraG took a more path dependent 
form before its adoption. Nonetheless, it has been a major contribution to the 
furtherance of the corporate governance debate in Germany by emphasising the need 
for monitoring management and by providing the legal basis for an enhanced 
shareholder-orientation for German companies. 
With regard to the Aufsichtsrat'S operation prior to the KonTraG amendments 
there had not been any clear standard practice. Prigge (1998: 961-964) reports that 
issues such as the frequency of board meetings and the preparation of their agenda, 
the flow of information from management to the board and the time dedicated by 
board members had not been uniformly dealt with in German companies. If anything, 
the intensity of management monitoring by the Aufsichtsrat had been minimal. With 
the enactment of the KonTraG the German legislator has set a minimum standard 
with regard to the board's operation as a monitoring body. Thus, it provides that in 
listed AGs the members must meet at least twice each half-year. 
289The 
total number 
of board positions that a member can have is still ten. 
290 However, chairmanships 
now count twice and are thus limited to a maximum of five. 
291 Moreover, disclosure 
of mandates in other Aufsichtsrdte as well as of candidate 
board members' 
professional occupation is now mandatory in listed AGs 
in order to prevent any 
potential conflicts of interest. Furthermore, even though the establishment of 
board 
committees is not compulsory, the Aufsichtsrat in 
listed companies has to state 
whether such committees exist and report in writing to the AGM 
how many times the 
289 Article 110 para. 3 AktG. In non-listed companies the Aufsichtsrat members are advised to meet 
once a quarter and must meet once each half year. 
290 The SPD parliamentary group had proposed the reduction of the number of mandates to five (SPD 
1995). 
29 1 Article 100 para. I AktG. 
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292 board met both as a whole and at committee-level . According to Hopt (1998: 242), 
committee work in Germany is still not as common as in the UK and the US where 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees are more or less mandatory. 
Nevertheless, the trend is to increase their use and KonTraG may be a driving force 
towards this direction. 
As regards the flow of information, the new law requires more detailed 
Vorstand reports which should include matters such as future business prospects and 
policy, financial planning, investments and personnel. It also demands sufficient risk 
management and internal control systems to be in place. Of particular importance is 
that, contrary to previous practice, under the new law the contracts for the audit report 
are awarded by the Aufsichtsrat which now also determines the auditor's 
remuneration. 293 There is also a requirement for submission of the audit report to each 
member or to the audit committee and the auditor has to attend the relevant board or 
committee meeting where the annual and group accounts are discussed. 294 The 
Aufsichtsrat examines the auditor and then reports in writing to the AGM. The 
KonTraG also contains provisions governing the form and content of the audit report. 
It requires that the report must be easily comprehensible, that special emphasis be 
given to particular risks that could jeopardise the existence of the company, and 
makes the inclusion of cash flow statements mandatory. 295 Moreover, the person who 
signs the audit certificate must change every six years and the auditor is excluded 
altogether if he received more than 30% of his total revenue over the previous five 
years from the company in question. 296 Finally, the level of the auditor's maximum 
292 Article 171 para. 2 AktG. 
293 Article III AktG. 
291 Article 171 para. I AktG. 
295 See also section 3.7.3 below on recent accounting standards changes. 
296 The previous threshold was 50%. 
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liability has been increased from DM500,000 (C250,000) to DM2 million (Elmillion) 
for non-listed companies and to DM8 million (C4 million) for listed companies. 
In section 3.4.1 above it was stated that the position of shareholders vis-a-\, is 
management under the old law has been somewhat disadvantageous. The minimum 
quorum that was required by the old law for the appointment of a special 
representative who would sue the management was very high and prohibitive for 
small minorities which, as it was shown above, are the most vulnerable to 
exploitation by strong blockholders. 297 With the enactment of the KonTraG, the 
situation has now been changed and the scales have been tilted more towards the side 
of the small shareholders as the threshold has been halved, i. e. 5% of the share capital 
or DMlmillion (E500,000) nominal value of shares. 298 However, for an action to be 
brought there needs to be a well-justified suspicion that the management has harmed 
the company (Grub 1999: 44). 
The KonTraG has also brought radical changes with regard to managerial pay 
by making the use of employee stock option plans (ESOPs) easier. This form of 
remuneration is one of the most effective means for dealing with shareholder agency 
problems as it provides managers with the incentives to maximise current shareholder 
returns. Before the new amendments there were major legal restrictions rendering this 
form of managerial remuneration very difficult and expensive. Kalisch (1998), for 
example, identified a number of major legal impediments, such as severe limitations 
on the acquisition by a company of its own shares 
299 and the general prohibition of 
members of the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat participating in ESOPs 
300 
Consequently, German companies who wanted to award this kind of (share) 
297 The old law required either a 10% stake or DM2million nominal value of shares. 
298 Article 147 Para 3 AktG. 
299Article 71 AktG para. 1. 
30'0 Article 202 para. 4 AktG 
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performance-related remuneration to their management had to resort to the use of 
convertible bonds or warrants and the creation of "phantom" stock plans. 
Since the passage of the KonTraG, shareholders can approve the disposal of 
shares outside the stock exchange as part of an ESOP for the company's managers. 
This has been achieved with the amendment of Article 192 AktG, which states the 
purposes for which contingent capital may be created, so as to encompass the 
granting of pre-emptive rights to the company's employees and management. 301 
Article 173 para. 2 provides for a number of special requirements that need to be 
satisfied, such as minimum holding periods, the determination of the issue price, the 
distribution ratios, and so on. The little empirical evidence that exists so far suggests 
that since the change in the law an increasing number of German companies have 
resorted to the use of ESOPs. While in 1996 and 1997 there were only 6 and 10 firms 
respectively that awarded this kind of incentive remuneration to their senior 
executives, by September 1998 this number rose to 27 and it is estimated that in 1999 
n'k aDOUt 100 ESOPs were adopted (Figure 3.8. a) (Winter 1999). The vast majority of 
these plans cover just Vorstand members and other executives, whereas only a small 
percentage are awarded to all employees (Figure 3.8. b). As ESOPs can be considered 
a powerful tool for aligning management interests with those of current shareholders, 
then this early evidence may suggest that the institutionalisation of shareholder 
supremacy at board level has already begun in Germany, even if the KonTraG 
amendments as a whole were in some degree shaped by the 
forces of path 
dependence. 
"' Article 192 para. 2 no. 3 AktG. 
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Figure 3.8. Use of Stock Option Plans by German Companies 
a. Number of Implemented Stock Option Plans Until 1998 
(1) 
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b. Hierarchical Layers Covered by Employee Stock Option Plans 
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Source: Winter (1999), Figures 5 and 6. 
Another important aspect of company law that is related to the ability of a 
company to focus on current shareholder-value maximisation is that of share buy- 
backs. A purchase of own shares can serve as a mechanism for increasing the market 
value of the stock or for returning excess cash flow to shareholders when no 
Imminent investment opportunities exist. Before the KonTraG amendments the 
acquisition of own shares by a company, despite it being a common practice in other 
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countries such as the US for some time, 302 was virtually prohibited under the old 
303 Article 71 AktG. With the amended Article, however, the restrictions have been 
significantly eased and the Aktiengesetz has been brought in line with "common 
international practice'9304 as that is shaped by global institutional investors' demands. 
A share repurchase is now generally permitted provided a number of conditions are 
complied with 305 and German companies seem to be willing to take full advantage of 
the new amendments. As early as in October 1998 there were over 50 firms which 
were already granted authorisations by their shareholders to proceed with share 
repurchases (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1998). By July 1999 this number had 
risen to 77 with another 72 companies planning to seek authorisations. For that year 
the value of share buy-back programs reached DM30billion or 1.6% of the market 
capitalisation compared with the US respective percentage of 1.9% for the same 
period (Finanzplatz e. V. 1999c). 
Another major area of corporate governance significantly affected by the 
KonTraG amendments is that of voting rights. In section 3.4.3 above it was shown 
that some German companies have used multiple or limited voting rights and voting 
caps as an anti-takeover mechanism with further repercussions for the development of 
the stock market. Article 5 para. I AktG now provides that all multiple voting rights 
shall cease to exist within five years from the date when KonTraG took effect unless 
the majority of shareholders with no such rights vote to the contrary. Similarly, voting 
caps and limited voting rights are now prohibited for all listed companies and 
have 
... Only in 1996 the value of share repurchase programmes announced by US companies exceeded the 
sum of $ 100 billion dollars. 
303 This Article contained a list of circumstances where a share-buy back was allowed, e. g. when it was 
deemed necessary in order to prevent serious and irnniinent harm to the company's interests, to offer 
shares to its employees or for compensating minority shareholders of subsidiaries wound up or 
absorbed by the parent. For a detailed analysis of the past regime see Stawowy 
(1994). 
304 Government Statement of Reasons, Federal Council Publications 892/97, at 150. 
305 Article 71 para. I AktG. 
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306 ceased since April 1,2000 . It is generally 
believed that this decisive move towards 
the 46one share-one vote" principle will have a significant positive effect on stock 
market development and will make investment in shares more attractive as it links 
capital contributions by shareholders with their share of influence. 
A ftirther modification in the law concerns the power of banks. Section 3.4.2 
above has shown that banks, especially the Big Three, are able to use their position as 
share custodians for small shareholders to help managers insulate themselves from 
outside shareholder pressures. During the discussions that preceded the passage of the 
KonTraG, the SPD had proposed the complete abolition of banks' proxy voting rights 
as well as the limitation of bank shareholdings in industrial and insurance companies 
to 5% or under. It also recommended a partial deviation from the universal banking 
system by prohibiting banks from owning mutual funds (SPD 1995). However, the 
KonTraG amendments have been more modest. They have created a new legal 
requirement that a bank must inform its share depositors about alternative proxy- 
agents such as shareholder associations. Moreover, banks must disclose to their 
customers any board memberships and equity participations in the company in 
question. The most significant legal amendment, however, is the new Article 135 
para. I AktG which provides that, unless they receive specific instructions, banks are 
no longer allowed to exercise their proxy-votes in companies where they own more 
than 5% of the equity outstanding. As Emmons and Schmid (1998: 27) point out, this 
provision discriminates against banks as voting custodians in favour of other non- 
bank vote custodians, such as the shareholder association Deutsche 
Schutzvereinigung Mr Wertpapierbesitz e. V. (DSW), who are not subject to this 
restriction, and thus reduces the attractiveness of banks as proxy-holders. It also 
"' The first draft of KonTraG contained provisions abolishing limited voting rights for all companies 
irrespective of whether they were listed or not. 
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creates an incentive for banks to reduce any holdings they may have to levels below 
the 5% threshold. 307 Finally, banks are required to vote in the interests of the "average 
customer" and submit their proposals on how they intend to use their voting rights. 
This requirement may serve as a disincentive for the continuation of the blind 
management- support approach of banks and, combined with the additional obligation 
to appoint one of their Vorstand members as the person responsible for the prompt 
exercise of proxy-votes, may push banks towards a more shareholder-friendly 
orientation in their votes which would then limit managerial discretion. Therefore, 
despite their relatively modest character, these amendments to the law are bound to 
have an effect on the traditional role of banks - i. e. as protectors of managerial 
discretion - in the German corporate governance system. 
Apart from the power of banks as share-custodians, the KonTraG has also 
affected another management entrenchment device, namely that of cross- 
shareholdings. The new Article 328 para. 3 AktG imposes a limit on the exercise of 
voting rights by companies with such holdings. Thus, a listed AG which knows about 
the existence of a cross-shareholding with another company is not permitted to use its 
voting rights with regard to the election of Aufsichtsrat members in that company. 
This reduces considerably the significance of cross- shareholdings as devices for 
preventing unwanted changes of control and therefore their practical usefulness. 
Thus, it is particularly interesting that between 1990 and 1998 such holdings by non- 
financial corporations have significantly declined from 41.6 percent to 30.5 percent 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 1999). While the KonTraG amendments regarding the use of 
votes may have been just one of many factors influencing the decisions of firms to 
reconsider inter-firm relationships - cross-border M&A, shareholder base 
101 it will be shown below that such a process is already underway. 
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diversification and other strategic factors must have also been influential- their 
significance should not be underestimated since they have effectively turned cross- 
shareholdings into an obsolete managerial entrenchment device. Significantly, their 
effect should be seen in combination with the recent changes in capital gains tax 
regime, which also facilitates the unwinding of cross-shareholdings. 
In general, if one were to characterise the KonTraG amendments to the AktG, 
it would be fair to say that they are not as radical and far reaching as many would 
want. Long-establi shed institutional arrangements, such as co-determined boards and 
the ability of banks to hold shares in non-financial finns have not been affected. 
Indeed, as far as the highly political issue of board level co-determination is 
concerned, it would be impossible to imagine even the slightest direct or indirect 
modification, e. g. through the elimination of the Aufsichtsrat, due to the high 
adaptation costs involved and the powerful agents representing them. The 
implementation of the KonTraG, however, does reveal that the debate on corporate 
governance and its significance for competitiveness in a global market place has 
gained momentum in Germany. Some of the adaptation costs that cause systemic path 
dependence are offset by the fact that the past confidence in German corporate 
practices and managers is being severely challenged and a more transparent and 
outside- shareholder orientation is favoured as the only visible alternative. The 
facilitation of stock option plans for executive management as well as allowing share 
repurchases and the limitations on multiple or limited voting stock indicate a clear 
shift towards a corporate governance system that incorporates the goal of outsider 
investor protection as an implementation of shareholder supremacy. Certainly, the 
amendments mentioned here, especially those covering ESOPs and share buy-backs, 
rely on the initiative and ability of shareholders who are responsible for 
338 
institutionalising governance mechanisms that protect their interests. However, the 
first empirical evidence shows that firms have indeed taken advantage of the 
KonTraG amendments. But what it also significant about the new law is the highly 
prescriptive character in other areas such as information flows between boards and 
the use of voting rights on banks and non-financial affiliates. These constitute a direct 
blow on the managerialist spirit of German company law and to some extent 
institutionalise shareholder supremacy within the existing legally prescribed corporate 
structure. 
3.7.3. Accounting Standards 
While the KonTraG amendments aim for the improvement of information 
flows from management to the Aufsichtsrat and of the form of audit reports, more 
dramatic developments have been taking place regarding the quality of audits. Section 
3.4.3 above mentioned that German accounting standards are creditor- or manager- 
oriented as opposed to shareholder-oriented. The ability of German companies to 
create hidden reserves not only undermines the level of transparency to outsiders with 
regard to their financial situation but also allows managers increased scope for 
deviation from shareholder supremacy in favour of a (stakeholder-) managerialist 
approach since it constitutes a form of excess cash flow retention. This is reflected in 
the evaluation of accounting information by investors (Keller and Mbller 1992). 
Thus, the German GAAP never gained international acceptance and have been a 
constraint on German companies' ability to raise finance abroad, especially in 
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countries with more shareholder-oriented accounting principles such as the UK and 
the US. 
Nonetheless, a number of German companies faced with the need to tap 
foreign stock markets in order to finance and realize their global FDI or M&A 308 
strategies had begun to file their accounts both according to the German GAAP as 
required under the HGB and according to the US GAAP or the IAS . 
309 This "dual 
reporting" practice, however, meant that German companies that were committing 
themselves to increased disclosure had to incur substantial additional costs. As a 
result, very few companies were able to prepare their financial statements in 
accordance with standards accepted by foreign investors so that functional 
convergence could not progress very far (Table 3.10). This urged the corporate sector 
to intensify the pressure for legal reform (Leuz and Verrecchia 1999: 7) so that they 
wouldn't have to bear all adaptation costs themselves due to dual reporting expenses. 
Table 3.10. Distribution of DAX 100 Firms Adopting International Reporting 
Strategies Across Fiscal Years. 
Year of Adoption Number of firms Strategies 
1993 2 reconciliation (1); dual reporting (1) 
1994 4 full report (1); dual reporting (3) 
1995 5 full report (1); reconciliation (1); dual reporting (3) 
1996 5 full report (2); reconciliation (2); dual reporting (1) 
1997 5 full report (2); dual reporting (3) 
1998 10 full report (7); reconciliation (3) 
Source: Leuz and Verrecchia (1999), Table 1. 
It was under such pressures from powerful (core) firms that the KapAEG 
amendments to the HGB took effect in April 1998 changing the situation particularly 
308 A common "accounting language" between the merging firms in the case of cross-border M&A can 
be as important as for portfolio investors seeking to invest across borders. 
309 Dain-der Benz AG was the first German company to adopt the US GAAP in 1993 due to it, s listing 
on the NYSE. 
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for those companies seeking finance from foreign securities markets. The amended 
Article 292(a) HGB provides that listed companies that are the parent of a group may 
prepare their consolidated accounts solely in accordance to internationally accepted 
accounting principles, namely the US GAAP or the IAS .3 
10 According to guideline 
83/349/EWG the accounting principles followed must provide information which is 
of at least equal value to that under the German GAAP. The fact that the new 
provision only covers consolidated group accounts does not mean that individual 
company accounts remain unaffected. As Schmidt observes: 
... the consolidated statements would in most cases not coincide with the financial statements of the corporation as a single entity. The result of this 
would be that the profit that would be available for dividend distribution 
would be accounted for by applying accounting standards which would differ 
significantly from the accounting standards being applied for the consolidated 
statements. It is difficult to imagine that such a disparity will be accepted by 
investors over a longer period of time. (Schmidt 1998: 748) 
Therefore, the scope and effect of the new Article 292 HGB may prove to be broader 
than it appears at first sight. There is evidence that the KapAEG amendments have 
already begun to have an impact on German companies' reporting practices. As Leuz 
and Verrecchia (1999: 7) and Clark et aL (2001) report, in fiscal years ending 
between June 1998 and March 1999 over a third of the DAX 100 and more than half 
of the DAX 30 companies had prepared their financial statements in accordance with 
either the US GAAP or the IAS. 
At this point it should be noted that the KapAEG is a measure which is 
transitional in character. The applicability of its provisions has a time limitation fixed 
on December 31,2004.311 This is because by that date a new German GAAP were 
supposed to be implemented. A German Accounting Standards Committee was 
3 10 As regards the Neue Markt, all firms listed therein are required to follow the IAS, the US GAAP, or 
the German GAAP with reconciliation to the former two. 
31 1 Article 5 KapAEG. 
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established in March 1998 under the provisions of the KonTraG 312 with the task of 
representing Germany in international accounting standard committees and of 
formulating new accounting standards for German companies in accordance with 
established international practice. In the words of Rirgen Krumnow, Chairman of the 
Committee: 
In Germany itself, it is a matter of bringing German accounting practices up to 
an international level as soon as possible. It goes without saying that there are 
no plans to adopt international accounting regulations out of hand. But there is 
no reason to reinvent good regulations that have already become accepted 
accounting practice worldwide. It is in this sense that German accounting will 
then be able to acquire new global recognition. (Krumnow 1998) 
However, given Krumnow's statement and Germany's influence within the 
EU5 it is perhaps not surprising that on 13 February 2001 the European Commission 
came forward with a legislative proposal requiring the adoption of IAS by all listed 
corporations in European exchanges by 2005. The proposed measure was adopted by 
the European Council on 7 June 2002 in the form of a Regulation which will have 
direct effect in all Member States. Therefore, the German Accounting Standards 
Committee's work and intentions have now been superseded by EU-wide legislation, 
so that once the Regulation gets the approval of the European Parliament all German 
listed companies will have to prepare their consolidated accounts in accordance with 
the IAS by 2005 at the latest. 
Moreover, as already noted, the KonTraG has established a mandatory 
requirement for all listed AGs to include cash flow statements in their consolidated 
account statements as of December 31,1998. Until that date such statements were not 
compulsory. Nevertheless, a large number of German companies had already begun 
to include cash-flow statements in their annual reports voluntarily since the early 
312 Articles 342 and 342a HGB. 
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1990s, mainly in response to foreign and domestic stock market pressures, 
international standards and business consultants' recommendations (Leuz 1999). 
Thus, the KonTraG amendments followed a more or less broadly accepted practice of 
the German corporate sector and a steady trend towards increased disclosure. This is 
another clear example of formal convergence ensuing functional convergence. 
To summarise, the recent changes in the law governing financial statements 
are all intended to enhance the informational value of company annual reports from 
the outside investor's perspective and bring German accounting standards in line with 
principles accepted by dominant (institutional) investor groups in global financial 
markets. Of course, a number of German firms under the influence or pressure of 
foreign investor expectations had committed themselves to increased financial 
disclosure before the enactment of the new laws. This means that the KapAEG and 
KonTraG amendments -and even the EU initiative-are the latest stages of a whole 
process that has begun since the early 1990s. The new provisions constitute a form of 
regulation facilitating the continuation and intensification of this process towards 
enhanced transparency of financial accounts to outsiders -a vital precondition for an 
outside shareholder corporate govemance system. For example, the ability to create 
hidden reserves under the US GAAP or the IAS as opposed to the existing German 
GAAP is substantially constrained. 313 This move towards a more outside shareholder 
oriented accounting regime thus has a significant impact on managerial discretion. 314 
The constraint on managerial reliance upon hidden reserves to smooth annual 
earnings will undoubtedly affect the prioritisation of corporate objectives. For 
instance, a company that does not have large reserves as a cushion may be forced to 
313For an analysis see Deutsche Bank Research (1993). 
314 For a case study see Kiffing (1996). It is indicative that in its mid-1993 interim report Daimler-Benz 
AG showed a surplus of DM168million according to German GAAP but a loss of DM949million 
according to US GAAP. 
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review its positive attitude towards retaining employees in difficult times. Cost- 
cutting would automatically appear as the only way out of a crisis. Simultaneously, 
shareholders may take advantage of the increased transparency by demanding higher 
cash flow distributions either as dividends or as share repurchases. 
Moreover, it would not be unreasonable to expect that increased financial 
transparency will affect the structure of shareholdings as well, by decreasing 
informational asymmetries between outside shareholders and managers and therefore 
by reducing the private benefits accruing from such large holdings. Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence suggesting a positive relationship between enhanced disclosure 
and dispersed ownership (Leuz 1999). 
3.7.4. Takeover Regulation 
The disadvantageous position of minority shareholders in cases of takeover 
bids and the ability of strong blockholders to appropriate benefits as a result of the 
lack of effective takeover regulation was noted in section 3.4.4 above. 315 It Was 
argued therein that, among other institutional factors, insufficient minority 
shareholder protection in takeovers was associated with the underdevelopment of 
German securities markets. With the vision of Finanzplatz Deutschland German 
regulators and policy makers could not ignore this vital aspect of investor protection. 
Thus, in the mid 1990s the Federal Ministry of Finance assigned the 
B6rsensachverstdndigenkommission (Commission of Stock Exchange Experts 
(BSK)) with the task of devising a code of practice for takeovers. In 1995 the BSK 
"' See also Hoffmann-Burchardi (1999). 
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introduced the Kodex which came into force on I October 1995, and the 
implementation of which was based on voluntary adoption by German listed 
companies. 316 A Takeover Commission, whose members are appointed by the BSK, 
was created to monitor and promote compliance. 317 
The formulation of the Kodex was along the lines of the London City Code on 
Takeovers and set four main principles: equal treatment of all shareholders, 
transparency of the takeover procedure (equal access to information for all 
shareholders), fair participation for all shareholders in the offer price and the 
requirement that the Vorstand remains neutral during the takeover. The most 
controversial rule in the code, however, was Article 16 which contained the 
requirement for a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders if the bid exceeded 
the threshold of 50% of all voting shares. Corporate interests had claimed that this 
mandatory bid rule was too far reaching whereas investor interests disagreed and 
believed that the 50% threshold was too high. 318 Despite the reactions of the industrial 
sector the latter won the argument and Article 16 was amended in 1998 so that the 
mandatory bid rule was strengthened. Under the amended rule it was not necessary 
anymore to obtain 50% of voting shares in order to trigger the rule. The threshold was 
the mere acquisition of control as that was defined in the old Article 22(l) WpGH 
which could be lower than the Kodex's previous 50% threshold. Moreover, the offer 
had to be extended immediately and not after a maximum of 21 months that the 
original provision required. 
In practice, however, the Kodex never fulfilled the expectations the BSK had 
when the code was adopted. Even though its rules provided satisfactory protection to 
"' For companies listed in the Neuer Markt adoption of the Kodex was mandatory. For all other 
signatory listed companies the code only constituted a set of contractual obligations. 
Article 20 of the Kodex. 
See comment by the chairman of the BSK Dr. Karl-Hermann in Bauman (1999). 
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minority shareholders in takeover transactions and although the Takeover 
Commission within four years of its inception processed 46 cases involving the code, 
the problem of enforcement remained. Despite the BSK's persistent efforts and the 
Deutsche B6rse's requirement that all newly listed companies in the DAX and 
MDAX had to adopt the code, and a joint declaration by German banks not to co- 
operate with bidders who did not adopt the code, on December 1,1998 only 348 out 
of the 758 listed companies had adopted the Kodex (Loehr 1999). It is indicative that 
prestigious companies like BMW, Hoechst, Viag and Volkswagen refused to adopt 
the code and withstood public criticism for giving priority to specific insider interests 
(Handelsblatt Interactiv 1999a). In the words of Dr. Karl-Hermann Baumann, 
chairman of the BSK, "this means that there is no guarantee for a level playing field" 
in the field of corporate takeovers (Bauman 1999). 
Consequently, the BSK announced its was abandoning its efforts to gain 
universal voluntary acceptance of the Kodex and proposed that there should be 
mandatory legislation regulating takeovers (Bdrsensachverstdndigenkommission 
1999). It suggested that the mandatory offer threshold should not be based on a fixed 
share-capital percentage but on the achievement of simple majority of votes present at 
the AGMs of the last three years, 3 19 but that there should be no requirement for a 
mandatory offer when the bidder owns less than 30% of the share-capital. 
Ironically, the successftil hostile bid for Mannesmann by Vodafone 320 changed 
the situation dramatically. Immediately after the takeover, the then Finance Minister 
Hans Eichel urged the EU to implement common takeover rules for all Member 
States (Atkins and Simonian 1999). The Thirteenth Company Law Directive 
proposed by the Commission for the establishment of common takeover rules within 
"9 Between 1995 and 1997, this was achieved with 21% of the share-capital in DAX companies. See 
Baumann (1999). 
121 See the discussion in the following section. 
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the EU had been pending for many years. Even though a political agreement for its 
adoption had been reached in June 1999, the Vodafone/Mannesmann takeover 
generated German opposition in the European Parliament on the grounds that, while 
the KonTraG has virtually eliminated multiple voting shares, other Member States 
were still using them in order to prevent hostile takeovers. The Directive was 
amended in December 2000 by the European Parliament, which introduced a clause 
permitting defensive action by management, and was eventually marginally defeated 
on 3 July 2001 (Dombey 2001). Only one week later the German cabinet approved 
the draft Obernahmegesetz which was eventually passed and took effect on I January 
2002. Although the new law contains a mandatory bid rule once the 30% of voting 
shares threshold is reached, its Article 33 enables management to seek shareholder 
approval for defensive measures, such as "poison pills", even if no bid is imminent. 
Moreover, under the same provision management is granted considerable discretion 
to employ post-bid defences with the approval of the Aufsichtsrat, i. e. without any 
direct shareholder involvement. 
Thus, even though takeover regulation could be regarded as an area of a rather 
"technical" nature as part of securities markets regulation, path dependence forces 
during its evolution in Germany have been very influential. This, however, is not 
surprising when one recognises that the significant adaptation costs of establishing an 
active market for hostile takeovers would have to be borne by labour interests in an 
era of high unemployment - this is something that German politicians cannot easily 
ignore. Therefore, it seems that the argument of Coffee presented in section 2.4.2 
above that convergence of securities regulation involves less adaptation costs and 
thus, as institutional complementarities transmit changes through the system, can 
drive corporate governance convergence needs to be qualified. Institutional 
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complementarities between different corporate governance subsystems - in 
Germany's case between securities regulation, industrial relations - are also carriers 
of path dependence and this must be taken into consideration too before predicting 
automatic convergence. Sometimes, complementarities can be so strong that even 
securities regulation - part of which is takeover regulation - itself stops short of 
converging fully, even if many important changes do get implemented. 
3.7.5. Preliminary Assessment 
The preceding sections provided an overview of a series of regulatory 
instruments and legal amendments recently implemented in order to bring German 
321 law "in line with international standards and practice" . Certainly, these 
developments, some of which are still on going, do not amount to a complete 
overhaul of the German system as that was described in section 3.4 above and to an 
instant transition towards an outside shareholder-oriented model of corporate 
governance. Two characteristic features of the legal corporate govemance framework, 
the two-tier board structure and co-determination, not only are still in place but have 
even been enhanced. Particularly in the case of codetermination it would be 
completely unreasonable to expect that reform could begin from such highly political 
issues that are considered by German people as great social achievements. 
Nevertheless, policy makers in Germany have realised that in order to sustain 
and expand the role of Finanzplatz Deutschland, a concept that is itself an outcome of 
global competition, a regulatory system which is compatible with the expectations of 
"' See comments of Seibert, supra. at 320, of Krumnow, supra. at 333, Bundesregierung, supra. at 
294, and supra. note 304 and text. 
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foreign as well as domestic investors is necessary, even if that could be considered as 
the outcome of a global regulatory race to the bottom. This has not only resulted in 
the development of German securities markets but has also enabled the serving of 
Gerinan companies' increasing financial needs directly from capital markets within 
Germany rather than without it. A number of companies who sought to deal with the 
challenges of globalisation were until recently facing significant hurdles within their 
country due to the domestic introversion that characterised numerous financial 
regulations. Simultaneously, as the largest firms could escape this situation by using 
their reputation to raise finance abroad, regulatory arbitrage became a serious issue. 
Therefore, the pressure for financial reform in Germany intensified. 
Thus, German regulators have recognised and acted upon the need for a legal 
framework governing listed corporations that is characterised by enhanced 
transparency and investor protection, and which also provides the context for a more 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance. Most important is the impact the new 
regulatory framework that is emerging in Germany may have on investment 
behaviour. More specifically, the patterns of concentrated ownership described in 
section 3.4.3 may gradually become economically irrational, as the balance between 
dominant blockholders vis-a-vis outside-shareholders has been shifting towards the 
latter. A restriction in the opportunities for private benefit extraction by dominant 
shareholders to the detriment of minorities amounts to a respective decrease in the 
incentives for the acquisition of large blocks which carry with them the insider status. 
To use Coffee's (1991) terminology, liquidity may become more preferable than 
control. Moreover, the abolition of capital gains tax and the KonTraG amendments 
with regard to cross-shareholdings, banks' proxy voting and voting limitations have 
reduced the number of managerial entrenchment tools. The simultaneous 
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strengthening of foreign and domestic outside shareholders' position and therefore of 
their governance influence can force German managers to follow a more market- 
oriented approach dictated more by current shareholder-value maximisation 
considerations. Where direct shareholder voice is practically impossible, crucial for 
the entrenchment of such a shareholder-value orientation are the legal instruments 
concerning share repurchases and managerial stock options, which as the next section 
will show are already popular measures implemented by German companies. 
In sum, it seems that due to horizontal complementarities, purely financial 
institutional reforms are now spreading to areas affecting corporate governance more 
directly in a process of cumulative institutional change. Just as this thesis argued in 
section 2.4.2 above, the areas affected by the recent legal changes, such as securities 
regulation and accounting standards, may be of a rather "technical" nature and 
surrounded by less political controversy than other institutions like co-determination. 
Still, contrary to Coffee's convergence argument, the developments in German 
takeover rules reveal that this does not mean that changes even in those areas of 
technical regulation go unnoticed; financial system's complementarities with more 
path dependent sub-systems can halt or delay the full re-orientation even of securities 
regulation. 
Given this background, the next section will attempt to determine the extent to 
which traditional stakeholder relationships are being affected by the legal changes 
implemented so far, and the degree of penetration of shareholder value as a 
benchmark in German corporate governance. 
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3.8. NON-LEGAL CHANGES AND THE CONCEPT OF SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE IN GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
It was mentioned above that in many respects legal reform followed change in 
business practice, i. e. functional change, caused by the redefinition of core firms' 
preferences as they tried to exploit the opportunities arising from product and 
financial market globalisation. The intensification of foreign competition and the 
dilemma of global reorganisation or extinction have increased considerably the 
financial needs of firms that want to remain competitive. The globalisation of 
competition for securitised corporate finance means that companies now need their 
public (institutional) investors, domestic and foreign, more than they did in the past, 
when bank borrowing was sufficient to cover their financial needs. Moreover, the 
adoption of growth and re-organisation strategies based on cross-border M&A not 
only dilutes the structure of stock ownership but also brings in international 
shareholders with divergent expectations. This leads to increased pressures for the 
"I'll abandomnent of established business practices and the adoption of rules and 
principles that are accepted internationally or, to be more specific, by investors in 
global financial markets. Banks, especially the Groj3banken, are becoming more 
interested in increasing their global presence rather than maintaining long-establi shed 
relationships with their corporate clients that may hinder their overall business 
strategy, hostile takeover bids have begun to take place where they were virtually 
non-existent, while shareholders, domestic and foreign, are becoming increasingly 
active in seeking to maximise their financial earnings by demanding a higher share of 
corporate cash flow. Furthermore, the enhanced bargaining power of outside 
shareholders and the simultaneous pressure on labour to conform to the new 
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economic realities by accepting a larger share of the adaptation costs involved has 
also contributed to the redefinition of stakeholder relationships. Since vertical 
complementarities between such functional changes and the legal reforms discussed 
above are strong and bi-directional, it is impossible to identify what took place first. 
As section 2.4.2 above has shown, institutional change is a continuous and complex 
process of cumulative causation so that it is almost impossible to identify with 
certainty its beginning or end. What is possible, however, is to treat legal and 
functional changes are mutually reinforcing, driving the German system in a 
particular direction. 
Thus, the following sections will present some early evidence suggesting that 
German corporate governance is gradually changing from one based on consensus 
and stable relationships among stakeholders into a more adversarial one, where 
financial, i. e. shareholder, interests tend to prevail. As entrenchment devices wane, 
managerial discretion is being contained and replaced by higher accountability to all 
shareholders, insiders and outsiders, on an equal basis. It will be argued that the 
notion of shareholder-value as a measure of shareholder supremacy is beginning to 
infiltrate the German managerial model as that was described in section 3.4 leading to 
its slow transformation into one where outside shareholder interests are given priority. 
3.8.1. The Changing Role of Banks 
The developments in Gen-nan financial markets and the banking sector more 
specifically discussed in section 3.6 above could not leave the relationships between 
banks and their industrial customers unaffected. Some general observations have 
352 
already been made above with regard to the inability of German banks to satisfy the 
corporate finance and investment banking needs of those companies that sought to tap 
international capital markets for funds and foreign banks' expertise. By turning to 
foreign investment houses such companies began to break away from their long 
established relational banking ties. This move has not been unilateral. Under the 
pressure of increasing competition from foreign financial institutions since the 
liberalisation of financial markets, large banks who wanted to remain competitive had 
to reconsider the viability of their close ties with non-financial companies. The 
increased financial needs as well as the potentiality of conflicts of interest 322 have 
made the maintenance of traditional links between banks and their corporate clients 
difficult. The decreasing profit margins in the traditional deposit and loan business 
have also been a significant factor. 
One first indication of German banks' changing attitudes is the significant 
reduction and reorganisation of their major equity participations in industrial firms in 
recent years. As Schr6der and Schrader (1997) found, the ten largest private banks 
reduced their holdings in non-financial firms from 1.3% of nominal capital in 1976 to 
just 0.4 in 1994. Most stakes in the 25%-50% range have been significantly reduced, 
as banks now have to follow a more diversified strategy with regard to industrial 
shareholdings. Such policies have already been announced and implemented by 
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank, Bayerische Hypotheken- und 
Wechsel Bank and BHF-Bank (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1995,1997a, 1997b). 
The Big Three, in particular, are engaged in a process of selling most of their major 
holdings. Deutsche Bank during the late 1990s significantly reduced its holdings in 
Daimler AG, Holzmann AG, Karstand AG, Südzucker AG and Horten AG, all of 
122 See discussion in section 3.8.2 below. 
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which have been long-term partners for many decades (Fischer 1997a, 1997b). It also 
span off most of its remaining holdings by creating DB Investor AG, a subsidiary 
company, which has the task of professionally managing the bank's portfolio of 
industrial stakes focusing on the bank's interest as a shareholder rather than creditor 
323 (Handelsblatt Interactiv 1998). Similarly, prior to its takeover by Allianz, Dresdner 
sold its holdings in Degussa AG and Hapag-Lloyd AG (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 1997c, 1997d), and Commerzbank in Karstand AG (Fischer 1997b). 
It should also be recalled here that large sales of shareholdings have been 
inhibited in the past by high tax rates on capital gains arising from stock trades 
(Miilbert 1998: 471). The recent abolition of this tax has removed a crucial 
institutional impediment to large reductions of stakes that are undesirable in the 
emerging economic context, so while this trend seems to be part of a long-term 
strategy of German financial institutions, it is now bound to intensify. For instance 
the insurance giants Allianz and Munich Re, owning 24% of total holdings in the 
DAX 30 - mainly in banks - almost immediately after the announcement of the tax 
reform plans expressed their intention to take advantage of them by selling many of 
their stakes in other companies (Major 2000; Financial Times 1999c). But even 
earlier moves such as the creation of DB Investor should also be seen in the context 
of the new tax regime. However, as section 3.4 above shows, banks' role in industrial 
corporate governance system derives mainly from their control of proxy votes rather 
than their relatively small equity stakes. This leads to the next point, which is the 
... The bank set its policy as follows: "By the reduction of existing holdings and acquisition of new 
ones, professional and active portfolio management is to be conducted, but no new holdings 
accumulated. DB Investor will act, for example, as a kind of midwife in repositioning companies on 
the basis of value -increasing concepts for companies and industries (e. g. Hapag-Lloyd) or participate 
in the restructuring and disposal of other companies' holdings which are no longer part of core 
business, as in the case of DIVAG/Metro" (Deutsche Bank 1999). Deutsche Bank also reduced its 
9.3% stake in Allianz by 2.3% as part of its program to increase shareholder value (Handelsblatt 
Interactiv 1999f). 
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changing role of banks in hostile takeovers as an indication of their changing 
intentions in using their voting power to support managers. 
For reasons already explained hostile bids have been virtually non-existent in 
Germany so that the market for corporate control has not been able to exert 
significant pressures on German managers and constrain their discretion. To a great 
extent this was attributed to the fact that banks have generally followed a supportive 
approach towards managements and management-defensive measures limiting the 
potentiality of successful hostile bids. However, the first signs of change began to 
appear in 1991, when Krupp launched a hostile bid for Hoesch. Even though the 
target's Chairman was Deutsche Bank's nominee and its CEO had received his office 
with the bank's involvement only three months prior to the bid, Hilmar Kopper, 
Deutsche's CEO at the time, approved of Krupp's move and encouraged Hoesch's 
chairman not to oppose the takeover irrespective of the management's opposing view. 
Deutsche Bank had been Hoesch's hausbank and controlled approximately 12% of 
the votes via proxies in the company. In the end, it was only after intense government 
pressure that an agreement was reached for a friendly merger between the two 
companies which took place on 8 December 1992 (Franks and Mayer 1998: 1392). 
An even clearer illustration of the changing attitudes of German banks, 
however, is given by their role during Krupp's bid for Thyssen, where in spring 1997 
the former announced its intentions to acquire its main competitor, which was larger 
but with diffused ownership, without the latter's consent. Krupp was financially 
assisted by Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank and advised by their investment 
banking subsidiaries in London - Morgan Grenfell and Kleinwort Benson respectively 
- with some additional help from Goldman Sachs. At the time of the bid a member of 
Deutsche's Vorstand sat on Thyssen's Aufsichtsrat while one active and one retired 
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member of Dresdner's Vorstand sat on the Aufsichtsrdte of both the bidder and the 
target. A point that has to be stressed is that this incident occurred in the most 
traditional industry in the German economy, as Thyssen is a steel manufacturer 
governed by the full-parity co-determination regime under the 
Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz. 324 Thus, added to the opposition from the 
management's side was the resistance of the workforce. The press was also very 
critical of Krupp's "wild west" tactics and even more of the banks who "dominated 
the country"325 . Thus, after a decisive intervention by the Northrhine-Westphalia 
State Government and under the pressure from labour representatives from both 
companies and unions, an agreement for a "friendly" merger was achieved on the 
basis that no redundancies would take place. Nevertheless, Krupp's attempt was seen 
as a first significant and direct effect of globalisation in the heart of the German 
system and as a turning point in the way of doing business in Germany. As Bendt 
comments: 
The German financial elite almost certainly had greater plans. The whole deal 
should finally prove that German Banks are just as able as their Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts to plan and manage such complex financial deals. (Bendt 1998) 
The fact that the hostile takeover envisaged by Krupp and its financial partners during 
the event did not materialise as planned cannot overshadow the fact that the new 
investment banking role sought after by the Groftanken in the global financial 
market place is in direct conflict with the traditional model of German stakeholder- 
managerialism. 
324 As a result of the takeover attempt, a stalemate arose in Thyssen's Aufsichtsrat for the first time 
ever, thus breaking a long tradition of decisions based on full consensus. 
325 The German newspaper Der Spiegel reported a member of Krupp/Hoesch's works council stating: 
"I can't globalize myself, I've got a flat here. Let us therefore march, in order to make sure that 
Deutsche Bank is no longer able to dominate the country"; cited in Bendt (1998). 
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Furthermore, banks are also becoming increasingly unable to keep up with 
their role as liquidity insurers or corporate rescuers. The recent events during the 
collapse of Holzmann AG, the second largest and most historic construction group in 
Germany, provides a prime example of the clash between the formulation of a global 
strategy and relationship banking engagements. Holzmann's main financial partner 
had for almost a century 326 been Deutsche Bank who even at the point of the collapse 
owned a 15.1 % stake in it. The first problems emerged when Holzmann was unable to 
make a profit out of a number of projects it had completed in east Germany after 
1989. As the debts began to mount - between 1995 and 1998 deficits had reached the 
level of about DMIA billion (Barber 1999b) - Deutsche Bank finally 
327 decided to 
intervene in 1997 by placing Carl Boehm-Bezing, a member of its Vorstand, as 
chainnan of Holzmann's Aufsichtsrat which undertook the responsibility of 
appointing a new management team that would restore the company's financial 
health. Nevertheless, the plan eventually failed and in November 1999 losses of about 
DM2.4 billion were disclosed which brought the group one step closer to a collapse 
(Handelsblatt Interactiv 1999j). Deutsche Bank was severely criticised not only for 
not having used its influence to make sure that the company's turnaround was 
successful but also for using Holzmann's business dealings for its own benefit rather 
than for the company's shareholders. 328 
326 Since the beginning of the 20th century a large number of Holtzmann's projects, ftom. the Baghdad 
railway (1907) to the new Reichstag building in Berlin, were completed with Deutsche's 
financial 
help. Even Deutsche's headquarters building was constructed by Holzmann. 
327 In 1994 a hostile takeover attempt was made for Holzmann by Hochtief with the co-operation of 
Deutsche Bank who had agreed to sell 15.9% out of its 25.9% equity stake at that time to the bidder. 
The takeover, however, was blocked by the Bundeskartellamt on competition law grounds. This 
indicates that Deutsche Bank's initial intentions were to terminate its longstanding relationship with its 
old industrial partner. For more details on the bid see Jenkinson and I-jungqvist (1997). 
328DSW, a shareholder association, called for chairman Carl von Boehm-Bezing to resign and called 
for a special audit investigating Deutsche Bank's dealings with Holzmann. Commerzbank had also 
considered the possibility of filing a law suit against Holzmann's board. See Handelsblatt Interactiv 
(1999g, 19991 and 1999m). 
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Despite the severe criticism against it and its level of involvement in the 
affair, Deutsche Bank was reluctant to engage itself into a fully committed 
restructuring operation that would rescue the company. 329 It was determined to limit 
its participation in the rescue plan to only 18.5% of the funds needed. This resulted 
into the failure of creditor banks to reach an agreement on their contributions to the 
rescue plan and to the subsequent initiation of insolvency proceedings in late 
November 1999. It was only after the direct intervention of the German Federal 
Government and a DM250 million state subsidy that a last minute agreement on a 
rescue package was achieved (Handelsblatt Interactiv 1999h and 2000b) . 
330 Again, it 
was not the banks' commitment to their industrial parter that led to the bailout but 
direct govermnent intervention. 33 1 Nevertheless, Deutsche Bank as well as other 
major creditor banks of Holzmann had been planning to disengage from the troubled 
company after its rescue by selling their shareholdings and promoting the possibility 
of an acquisition (Handelsblatt Interactiv 1999i). Eventually, the steep downturn in 
the construction industry even after the rescue led a new crisis for the group and its 
eventual collapse in March 2002 as neither its bankers not the government this time 
were willing make any further contributions (Major 2002a). 
If banks' attitudes towards their long-term industrial partners are becoming 
less supportive, in other cases they can also become aggressive as creditors. This is 
evidenced by Deutsche Bank's stance in the collapse of the Kirch media empire in 
2002, the largest in Germany's history so far. Deutsche was again heavily involved. 
329The initially agreed rescue plan comprised a financial injection of DMI. 25 billion from a capital 
increase and DM I billion in the form of a syndicated loan. 
330 The final rescue plan would also result in a reduction of the workforce by 3,500 out of a total of 
17,000 and additional concessions on the part of employees such as five hours of overtime for free for 
one and a half years. See Handelsblatt Interactiv (2000a). 
33 ' This was done after intense protests of German building workers outside Holzmann's and Deutsche 
Bank's head quarters and a threat of a nationwide strike. The coalition government's political 
uncertainties were also a significant factor determining the Chancellor's decision to intervene. See 
Mai or 0 999). 
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Although it was Kirch's second largest creditor with a C715m secured loan, it 
effectively welcomed the break up of the group in order to seize the collateral, a 40 
per cent stake in publisher Axel Springer worth C880m, which it intended to liquidate 
and thus improve its own deteriorating profitability. Indicative of the strained 
relationship between the two sides is the lawsuit filed by Leo Kirch, the founder and 
then CEO of the media group, against Deutsche's chairman Rolf Breuer for the 
latter's negative comments in the media about Kirch's creditworthiness when it was 
still struggling to avoid insolvency (Major 2002). 
Furthermore, the increasing presence in the German market of foreign 
investment banking houses, that are not part of the domestic relationship network, 
also serves as a catalyst for functional change. It has created significant pressure for 
German universal banks to abdicate from old practices if they are to build a reputation 
as established investment houses. The recent hostile bid of the British mobile 
telecommunications giant Vodafone for the German conglomerate Mannesmann 
shows that takeover predators need not resort to one of the Groj3banken in order to 
launch an unsolicited bid against a German target. 332 When it launched the largest 
hostile takeover offer in German history, Vodafone employed as its main financial 
advisers the US investment banks Goldman Sachs and Warburg Dillon Read. 
Similarly, Mannesmann was advised mainly by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, J. P. 
Morgan and Merryl Lynch. Thus, Deutsche Bank's stance is of particular interest in 
this case. Although it also acted as a financial adviser to Mannesmann, it nevertheless 
avoided expressing its support for the target's management directly. It refrained from 
giving a central recommendation to its local investment advisers with regard to 
whether retail investors should sell their shares to Vodafone or not. Deutsche Bank 
See ftulher below for a more extensive analysis of the takeover. 
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restricted itself to a public relations comment that it was "not without emotion" for 
the particular hostile takeover attempt (Financial Times 2000). Most other major 
banks (e. g. Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank, but not HypoVereinsbank who issued 
a clear guideline in favour of Mannesmann's management) followed a similar line 
and merely recommended that shareholders remain cautious until the last moment 
(ibid. ). On the other hand, WestLB Panmure, Westdeutsche Landesbank's investment 
banking branch, almost immediately supported Vodafone's offer and described it as 
attractive to both companies' shareholders (Financial Times 1999b). 
One general observation that can be made from the above is that, even if some 
of the old practices are deeply rooted in the economics and politics of Germany, it is 
becoming increasingly obvious that the competitive forces in the global marketplace 
have already begun to cause cracks in the long-establi shed relationships between 
banks and non-financial companies. It seems that German managers are losing the 
unconditional support of their large financial partners who are increasingly unwilling 
to use their voting power and overall influence to shield corporate managements 
against hostile takeovers or to finance their rescues in cases of distress. This is also 
evidenced by the slow but observable decline of bank representation on company 
boards since the late 1980s. The Bundesverband deutscher Banken (Association of 
German Banks) (1995) has revealed that, in 1993, banks held 99 Aufsichtsrat 
mandates in the 100 largest firms as opposed to 114 in 1986, that is a reduction from 
8% to 6% in total. As the possibility of conflicts of interest arising from the banks' 
dual role as providers of credit and investment banking services becomes more 
visible, it is reasonable to expect that board representation will become increasingly 
problematic. This issue became very obvious in the case of Krupp's hostile takeover 
attempt for Thyssen, where bank representatives sat on the boards of both the bidder 
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and the target. 333 Large German banks that are determined to follow a global strategy 
are now forced to face the dilemma of abandoning their old partnerships with 
industrial firms in order to proceed with their strategic plans or become laggards. 
Given the clear preference for investment banking to traditional deposit and loan 
business, this dilemma seems to be resolved in favour of the former case. 
3.8.2. Global Market for Corporate Control 
Traditionally, hostile takeover bidding has been taboo in Germany and has 
been perceived by managers and labour as the adoption of Anglo-American "wild 
west" business practices for the benefit of outside shareholders and to the detriment 
of long-term value and stakeholder interests. The events described above, however, 
reveal a gradual departure from these old perceptions. Even though it would be 
premature to believe that an active market for corporate control is already in place in 
Germany, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that managers are no longer as 
isolated from external financial pressures as they have been in the past. As the 
possibility of their companies becoming takeover targets has become more tangible in 
recent years, German managers have already begun to respond to the pressures from 
the financial market and be more aware of outside shareholder interests. 
The case of Daimler Benz's reorganisation in the early 1990s and its 
subsequent merger with Chrysler may indeed constitute an illustration of the way the 
new economic environment may affect corporate governance through the global 
333 A similar situation also arose in Pirelli's hostile takeover attempt for Continental in 1990. While 
Deutsche Bank had advised Pirelli on the potential merger with the German company, it later used 
Morgan Grenfell, its London-based investment banking subsidiary, to help Continental's management 
during the takeover battle. At that time the chairman of Continental Ulrich WeiB was also a Vorstand 
member in Deutsche Bank. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1990). 
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market for corporate control. Under the leadership of Jurgen Schrempp, who 
succeeded Edzard Reuter, a long lasting conglorneratisation strategy of the firm came 
to an end in 1995. The new CEO, with the strong encouragement of Deutsche 
Bank, 334 one of the main shareholders, implemented a restructuring strategy that 
would make Daimler Benz leaner and more focused on its main operations by 
spinning off unprofitable businesses. This process, combined with the company's 
increased stock liquidity after its listing on the NYSE in 1993 and the reduction of 
Deutsche Bank's stake in 1994, rendered Daimler-Benz more exposed to the market 
for corporate control. 
335 
While the goal of capturing the US market cannot be ignored, the fear of a 
takeover may have also been one of the reasons behind Daimler's merger with the 
American carmaker Chrysler in 1998, the largest industrial merger in history at the 
time. The vast size of the merged entity, DaimlerChrysler, could stave off any 
potential predator. Nevertheless, even if this merger could be characterised as a 
managerial entrenchment move, the final outcome is by no means one that increased 
managerial discretion. At first sight the transaction appeared to be an effective 
acquisition of Chrysler by the German company (Logue and Seward 1999: 105). 
True, Daimler's shareholders now own the majority of DaimlerChrysler shares. 
Nevertheless, the largest group immediately after the merger was by far American 
investors owning approximately 44% of the outstanding stock, compared to about 
37% German-owned shares. Subsequently, US ownership declined to about 25% 
(Ball 1999). However, the most important sequence from the merger has been the 
... Deutsche Bank, who also faced a performance decline at the time, arguably benefited from 
Dain-fler's restructuring and increased profitability. See Logue and Seward (1999: 93). The bank's 
attitude also signifies the change in relationships between financial and non-financial firms that has 
been occurring in Germany. 
335 The NYSE listing can also be seen in the context of Deutsche Bank wanting to dispose its 
shareholding in Daimler. 
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dilution and globalisation of share ownership. For instance, Deutsche Bank's stake in 
DaimlerChrysler is now a mere 13% with the remaining shares being distributed 
among numerous foreign and domestic investors. In sum, the company that has 
emerged from the merger with its multiple listings in New York, London and 
Frankfurt constitutes a significant departure from the German-style stable and passive 
ownership patterns towards a more uncommitted and return-on-equity oriented 
shareholder structure. 
On the other hand, even if the German corporate establishment's attitudes 
have not been transformed completely so as to have a wave of hostile acquisitions, 
foreign predators may fill the gap. In the past, foreign companies have found it 
difficult to launch an unsolicited offer for a German listed company. 336 To see such 
an attempt ending within a couple of months with success for the bidder would have 
been unthinkable. Vodafone's bid for Mannesmann in October 1999, however, was to 
change all this. Not only was it the first time a foreign company's hostile takeover bid 
for a German listed firm ended successfully, but also the target was one of Gen-nany's 
largest and best performing conglomerate firms based in the "heart of German 
capitalism", Nordrhein-Westphalen, home of the most important companies in the 
steel industry such as Krupp-Thyssen. Consequently, the whole affair deserves 
particular attention as the most significant evidence of the global market for corporate 
control's impact in Germany. 
Before Vodafone's bid, Mannesmann, had been in the process of restructuring 
by splitting its unprofitable steel operations from its highly successful fixed-line and 
mobile telecommunications services and focusing on the latter. This strategy, 
however, gave rise to the possibility of the company becoming a takeover target since 
336 This is exemplified by Pirelli's bid for Continental, which not only lasted for two and a half years 
but also ended unsuccessfully. See supra. note 333. 
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a potential buyer could spin off operations with low short-term returns more easily 
(Barber 1999a). A global issue in 1998 of 20.7 million new shares, 48.4 percent of 
which was absorbed by non-German investors5 was also significant, as it contributed 
to the global dispersion of the company's shareholdings. Subsequently, Mannesmann 
acquired the British mobile operator Orange in spite of CEO Klaus Esser's public 
statement that he would "not be bound in any decisions by consideration of whether 
they leave [the company] more vulnerable" (ibid. ). Obviously, Esser was aware of the 
possibility of a hostile takeover attempt for his company - Vodafone being the main 
potential bidder at the time - and thus hoped that the deal with Orange would serve as 
poison pill for anyone who would try to acquire Mannesmann, since it would trigger 
EU competition and German company law rules (Rivlin et al. 1999; Financial Times 
1999a; Barber 1999a; H6pner and Jackson 2001). 
All this, however, was not sufficient to inhibit Vodafone. On the contrary, the 
Orange purchase was Perceived as an aggressive move against it within its home 
market. In response, and after the failure of negotiations for a friendly takeover, 
Vodafone launched an C 119 billion all-share offer for the Gennan group. 337 Esser 
rejected the offer as "weak and extremely risky for [Mannesmann's] shareholders" 
(Larsen 1999) and began a defensive campaign. 338 The reactions from politicians as 
well as employee representatives were immediate and critical of Vodafone's move. 
IG Metall, Gen-nany's most powerful union, mobilised the workforce through its 
representative on Mannesmann's Aufsichtsrat but did not call for a strike, while 
Wolfgang Clement, State Prime Minister, and the German Chancellor Schr6der were 
dismayed. The latter declared that hostile bids destroy the culture of the target 
337 Therefore, Vodafone's takeover of Mannesmann can be regarded as a defensive acquisition of a 
competitor; see section 2.4.2 above. 
131 In December 1999 a group of minority shareholders led by Adreas Dinike, a lawyer in Hamburg, 
filed a lawsuit against Mannesmann's management claiming that its defensive tactics were prejudicial 
to shareholders' interests. 
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company and that hostile bidders "underestimate the virtue of co-detertnination" 
(Larsen et al. 1999). Nevertheless, they did nothing to block the bid. The fate of the 
largest hostile bid in history was to be decided solely by shareholders. For Germany 
this was perceived as a breakthrough point, especially when Schr6der's interference 
in the battle between Krupp and Thyssen two years earlier, when he was state prime 
minister, is taken into account. The relatively muted response from the political, 
industrial, labour and financial circles was indicative that within just two years a 
significant change in mentality and attitude towards shareholder supremacy had 
occurred. 
Thus, on February 3,2000, Esser gave in under the pressure from the majority 
of Mannesmann's shareholders (Handelsblatt Interactiv 1999k) and eventually agreed 
to the takeover after a slight improvement in Vodafone's offer. 339A significant factor 
for the final result of the bid was Mannesmann's ownership structure. Not only were 
shareholders dispersed - the largest blockholder owned 10% of the shares - but also 
62% of them were foreign. Most significantly about 40% of them were American or 
British as opposed to a 39% of German shareholders. Nevertheless, even the latter, 
most of whom were institutional investors, were not supportive of Esser and his 
management team's effort to oppose the takeover, as they had begun dumping their 
shares on the market even before the final agreement was reached (Boland et al. 
2000). 
It could be argued that Mannesmann finally "paid" for the shareholder value 
orientation it followed, since by separating its profitable telecommunications business 
from the seamless steel pipes and tubes activities in order, to use Esser's words, to 
339 According to the original offer, Mannesmann's shareholders would receive 47.2% of the shares in 
the merged entity. Esser agreed after Vodafone raised its offer by an additional 2.3% and agreed to 
retain the fixed-line operations. See Handelsblatt Interactiv (2000c). 
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"create value for the shareholders', 340 it became a takeover target. It also paid for the 
decision to base its expansion upon funds raised in stock markets at home and abroad. 
In addition, the acquisition of Orange, a company with dispersed foreign 
shareholders, contributed even further to the globalisation of Mannesmann's 
shareholder base. In general, the Vodafone-Mannesmann affair serves as a prime 
illustration of how the opportunities and challenges of globalisation can translate into 
change in national corporate governance systems. It is plausible to suggest that the 
Vodafone-Mannesmann takeover will not be the last one. As German companies 
increasingly resort to the national and foreign capital markets, incidents similar to the 
Mannesmann or even the Thyssen-Krupp takeover are bound to reoccur. 
However, the battle has not been decisively won in favour of shareholder 
supremacy. On the one hand the elimination of voting rights defences by the 
KonTraG, the adoption of more transparent accounting standards, the changing role 
of banks and the abolition of capital gains tax constitute important institutional 
changes that expose managers to the market for corporate control. On the other hand, 
however, the new Obernahmegesetz, mainly a response to the Vodafone- 
Mannesmann takeover, reveals that the forces of path dependence in the area of 
takeovers in Germany are still strong. In other words, even though micro-interference 
by the government is diminishing, typical Soziale Marktwirtschaft-type protective 
macro-coordination has now been introduced. 
Therefore, it seems that, as regards the future occurrence of hostile takeovers 
in Germany, a lot will depend on the structure, identity and influence of shareholders, 
foreign and domestic. The most important developments in this respect are the 
gradual liquidation of cross-shareholdings and the institutionalisation of listed shares, 
340 Cited in Barder (1999a). 
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which signify the replacement of traditional patient shareholdings by more retum-on- 
equity oriented ones. Combined with the diminishing support of banks for managers, 
if these developments continue, they may even counterbalance the managerialist 
effect of the Obernahmegesetz. The changing attitudes of shareholders in German 
companies and the role of the stock market in transmitting their expectations to 
managers are discussed next. 
3.8.3. Rising Significance of the Stock Market as a Channel of Direct and 
Indirect Shareholder Influence 
Despite the fact that the number of listed companies in Germany is still 
relatively small compared to the US or the UK, the number of initial public offerings 
(IPOs) has shown a dramatic increase in the past two years. While in 1997 there were 
merely 33 IPOs, in 1998 the total was 78, while there were 86 during the first half of 
1999 alone (DAI 1999). According to DAI's estimates, some 1,500 German firms 
could go public in the near future (Rosen 1999). 
341 The Neuer Markt's contribution is 
of great significance. While the total number of companies listed there was 41 in 
1998ý by July 1999 listings had trebled reaching 124 (Deutsche Mrse Group 1999: 
25; Handelsblatt Interactiv 1999d). The mere fact that small and medium-sized 
German companies are willing to comply with the stricter disclosure ruleS342 in the 
Neuer Markt is evidence of the changing perceptions among managers towards 
outside-shareholder interests. 
34 1 Although the recent collapse in world markets has definitely had a significant effect on these 
estimates. 
342 Companies listed on this market are required to prepare their financial statements on a quarterly 
basis and in accordance with the IAS, the US GAAP, or the German GAAP with reconciliation. 
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German listings on foreign stock markets are still relatively few but they 
comprise companies with major influence such as Deutsche Bank, Daimler-Benz, 
Allianz, Deutsche Telecom, Hoescht and Siemens. 343 It appears that those companies 
that decide to expand their international activities and achieve the status of a global 
company need to list their shares on a major (Anglo-American) stock market and 
exploit the broader investor base and larger liquidity available therein. Such a move, 
however, entails two major implications. The first is the adoption of financial 
reporting an disclosure standards that are required in those markets. This is 
particularly the case in the NYSE where all firms have to adopt the US-GAAP with 
the already discussed consequences for managerial discretion. The second implication 
is that companies listed on Anglo-American stock markets have to adapt to the 
demands of the investor communities therein mainly comprised of institutional 
investors (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2 above). For instance, the large gap between the 
12.8% average return on equity of German companies and the 23.2% of their US 
competitors (see Figure 3.9 below) creates significant pressures on the former to 
focus more on current shareholder value creation. The following quote illustrates this: 
One of the largest investment houses in the world. The displaying board in the 
waiting area shows tightly organised appointments: "ten o'clock Schering, 
eleven o'clock Karstandt, twelve o'clock BASF". Like schoolboys, the 
finance directors of the powerful German companies wait for their turn. In the 
analysts' department one hour of embarrassing interrogation begins. The 
young investment experts, often not more that 30 years old, know no respect 
for the company bosses; they only know about return on capital: "Your 
division xy only brings 6 percent. Why did they not get rid of that a long time 
ago? " The cross-examination lasts exactly one hour. Then the finance director 
is dismissed. He has not even reached the door when the analyst turns to the 
343 Deutsche Bank, Veba, Daimler-Benz, DaimlerChrysler, Deutsche Telekom, Adidas, Fresenius 
Medical Care, Hoechst, Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology, SAP, SGL Carbon, RWE (ADRs) are already 
listed in NYSE, whereas Siemens, BASF, Schering and Allianz intend to list in the near future. The 
German companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are Allianz, BASF, Bayer, Commerzbank, 
Deutsche Bank, Hoescht, Schering, Siemens, ThyssenKrupp, Volkswagen. 
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investment banker in the comer and dictates his decision: "Alright, we buy 
$30million of Schering shares today. " (Wetzel 1997, author's translation) 
Furthermore, the infiltration of shareholder supremacy in German decision- 
making does not result only from foreign listings. The influx of foreign investors into 
the German stock market, with US and UK institutions counting for over 70% of the 
foreign funds invested in 1999, also has an impact on managerial values (Table 3.11). 
As early as in 1993 about 40% of traded shares in German companies were owned by 
foreigners and this has continued to rise (Financial Times 1993). Cross-border M&As 
such as the merger of Daimler with Chrysler and the takeover of Mannesmann by 
Vodafone also contribute to the globalisation of shareholdings. 
This does not mean that foreign (institutional) investors have already become 
major players in Gennan corporate governance. Their holdings are usually too small 
to effect any direct changes and most of them follow passive indexing strategies. 
However, some foreign institutional investors such as the California Public 
Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), who are known for their activist policies 
in their countries, have already had an effect in Germany. As the first incident of 
foreign shareholder activism Bendt (1998) identifies CalPERS' proposal at RWE's 
annual general meeting in 1992 for the abolition of the multiple voting rights owned 
by German local authorities. 344 Wenger and Kaserer (1997) also report that corporate 
failures in Germany have also generated criticism from Anglo-American investors 
who have threatened to withdraw their funds unless German companies improved 
their internal and external controls. 
"' See also Waller and Dickson (1992). 
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Table 3.11. Total Investments in German Equities in DM Billion. 
Year Total Foreign Investments UK Investments US Investments 
1 
Purchases Sales Balance Purchases Sales Balance Purchases Sales Balance 
1988 53,9 48,3 5,6 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1991 86 82,9 3,1 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1993 171,3 162,7 8,6 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1994 167 165)7 1,3 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1995 160,9 162,6 -1ý7 87,4 87,5 -0,2 15,2 14,6 0,6 
1996 237,6 215,5 22,1 133,1 120,4 12,7 27,8 19,4 8,4 
1997 385,5 358 27,5 187,7 182,4 5,3 39,9 40,7 -0,8 
11998 1 652,1 554,9 97,2 309,9 292,4 17,5 116,4 63,8 52,6 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1999c). 
In 1996, having seen the positive results of its governance strategy at home, 
CalPERS decided to gradually expand its activism in foreign companies too. Thus, it 
formulated specific corporate governance principles that should be followed by 
companies in a number of countries, one of which is Germany (CalPERS 1996). 
345 
Other, American investors have also attempted to intervene from time to time (Andre 
1998: 73). However, the CalPERS initiative is the first systematic effort to steer 
established board practices in German companies in order to promote shareholder 
supremacy. It has already started publishing target-lists of German companies with 
governance standards that do not satisfy its principles. Most importantly it appears 
that the US pension fund intends to co-operate with domestic shareholder associations 
and activists. It is not coincidental that in Principle 2 of its International Governance 
Policy CalPERS calls for German companies to adopt and support the corporate 
governance recommendations of the German shareholder association DSW which ask 
for improvements in the Aufsichtsrat and the General Meeting auditors' 
independence, transparency in banks' proxy voting, and focus on shareholder 
345 other major countries targeted by CalPERS include Japan, France and the UK. 
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value. 346 Indeed, it was with the help of this particular shareholder association and 
other local shareholders that CalPERS finally effected the adoption of the one share- 
one vote principle in RWE (Atkins 1998). 
This, mainly imported, phenomenon of shareholder activism is gradually 
gaining momentum even amongst domestic investors. There have, of course, been 
voices for increased shareholder protection and influence before CalPERS' 
systematic involvement. For instance, Professor Ekkerhart Wegner of Wiirzburg 
Universtdt has been a critic of Gennan corporate governance and an activist on 
several occasions during the 1990s. 347 However, with the exception of DSW, such 
incidents were isolated and constituted evidence of minority shareholders' 
aggravation rather than a systematic campaign of outside shareholders to change 
corporate governance in Germany. Nonetheless, more recently the shareholder 
movement appears to also involve large investors such as the DWS, Deutsche Bank's 
powerful mutual fund, which in January 2000 commissioned the creation of a ranking 
list for German blue chip firms based on their corporate governance record (Davis 
Global Advisors 2000). The main criteria were quality of disclosure, extent of 
performance-linked remuneration, Aufsichtsrdte quality and minority shareholder 
rights. This initiative constitutes a breakthrough for shareholder activism in Germany 
as it is the first time a target list is formulated domestically and it is also backed by 
the largest mutual fund in Germany with assets of DM87 billion. The list is used by 
DWS and other investors or shareholders' associations as a guide for their investment 
and targeting strategies. 
346 See www. das-wertpapier. de. 
347 He is a member of Verein zur F6rderung der Aktiondrsdemokratie (VFA), an association of small 
shareholders which in 1996 filed a law suit against Daimler's management for incorrect presentation of 
the company's situation at the 1995 General Meeting. He has also brought an action in the same year 
against Deutsche Bank seeking the disclosure of the bank's hidden reserves See Wenger and Kaserer 
(1997). 
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The role of Anglo-American institutional investors in this movement of 
shareholder activism that is slowly beginning to challenge company boardrooms in 
Germany is clear. It is not only the direct involvement of institutions, such as 
CalPERS, that has set the German corporate governance agenda for the near future. It 
is also their indirect influence, as German institutional investors and shareholder 
associations have begun to adopt policies and methods that some Anglo-American 
institutions have been following since the beginning of the 1990s in the UK and the 
US. Most importantly, the channels of co-operation between domestic and 
international activists that are gradually being established will be important drivers of 
change in corporate Germany. 
3.8.4. Managers' Response and the Development of the Shareholder Value 
Concept in Germany 
The preceding discussion examined how the new (global) economic 
circumstances have been affecting the institutional environment and through that the 
position of managers as controllers of Germany's largest and most influential 
corporations. While some formal path dependent institutions such as codetermination 
and takeover regulation have remained rigid, evidence was also provided showing 
that banks are distancing themselves from the old cosy relationships with their 
industrial clients, thus exposing company managers to external market pressures. 
Simultaneously, international and domestic shareholder activists have begun 
demanding an enhanced role in corporate governance in order to maximise their 
investment returns and minimise their risks. Therefore, the question that arises is what 
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the managers' response has been to these changes in the institutional context of 
corporate decision-making? That is, have they started accommodating shareholders' 
interests in their decision-making to a greater extent than in the past by focusing more 
on maximising shareholder value as opposed to balancing stakeholder interests? 
The first observation that can be made is that the same conflict that arose in 
hostile bids with traditional business practice has also been present during the 
incorporation of the shareholder value concept in German corporate governance. Of 
course, in a hostile takeover the impact on the target company and its workforce is 
usually much more drastic and immediate than where there is a gradual re-orientation 
of business strategy. Even the decision by a "core" company, such as Daimler-Benz, 
to focus on shareholder value could not attract the same immediate attention of the 
public as a hostile bid for Thyssen or Mannesman and lead to government 
intervention. Nonetheless, in the long run the departure from long-establi shed, 
consensus-based practice can have significant effects on different stakeholders; 
clearly, the adoption of shareholder value is a process of re-balancing intra-firm 
interests in favour of current shareholders. Thus, as the concept of shareholder value 
had begun to take root during the first half of the 1990s, with a number of companies 
embracing it as a benchmark for their strategies, 
348 by 1996 criticism by labour 
representatives (Munchau 1997), the press, 
349 academia, 350 but also by some reluctant 
348 Daimler-Benz, Veba and Hoechst were the pioneers. Until 1995, they had all undertaken large 
restructuring programmes aiming for the maximisation of shareholder value. Many others 
followed 
and begun to see the first results in their share yields, which were higher than those of companies that 
did not embrace shareholder value. See Price Waterhouse (1997). 
349 See Munchau (1996) and Financial Times (1996) emphasising the conflict between shareholder 
value and the interests of the workforce and the society at large. 
350 See Werder (1998) for a critical view of the shareholder value concept questioning even its 
admissibility under German law. 
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senior managers, 35 1 begun to intensify. The real impact of these reactions, however, is 
not very clear. 
The case of Daimler is indicative. After its listing on the NYSE in 1993, 
Daimler-Benz officially announced its commitment to the principle of shareholder 
value maximisation. Under the guidance of a new Vorstand chairman, Rirgen 
Schrempp, the company gradually cut thousands of jobs worldwide, 80,000 of which 
were in Gen-nany, and transfonned itself into a "technology" group by divesting its 
non-core activities (Logue and Seward 2000). However, the criticism by the 
workforce, who also had the support of the press, was so severe that Daimler had to 
reconsider its new focus and Schrempp had to announce that the term shareholder 
value would not be used by the company in Germany but would be replaced by the 
more moderate "company value" (Werder 1998: 69). Nonetheless, under Schrempp 
Daimler-Benz continued to focus on shareholder value maximisation, 
According to White and Coleman's (1998) report, as the merger with Chrysler was 
being finalised the "company value" pretence was dropped with the implementation 
of $3 billion cost savings involving a contraction of total employment in order to 
boost the share price. 
Thus, despite some initial criticisms, DaimlerChrysler as well as an increasing 
number of German firms have continued to implement and expand their shareholder 
value-oriented policies even if they come under the term "corporate" or "enterprise 
value" instead (Vitols 2000; Rirgens et al. 2000). This is shown by the continuation of 
extensive restructuring programmes involving spin-offs of businesses and layoffs 
(Economist 1998: 63), the commitment to higher disclosure standards with the 
adoption of the US GAAP or the IAS. 
35 1 Note for instance Hermann Franz, Siemens' A ufsichtsrat chairman, who commented: "All you need 
to do is announce that you make 20,000 workers redundant and your share price will go up" (author's 
translation) cited in Werder (1998: 70). 
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Many recently implemented legal changes concerning voting, corporate 
disclosure, accounting, executive compensation, capital gains tax and so on have 
certainly facilitated the adoption of a shareholder value orientation by Gennan 
companies. For instance, in the previous section it was mentioned that extensive share 
buy-back programmes and an increasing number of executive stock option plans have 
been adopted since the KonTraG came into force. The amendments to the law 
governing financial statements have also had an important impact on corporate 
governance culture. Thus, while in 1993 the adoption of the US GAAP by Daimler 
Benz was perceived as an "unpatriotic betrayal" of German corporate culture (Riley 
1993), such a move by a company is now welcomed as a positive move towards 
transparency. Moreover, most listed companies have now become more active in 
enhancing their relations with global investors by publishing their annual reports in 
English, and by organising international road shows or private meetings with investor 
representatives, analysts and journalists. 
Thus, it now seems that, despite some initial setbacks, the principle of 
shareholder value is gaining wider acceptance by managers in Germany. Indeed, 
Figure 3.9 reveals an identifiable reorientation of managerial goals with return-on- 
equity maximisation gradually becoming a basic benchmark for company 
performance and a tendency towards convergence to US retum-on-equity levels. 
Even companies like Siemens, that until very recently were categorically opposed to 
the concept of shareholder value, 352 have now embraced it as a rule of thumb. 
Europe's largest electronics group realised that its planned listing on the NYSE would 
352 See Hermann Franz's comment, ibid. 
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not materialise unless a restructuring program aiming to increase shareholder value 
was implemented (Handelblatt Interactiv I 999C). 353 
Figure 3.9. Return on Equity and Capital in US and German Companies, 1993- 
1995. 
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Source: Berdt (1998), Figure 4. 
Nevertheless, this is still the beginning since German companies still lag 
behind their US and British counterparts in maximising value for their shareholders. 
Certainly, some firms, e. g. Deutsche Telecom, have already distributed payouts as 
much as 84% of their profits, but this practice is by no means universal (Handelsblatt 
Interactiv 1998b). It is indicative that in 1998 only 7 of the DAX 100 firms had 
implemented the shareholder value concept to strategic business areas (Handelsblatt 
Interactiv 1998a). This is because the full implementation of the concept below 
Vorstand level is a time-consuming process involving sweeping changes in corporate 
culture at all levels. This is exposed by the still relatively small number of firms 
worldwide that have fully implemented such policies (ibid). It seems that micro-level 
path dependence dynamics should not be overlooked when examining corporate 
governance change. 
353 The intensified pressure from shareholders was also an important factor; see Handelsblatt Interactiv 
(1999b). 
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However, the fact that managers of "core" German corporations have begun to 
refocus their decision-making process by increasingly attributing shareholder interests 
a paramount importance over other stakeholders can by no means be ignored. It is 
simultaneously a cause and an effect of the macro-level institutional changes 
described in the preceding sections, which seem to have created an evolutionary 
trajectory away from the traditional consensus based governance practice despite the 
rigidity of codetermination and takeover laws. It seems that it is this reorientation of 
managerial objectives that drives the functional changes undermining formal 
industrial relations institutions as described in section 3.5 above. This in itself reveals 
a workability problem emerging in the German corporate governance system, which 
is also evidenced by the increasing unemployment and the persistent economic 
slowdown since the 1990s. 
3.9. CONCLUSIONS AND PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
This chapter has examined the interaction between the forces of global 
isomorphism and German corporate governance institutions. It was shown that, while 
in the outsider models of the UK and the US the institutionalisation of shareholder 
supremacy took place relatively early, the equivalent process in the German insider 
system has proved slower and more cumbersome. 
Firstly, it was shown that the most radical changes so far have taken place 
within the financial system as the role of securities markets in the mobilisation of 
savings has been gaining importance over the past two decades. As the liberalisation 
of capital controls progressed after the demise of the Bretton Woods exchange rate 
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regime, the interaction between domestic and foreign financial markets through 
regulatory arbitrage created a need for the gradual deregulation and reregulation of 
the German financial system according to a more market-oriented model. 
Simultaneously, increasing pressures on the German pension system, not least due to 
high unemployment, have also stimulated investment by households in securities 
either directly or indirectly through institutional investors in order to face the 
uncertainties of future retirement. Significantly, institutional control of financial 
assets also implies a change in equity ownership, though at a slow pace, with 
institutional investors gaining more influence as owners of stock. Certainly, this 
process is still in its early stages, but imminent pension reforms are bound to have a 
more visible effect. Another significant factor bringing shareholder structure changes 
has been the abolition of the capital gains tax, a measure that used to be an enormous 
obstacle to the liquidation of large shareholdings. 
Simultaneous to the development of securities markets have also been legal 
reforms aiming for the enhancement of outside investor protection. These have given 
the German system a more outside-shareholder orientation since, by increasing 
information flows towards market investors, they aim at constraining the ability of 
insiders to extract private benefits. Moreover, they have removed legal obstacles for 
current shareholder value maximisation tools such as share repurchases and ESOP 
awards to managers. These legal changes have followed and been followed by 
functional transformations resulting from financial and non-financial firms' efforts to 
meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities of financial globalisation. Overall, 
vertically complementary legal and non-legal institutional changes have been undoing 
parts of the system that supported German managerialism by opening up corporate 
governance to outside shareholder influence either directly or via the national market 
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and global for corporate control. The Krupp-Thyssen and Vodafone-Mannesmann 
takeovers are clear illustrations of this. 
However, the institutional reaction to the latter affair also demonstrates that 
path dependence forces have also been very strong within parts of the German system 
as they have resulted in a regulatory backlash with the enactment of the 
Ubernahmegesetz. Similarly, legal industrial relations institutions have not only 
withstood pressure, but have even been strengthened by the BetrVerjReformgesetz, 
despite significant functional changes, such as the adoption of global production 
strategies by large employers and the contraction of the workforce covered by 
collective agreements and works councils. This conforms only with the first part of 
Coffee's argument that if global convergence to an outside shareholder system of 
corporate governance can take place, it will begin from changes in "technicall" 
securities regulation institutions and not from less technical ones that have 
immediately visible repercussions for the vested interests of labour or managers. But 
just as it was predicted in section 2.4.2, complementarities between different sub- 
systems can prevent full convergence even in the sphere of securities regulation, so 
that cumulative change stops short of producing a new workable system; the decisive 
factor is how complex institutional interactions resolve themselves each time. 
Thus, the issue that arises is whether the transformations that have already 
taken place are sufficient to sustain a cumulative causation process of systemic 
change that will push the German corporate governance system away from its 
traditional managerialist path by establishing shareholder supremacy or another less 
workable model. As already explained, the outcome will depend on the nature of 
interactions between the remaining old institutions that have been supporting the 
stakeholder consensus in German managerialism and those newly implemented 
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enhancing the role of outsiders. The critical issue is whether the consensus between 
stakeholders within and outside the finn, two levels that are closely connected in 
Germany, remains intact as the backbone of corporate governance. If that breaks 
down because one particular constituency such as the shareholders is in a better 
position to enforce its objectives, according to the workability concept, 
complementary adaptation in labour markets will be needed. If the latter does not take 
place, Germany will end up with an unworkable hybrid system. 
To some extent this chapter has provided evidence showing that, following the 
reorientation of institutional incentives, there is a redefinition of managerial 
objectives which leads to the erosion of the stakeholder consensus that characterised 
German managerialism in the past. Shareholder value has already gained some 
acceptance within large corporations as a reflection of significant changes in 
managerial constraints enhancing the position of outside shareholders. Moreover, 
there have been signs of a simultaneous degeneration of commitment in industrial 
relations from the employers' side. On the other hand, formal labour market 
institutions have been maintained and strengthened, albeit with a de facto diminishing 
scope. The combined effect has been high levels of unemployment and a division 
within labour between those with a (protected) job and those without one, at a time 
when the ability of government to compensate the latter is limited. Macro-economic 
growth and current account surpluses - or rather the lack of them - cannot 
compensate for unemployment as they did during the post-war era. 
Resulting 
aggregate demand problems further intensify the pressures on 
German managerialism 
and complete the vicious circle of slow growth which can only 
be broken by 
increasing reliance on foreign effective demand - something that is problematic since 
markets for German exports already seem saturated. In sum, these are signs that 
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recent changes triggered by globalisation have a negative effect on the German 
system's workability. If the globalisation process continues in its current form and the 
unemployment problem persists or intensifies, the long-term result may be that the 
adaptation costs even of path dependent institutions will decrease so that further 
moves towards the outside shareholder system can be anticipated. Whether this 
happens or not, the German corporate governance system as that was described in 
section 3.4, cannot work in the context of a globalising world economy; a conclusion 
that is consistent with the prediction of this thesis that globalisation undermines the 
sustainability of managerialism. 
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CHAPTER4 
CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this thesis has been to follow the evolution of corporate 
governance in the manager-controlled firm within the context of the current economic 
globalisation wave. After an extensive overview of the most influential theories 
developed to explain the nature of the firm it was argued that two competing visions 
of the corporation emerge: one that is based on the shareholder supremacy principle 
and that gives the corporation no real existence separate from its shareholders, and 
another that relies on managerial discretion as a tool for pursuing the corporate 
interest which cannot be identified with the interests of any particular stakeholder 
type. The former vision largely relies on justifications provided by neoclassical 
economic theory, while the latter draws on the institutionalist critique that models 
based on perfect markets assumptions are unable to provide any realistic conclusions 
about economic coordination. It is due to this lack of realism in neoclassical theory 
that this thesis has adopted the institutionalist methodology for the analysis of 
corporate governance by allowing the existence of market imperfections and 
transaction costs. 
In section 1.4 a corporate governance system was conceived as the nexus of 
institutions determining the policy choices of those vested with the corporate control 
function. It was also argued that each particular system is characterised by a whole 
web of institutional forces the resultant of which detennines the nature of corporate 
governance. It was then attempted to place the two visions of the corporation within 
their institutional contexts as static constellations of institutions shaping corporate 
decision-making. The aim of this "comparative statics" analysis was to investigate 
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how institutions determine corporate governance according to the shareholder 
supremacy or the managerialist ideal. Firstly, it was argued that, while company law 
through its basic doctrines could have easily ascertained the nature of the firm 
according to each of the two visions, it is so flexibly designed that where share- 
ownership and control are de facto separated it becomes indeterminate. Thus, a 
broader approach was adopted with the identification of three general component sub- 
systems of institutional constraints comprising each corporate governance system: the 
financial system, the industrial relations system and macroeconomic and competition 
policy institutions. It was argued that, given extensive vertical and horizontal 
complementarities within and between sub-systems, where the link between share- 
ownership and control does not exist two workable but not perfectly efficient 
systemic equilibria emerge corresponding to the two visions of the corporation. 
In the first, the institutional framework emphasises market transactions by 
promoting the externalisation of corporate functions, such as corporate finance, 
human resources planning and competition, and tends to align managerial decision- 
making to the interests of shareholders mainly through the market for corporate 
control. In the second workable equilibrium there is a tendency towards the 
internalisation of corporate functions by the corporate organisation with enhanced 
managerial discretion being a crucial element for the sustainability of this sort of 
coordination. The crucial difference between these two institutional equilibria, i. e. the 
shareholder-oriented and the managerial, is that the former emphasises lack of 
commitment between stakeholders and exit from corporate relationships, whereas the 
latter relies on stakeholder commitment and voice. It is due to this difference that the 
managerial paradigm is more susceptible to price competition which involves cost- 
cuttings that may affect stakeholder relationships and therefore more reliant on stable 
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but relatively high macroeconomic growth rates and effective demand. The 
shareholder-oriented model, on the other hand, is more flexible and therefore less 
vulnerable to cost-based competition or adverse demand conditions. A central 
hypothesis of this project was that this fundamental difference between the two 
systems is a decisive factor behind their ability to survive within the current context 
of economic globalisation. 
As chapter 2 argued, since the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates and the subsequent abolition of capital movements restrictions, the 
world economy entered a process of gradual integration, especially in foreign 
exchange and short-term financial markets. This was combined with the lack of trade 
flows coordination, a relic of the post-war trade liberalisation regime under GATT. 
The result has been an overall increase of market forces as the medium of the world 
economy's coordination. Certainly, Chicago School economics would welcome this 
development and ask for further removals of government sponsored economic 
coordination institutions which it tends to regard as elements distorting the smooth 
operation of the market. However, once the reality of imperfect markets is 
acknowledged, the globalisation process as it has been evolving in recent years leads 
to increased economic instability due to recurrent imbalances and to slower economic 
growth. Resulting redefinition of opportunities and challenges as perceived by 
economic agents have an equivalent effect on stakeholder relationships that were 
established during the pre-globalisation golden age years of high growth and full 
employment. The gradual removal of economic barriers has brought national 
corporate governance systems in competition with each other with increasing 
emphasis being placed on cost-reductions and short-term investments due to slower 
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growth of aggregate demand and increased volatility. As it was mentioned above, this 
has a negative impact on the workability of managerial models. 
Consequently, as the globalisation process continues, growth-oriented and 
demand-dependent managerial systems are subjected to increasing pressures to 
accommodate the new competitive challenges by redesigning important institutional 
configurations in a more flexible manner across national systems. This flexibility is 
antithetical to stakeholder commitment and the internalisation of corporate functions. 
Thus, adaptation to globalisation forces implies a trend towards a corporate 
govemance model that resembles the Jensenian nexus-of-contracts paradigm where 
the firm is regarded as nothing more than a market. Competition in world markets 
may be gradually giving rise to a process of global isomorphism which forces 
national systems to adopt common institutions which seek to entrench the shareholder 
supremacy principle not because it is the most efficient solution but simply due to the 
more flexible character of the Jensenian model and the increased bargaining power of 
uncommitted outside shareholders and investors in general. The dilemma between 
high employment with low wages and low employment with high wages -especially 
for those with low skills- undermines the ability of labour to counterbalance power 
differentials that tend to favour capital. The main factor contributing to this is that 
while financial or factor capital is becoming increasingly mobile across national 
borders, labour remains geographically fixed. As a result, the more systems converge 
towards a shareholder-oriented model, the higher the ability of shareholders to 
expropriate employees' investments. That is, capital mobility renders labour the main 
adaptation cost bearer. 
Nonetheless, while these pressures on corporate governance systems are real 
and often rather intense, different national systems do not necessarily adapt in the 
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same manner or to the same extent due to differences in their internal dynamics. 
Diverse institutional complementarities lead to differences in the allocation of 
adaptation costs and thus give a national "flavour" to the forces of global 
isomorphism. That is, cumulative causation cycles of institutional change differ both 
in scale and in scope depending on the balance between forces of path dependence 
and change transmitted through institutional complementarities within each system. 
As a result, complete convergence of corporate governance systems towards the same 
shareholder model, as a global choice cannot be guaranteed at least in the near future. 
In the meantime, provided the globalisation process continues in its current form, it is 
more realistic to expect that some national systems will converge more and others 
less, with changes in less path dependent areas such as financial markets and 
securities regulation taking precedence. However, due to workability problems even 
those systems that do not completely transform will probably have to face the 
dilemma of further adaptation towards what is perceived as global practice or of 
persistent underperformance. Where the general negative welfare effects of 
workability problems exceed the costs arising from the uncertain consequences of 
further systemic adaptation, convergence should be expected to progress. Ironically, 
this implies that those systems that are characterised by the highest levels of adaptive 
efficiency will be the first ones to converge towards a less efficient model of slow 
growth and unbalanced economic development. 
In order to assess the validity of these insights, in chapter 3 the German 
system of corporate governance was used as a case study. The analysis of institutional 
arrangements influencing corporate decision-making revealed that, at least until the 
1980s, managers of large German corporations have enjoyed considerable discretion. 
Moreover, numerous constraints, especially board representation and labour market 
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institutions, have been supporting a consensus between stakeholders, such as banks, 
shareholders, employees and affiliated firms, which has been the driving force behind 
managers' motivation to pursue the corporate interest. Generally, the German 
corporate governance system has been based on the element of commitment between 
stakeholders who have been forming inside relationships with the corporation. This 
important role of insiders is what makes German corporate governance particularly 
interesting as a subject matter, since it means that systemic adaptation to an outside- 
shareholder model should be more complicated than it would be for outsider- 
managerial models. Indeed, while in outsider systems such as those in the UK and the 
US shareholder supremacy became the dominant governance norm since about the 
mid 1980s, in Germany institutional adaptation has been taking longer as it has to go 
through more stages. 
The first pressures from global isomorphism on the German system occurred 
in the area of monetary policy as a result of increased capital flows, which then 
spread to the financial system giving it a more market-oriented character with 
securities markets gaining significance as intermediated credit became a smaller 
source of corporate finance for large firms. Subsequent reregulation efforts and 
gradual redefinition of financial relationships between banks and industry seeking to 
endure increasing competition and exploit the opportunities of globalisation have 
been mutually reinforcing in altering the constraints on managerial decision-making 
and in enhancing the governance role of outsiders vis-a-vis insiders. While the lack of 
liquid US-style shareholdings still remains a general characteristic of the German 
system, some firms, especially those pursuing globalisation strategies have been 
detaching themselves from this norm and have become subjected to increasing 
pressures to focus on current shareholder value maximisation. The Vodafone- 
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Mannesmann takeover and Daimler Benz' restructuring are the clearest indications of 
the impact of institutional changes during the 1990s. 
On the other hand, there has also been significant evidence of path 
dependence forces in some legal institutions as the recently implemented 
Ubernahmegesetz has revealed. Similarly, codetermination institutions have remained 
rigid. However, their scope in terms of employee coverage has been decreasing as 
have collective agreements, since in recent years the number of employers and 
employees participating in bargaining processes has been declining. In other words, 
functional change has been undermining those legal institutions which support 
codetermination. German firms facing increasing price-based competition from 
abroad have had to resort to extensive labour cost-cuttings while they have 
simultaneously been resorting to cost-driven FDI strategies. Resulting record levels of 
unemployment significantly affect the bargaining position of labour, especially those 
possessing low skills, while recent industrial disputes may constitute an indication 
that the capital-labour consensus, the backbone of the Soziale Marktwitschaft, may be 
giving way to more adversarial industrial relations. So long as unemployment remains 
high, foreign and domestic demand low and therefore growth subdued, the German 
system is bound to face increasing pressures for further reform aiming for more 
flexibility in industrial relations. All this constitutes evidence that there are already 
workability problems between corporate governance subsystems that used to support 
Germany's managerialist model. 
Generally, the empirical evidence and theoretical insights presented and 
analysed in this thesis reveal that, while globalisation continues, there is an increasing 
need for more governance on a supra-national level. International organisations, such 
as those instituted by the Bretton Woods agreement, could become the main vehicles 
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for such govemance. However, prior to that they would have to be reformed and 
democratised, because currently powerful nations use their global influence to turn 
them into their tools of global dominance. 
Ironically, as the most influential nations that endorse the IMF's and the 
World Bank's operations seek to enhance their international role, they promote the 
globalisation process as one that is based on the discipline of unconstrained markets, 
which itself implies a loss of influence for the nation state. Perhaps this is reflected in 
the recent re-emergence of US and European protectionism as a threat to the liberal 
world economic order that was being formed during the past three decades or so 
(Thornton 2002). Though minor transatlantic trade wars have not been uncommon in 
the past, for many decades the world had not seen such controversial measures as the 
imposition of tariffs up to 30 percent on European and Asian steel products imported 
in the US. Unmanaged trade liberalization seems to be the cause of this as it has given 
rise to the enormous US trade deficits against major competitors. However, 20th 
century history teaches us that protectionism can be as catastrophic as the inability of 
free markets to establish "spontaneous orders"; two phenomena that are causally 
linked. The world felt the consequences of the former after the Great Depression that 
followed the first globalisation wave. It seems that the global consequences of the 
latter are also obvious now after the burst of the US "bubble" in 2001 and the series 
of corporate scandals that it exposed. Enron's collapse is not just a failure of a 
formerly successful corporate giant. As Bratton (2002) argues, this landmark event 
for US and global capitalism is the collapse of a company that had shareholder value 
maximization embedded in its structure as it had adopted the Jensenian view that 
firms are fictitious entities that are no different than markets. 
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Keynes lived long enough to see his economics becoming at least partially 
implemented after World War 11 in a successful, though not flawless, plan for an 
international economic order based on cooperation between nations rather than on 
unmanaged competition. Tobin, on the other hand, irrespectively of whether his more 
moderate proposals for a tax on speculative capital flows are a realistic solution to the 
current problems or not, died this year with his economics still being generally 
regarded as the "economics of dissent". 
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